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Abstract 
REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN AUSTRALIA: RETHINKING THE BASIS 
FOR REGIONAL POLICY 
by MARK JAMES QONEY 
The aim of this thesis is to explore whether and how the governmental arnmgements of 
Australian competitive Federalism intersect with the new priorities, policies and institutional 
arnmgements of post-Fordist regional development. It argues that contemporary structures 
do not adequately address Australia's regional problems and are ill suited to post-Fordist 
priorities, providing institutional barriers for effective pursuit of regional development. 
Consequently, the thesis proposes the development of new regional structures and priorities, 
coordinated by the Commonwealth, that have similarities to models developed by the United 
Kingdom, United States and Canadian govenunents. The ideas underpinning this approach 
to regional development derive from the major theoretical subsets of recent post-Fordist 
debates, namely: neo-Schwnpeterian, neo-Srnithian, and neo-Muxist (and economic 
geograph~ theories (Amin 1994). These ideas incorporate key concepts and development 
tools such as in/us try dustErs, institutim:tl thitkrl5S, institutim:tl rEtu!Kks, ~ buildirtt, and rr11frnal 
infmmimS)6tem (RIS). Global changes and structural adjustment continue to create 
significant pressures on the design and direction of regionaV industry policy and program 
delivery and this has a special significance for small peripheral economies like Australia. Can 
Australia learn from and adapt to this international experience where regions are becoming 
the main foci for economic development? What is the conceptual basis of these 'spatial' 
and/ or regional policies? Can these types of spatial policy approaches be re-created or 
transferred from one region (nation) to another? Are there peculiarities to Australia's model 
of competitive Federalism that inhibit the adoption of more spatially oriented collaborative 
industry/ regional policies? What adaptations may be required? It is through the exploration 
of these types of issues and lessons from the international experience that the Australian 
government can draw the basis to rethink its approach to regional development. 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCfiON 
The aim of this thesis is to explore whether and how the governmental arr.mgements of 
Austr.ilian competitive Feder.ilism intersect with the new priorities, policies and institutional 
arrangements of post-Fordist regional development. It argues that contemporatystructures do 
not adequately address Australia's regional problems and are ill suited to post-Fordist priorities, 
providing institutional barriers for effective pursuit of regional development policy. Post-
Fordist ideas incorporate key concepts and development tools such as in/us try ~ters, 
intitutitnd Mrr5s, intitutitnd retunks, Cl1{klCity ~and reyjl:nd inrrJult:i.ooS)Stem (RIS). The 
thesis explores the nature of Australia's contemporaty regional problems and critically evaluates 
the potential and barriers to the adoption of post-Fordist spatial regionaVindustrypolicy. 
Global changes continue to create significant pressures on the design and direction of 
regionaVindustrypolicyand program delivery and this has a special significance for small 
peripheral economies like Australia. Internationally, regionaV industry development policy that 
focuses more explicitly on the 'institutional' and 'spatial' dimensions of enterprise and socio-
economic development has emerged as a major policy tool for nations seeking to address 
economic development and the fon:es of snuctural change (Gioniano, 2001:25-30). In 
particular there has been an increased focus upon the imponance of 'institutional thickness' in 
enhancing regional development (Macleod 1999:1). In essence, this institutionaVspatial 
approach is concerned with enhancing social capital utilising 'self-organising processes' and 
'planning strategies' that encourage greater regional-level governance of the local production 
system toward progress over time. 
The ideas underpinning this approach to policy derive from the major theoretical subsets of 
recent post-Fordist debates, namely: neo-Schumpeterian, neo-Smithian, and neo-Marxist (and 
economic geographY.) theories (Amin 1994). Modem applications of post-Fordist literature also 
attempt to understand the implications of the removal of the post-war institutional structures 
and gives consideration to what new socio-political arrangements might emerge. The 
implication for global, national and regional Qocal) economic development of these new 
arrangements, particularly in a period of increased globalisation, is a specific focus. 
Since the 1980s, there has been resurgence in the view among theorists and national policy-
makers alike that the development of 'regions'; (sub-national economic units) necessitates 
policy consideration and analysis in its own right (Esser and Hirsch 1989; Sabel1989; Amin 
1994; Scott, 1998; :Maskell and Malmberg 1999; Tomaney&Ward2001; Giordano, 2001). 
Establishing institutional structures and linkages that support local priorities, learning, 
innovation and development aspirations of communities (regions) have emerged as a key 
aspect of a national economic development strategy. The focus here is on how national 
government develops spatial policies and institutionalises support for greater local capacity and 
institution building. Internationally this has occwred through decentralisation and/ or 
devolution, utilising partnerships, joint ventures, and business and institutional netwooo. These 
changes in program delivetyand design are aimed at engaging local 'stakeholders' (Le. 
government, business and communi~ in a two way process of regional economic planning 
and development. This is particularly important where social, environmental, and economic 
concerns and problems involve not only different tiers of government and community interests 
but also business (see Jessop 1994). 
O'Riain (1999:1), based on observations of the recent success of the Irish economy, coined the 
phrase the 'Flexible Development State' (FDS) to describe this new form of devolved 
governance arnmgernents. FDS is where state-led activity aims to nurture collaborative 
networks of production and innovation as a means to facilitate broader nationaVlocal 
developrnem objectives. Importantly, from a public-policy perspective, this literature treats 
regional and industty development issues as one and the same. 
The institutional dimensions refer to the 'socio-political system of production' within a given 
state within which firms and communities operate. The socio-political system includes: the 
industrial relations system; the system of education and training of workers and managers; the 
internal structure of corporate firms; the structured relationships among firms and their 
relationships with suppliers, customers and competitors; the financial system; the structure of 
the state and its policies; and the customs and traditions as well as norms, rules, and laws 
(fonnal and infonnal) that guide human behaviour (Hollingsworth and Boyer 1997:2). The 
spatial dimension refers to a shift in focus by policy-makers away from supporting individual 
firms to policies that support the geographical location (the local production system) within 
which firms operate. Institutional thickness refers to the mix of local social, cultural and 
institutional factors, such as non-market fonns of interaction, including uust and untraded 
interdependencies, which promote innovation and impact upon regional development 
trajectories (EC, 2002:19). Capacity building focuses on the policies and process used to 
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enhance the accumu1ation of human skills (expertise, lmowledge, education and training), 
physical and financial capital systems, seiVices (public and private) and social capital within a 
region (Maskell and :Malmberg 1999). The belief here is that by strengthening local 'capacity' 
you increase opportunities for greater social and economic participation and therefore long-
term economic development (discussed in chapter 4). A regional innovation system approach 
is understood as a collaborative process to generate diffuse and exploit knowledge within a 
given space (nationaVloca.Q with the object of fostering wider regional development and 
greaterterciaryprivate sector collaboration (Landabaso et al1999). In this context innovation 
applies to conununities, or social capital, as well as all aspect of firm activity embracing R&D, 
technology, training, marketing, design and quality, finance, logistic and business management 
etc. 
In shon, international trends indicate that regionaV industry policies that incorporate 
'parmerships' between communities, the private sector and government, and that are more 
sensitive to the importance of the characteristics of 'location' are proving vital in securing 
national socio-economic wellbeing. The objective of these policies is to better coordinate 
collaboration structures in regions to support the supply side inputs that drive regional 
development and innovation. This includes inputs such as world-class infrastructure, 
Infonnation Technology (!1), efficient transport systems, education and training and Research 
and Development (R&D) etc. Most importantly, these policies offer an alternative way to 
approach regional development to the reliance on direct subsidies to firms. Can Australia learn 
from and adapt to this international experience? To do so would require an understanding by 
govenunent of varying community structures, goals, capabilities, and capacities (i.e. industry 
structures, physical and human capital). It also requires an understanding of the effects 
corporate governance of key firms have on shaping economic interdependencies and 
innovative potential of regions and of different communities capacity to respond to these 
changes. 
1his implies a need for national governments to restructure or create institutional arrangements 
that build trust and better collaboration and planning among local stakeholders within regions. 
The main purpose is to encourage strategies (collaborative processes) that stimulate regions 
(and their firms) along a continuous path of 'innovation' and 'learning' (i.e. fostering local 
education, skill development and technology and infonnation diffusion). As the world moves 
from the industrial to an infonnation age the emerging 'knowledge-based econornr implies 
that internationally competitive firms are increasingly reliant on the learning capabilities of their 
people and, by implication, their region (see Maskell and Malmberg 1999). 1his is particularly 
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important for poorperlonning regions as they cope with restructuring because they are often 
dependent on single declining industries. The suggested approach here is to give assistance that 
deepens and develops local knowledge and resources such technology and human capital and 
phy.;ical infrasuucrure in an attempt to build the capacity of regions to respond to change (and 
diversify their economic base). 
Despite living in an era of rapid change, the purpose of these new forms of governance is to 
empower communities to wotk to"W'a.l'd long-term common goals (social, environmental and 
economic) within a more cenain collaborative and supportive planning framework These new 
forms of governance challenge the notion that indusny competitiveness and innovation are the 
sole products of market forces. Indeed, despite popu]arcommentcuyto the contrary, 
international trends indicate that the state remains intimately involved in shaping the policy 
choices and institutional environment in which economic and social change occurs. The state 
in this context comprises government, its individual members, its statutory bodies and public 
corporations, its international linkages, and its relationships with business and society more 
generally. 
The intention is to contrast these international policy development trends with the Australian 
government's approaches to regional problems between 1983 and 2001. The central questions 
here are: What is the current extent of Australia's regional problems? What are the key 
governmental arrangements that characterise Australia's model of competitive Federalism? 
What policy approach has the Howani government embraced to address regional problems? 
What is the conceptual basis of the post-Fordist informed approaches to regional 
development? What are the common organising strategies that nm through these approaches? 
Are there peculiarities and tensions in Australia's governance arrangements that inhibit the 
adoption of collaborative industty/ regional policies? What new regional suucrures may be 
required? And, what would be the policy implications for Australian policy-makers? It is 
through the exploration of these types of issues that lessons from the international experience 
can be considered as a basis to rethink regional policy in Australia. 
Although not a central theme of this thesis, Australia's pursuit of rapid economic growth since 
European settlement has come at significant cost to its natural environment (Gosset. al1995; 
C'.ommonwealth of Australia 1996; :MDBC 1997 & 1999; LWRRDC 1998a & 1998b; Price 
1999; Williams 1999; Yencken &Wtlkinson 2000; End:rarrrmtAustralia 2001). The continued 
degradation of Australia's environment has the real potential to undermine its long-term 
productivity and economic competitiveness (as discussed in the case study in chapter seven). 
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Interestingly, the international resurgence in regional policy has been paralleled by a growing 
sense of regional consciousness, heightened by the politicisation and concern for 
environmental issues and the objective to achieve Sustainable Regional Development (SRD). 
When used in this thesis the term SRD refers to the general principle of improving social 
wellbeing and economic opponunity while caring for the environmen~. 
The notion of SRD has been popularised by the environmental slogan 'think global, act local' 
(fomaney & Ward 2001:6). SRD remains a contentious term subject to ongoing debate. Just 
what should be preseiVed and what should be altered in the name of 'sustainable development' 
and 'progress' remains problematic and, ultimately, subject to competing business, community 
and political interests. Moreover, the ultimate test for successful environmental policy, 
particularly in relation to regional development policy, is whether policy actually alters the 
decision-making processes (local/ national/ international) that have created past problems 
(Aplin 2000). 
Given Australia's cuxrent range of environmental problems (as highlighted in the case study in 
chapter seven), there remains an urgent need to reconcile economic development priorities 
with the goal of SRD. The problem remains that in Australia areas of public policy that effect 
industry, regional development and environmental issues continue to be treated separately at 
the national level 
Understanding Austr.tlia's regions 
When reference is made to Australia's regions or regional development in this thesis it will 
imply metropolitan and non-metropolitan regions alike unless otherwise stated In other words 
the whole nation is comprised of regions. In this regard, this thesis does not share the Hovmcl 
government's position that regional development policy applies only to Australia's non-capital 
city regions. Nor does it share the popular use of the term 'regional Australia' to mean non-
metropolitan Australia. 1he exclusion of urban/ metropolitan areas from regional analysis is 
inappropriate particularly when advanced business seiVices have emerged as such a dominant 
force in the global economy (Spiller 2002). 
Urban/ metropolitan areas dominate much of Australia's economic activity and contain about 
65 percent of its population (FAQ; 2001:ix). Moreover, there are now more Australians living 
in coastal regions than in what is cuxrently popularly described as 'regional Australia' (Salt 
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2001). Australia's capital city regions are a1so crucial to the export competitiveness of firms in 
metropolitan and non-metropolitan alike, i.e. through their provision of potts, transport, and 
financial and other services. Moreover, as will be discussed in chapter two, the growth in 
unemployment and income inequality across Australia's regions over the past five Jears is far 
more complex and diverse than that captured by the simple notions of a city/bush divide 
(Lloyd, Ret al, 2002). This is because Australia's new growth industries, such as information 
technology, tourism and selVices, have different locational requirements to the older industty 
structures and this affects patterns of economic activity, employment and income across 
Australia's regions (see Tonts 2000:54; O'Connor, et al, 2001; National Economics 2002). 
This is not to deny important differences between metropolitan, wban fringe, rural and remote 
regions, particularly, in the Australian context. Some of these spatial differences include 
difficulties that emerge as a result of isolation and distance, environmental degradation, 
diseconomies of scale, single industty dependence, high and persistent unemployment levels, 
lower levels of household disposable income, decline in the quality and provision of 
infrastructure and services, for example. There is a good case for public policy being targeted 
according to these spatial differences. 
Yet, as we attempt to identify the problem facing Australia's regions we are often faced with 
conflicting evidence, with some regions better able to absorb the forces of structur.U change, 
for example. The economic petfonnance of Australia's regions remains diverse and full of 
contrasts with many examples of non-metropolitan, metropolitan and intra-metropolitan 
regions, and particular industries, which continue to attr.lct economic growth. Large parts of 
Western Australia including the city of Perth, the southwest regions of Great Southern, Peel in 
the South West, and the northwest regions of the Pilbara and Kimberley continue to petform 
well in tenns of low unemployment and growing investment. The Goulbum Valley and 
Sunraysia regions in Victoria, the Riverina in New South Wales and other wine, dally food 
processing regions in these states and South Australia are further cases in point. Other 
examples include the city of Brisbane and coastal regions of Far North Queensland, and the 
Gold and Sunshine Coasts. Lifestyle choice, retirement and tourism, and the services these 
activities bring are key drivers for development of Australia's coastal regions (Salt 2002; 
Mwphy 2002). Many of Australia's capital cities and their inner subwbs are a1so benefiting 
from a surge in inner city living driven by the preferences of 'generation Xers' for life in the 
city over the suburbs {Salt 2002; National Economics, 2002). 
6 
However, even in these better performing regions significant ongoing issues have the potential 
to undermine their long-term social, environmental and economic wellbeing. These include 
issues such as environmental degradation, poor infrastructure, lack of skilled workforce, 
shortages of affordable public and/ or private housing and health facilities, wban sprawl, high 
levels welfare dependency, congestion and growing income inequality, for example. 
In re-considering its explicit spatial policies the CoilliOOnwealth also needs to be sensitive to 
the fact that there are many regionalo/-based organisations actively engaged in seeking to 
promote regional development. Moreover, Australia's State and local governments have 
policies and programs to assist regions and industry development. However, the amount State 
and Territory governments spend on direct subsidies to industry (estimated at $AUD6 billion 
in 1996) makes their financial commitment to explicit regional development programmes pale 
into insignificance (Baragwanath and Howe 2000). Moreover, without pre-empting the findings 
of this research, much of this activity oc~ in isolation and reflects an historical lack of 
collaboration between Australia's tiers of govenunent, business and community in jointly 
addressing regional problems (all characteristics of Australia's model of competitive 
Federalism). 
Regional policy 1901- 2001 
In the Australian context, for the most part, regional and industry development has been left to 
State and local governments. Federal governments have tried at different times various sorts of 
policies that have had an implicit or explicit regional development dimension. However, there 
has not been a consistent or sustained explicit approach by the Commonwealth to regional 
development policy. Nk>reover, with its centralised administration and decision-making 
governance structures, development in Australia has favoured the more heavily populated 
wban/metropolitan regions (Australian Senate 1999: chapter6:5). 
More explicit regional progr.unmes were introduced in 1994 with the Hawke/Keating Labor 
government's regional and wban development programmes - but were short lived These 
programs were the Commonwealth's first attempt at spatial policy in over 20 years. The 
Regional Development Programme (RDP), in particu1ar, had begun to create the institutional 
framewoik for developing collaborative strategies to better deal with regional problems. 
lhrough a process of cormnunity consultation some 40 Regional Development Organisations 
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(RDOs) established across Austr.ilia were exploring the impacts of globalisation and change on 
their regions. 
However, these wban and regional programs were introduced against a backgrmmd of market-
led policies aimed at intemationalising the national economy, which fostered a period of 
sustained and rapid domestic structural change (PC 1998). Labor government policy between 
1983-96, which reflected this broader neo-hberal agenda included the deregulation of the 
Australian financial system, privatisation of former public-owned entities, tariff reduction, the 
introduction of national competition policy (NQ>) and an emphasis on multilateral tr.1de 
negotiations (Ravenhill1997; Argy 1998). 
Wtth the election of the Howard-led Coalition government in 1996, with some notable 
exceptions, the liberal economic reform agenda has been accelerated and a commitment to 
wban and regional development abandoned. The H>ward government increased emphasis on 
national competition policy, labour market deregulation, agriculture deregulation, public sector 
refonns (downsizing and outsourcing) and tighter fiscal management. Some $AUD9 .4 billion iii 
was slashed from federal expenditure in the Coalition's first Budget which included the axing 
of fanner Labor government's $AUD150 million RDP. 
Yet, the problem remains that the last seventeen years of market-led restructuring of the 
Australian economy has at best produced mixed results; and the debate over the efficacy and 
spatial impacts of globalisation and neo-hberalism has become increasingly polarised. The fact 
is that many of Australia's regions remain characterised by narrow economic bases, shallow and 
fragile social support systems, and lack the administrative and political strength which lessons 
their ability to cope with the pace of structural change (Walsh, 1999:204; PC 1998). 
Australia's spatial divide 
For some (Lan:ombe 1997; WISeman 1998; AORRT 1999; Contractor 1999; Stilwell2000; 
NIEIR 1998, 1999; National Economics, 2002; Vison 1999; O'Connor, etai, 2001; Borland, et 
al, 2001; DI1R 2002) the reform agenda combined with the effects of globalisation has had an 
unanticipated spatial dimension. Traditional areas of labour intensive employment, such as 
rural industries, large-scale manufacturing and the public sector, have declined while service 
sector industries, such as tourism, infonnation technology, finance and banking, health and 
education, have expanded and tended to centralise into metropolitan and larger provincial 
8 
centres. 1hese trends produce greater uncertainty, greater regional disparities in income and 
investment, and structural underemployment for many Australians (Borland, et a1, 2001). 1hese 
'spatial inequalities' stem from the dramatic structural change and from changed distribution 
effects associated -with the hard edge policies of neo-liberal refonm (Argy 1998; Walsh, 1999; 
O'Connor, et al, 2001). 
More generally, there appears to be a gro-wing perception that, despite continued economic 
growth, many Australians are less well off than they were a decade ago and have less control 
over their lives. This is particu1arly so in tenns of income and social equity, working conditions, 
access to services, employment, education and quality of family and community life (Bryan and 
Rafferty 1999 chapter4; Eckersley1999; Society of St Vincent de Paul1998 & 1999; Ao:YSS 
2000; Borland, etal, 2001; NEEF, 2002; 1heCtznkrra Tim5 9 September 1999, p.S). 
On the other hand supporters of the reform agenda point to the increases in the level of 
Australia's exports of elaborately transformed manufactures (E~) or its average annual 
growth rate of 32 per cent for the past nine years as underlining the success of these reforms. 
1hey suggest the growth in Gross National Product (GDP) of $AUD180 billion over the same 
period is indicative of the benefits of globalisation to all Australians (St Vincent de Paul 
2001 :2). They add that Australia's low inflation and interest rates, and the decision to deregulate 
Australia's financial system, have combined to insulate the Australian economy from the worst 
effects of the Asian financial crisis and economic decline (Eslake 1999; Henderson 1999). In 
short, they use macroeconomic (aggregate) indices to imply Australians are better off. 
However, the actual spatial detail, the fracturing of the Australian labour market and the 
regional benefit and costs of ongoing structural change continue to haunt Australia's regions. 
1he liberalisation of the Australian economy is being achieved at the cost of a -widening gap 
between the 'haves' and 'have-nots', leading to greater spatial inequalities- a point 
acknowledged by the Australian Prime Minister, the Hon John Howard (Howard 1999). 
Similarly, globalisation - the rapid integration of global production, trading and financial 
systems - has centralised high skilled functions, i.e. R&D, product design, marketing and 
corporate functions, in economic nodes while low skilled activities are transferred to low wage 
workers (and regions). Regions in advanced developed economies, like Australia, that have low 
skills and rely on labour intensive low value-added industries are the losers in this process of 
global capital restructuring, while 'global cities' such as Sydney and Melbourne and their outer 
metropolitan regions have benefited most (O'Connor, et al. 2001; National Economics, 2002). 
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1he HoVJard government's decisions in its first five years in office to selectively support some 
industries, workers and communities negatively impacted by change, and not others, exposes 
the absence of a national approach to regional and wban policy that would more equitably 
address Australia's rising spatial inequalities and the ongoing impacts of structural change. 
Major themes 
Five themes are developed to set out what, among the various issues discussed, are the focal 
points of this research. 1he central theme is concerned with gro-wing spatial disparities and 
inequality (employment and income) associated with structural economic change in Australia 
since 1996. Regional problems continue to haunt Australia despite national gro-wth being above 
the OECD average for much of the last five years. To understand Australia's contemporary 
regional problems one needs to explore the historical context for their emergence. 1his 
includes a discussion on Commonwealth implicit and explicit 'regional' policies and how they 
affect spatial patterns of development. 
A second theme considers the linkages between indusoy, regional and macroeconomic polices 
which have been traditionally ignored in the Australian context. 
A third theme explores the tension and contradictions between more recent developments in 
international spatial indusoy/ regional (post-Fordist) ideas and prnxis and nee-liberal inspired 
policies. The fonner emphasises the imponance of non-market relationships as a detenninant 
of economic success, i.e. institutional thickness and frarnewotks, col1aborative netwotks and 
oust, and local planning processes; while the latter promotes individualism, stable 
macroeconomic management and price-led economic change. Perhaps not so surprisingly, in 
many 'W'cl}'S these contemporary conttadictions share common ground with the historical 
theoretical debates that came to distinguish classical and neo-classical economists (Hunt, 1979, 
chapters 3, 4 and 5). 
1he fourth theme looks more closely at the relationship between spatial concepts of business 
networks, institutional netwotks, and indusoy clusters, which are sometimes treated as the 
same thing in spatial literature. The argument here is that the distinction is to be found in their 
different 'objectives'. Business network strategies are based on enhancing individual business 
relationships and linkages, while institutional networks and industry clusters focus on 
collaborative stakeholder driven mechanisms to enhance the flow of economic benefits and 
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perlonnance of the local production system. Having resolved this tension the question is 
whether the business netwotks are a necessary, but not sufficient, precondition in developing 
the institutional netwotks and industtyclusters. 
A final theme (discussed below) looks at the general resurgence in regionalism, regional 
analysis, and devolution, that has pre-occupied policy-makers in most developed nations 
particularly since the 1980s. It would appear that governments of various political persuasions 
have found explicit spatial policies (and regionalism) consistent with national economic 
management in a period of increased globalisation. Remembering that regionalism itself 
remains a contentious term in the sense of just whose interests get prioritised in any regional 
planning process, i.e. capital, labour, environmentalists, government and/ or the communitys 
(Lovering,]. 1999). 
The resurgence of 'regions' and regional analysis: forces that have heightened the 
importance of explicit spatial policies 
The interest in the study of regions (the sub-econom~ as an integral part of state policy and 
economic development is well docwnented in economic histoiy. As Esser and Hirsch 
(1989:78), have observed, the various developments and historical phases of capitalism have 
also been associated with specific structuring (or re-structuring) of geographic 'space'. Until at 
least the mid-nineteenth century 'the region' was a natural unit of economic activity and 
analysis, i.e. Lyons produced silk, Sheffield and Solingen cudery, Binningham and St Etienne 
guns and hanfware, etc (Sabel1989). Central political authorities then only marginally 
controlled national economic development. Even until the 1920s, the neoclassical economist 
'Marshall studied the regional characteristics of Sheffield and South - East Lancashire to make 
the point 'that the matrix of economic activity there was an area, not a finn' (Sabel1989:102). 
It was during the post-war years, when Fordist production was at its peak, that the concept of 
the region became somewhat of a 'derivative category of analysis' (Sabel1989:102). That is, 
local and regional governments became increasingly subordinate to national administrations 
(Sabel1989:102). While regional and industtypolicies remained, policy-makers placed less 
emphasis on understanding the inputs to the 'space' firms occupied and more on national 
barriers (tariffs) and subsidies to industry. The regional structure of cities was driven by the 
dominance of Fordist industrial locations, eg steel industry, car industry, chemical industty, 
electrical equipment industry Esser and Hirsch (1989). In most western economies post-war 
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industrialisation was matched by a dramatic drop in the population of agricultural based 
regions due largely to advances in technology and fann aggregation. 'While some more 
innovative and better politically connected regions attracted branch p1ants and! or developed 
manufacturing industries (some publicJ some private) to stem the population drifts to the larger 
regional centres and major cities. 
Eisenschitz and Gough (1993) suggest the heightened interest by communities in local 
economic planning (regionalism) emerged in response to these general trends and the 
recessions that plagued most western economies beginning in 197 4-1976. 
The 1970s: ~rri as a respoose toeanrricinstability 
Hatvey(1989)J describes a transition in spatial governance since the late 1970s from Ke)Tiesian 
inspired managerialist, or 'top down', to entrepreneurial, or 'bottom up'J models of local 
economic development (Amin and Malmberg 1992:242). The rnanagerialist model refers to a 
form of centralised intervention relying on the modernisation of infrastructure and industrial 
relocation in poorer performing regions as part of a national overa.rching Ke)!lesian 
macroeconomic policy framework Entrepreneurialism refers to a greater reliance on private-
sector-led efforts to develop local entrepreneurship as the driver of urban and regional 
development rather than the redistnbution policies of central government (Amin and 
Malmberg 1992:242). 
Since that time, accon:iing to Hatvey (1989), governments have developed a range of policy 
choices depending on their particular geographical and political context. The New Right, 
market-led, version was prominent in Britain under the Thatcher and 1vfajor governments, 
whereas more orthodox forms of regional support from central government continued to be 
important in Italy, France and Gennany, for example (Amin and Malmberg 1992:243; 
Eisenschitz and Gough 1993). In essence these policies attempt to draw upon locally based 
efforts to improve the competitive potential of the weaker performing regions and cities. 
Policies and strategies included the creation of 'technopoles' and 'science parks' and other 
forms of support to improve local technological capability and innovation potential. The 
funding of public and private sector 'partnerships' to regenerate wban areas through flagship 
property redevelopment projects and high-visibility initiatives such as theme parks, leisure 
centres, and popular cultural events are also evident (Amin and Malmberg 1992:242). 
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The 1980s: '~ism as a resJXne to the irrpacts if~ 
Over the past 15 years several factors have heightened the importance of explicit regional 
policies in achieving national economic development objectives. Larcombe ( 1997) summarises 
these developments as follows. Firstlytrnde libera.lisation and financial deregulation have 
caused both a rnpid expansion of world trade and a relocation (re-distribution) of resources and 
economic activity within national boundaries. In a similar way the process of globalisation is 
causing a concentration of value-added activities such as R&D and design, and high skilled jobs 
to locate in some 'advanced' regions eg, silicon chips technology in Silicon Valley, USA 
Secondly, technological advances in information and communications, transport and global 
distnbution systems eg, just-in-time delivery logistics, are expanding location options for larger 
firms by reducing trnnsaction costs. Thirdly, shorter production cycles, the high cost of 
maintaining specialist facilities in-house, intense technology and price competition, have seen 
some finns gain a competitive advantage byfonning closer collaborntive business networks 
with complementary finns, resean:h institutions and customers. These new cooperntive 
networks, or strategic alliances, often have a base in regions where proximity to other firms, 
suppliers and a skilled labour pool play a critical role (Rosenfeld 2001; Porter 1998). 
So while many recent global developments since the 1980s in, for example, information 
technology (Internet and e and b-commerce), appear to undennine the importance of location 
there is also a contrasting global tendency towards increased regionalism. lvfany national policy-
makers have turned to policies of devolution and/ or decentralisation and the use of semi-
autonomous development agencies to enhance local economic development. 
~in form if~· the tmrl tmmrd grwter deu:httiooard/ or dm-rtralisatim 
According to Jessop (1994), this shift toward regionalism is linked to a broader strntegyof 
reorganising, national, state and local relations (or governance) to guide and promote the 
development of local resources. Jessop (1994:272) describes this change as 'a shift from local 
government to local governance'. Thus local unions, local chambers of commerce, local 
venture capital, local education bodies, local research centres and local states may enter into 
arrangements to regenernte the local economy. This trend is also reinforced by the central 
state's inability to pursue sufficiently differentiated and sensitive progr.unmes to tackle the 
specific problems of particular localities. It therefore devolves such responsibility to the local 
states and provides the latter with general support and resources Oessop 1994:272). Part of the 
rntionale here is for national govenunents to promote the intemationalisation of regions by 
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transferring powers to regional authorities and encouraging partnerships between various 
interests (eg. the private sector, chambers of conunen::e and govenunent agencies). 
More recently the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (1997; 
2000 & 2001), in its comparative ovetview of regional development trends in member 
countries, argues that most governments have now come to two conclusions. Firstly, that 
significant spatial disparities exist within countries and economic globalisation could well 
exacerbate them. Secondly, a region's comparative advantage and its capacity for job creation 
are dependent on the competitiveness of its firms (OECD 1997:7).It follows that the 
competitive capacity of firms is greatly strengthened if they can find the services, sub-
contractor networks, and skills they need locally, and if it has access to good infrastructure with 
fast links to markets (OEffi 1997:7).1he common objective of regional policies is to 
stimulate regional development by influencing the factors upon which development depends. 
A region specific collaborative learning network between government, competitors, managers 
and workers, and resean::h institutions tends to be a key characteristic of growth industries and 
their regions (Porter 1990). 
The increased attention being accorded to developing regional potential led govenunents to 
develop strategies which concentrate on fixed and intangible infrastructure, the development of 
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), industty cluster networks and attracting direct 
investment (OEffi 1997:5). Increasingly, the development capacity of regional economies and 
their competitiveness is now being related to the existence of networks and nodes of activity 
whose dynamism is based on the minimisation of transaction costs and "untraded 
interdependencies" (OECD 1997:15-16). In many regions a shared order is established, based 
on the observance of certain rules, on commen::ial relations based on trust, on fonns of co-
operation, a corporate and risk cuhure and on special relations with private and public 
institutions. Government intervention is required to undetpin this order, when it is deficient 
(OECD 1997:15-16). This can be done through the provision of new infrastructure, local and 
regional agencies and through initiatives to strengthen institutional networks and industty 
clusters. 
To a large extent, the level and types of intervention adopted depend on how policy-makers 
understand the structural impact of the globalisation process on their industries and regions. It 
can be understood as a process that offers almost limitless competitive opportunities and the 
goal of policy is then to improve 'competitiveness' and push for growth. Or, in contrast, it can 
be seen as a process of destructive competition widening the spatial gap between highly skilled 
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and less skilled workers, technology, education and infonnation, rich and poor communities 
(see Enright 2000:308; Hood & Young 2000:11; Amin & 'Thrift 1994). 
Some states have had the goal of balanced regional development (spatial equit0 laid down in 
the constitution (and/ or national legislation) for manyyears. This includes the US, Spain, 
Germany and France (OEffi 1997). In some Nordic countries, the equalisation of living 
standards remains a stated objective of the government of the day (Hugonnier 1999). In Japan, 
for example, the decentralisation laws of 1995 and the Fifth Regional Development Plan 
signalled the national government's intention to underpin local partnerships, facilitate greater 
regional autonomy and balanced economic development (OEffi 1997:10). In the US a 
national spatial framework for assisting distressed regions, as well as many other regional 
development programs, has existed since 1965 (EDA 1999). 
It is interesting to note that Australia too has a Constitutional mechanism to address equity 
issues between the states in terms of access to, and the standard of, senrices. These equity 
concerns remain the basis for the financial arrangements between the Commonwealth, state 
and local governments (captured in the guiding principles of horizontal fiscal equalisation -
HFE - discussed in detail in the next chapter). However, the bulk of the funds associated with 
HFE are directed through state structures and remain untied in the sense that the 
Commonwealth does not require state governments to demonstrate or report on how the 
funds have been spentv. In other words, there are no specific regional development objectives 
or outcomes tied to the granting of HFE grants. :MOreover, given the discussion that follows in 
the next chapter on Australia's rising spatial inequalities, there is a real question on whether the 
objective of providing equity in senrices between the states and territories through this 
mechanism is being met. 
The more recent resurgence in 'regionalism' is paralleled by a growing involvement of 
mainstream business economists like Harvard's Professor Michael Porter who have advocated 
its importance to achieving international competitiveness. Theorists in the neo-Smithian and 
neo-Schumpeterian schools to be discussed in chapter four have also sought to capture much 
of the new mainstream approach to regionalism. 
This approach appeals to policy-makers because the objective is not to govern directly the 
internal operations or decision-making of firms, but to provide the institutional, educational 
and technological inputs critical for their development. Through new collaborative 
arrangements, governments look to enhance economic growth through a better engagement 
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and understanding of the economic and social factors and synergies that operate in a given 
location. In other words they are broadening their microeconomic reform agenda to tailor 
policies that stimulate favourable, region specific outcomes in education, infrastrucrure, 
technology, hwnan and financial capital systems (OECD 2001). The rationale here is that 
agglomeration economies help to reduce transaction costs, increase positive externalities such 
as knowledge spillovers, increase innovation, and entrepreneurship. In many instances they are 
correcting specific market failures, for example, poor information flo'WS and barriers to capital 
formation (OECD 2001). 
Because of the contribution of Potter and others the region as a unit of economic activity and 
~is has again gained centre stage among international theorists and policy-makers alike. 
Methodology and structure 
A concern of the study is to explore whether the institutional and indusuy structures that 
suppon successful spatial approaches to indusuy/ regional development internationally can be 
tr.msferred to other locations. This is considered by undenaking a critical evaluation of post-
Fordist (economic geograph:0 literature and its theoretical framework The emphasis here is on 
understanding the various perspectives (and policy prescription) within the literature to tease 
out which elements are more suitable to the Australian case (Potter's industty cluster model is 
panicularly relevant here). The New Zealand case study in Cllapter 5, in particular, 
demonstrates the challenges policy-makers face when national institutional arrangements nm 
contrary' to the supply side inteiVentions needed to facilitate a post-Fordist economic 
development framework 
Secondly, the study investigates the forces that have, and are shaping Australia's spatial patterns 
of development, industty structure, its place in the global economy, and the nature of its 
regional problems. Two contrasting regional case studies (metro and non-metropolitan regions) 
are undenaken to provide the empirical investigation in understanding the tensions, structural 
barriers and potential of new spatial policy approaches and the implications and adaptations 
required for their implementation. The differentiation of regional types is used to provide two 
different geographical and social contexts within which to explore the potential of new spatial 
policy. 
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The regional case studies involved semi-structured intetviews that explored the presence and 
condition of structural and institutional factors that are characteristic of higher perlonning 
regions often cited in spatial development literarure (discussed in chapters four and five). Some 
of these characteristics include: 
• highly 'innovative' firms (endogenous and/ or foreign) with strong connection and 
commitment to the local economy; 
• economies of scale and access to markets (domestic/intemationaJ); 
• high level of community skills, education and training; 
• availability of venrure capital (for R&D and to encourage start-ups and spin-off firms etc); 
• well developed formal and informal institutional arrangements (and interaction between 
industry and higher learning institutions); 
• strong (high profile) community and business leaders (entrepreneurs and/ or champions); 
• public/ private support of networking, innovation and collaboration; and 
• specialised world-class infra.strucrure (soft and hard). 
The prirnaty method for collecting infonnation/ data in the case studies was from semi-
strucrured intetviews {55 in total) conducted in each jurisdiction over a five to eight-day period 
A list of those intetviewed is at Appendix 1 (this is a list of the primary contacts; on most 
occasions two or more people were present at the intetviews). An introductory letter outlining 
the objective of the project and its background was sent in advance of intetviews (example at 
Appendix 2). On occasions ethical consideration was given to intetviewees who requested not 
to be identified as part of the field interviews (particularly in Olapter 3 where 5 public setvants 
currently working for the Commonwealth government asked for anonymit}j. 
During each field trip separate intetviews (consisting of one to six people) were conducted with 
representatives of industry (small and large), higher education, government, regional 
development bodies, catchment authorities, large utilities, community and social welfare 
groups. A deliberate effort was made to get a geographical spread of interviews making sure 
the views of those outside the largest centres (cities and/ or local government areas) were 
captured The discussions focused on regional problems, approaches to regional development, 
barriers to business and employment growth, local collaborative strucrures (business to 
business, between community, govenunent and business), the level of engagement with local, 
state and federal governments and social concerns. The intention of the regional case studies 
was to explore absence, presence or barriers to those characteristics associated with post-
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Fordist development approaches. It was not an attempt to measure or quantify the scale or 
extent of post-Fordist activities, such as industry clusters orRIS, so no fonnal surveys or 
questionnaires were conducted. 
The researcher also drew on material presented by individuals interviewed, several previous 
regional studies, and some other contacts made during the course of the research. Several 
follow-up telephone interviews were conducted to confinn the infonnation gathered The 
semi-structured interviews with current serving Commonwealth officers (mentioned above) 
were conducted either over the telephone or in person. These interviews (undettaken between 
2000 and 2002) focused almost exclusively on matters pertaining to the content of chapter 
three. Interviewees were asked their recollection of events and/ or to consider the infonnacion 
presented These officers were directly involved in the day-to-day management of many of the 
programmes and had responsibility to respond to many of the issues discussed. They were 
Branch and Section heads that had to draft letters (Ministerial responses), take notes at 
meetings or offer policy advice and as such have an intimate understanding of events. 
The above approach relies mostly on qualitative research (on the subjective views of the 
interviewees), which has its pros and cons. While evetyattempt has been made to validate 
claims some of the comments remain intuitive and anecdotal rather than empirically based On 
the other hand, what are presented are the views of people in authority who have the 
responsibility to manage change and, as such, they offer some insights into the day-to-day 
understanding and experience of issues being explored 
The chapters of the thesis unfold as follows: 
dlapter two develops the first theme by exploring Australia's current regional problems. It 
presents social and economic data that highlights the diversity and varying state of economic, 
social and environmental conditions across Australia's regions. In many instances domestic 
policies have combined with the impacts of globalisation (including technological change) to 
accenruate the downward multiplier effects of the loss of key industries, leading to declining 
real incomes, loss of services, growing unemployment and population drift. Many regions have 
dilapidated and inefficient infrastructure that require a large public funding component to 
attract investment. Victoria's LaTrobe Valley region, South Australia's Spencer Gulf, 
Queensland's Wlde Bay-Burnet and many outback Aboriginal communities are typical of these 
regions. This chapter also briefly explores Australia's environmental problems and highlights 
their potential in undermining its longer-term development (social and economic). 
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Chapter three presents an historical review of Ausualia's place in the world economy and the 
domestic policies (implicit and explicit) that influenced spatial patterns of development 
between 1901 and 2001. This chapter explores the evolution of Australia's particular model of 
competitive Feder.ilism and regional structures in three parts. Firstly, it presents a brief 
historical overview of the period 1901 to 1983 with particular emphasis on the post-war period 
Secondly, it looks at the period 1983 to 1996 under the Hawke/Keating Labor governments 
when regional development policy re-emerged in the Australian context. Thirdly, and this is the 
major emphasis of the chapter, it explores in some detail the period from 1996 to 2001 under 
the Howard Liberal-National CDalition. 
We discover, for example, that since 1944 regional development policy at the national level of 
government in Australia has been divided along patty political lines: Labor governments have 
established regional approaches to national development and Liberal government's have 
t}pically abolished them Nonetheless, there has been continuity in the sense that regional 
development policies have not been well integrated with indusuy policies and national macro-
economic planning in genernl (the second theme identified earlier in this chapter). 
It is not until late 2001 that the Howard government began to rededicate itself to regional 
problems in, potentially at least, a more active way. At the time of writing, the I-hward 
government's prog.l"Cllm for regional development remain restricted to some small non-
metropolitan communities and select regions struggling to deal with structural change and a 
loss of services. Moreover, the important links between indusuy, urban and regional 
development policy had not been made. 
The next three chapters begin to explore and critically review alternative approaches to regional 
policy through a series of international examples and incorporate the third and founh themes 
detailed above. 
Chapter four presents a critical review of contemporary post-Fordist and economic geography 
literature and ideas which are infonning a resurgence in spatial approaches to regional and 
industtypolicyin most OEQ) economies in the 1990s (for example see Saxenian 1994; 
Maskell et al 1998; Rosenfekl1997; Malmberg et al 1997). Many of the ideas contained in the 
post-Fordist and economic geography literature have links to earlier economic writings that 
examined the spatial aspects and spill-over effects of indusuy co-location (for summaries of 
these earlier works see Harrison 1992; Mwphyet al. 1997; :Man;eau et al. 1997; Rosenfeld 2001 
a & b). The more contemporary works pay attention to business structures, collaboration, and 
19 
the conditions surrounding innovation, learning and entrepreneurship in attempts to explain 
the determinants of long-term economic growth, both at national and regional levels. Most 
importandy, post-Fordist insights offer an alternative to neo-liberal economic policies for 
economic management and reform. 
Chapter five looks in more detail at Porter's contribution to recent spatial public policy and 
regional development practice and the inherent tensions and contradictions in his work. 
Michael Porter's seminal book The Competitive Advantage of Nations (1990) renewed mainstream 
interest in regional and industry development with his observations about the importance of 
industry clusters in gaining a competitive advantage. According to Porter, competitive 
advantage is created and sustained through a highly localised process, where national economic 
structures, values, cultures and histories contribute to competitiveness (Porter 1990:19). He 
makes the observation that it is regions and their firms that compete in the global economy, 
not nations, thus elevating the importance of regions and the need for regional analysis. 1bis 
chapter includes a critique and discussion on the broader theoretical foundations of Porter's 
work and examines the place of cluster theory in terms of the contrast between neo-liberal and 
more spatial industry/regional debates. Tensions and contradictions in Porter's analysis are 
highlighted by a brief case study on his contribution to industry / regional development in New 
Zealand during the 1990s. 
Chapter six presents a brief international overview of how other national governments (and the 
European Union) are re-structuring domestic institutional arrangements to foster local 
economic development. In particular, examples from the UK, Ireland, Canada and the US are 
reviewed to explore the mechanism and policies enacted to facilitate the trend toward 
economic devolution. There is no evaluation of the efficacy of individual programmes 
attempted. 
Chapters seven and eight present case studies of Australian regions in an effort to examine the 
potential of more spatial industry/ regional approaches in the Australian context. The two case 
studies were chosen because they represent both metropolitan and non-metropolitan 
Australian regions. The principal questions being explored in each case study centre on 
understanding the barriers to better regional collaboration and regional economic development 
planning. These case studies will contribute to the policy implications offered in the conclusion 
in chapter nine. This chapter draws the themes of the thesis together to explore the 
implications for post-Fordist regional policies in Australia given its current spatial problems 
and its particular model of competitive Federalism. 
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1he next chapter begins to explore Australia's contempor.uy spatial development problems 
and its widening regional disparities in more detail (it a1so incmporates some brief obsetvations 
on Australia's c\J.lrent envirorunental challenges at the end of the chapter). 
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Chapter 2 
REGIONAL PROBLEMS: THE EQUITY DIMENSIONS 
Introduction 
This chapter presents spatial analysis of the differentials in the current economic and social 
conditions affecting Australia's regions. Despite Australia's sustained economic growth over 
the 1990s the Australian economy is characterised by a widening gap between the 'haves' and 
'have-nots' and the well performing and poor performing regions. Neo-liberal inspired 
structural change of the Australian economy and its governance arrangements combined with 
the ongoing fon:es of globalisation continue to effect different workers and regions in different 
ways. In particular, these factors combine to influence the distribution of employment, health 
services, infrastructure, the affordability of housing, education and income opportunities across 
Australia's regions. 
1he following examines the unevenness of income and employment growth by exploring 
Australia's regional diversity and spatial inequality. This includes a discussion on the general 
income and employment trends in Australia and exploring their spatial dimensions. This is 
followed by an examination of the causal factors associated with structural change in Australia 
since the 1980s. Some of the data to be presented remains contestable in tenns of its ability to 
accurately measure the absolute changes in community wellbeing. 1his simply acknowledges 
the fact that there is no consensus among resean:hers as to the best measure of poverty or 
inequality. However, even those that challenge particular data sets acknowledge that regional 
inequality and diversity are widening in Australia (Sorensen 2000). This is followed by some 
brief comments on Australia's current environmental problems and the challenge of integrating 
environmental concerns into a broader national industry/ regional development policy debate. 
Spatial irHjUtJiity am pmerty in A ustralia 
Before this discussion begins, however, we need to consider what spatial inequality and poverty 
in the Australian context imply (Gregotyand Hunter and 1995; Walmsley and Weinand, 1997; 
Stilwell, 2000; OConnor et a1, 2001). Inequality emerges from a complex interaction of 
structural and spatial factors {to be discussed). For example, new growth industries have a 
different spatial requirement to older industry; jobs in the globalising economy often don't 
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emerge in the same location where other jobs are lost. Growth jobs in, for example, services 
and IT, may require different teclmologies, skills and occupations, which favour certain 
economic nodes, ie. Silicon Valley in the US and Australia's global city of Sydney. Some 
Australian regions are better able to absorb and adapt to these spatial and structural pressures 
while, for others, inequality widens as critical mass, opportunity and access declines. 
When we talk of poverty in Australia, the concept is not directly comparable, in most instances, 
to the absolute poverty experienced in many Third World countries. As the Australian Society 
of St Vincent de Paul {1999:2) explains: 
While poverty, in the sense of the chronic deprivation of the basic necessities of life, 
is rare, there are fonns of poverty experienced in Australia that are no less 
debilitating and destructive as absolute poverty. People experience poverty when 
they lack the resources to have a standard of living in keeping with general 
community standards and expectations. l\.1ost importantly, through their poverty 
they are unable to participate in activities widely accepted and encouraged in the 
conununity. 
Some Australians are also disadvantaged from opportunities because of the debilitating effects 
of mental illness or physical disabilities. Other causes of disadvantage include low income, 
structural unemployment (industtyrestructuring), alcohol and drug abuse, lack of education 
and training, and/ or a lack of access to affordable housing, services and transport. 1he 
problem the following highlights is that, without changes in national policy direction, an 
increasing number of Australians are being disadvantaged because of where they live. 
Australia's rising spatial inequality is not restricted to Australia's non-metropolitan regions. For 
example, in the small area of North Mt Druitt, in Western Sydney, the Society forSt Vincent 
de Paul assists 5,500 struggling families and individuals a year. 1his is four times the amount 
the Society assists within other western and south-western areas of Sydney (Society of St 
Vincent de Paul1999:5). In Sydneyalone there are 97,000 people on public housing waiting 
lists, which contrasts with 65,000 for the whole of the State of Victoria. According to the 
popular press, the number of homeless people in Sydney has risen from an estimated 20, 000 in 
1996 to 70,000 in 2000 (7beSyin?yMrmingHerald, Gaxi WfdeerdMagain!, 9 September, p. 22; 
1he Smith Farnily2001). 
As we attempt to identify the problems facing Australia's regions it is important also to note 
that we are often faced with a diverse range of experiences. 1he reasons for this growth are 
varied and complex, however, it appears that some regions have, to varying degrees, lessened 
their reliance on low skilled, traditional manufacturing industries and/ or low value added 
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prirnaty conunodities for their income. Typically primaty producers in some regions have made 
advances in on-farm production systems as well as first-stage processing, rna.tketing setvices, 
infonnation and tnmsport systems (Pritchard and McManus 2000:0tapters 1, 6). Other life-
style coastal regions have experienced growth from the expanding retirement, tourism and 
leisure sectors. While, Austr.ilia's global cities of S}dney and Melbourne (and their outer 
metropolitan regions) benefit from their links to growth in knowledge intensive industries and 
setvices. However, even in these growth regions there remain common problems associated 
with increasing income inequality, affordability of housing, workers insecurity, pollution and/ or 
wban sprawl and congestion, environmental degradation, declining setvices and dilapidated or 
insufficient infrastructure (NATSEM 2000; NIEIR 2000; St Vincent de Paul2001; The Smith 
Family2001: CYConnor, et al, 2001: AHNRC 2001; Borland, et al, 2001). 
For these reasons it makes sense to talk of Austr.ilia as a set of regional economies rather than 
as a single national entitywhen analysing the equity and distribution impacts of structural 
change (Long 1999:11). The following presents a more complex understanding of growing 
income and employment inequality in Austr.ilia than is portrayed by the notion of a city/bush 
divide as stated by government and the popu1ar press (Stimson 200 1; Sorensen 2000:5; ~ 
Sy}n!yMcmirf,Hemld29 May2000, p. 3). 
Aust:ralia's rising spatial inequality in income and employment 
There exists an overwhelming body of evidence that indicates Australia has become a more 
unequal society in tenm of income and employment opportunities since 1996 {Bray and Mudd 
1998;Jesuit Social Services 1998; The Society of St Vincent de Paul1998, 1999 &2001; BRS 
1999; UNDP 1999; WISeman 1999; NIEIR 1998, 1999 &2000; AORRT 1999; NATIEM 
2000; The Smith Family 2001; O'Connor, et al, 2001; Borland, et al, 2001; AHNRC 2001; DI1R 
2002). In panicu1ar, the shift from wages to profits over the last six years, combined with 
structural change, rising long-term unemployment and the casualisation of the labour force, 
have significantly increased Australia's level of inequality (Fincher and Wulff 1998; WISeman 
1999:65; AQRRT 1999; Bryan and Rafferty 1999; ABS 2000a; Aca5S a 2000; NISsan and 
Carter 2001; AHNRC 2001; Borland et al, 2001; DllR 2002). 
Moreover, inequality in Australia manifests itself in rising levels of poverty both across and 
within regions as more and more Australians become dependent on government payments for 
their income. For example, according to the ABS index of Socio-economic Disadvantage, 
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while smaller towns and rural areas account for approximately 26 per cent of the Australian 
population they also account for 39 percent of its most disadvantaged citizens (ABS 2000b). 
The :Howard government's Intergenera.tional Repon 2002-03 indicates that between 1981 and 
2001 the number of Australians on disability suppon, parenting pajlllfnts and unemplo}lllfnt 
allowance has effectively doubled and was continuing to rise (DoFA2002:8). Arepon by The 
Smith Family (200 1) found that in 1990 48 per cent of families dependent on government cash 
benefits lived in poveny; by 2002 this had risen to 58 per cent. Similarly, research by Borland, 
et al, (2001:2) demonstrates that in 1970 only 3 per cent of Australia's income units were 
dependent on social security as theirprimaxysource of income and that by 1997-98 this had 
risen to 20 per cent. 
Gerrral itr:arE trends 
Australia's rising income inequality has provoked lively public debate over the last five years 
and has been well documented in the popular press and by researchers alike. For example, in a 
series of articles in Australia's only national newspaper, 7he Australian, highlighted the rising 
disparity between average and high-income earners (see also AORRT, 1999, chapter4). While 
Australia's four biggest banks paid their chief executives multi-million dollar packages, and 
senior management income rose by 5.1 per cent in 1998-99, average weekly earnings rose just 
2.5 percent that same year (7he Wa*eniAustralian20-21 November 1999, p 1.). In 1998-99, 
for example, ANZ bank's chief executive John McFarlane was paid $AUD2.8 million 
(including a $AUD1.3 million bonus), Westpac's David Fite, $AUD2.7 million, National 
Australia Bank's former head received $AUD2.7 million, including an extra. $AUD9.25 million 
when he left the bank in 1999. At the same time the federal minimum wage in Australia was 
$AUD385.40 a week The minimum award wage for a shop assistant was $AUD443.80 a week, 
$AUD477 20 for a tra.desperson and $AUD414.70 for a child care wmker- or between of 
$AUD21- $AUD25, 000 per annum (7he Wa*eniAustralian20-21 November 1999, p. 33). 
Much of the popular commentary is supported by more empirical research and analysis 
(Borland, et al, 2001; O'Connor, et al, 2001; Harding, 2002). For example, between 1985 and 
1999, according to the ABS (2000), the top 1 per cent of income earners in Australia enjoyed a 
30 per cent increase in their real income while the bottom 10 per cent's real income declined by 
2 per cent (i.e. 98 per cent of their 1985 income). The ABS :Household Expenditure Survey 
shows that between 1993/4 and 1998/9 2.2 million Australians in the lowest quintile of 
household income received an average weekly increase of $AUD9 (a 5 per cent increase). This 
compares to the top quintile of household incomes that received $343 or 23.4 per cent increase 
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\~t '1\ncent de \>au\ 100\1.). Most sa\ient \s U\at accon\\)all~ c~es to \ncome distn"but\on 
meant that by 1997 only 37 per cent of Austr.ilian workers were clustered between 75 and 125 
per cent of national middle earnings, which was down nearly 10 per cent from a decade earlier 
as discussed in chapter one (NATSEM 2000). 
This is systematic of the fact that it has been the less skilled lower to middle income earners 
that have been asked to cut "'W'<lges and be more flexible in their employment conditions as part 
of the 1ast two decade's economic reforms (AQRRT 1999; Bellet al2000; NATSEM2000; 
Borland, et al, 2001). 
spatial irrplicatims to in.ml! trerrls 
Research undertaken by the Society of St Vincent de Paul (1998 & 1999} and the Jesuit Social 
Services ( 1999) confirms that since the Henderson Poverty Report of the 1970s there has been 
a long-term increase in Austr.ilia's rate of poverty as well as spatial income inequality. Between 
1990 and 2000 the percentage of Austr.ilians living in poverty rose from 11.3 per cent to 14.3 
percent (The Smith Family2001). Most alarmingly, the growth in the gap between rich and 
poor narrowed (and slightly dipped) between 1994-5 and 1995-6, under the Keating Labor 
government, but expanded again from 1996 under the Howard Liberal government (Harding 
& Greenwell, 2002). 
While Australia's rate of poverty continues to rise, spatial income inequality continues to widen. 
This is evidenced by the fact that the income gap between Australia's poor and rich suburbs 
continues to grow. Uoyd et al (2002:27) notes that between 1986 and 1996 the average 
household incomes for the top 5 per cent of most affluent local government areas rose 7.9 per 
cent while for the bottom 5 per cent income declined by -5 per cent. Research by I-farding 
(2002:9), looking at the five years to 1999, demonstrates that while the average taxable income 
in the 10 per cent of taxpayers living in the most affluent postcodes rose by 25 per cent the rise 
for the lowest 10 per cent was only 16 per cent. There also remains a large, growing gap 
between the incomes of those Austr.ilians living in capital cities and the rest of Austr.ilia. The 
incomes of metropolitan residents increased at a rate double that of those living in major urban 
centres and rural towns in the five years to 1996 (Lloyd, 2002:30). 
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Table 2.1 Cllange in average income for taxpayers ranked bytaxable income of their 
postcodes, 1994-95 to 1998-99. 
Year Bottom 10% Top 10% 
1994-95 $23,339 $41,652 
1998-99 $27,183 $52,017 
$0lange $3,786 $10,365 
% Olange 16% 25% 
Source: adapted from Harding (2002:9) 
The spatial dimension to Australia's rising income inequality remains complex across, and 
between, regions and states. The follo'Wing Table (fable 22) indicates that there is a large gap 
between incomes in the capital and the rest of Australia with the big losers being residents of 
small rural towns. Yet this is not a uniform trend NSW has the biggest gap between city and 
non-city regions (followed by Melbourne), while in Western Australia and South Australia the 
gap actually narrowed 
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Table 2.2: Estimated average household income by State and region, 1996. 
State/T enitory Capital Major Regional Rural R.ur.U All areas 
cities wban towns towns areas 
areas 
$ $ $ $ $ $ 
NSW 49,000 38,044 33,309 30,060 35,232 43,528 
VIC 44,466 35,015 32,186 28,587 36125 41,363 
QLD 41,898 37708 36,926 31,646 35,948 38,959 
SA 37,047 31,333 28,720 35,942 35,868 
WA 42,162 42,048 34,286 39,090 41187 
TAS 36,408 32,064 30152 33,586 34,037 
NT* 52,856 52,252 39,155 38,863 50,227 
ACT** 54,726 37,469 54,707 
Source: Uo}{i, et al, 2002:19 (* ** Nf and ACf have smaller populations with higher concentration of specialist 
high income earners "Which distorts their figures). 
The clear trend is that it has been Australia's non-metropolitan regions that have been most 
affected by changes in income distribution in the 1990s (FA~ 2000:x1). For example, in terms 
of per capita income, 31 of the poorest 37 federal e1ectorntes in Australia are in non~ 
metropolitan Australia (quoted from Stilwell 2000). The Australian Bureau of Statistics figures 
show that in tenns of lowest medium income, 97 of the bottom 100 people in New South 
Wales, and in Victoria, 93 out of the bottom 100, were in non~ metropolitan regions (Society of 
St Vincent de Paul1999:5). This is also supported by recent Department of Social Security 
(DSS) data that applied a spatial analysis to the distribution of ttansfer payments as a portion of 
total income. For the nation as a whole DSS ttansfer payments represented 15.8 per cent of net 
personal income (after income tax) and on average 14 per cent in metropolitan areas. W'hile for 
non-metropolitan Australia the average figure was 20 per cent (FA~ 2000:xit). The variance 
from these averages remains quite a1anning with some regions, metro and non-metro, 
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recording between 40 per cent in Elizabeth, north of Adelaide, Bre'W'cUTina, NSW and nearly 60 
per cent in Mount Morgan, Queensland (Stilwell2000). 
Similarly, the Rural Atlas produced by Bureau of Rural Science (BRS 1999) indicates that there 
is a concentration of below-average incomes in Australia's wheat and sheep belt, and that a 
third of people outside capital cities rely on some form of pension or government benefit. 
More alanningly, the report notes that 23 per cent of non-metropolitan children were living in 
low-income families, compared with less than 17 per cent in the cities (BRS 1999:62). 
E rrployrmrt trrnl5 
Despite more recent drops in Australia's unemployment tate, the tate of job growth between 
1990 and 2000 did not keep pace with increases in the supply of labour. Moreover, the growth 
in part-time (casual) work outstripped full-time employment growth (AORRT, 1999; Borland, 
et al, 2001; O'Connor, et a/2001:46-49). Table 2.3 (below) indicates of the 828,000 jobs created 
between 1996 and2001 some 55 percent (452,600) were part-time (casual) positions, which 
was some 10 percent higher than the growth tate of full-time employment over the same 
period (45 per cent). Nearly 190,000 (ABS 2003:160) of Australia's current unemployed have 
been unemployed for 12 months or more Qong-term unemployed) and this represents nearly a 
trebling of the long-term unemployment tate since the 1970s (Chapman &Kapuscinski 2000). 
Table 2.3: Austr.tlia's employmenthmemployment between 1996-97 and 2001-02. 
1996-7 2001-02 CHANGE +1-
Total employment 8,404,000 9,232,000 +828,000 
Full-time employment 6,276,000 6,651,000 +375,000 
Part-time employment 2,127,900 2,580,500 +452,600 
Male employment 4166,300 5,160,400 +394,100 
Female employment 3,637,700 4,071,600 +433,900 
Number unemploJ-ed 764,900 656,800 -108,100 
Unemployment rate 8.3% 6.6% -1.7% 
Labour forte 9,168,900 9,888,800 +719,900 
Labour forte participation rate 63.4% 63.7% +.3% 
Source: ABS The YearBook{2003:157) 
Despite continued growth in Australia's GDP, changes in the distribution of jobs and earnings 
over the last decade continues to create deep social division within and across Australia's 
29 
regions leading to an increasing demand for a nmge of social security payments (Borland et al, 
2001 :2). Pan of the explanation for this growing trend .is that 87 per cent of the additional jobs 
created during the 1990s paid less then $AU 500 a week which has created an increasing class 
of working poor in Australia (Borland, et al, 2001:4). Indeed, Borland's research concludes that 
the increase in jobs paying less than $AU 600 was greater then the total increase in jobs over 
the decade (Borland, eta!, 2001:4). 
There have been two major drivers of the demand for casual labour. The first has been the 
change in the general industrial relations environment associated with government-led 
'deregulation' agenda aimed at increasing national growth through increased productivity and 
labour flexibility. According to Campbell (2000), casual employees offer employers lower 
labour and administration costs and increased fleXIbility over matching labour supply to 
product demands. The second cause has been a function of the changes in the structural 
demand for labour across all industries (Borland, et al, 2001:18). The problem here .is that these 
jobs are often available on a contract basis that compromises employee financial insecurity and 
the ability for a large proportion of the wmkforce to plan for their long-term financial futures 
eg including effecting Australia's level of home ownership (Campbell2000; SocietySt Vincent 
de Paul1998:9). 
Another problem according to research by Borland et al (2001:10-12) .is that part-time and 
casual average weekly earnings continued to decline relative to full time earnings in the 1990s. 
For example, by 2000 the median part time casual employee earned only 23.5 per cent (down 
from 25 per cent in 1990) of the average income of persons in full-time permanent 
employment (Borlnad, et al, 2001:12). Indeed, Borland concludes that 75 per cent of job 
growth over the 1990s was concentrated in two employment cells - full time managers and 
professional and part time casual workers (2001:13). 
spatiAl inp/icatiars if errp/oyrrmt mnl5 
The shift in employment trends in Australia results from both a complex mix of national 
policy, supply and demand and structural forces (Borland, et al, 2001; O'Connor, et al, 200 1; 
Mangan &Williams 1999; AORR 1999). All of which combine to have a major spatial impact 
on the d.istnbution of employment, and employment opportunities, within and across 
Australia's regions. 
Policy changes introduced to the official measure of the unemployment rnte in the 1990s also 
tend to mask substantial spatial differentials in unemployment distribution (NIEIR 1999 & 
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2000). A state-by-state breakdown of the official unemployment figures in early 2002 highlights 
the spatial dimension to Australia's unemployment problems. Wtth a national rate of 6.9 per 
cent, rates range from 5 per cent in the ACf and NSW to more then 8 per cent in Tasmania 
{Kty6er 2001:1). On a regional basis, below the level of the state boundaries, the variations are 
even more dramatic. For example, the rate was over 12 per cent in statistical regions such as 
the Richmond-Tweed/Mid-North Coast and Wide Bay-Burnett regions and, at the local area 
leve~ over 20 per cent in Kingston (Queensland) and in Elizabeth, South Australia {Kty6er 
2001:1). According to the estimates based on ABS Small Area Labour Market Data in March 
2002, of Australia's 1,300 Statistical Local Area (SLA) - roughly equivalent to the size of one 
local government area - there were 13 with an unemployment rate of greater than 20 per cent. 
There were a further 42 SLAs with an unemployment rate between 15 and 20 per cent {Ktyger 
2001:2). 'While SLA unemployment figures remain estimates, and need to be viewed with some 
caution, they are, nonetheless, the clearest indicator of the significant spatial variance of 
unemployment levels across Australia's regions. 
The next Table (2.4) offers some further insights to the spatial distribution in employment 
across Australia's regions by linking industry type to the portion of workforce in particular 
regions. It highlights that across all regions there is some evenness in the contribution of 
industry types to employment and yet there remains some stalk and important differences -
particularly in terms of employment growth areas. This is particularly so in differences between 
capital city and major urban areas and non-metropolitan regions in terms of financial and 
property and business services employment. 
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Table 2.4: Proportion of workers, by industry and region, 1996 
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Source: Hicks (2000: 11) 
In summarising spatial employment trends between 1986 and 1996 Hicks concludes the 
following. lhere -was an .increase .in retail-wholesale tr.lde; property and business services; 
accommodation, cafes and restaurants; education; health and commwllt:y setvices; cultural and 
recreational services; and personal and other services. 'While there remains decreases in 
agriculrure, forestry, fishing and hWlting; mining; electricity, gas and water; and transport and 
mixed results across the regions for the other .industries i.e. manufacturing; construction, 
communication services; and government administration and defence (Hicks 2000:9). Oearly 
those regions with a greater dependence on agriculture, mining, electricity and gas, 
manufacturing and communication services have a structural disadvantage to those that have a 
higher proportion of employment in the services sectors and the new growth industries 
(discussed below). 
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Oher sOOal, a:vuric and hmhh prWiem fiJinuin6 errployrrent and in:url! spatial trmls 
Austnilia's growing spatial income and employment inequality is also associated with a rise in a 
range of other social, economic and health problems. 
In a 1999 study by Jesuit Social Setvice, the distnbution of social disadvantage in Victoria and 
New South Wales was shown to be increasingly entrenched and was falling disproportionately 
on some urban and nua1 communities rather than others. In the most comprehensive swvey 
of its type, 622 postcode areas in Victoria and 578 in New South Wales were compared against 
ten indicators of social disadvantage to develop a picture of 'cumulative disadvantage'. The 
indicators used in the repon were: unemployment; low income; low binh weight; child abuse; 
left school before the age of 15; emergency assistance; court convictions; child injuries; 
monality; long-term unemployment; unskilled-worlters, and court defendants Qesuit Society 
Setvice 1999:7). 
According to this investigation, compared to the state as a whole, on a per capita basis, the top 
30 disadvantaged areas in NSW accounted for. 
• four and a quarter times their share of child abuse; 
• three and a quarter times their share of emergency assistance; 
• three times their share of court convictions and long-term unemployment; and 
• a little under one and a half times their share of leave school before 15 years. 
The top 30 disadvantaged areas in Victoria accounted for. 
• three and a quarter times their share of emergency assistance claimants; 
• two and a quarter times their share of child abuse cases; 
• twice their share of court defendants 
• one and a half times their share of child injuries; low income households; psychiatric 
hospital admissions; and 
• one and a half times their share of leave school before15 years of age Qesuit Society Setvice 
1999:44). 
The repon argues that a spatial approach for measuring disadvantage could better assist 
government to target programs and develop preventative strategies. 
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Yet another repon, the Social Health Arlas of Austtalia, produced by the University of 
Adelaide, indicates that the health divide between the rich and poor increased between 1985 
and 1995 {Glover,]. et al, 1999). Austtalia's bottom fifth of income earners were twice as likely 
to die from heart complaints or lung disease than are the wealthiest fifth. lhe difference in 
death rates from heart disease between the poor and wealthy has grown from 1.55 times higher 
to 1.92 times higher between 1985 and 1995, and for lung disease the rise is from 1.53 times to 
1.90 times {Glover, J, et al, 1999:v-vi.t). Moreover, this has occurred in a context where there 
has been an overall national drop of 20 per cent in all deaths from all causes and a 40 per cent 
drop for deaths from heart disease over the same period (Glover, J. et al, 1999). 
Just as with income and employment inequality, many of the health problems in Austtalia 
exhibit an alarming spatial dimension. The Northern Territory recorded the highest heart 
disease rate at ahnost three times the national average, which is attributed to its higher 
indigenous population. Inner Sydney, which takes in South Sydney, Botany, Marrickville and 
Leichharclt, with its higher rates of homelessness and vagrancy, has a 47 per cent higher death 
rnte from heart disease than the national average. This contrasts the wealthy suburbs of 
Sydneys northern beaches, Hornsby and Ku-ring-gai where the death rate from heart disease is 
40 per cent lower than the national average. A similar divide occurs in Melbourne where the 
more affluent inner eastern suburbs are 40 per cent lower than the national average while inner 
Melbourne is 24 percent above {Glover,]. et al, Vol 1&2, 1999). 
Ha~Sirtt affordahility amher imimtor cfsfkl~Ud inY;plaJity 
As briefly mentioned earlier, home affordability is also becoming a key driver of Austrnlia's 
rising spatial inequality (Badcock and Beer, 2000; Berry, 2002; Kelly, 2002). According to one 
research paper, in 2000, no low-income household could afford to buy a 3-bedroom house in 
Adelaide, Melbourne or Sydney (AHNR.C, 2001:14). The same research suggests the number 
of households in 'housing stress', i.e. the bottom 40 per cent of low income earners who pay 
more than 30 per cent of gross income on housing costs, increased in most Austrnlian capital 
cities between 1986 and 1996 (as a portion of total households renting private!~. In 
Adelaide, the portion climbed from 63% to 76%. In Melbourne from 60% to 74%, while in 
Sydney it went from 67% to 80% {AHNRC, 2001, p12). According to Berry (2002), some of 
the causes of the current crisis include relentless rising house prices, mismatch between 
housing needs and outcomes, falling stock of low-rent accommodation, increased social 
segregation leading to spatial enclaves of rich and poor residents, a vicious circle of 
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disadvantage and marginalisation associated 'With income and employment disadvantage 
already discussed (Beny, 2002:2). 
Research by National Economics (2002), in the latest State if the Re;jars Repat, confirms an 
increasing concentration of housing wealth in fewer and fewer Australian regions. The report 
concluded that the wealthiest 20 per cent of regions had gained 41 per cent of the growth in 
housing value since 1996 (National Economics, 2002: chapter three). By another estimate, 
the number of Australian households in dwelling stress has grown from 90,000 in 1986 to 
over a quarter of a million households in 2001 in major capital cities' regions alone (AHNRC, 
2001). 
According to Kelly (2002) and AHNRC (2001), without changes to current policy settings, 
increasing disparities in housing wealth in Australia will be a major driver of increased 
inequality across Australia's regions in the decades to come. For example, Sydney is 
increasingly becoming too expensive for many to live. Much of Sydneys boarding and hostel 
accommodation for the poor is being converted to the more lucrative backpacker hostels and 
elegant urban apartments (private housing). The current crisis in public housing and 
homelessness in Sydney prompted some to describe it as 'the greatest social problem we now 
face - without doubt and without equal' (Sy:}try Mornirf!, Herald, Gad WrekerriMagaitr 9 
September 2000 p22). This has been exacerbated by the fact that the Commonwealth 
contribution under the Commonwealth State Housing Agreement continues to decline as do 
state government public housing stocks (AHNRA, 2001:24). 
Australia's ~ inxJuality attracts internatimaJ attentia'l 
The United Nations (UN) Development Programme paper the Humm/JeuiqJrrmtReport, the 
authors report found that, while Australia ranked as one of the most liveable countries in the 
world, its income inequality was among the highest of the developed countries (UNDP 1999). 
The report ranked 17 4 nations on issues such as standard of living, life expectancy and 
education, found that the richest 20 per cent of Australians earned almost 10 times per head 
more than the lowest 20 per cent. The report concluded that Australia had not been successful 
in reducing poverty, and inequality remains a major problem. In panicular, as others have 
identified, it recommended that Australia needed to develop policies that focus on relieving 
poverty and inequalities on a spatial basis. 
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Given the above discussion it seems reasonable to explore in more detail who, and what 
regions, have most benefited from Australia structur.tl reform, particularly in the 1990s, and 
why. 
Who are the winners from structur.d change and why? 
There can be little doubt that Austr.ilia's 'global city' Sydney and to a lesser extent Melbourne 
(and their inner and outer metropolitan regions) have been the major beneficiaries of 
Austr.ilia's growth over the last decade. Research by Raskall (2002) sho-ws that 60 per cent of 
Australia's GDP largely accrues to residents in inner metropolitan Sydney and to a lesser extent 
Melbourne and Brisbane. Because of the concenttation of economic activity in some regions, 
other regions have had to disproportionately deal with the impacts of structural change and 
Australia's unemplo}'lrent burden. For example, in the late 1990s, Newcastle, Wollongong and 
Sydneys western suburbs accounted for around 40 per cent of all unemployment in NSW, 
even though they have only 27 per cent of the total workforce. In Victoria a similar pattern 
repeats itse1f in the five areas of - Gippsland, Geelong/Ballarat, :Maryborough/Bendigo, 
northern and western Melbourne, and Dandenong/Springvale (Cluk 1998:149). 
While the forces shaping the geography of employment growth remained varied, the 
correlation between the new growth occupations and the emergence of 'global cities' is a key 
demand factor (see Sassen 1994). Global cities are distinctive in that they develop clusters of 
producer service industries and knowledge based workers. Such high skilled, knowledge based, 
workers tend to cluster in global cities because of the greater demand for their services, for life-
style reasons and because this is where the bulk of education and training facilities are located 
(NIEIR, 2002). For example, by 1997 on Sydneys North Shore, 63 per cent of the people 
employed full-time worked as mangers, administtators and professionals, compared to 33 per 
cent nationally (ABS 1998:55). Indeed, the Bureau of Statistics classified 55 per cent of all new 
jobs created in Austr.ilia during the 1990s as professional or associate professions: accountants, 
information technology workers and marketing people. 
According to more detailed research undertaken by NIEIR (1998 -2002), the winning regions 
are those in which household members are tertiary educated and employed in high-value added 
industries. The losers are regions in which the proportion of household members with tertiary 
education was low and emplo}'lrent was in industries developed during the first 70 years of this 
century (NIEIR 1999:7 -9). In an annual series of reports, begun in 1998, produced for the 
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Australian Local Government Association, NIEIR breaks Australia into 57 regions and 
measures 28 indicators to determine comparntive regional perlormance (NIEIR 1998 & 1999). 
A key problem here for Australia's non-metropolitan regions, in tenns of education attainment, 
is the fact that the proportion of people with post-secondary education in rural regions is about 
25-30 per cent less than core city regions (NIEIR 2002). 
It is clear from the above that despite Australia's strong gro'Wth of the 1990s, both across and 
within Australia's regions, metropolitan and non-metropolitan alike, there remains a wide 
divergence in economic and social conditions and opportunities. This is particularly so in tenns 
of income, employment, public and private infrnstructure, skills and education standards, 
lmowledge-based workers, public private service provision, and access to strong labour markets 
(DI1R 2002). 
To understand Australia's rising spatial inequalities we need to consider in more detail the 
causal factors driving structuial change in the Australian economy. As the following analysis 
indicates these causal factors are often complex and multi-faceted (see for example Toner 
2000; DI1R 2002). But, nonetheless, at the centre is the failure of government to adequately 
conunit resources to either ex-post or ex-ante targeted amelioration strategies to address the 
differing spatial impacts of either policy induced and/ or market-driven structural change. 
Structural changes of the Australian economy 
"When discussing structuial change we are concerned with adjustments to the overall 
distribution of activity and resources across finns, industries and regions that result from either 
market based changes or explicit government policy changes (Savage 1998: 172). With market 
based changes governments' ability to govern for the negative impact remains largely ex-post 
(after the event). So, for example, continued advances in technology say in agricultural 
mechanisation, have led to farm aggregation and job shedding in much of regional and rural 
Australia. These technological advances are largely beyond the control of government and 
whether government should respond in a policy sense to this structural change will depend on 
many factors including the size of the impact and the balance of competing domestic political 
forces, i.e. the power of the rural sector lobby. :However, in the case of explicit government 
policy changes Savage (1998:172-173) makes the point that there is an opportunity for 
government to alter policy to ameliorate against the adverse impact of structuial change in the 
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policy design stage (ex-ante). More importantly, this includes its role in making further ex-post 
policy changes when the full impacts of adjustment and distnbution effects are knovm. 
The level of policy induced structural change in Australia over the last three decades has been 
significant by world standards and in many ways relentless (discussed in more detail in the next 
chapter). Indeed, according to a 1998 Productivity Conunission (PQ research paper, between 
1970 and 1994, Australia's average rate of structural change was greater than in 15 select 
OEffi countries (i.e. the United States, Canada, Japan, France, West Germany, Italy, the 
United Kingdo~ New Zealand, Belgiwn, Denmark, Finland, Netherlands, Norway and 
Sweden). And, while the Hawke/Keating Labor governments (1983-96) at least attempted to 
strike some balance between economic efficiency and social and spatial equity, it has been the 
introduction of a neo-liber.U inspired regulatory framewotk that has dominated the national 
economic reform agenda for most of that time. 
The following Table begins to offer one perspective into the changing composition of 
Australia's industrial base since the early 1980s. 
Table 2.5: Cllange in share of exports 1984/85 to 1997/98 
Export 1984/85* 1994/95* 1997/98+ 
Rural 32% 22% 19% 
:Minerals and fue]s 32% 22% 22% 
Manufactures 17% 24% 24% 
Setvices 16% 24% 24% 
Other 3% 8% 11% 
' 
- ~ 
' 
Source: mxliforifomDFAT, Trade~ ardlrrustmn StatmBt {1999:3) 
It is clear from Table 25 for example, that setvice, manufactures and 'other' are becoming 
increasingly important to Australia's expott performance and this implies a dramatic shift in 
resource allocation in the domestic economy (i.e. in employment and investment). In 1985 the 
rural and mining sector accounted for around 64 per cent of Australia's exports. By 2000 the 
situation is ahnost reversed with rural and mining sector at 41 per cent and selVice, 
manufactures and 'other' now accounting for 59 per cent of all exports. Although 
manufactured goods have increased as a percentage of total exports, the manufacturing sector's 
in terms of its contnbution to national GDP continues to decline. Between 1970 and 1994 the 
manufacturing sector share of GDP fell from 24 per cent to 13 per cent. Moreover, by 2001 
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only 23 per cent of Australia GDP comes from all primary and manufacturing activities 
combined- while services accoWlted for 72 per cent of GDP (Stimson 2001:200). Of course, 
as discussed above, most of this service activity is predominandy in wban capital city based 
industries. 
H~ the caJk1City to ahsurb the fora5 if structural~ 
Some recent research by the Productivity G>mmission confinm that changes in indusny and 
employment composition effects different regions in different ways - depending largely on 
their ability to absorb change. For example, measuring the comparisons of structural change in 
employment across industries and regions over time the Commission devised a structural 
change index (i.e. change in employment share of a common set of 60 industries across 113 
regions). Under this index a change value index of 10, between 1981 and 1996, indicates that 
10 per cent of the region's wotkfon:e in 1996 would need to be relocated to other industries to 
maintain the employment share existing in 1981 (PC 1998:27). 
Overall the ProductivityG>nunission (1998) foWld that Australia's metropolitan regions have 
endured an average structural change rate of 14.3, which is below that of Australia's non-
metropolitan regions (18.9). Australia's non-metropolitan regions also displayed the greatest 
variation in their rates of struetwal change. The index for non-metropolitan regions ranged 
from 7 .4 in Lyell on the West G>ast of Tasmania to 9.8 in Lower Munumbidgee in New 
South Wales, while for metropolitan Australia's rates of change ranged from a high of 162 to a 
low of 12.1 (PC 1998).1he lower variation and rates of structural change in metropolitan 
regions reflects, according to the G>mmission, their greater diversity of economic activity and 
higher levels of employment, i.e. metropolitan regions could better absotb the impacts of 
structural change. Non-metropolitan regions tend to have a smaller employment and indusny 
base with a greater dependency on agriculture and mining and, consequently, are less able to 
absorb the fon:es of structural change. 
The Commission's conclusions support the earlier finding of NIEIR and others already 
discussed in this chapter. The regions experiencing the highest rates of structural change in 
employment were typically those most heavy reliant on mining and agricultural and labour 
intensive manufacturing (textiles, clothing footwear and base metals). These are the industries 
-where the largest job shedding occurred over the period considered Conversely, in regions 
-where the service sector was large rapid structural change was more easily absorbed (see also 
DI1R2002). 
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A aYrp/ex interplay if fora5 
There remains a complex interplay of forces that continues impact differently across Australia's 
regions metropolitan and non~ metropolitan alike. Regions such Northern, greater Hoban and 
Mersey-Lyell Tasmania, Northern and Western Adelaide, Western Victoria, Victoria's LaTrobe 
Valley region, South Australia's Spencer Gulf region, Queensland's Wide Bay Burnet and many 
outback Aboriginal communities are typical of regions that continue to struggle -with structural 
change. 
Some of these forces include: 
• extensive restructuring or shrinkage of the region's industrial base; 
• declining tenns of trade; 
• increased import penetration from low v;age exporting countries; 
• job destroying rather than job creating technological change; 
• mismatch of skills and emerging employment opportunities, including failure to address 
skill shortages in potential growth areas; 
• declining public expenditure and restructuring (contraction) of public sector agencies, 
services and programs; 
• aging and/ or inadequate infrastructure provision (soft and hard); 
• corporate down-sizing and contraction of industtyto larger regional centres and/ or 
metropolitan areas, particularly by the financial services, and 
• periodic deflationary policies, which tend to have a disproportionate impact on regional 
areas (Bell (ed) 2000; Green 2000:9; NIEIR 1998 -2002; Wtseman 1999; Bryan and Rafferty 
1999; DI1R2002). 
:Moreover, the decline of services (public and private) has also been a key feature of the 
regional in decline. For example, Australia Post cut the number of it post offices after 
corporatisation by25.6 percent between 1991 and 1997 (Gerritsen 2000:125). In a large 
nwnber of cases these offices were replaced by community mail agencies, usually operating out 
of an already established local business such as general store or newsagency. The replacement 
of a stand-alone post office -with community mail agent typically meant the removal of at least 
three jobs from a local community. This phenomenon can also been seen in the massive staff 
reductions in decentralised State Rail and Telstra depots (Gerritsen 2000:12> 126). 
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Although not specifically the focus of this thesis, many Australian regions have dilapidated 
and/ or inefficient infrastructure much of which requires a significant public-good funding 
component to insure both infrastructure renewal and future provision (Commonwealth of 
Australia 2000; AusOD 1999). For example, declining or inadequate infrastructure - road, rail, 
sewerage, water, power, telecommwlications - and services provision in transport, health, 
education, housing, childcare, community centres, financial, and leisure sectors continues to 
present major problems. 
Severe environmental problems associated with congestion and wban sprnwl, pollution, quality 
of water, wastewater, irrigation, land clearing, dryJand salinity and soil erosion also continues to 
erode the physical and economic capital of Austrnlia's regions. 
Environment: the cost of economic growth 
This thesis is not primarily concerned with evaluating the current state of Austrnlia's ecological 
environment. Others have made comprehensive contributions to this scholarship elsewhere 
(Goss et. a/1995; Commonwealth of Australia 1996; :MDBC 1997 & 1999; L WRRDC 1998a & 
1998b; Price 1999; Williams 1999; Yencken &Willcinson 2000;Enzin:nnmlA~tralia2001). 
Suffice to say that the 1996 State cf theE rnin:nnmt Report identified loss of biodiversity, land 
degradation and deterioration of inland waters, as Austrnlia's most pressing issues, problems 
that also impact on Austrnlia's marine and estuarine environment. A second group of problems 
identified in the report relate to Australia's energy and resourt:e use in genernl (Yencken & 
Wt1kinson 2000; E nzin:nnmt A ~tralia 2001). The primuy concern with these problems in this 
thesis is to briefly highlight the interdependency that exists between the environment, industry 
and Australia's regions metropolitan and non-metropolitan alike. 
Some of the more a1anning symptoms of the effects of current land and energy use practices in 
Australia include: 
Acid soils - 24 million hectares of agricultural land is affected by soil acidity with pH below 
4.8 and production losses to the nation expected to exceed $134 million per year (L WRRDC 
1998a). 
Water- around 70 per cent of stored surface water in Australia is used for irrigation, as is the 
majority of abstracted growtdwater. Damming, and water diversion from natural river flows, 
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has had a major impact on the health of many of Austrnlia's southern river systems and capital 
city drinking water. Post European land and water use practices have increased the levels of 
sediment, salt and nutrients reaching streams. The Western Austr.ilian Government Salinity 
Situation statement of 1996 stated that 36 per cent of the State's diverttble swface water has 
become too saline for further use, with a further 16 per cent under innnediate threat (Price 
1999; Williams 1999). 
Toxic algae blooms - A recent report found that toxic algal blooms in fresh water systems 
cost the nation about $AUD200 million a )ear. The problem emerges when high nutrient loads 
coincide with bodies of still water, which occurs across Austrnlia's metropolitan and non-
metropolitan regions. The report estimated that the direct cost to those that must take the 
water at $AUD1 00 million and the cost to other activities such as fishing and tourism at an 
extra $AUD76 to $AUD136 million per annum (1he Wtdeerr/Australian22-23 April2000, 
p.10). 
Vegetation- Austrnlia's rural landscapes is scared by a loss of native vegetation largely due to 
over-grazing and land clearing. For example in Western Australia 82 per cent of the State's 20.8 
million ha of private held agricultural land is already cleared Land clearing continues to be a 
major issue in Queensland the flow-on effects of which affect metropolitan and non-
metropolitan regions across Austr.ilia's east and southern coast. As much Jand has been clear in 
Australia since the 1950s as was cleared in the 120 years that preceded it (Grose 2002: p.C6). 
Greenhouse gas- emissions rose 16.9 percent from 1990 to 1998 (Grose 2001:p.C6). 
Energy conswnption- Per capita energy use in Austrnlia is high by world standards and 
continues to grow having doubled over the last 25 )eaJ'S (E nUrmnmt Australia 2001). Most of 
this energy is fossil fuel generated and a low energy price as a result of market deregulation 
(NCP) is driving increased consumption (EmirmtmrtAustralia 2001). 
The continued degradation of Australia's environment undermines Australia's long-run 
production potential and its clean, green 'competitive advantage' in many agricultural products. 
In an increasingly environmental aware and sensitive global market the adherence to many of 
the principles captured in the notion of sustainable regional development (SRDry is becoming 
more important. Moreover, as Austrnlia's becomes signatotyto more international conventions 
on the environment the impact on particular regions needs to be given greater consideration. 
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Australia's Cllll'ent envirorunental problems stem from two main factors (Gosset. a/1995; 
Commonwealth of Australia 1996; 1viDBC 1997 & 1999; LWRRDC 1998a & 1998b; Price 
1999; Williams 1999; Yencken &Wilkinson 2000; Ern.irrnm!ntAustralia 2001). The first is the 
failure of past national governments to develop institutional am.ngements to facilitate greater 
collaboration between the three tiers of government on environmental matters and the impacts 
of development. 1his includes the failure to enforce states to demonstrate greater 
accountability and transparency on matters of environmental management. The second sterns 
from the historical failure to develop production s~tems, agriculture technologies, species of 
plants and animals, and land (including urban) management practices more suitable to the 
Australian landscape. Much of this results from the fact that policy-makers, urban planners, 
local governments, scientists and primaiyproducers, until the second world VJar, simply did not 
have the scientific knowledge or understanding to predict the impact that land practices would 
have on the balance of Australia's fragile ecology. 
Yet concerns over impending environmental problems had been raised at the national level 
since 1945. Indeed, between 1945 and 1983, some 17 Parliamentary and other reports called 
for national action on land conseiVation issues only the see little or no comprehensive national 
response (Toyne & Farley 2000:4). 
Recognition of the enormity of the environmental crisis that faces Australia's regions has 
brought together strange political bedfellows. For example, the National Fanners Federation 
(NFF) and the Australian ConseiVation Foundation (ACF) released a joint report in :May 2000 
that called for $AUD65 billion package over 10 years to reverse the envirorunental crisis on the 
land The Commonwealth government, in response to these concerns, and the ongoing work 
of the Murray Darling Basin Commission (MDBQ, announced a $AUD750 million five year 
funding commitment to address the salinity issues. However, the Commonwealth government 
funding is contingent on receiving matching funds from the state and Tenitories- a situation 
that was not yet agreed at the time of writing. 
Moreover, for many Australians living in metropolitan regions urban congestion, water and air 
pollution remains major issues that cannot be separated from broader wban/ regional 
development concerns (Latham 2002). 1his was highlighted at a National Summit of planners 
in june 2001 coordinated by the Royal Australian Planning Institutive (RAPI) where a 
communique was signed that identified a need for national govenunent to link the principle of 
SRD with industtyand wban/ regional development. The majority of Australia's population 
lives in urban river catchments and their collective impact (power usage, sewerage, industrial 
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waste, tr.mspon pollution etc) affects the quality of the waterways and estuaries, soils, air and 
drinking water- the very systems that sustains them. 
Furthermore, the environmental problems of metropolitan regions are often linked to activities 
in non-metropolitan regions and affect other industries, and vice versa. For example, land 
clearing in Queensland affects the quality of the Murray River, which is the source of the city 
of Adelaide's drinking water (Hill2000). Similarly, greater consumption of energy in cities 
means increased mining and processing facilities as well as heavytranspon movements in non-
metropolitan regions. Much of this activity is associated with higher pollution levels 
(E rrzirrnmnt Australia 2001 ). A recent Productivity Commission {2003) report foWld that 
continued bad land management practices by Queensland fanners was a key threat to the very 
survival of the Great Barrier Reef (the Reef is a listed World Heritage area and also supports a 
multi-billion dollar regional tourism industry). The repon said that soil erosion and runoff of 
fertilisers and chemicals from the Queensland beef and sugar industries were major 
contributors to the continued degradation of the Reef and its environs (Productivity 
Commission, 2003). 
These types of complex environmental, industry and spatial interdependencies pose particular 
challenges for the development of national regional policies. 
Conclusion 
Factors such as globalisacion, technological advances, as well as government refonns, have 
combined to create rapid structural change in the Australian economy since the 1980s. Despite 
continued national economic growth in the 1990s, the Australian economy in 2002 is 
charactemed by ruing spatial disparities and inequalities. Spatial inequality in this sense includes 
the distribution of wealth, infrastructure, skills, knowledge-based workers, service provision, 
emerging industries, affordable housing and access to strong labour markets. The implication is 
that low-skilled workers and poorer regions continue to lag behind Wlder the current national 
policy settings (NIEIR 1998-2002; Productivity Commission 1999; Green 2000). For many 
Australians national growth is being achieved at the cost of their of human, social and 
environmental capital. 
The regions in Australia that have most benefited in tenns of income and employment 
opponunities have been the 'global cites' of Sydney and Melbourne and their outer 
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metropolitan regions. In these regions there exists a correlation between the new growth 
occupations and the emergence of clusters of producer services and knowledge-based workers. 
However, even in these region there remains a widening gap between the working poor and 
the working rich. We have also witnessed a trend VJithin metropolitan Australia where higher 
income/ work status households are increasingly concentrated in inner suburbs while, 
conversely, lower income/work status households are being concentrated in outer suburbs 
where employment oppottunities are falling (Moriarty 1998; NIEIR 1998 & 1999). Some other 
regions have benefited from the expansion of key industries such as daity, processed foods, 
wine and tourism while and some provisional centres have grown as key services centres - but 
not to the extent of the larger metropolitan regions. 
Moreover, since 1996, there has been an acceleration of the income and employment gap 
between rich and poor workers, rich and poor regions, as well as growing disparities between 
metro and non-metro Australia (Harding 2000). Part of the explanation has been the rise of 
'centralisation forces' whereby government and private sector activity and services have 
consolidated and retracted to larger regional centres, metropolitan regions and global cities, at 
the expense of the more rural and remote regions. 
lhese economic disparities across many Australia's regions emerge as result a complex 
interlace of other spatial and structural factors. Typically these factors include: extensive 
restructuring or shrinkage of the industrial base; declining tenns of trade; increased import 
penetration from low wage exporting countries; job destroying rather than job creating 
technological change; mismatch of skills and emerging employment opportunities; increasing 
casualisation of the worldorce; declining public expenditure and restructuring (contraction) of 
public sector agencies, services and programs; aging and/ or inadequate infrastructure provision 
(soft and hard) and, corporate down-sizing and contraction of industtyto larger centres. 
Ironically, many of the policy induced structural reforms over the past two decades were 
implemented in the name of increasing Australia's economic efficiency and labour productivity 
(discussed in detail in the next chapter). However, as this chapter demonstrates, it could be 
argued that the spatial problems that arise from underemployment (under-utilised labour) and 
under-utilised infrastructure in some regions have implications for higher costs of labour and 
additional infrastructure expenditure in expanding regions. These additional costs in stronger 
regions, and resulting expansion in government transfer payments in poorer regions, when 
taken together, continue to undermine any notions of national economic efficiency gains. The 
problem remains that for most of the last 20 years neo-libetal policies that promote national 
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economic growth have been held out as the panacea for Australia's economic and social 
problems. However, for the most pan, policy-makers have largely ignored the actual spatial 
implications of this high growth muket-led strategy, i.e. the fracturing of the Australian labour 
mukets, the regional benefits and costs, the changes to the distribution of income and 
employment, as well as the environmental costs. 
lhe brief discussion on Australia's environment indicates that Australia faces major problems 
to sustain its long-term productive base and wellbeing of it metropolitan and non-metropolitan 
regions. Pan of the problem has been that domestic institutional arrangements have failed to 
both protect Australia's natural resource base and to ensure transparency and accountability on 
matters of environment management between the tiers of government. More generally there 
has been a failure of policy to link the issue of sustainability to broader questions of industry, 
social and regional development policy (discussed in the next chapter). Interestingly, some 
more recent initiatives by the O>mmonweakh government such as Landcare and the 
establislunent of the MDBC suggest a momennun toward regionalism in addressing some 
environmental problems in Australia. 
The next chapter begins to explore the origins of Australia's panicu.Jar model of competitive 
Federalism and the institutional arrangements that historically underpinned Australia's patterns 
of settlement - and how they changed in the 1980s. This provides a better political 
understanding of the Wlderlying forces of the structural change that continues to affect 
Australia's regions (the consequence of which was discussed in this chapter). It then looks in 
more detail at how successive O>mmonweakh governments have responded or failed to 
respond to Australia's regional development problems. lhe major focus of what follows is on 
the Howard government's approach to regional development since 1996. This next chapter 
draws out the context for chapters four, five and six that attempt to explore alternative 
theoretical and policy approaches for regional development. 
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Chapter 3 
THE COMMONWEALTH'S ROLE IN REGIONAL POLICY: THE 
HAWKE/KEATING AND HOWARD YEARS 
Introduction 
As Stilwell has argued, 'in the economy, p1ace and space are continuously confronted by the 
integrating effects of changes in ttansport and comnnmications technologies, tr.ade and 
invesunent' (1994:7). Similarly change in public sector management and policies- the way 
national government operates and what it does and chooses not to do based on its ideological 
belief - also influence spatial development patterns. 
Until the 1980s, Australia's inter and post-war governance arrangements, in particular, focused 
public management processes and outcomes to assist industry and infrastructure development. 
There was a conscious attempt by national policy-makers to incorporate issues of equity with 
industrial development (economic growth). Government interventions gave emphasis to 
achieving equity in income distribution, the achievement of full employment; and, increased 
welfare and service provision. These institutional arrangements acted to buffer Australia's 
regions from the more immediate vagaries of capital restructuring. Various regions and 
fractions of private sector capital, in particular, manufacturing, mining and rural, benefited 
from the multiplier effects of government investment, activity and protection during Australia's 
formative years. In many ways interventions by the state accentuate the multiplier effects of 
private investment and the spread of key industries with policies to protect industries, assist 
technological ttansfer, raise real incomes and provide services and infrastructure - with 
development predominantly favouring Australia's metropolitan regions. 
Interestingly, however, since Federation there has been no national consensus or coherent 
policy approach to spatial planning or regional development policy. Rather, Commonwealth 
govemrnents tried at different times various sorts of policies that have had an 'explicit' regional 
development dimension. That is, regional policy has been on and off the national agenda and 
Conunonwealth influence has been for the most part 'implicit'. 
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Yet, the notion of spatial equality, in terms of access to and the standard of services and 
representation and participation in Federal Parliament remains a cornerstone of Australia's 
Constitution. These equity concerns remain the basis for the financial arrangements between 
the federal, state and local govenunents (captured in the guiding principles of horizontal fiscal 
equalisation -HFE). Moreover, the Australian Senate continues to give a spatial representation 
and balance to national decision-making. 
An important factor that has trnditionallyworked against achieving a national approach to 
spatial planning and/ or regional development has been Australia's particu1ar model of 
'competitive Federalismovii. Under this model the tiers of govenunent have been preoccupied 
-with addressing the 'vertical fiscal imbalance' and often greater collaboration and coordination 
has been the real cost (Stilwell and Troy 2000). Moreover, as discussed earlier, over the years 
Australia's State and Territorygovenunents have been locked in competitive bidding 'WafS for 
footloose investment - offering inducements such as financial, infrastructure or reduced 
environmental regulation used to entice capital investment. The legacy has been that for the 
most pan state governments in Australia have operated in competition with each other, 
particularly in terms of regional and industry development. Furthermore, Australia's local 
governments have had fewer resources and less responsibility to address regional issues than 
their counterparts, for example, in Britain, the USA and many European States (Gleeson 
2001:135). Together these factors have lead to poor collaboration between governments (in 
terms of industry and regional policy and environmental management) and to ad-hoc spatial 
development patterns often resulting in the duplication and waste of public resources (see 
Sorensen 2000:19). 
Between 1983 and 2001 much changed in Australia's approach to national economic 
management and the way the state acted in its role as an adjunct to technological, market and 
corporate processes discussed above. 1his began under the Hawke/Keating Labor government 
whose economic policy, whilst encapsulating some spatial aspects, was, nonetheless, dominated 
by a free market led agenda to internationalise (deregulate) the Australian economy (Argy 1998; 
Coney 1998; Pusey 1990; Stilwell and Troy 2000). Policy-makers under Labor were pre-
occupied -with interventions designed to facilitate a macro and micro economic restructure of 
the Australian economy (neo-liberal inspired reforms). Examples of which were Labor's 
heightened commitments to multilateral trade negotiations the establishment of the Council of 
Australian Governments (CDAG) and the introduction of National Competition Policy 
(N<J>). 
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The dominant neo-liberal approach created an unresolved tension for Labor policy-makers 
between implementing market refonns and somehow maintaining a notion of (spatial) equity. 
In particu1ar, the spatial impacts of policies that promoted 'competition,' user pays principles 
and market driven outcomes ran contrary to those associated with the traditional goal of 
achieving full employment and the cross-subsidisation of services and infrastructure. The 
implementation of neo-liberal policies has resulted in the diminution of the traditional 
institutional buffers that cushioned Australia's workers and regions from the direct impacts of 
capital restrucruring (structural change). 
Labor at least had some wban and regional, social, and labour market programs designed to 
address the impacts of structural changes, however, they were quickly abolished with the 
election of the Howard Liberal govenunent in 1996. For the Hovvard govenunent regional 
development was seen as a state government issue, particularly in metropolitan regions. 
According to the Hovvard government, there was no constitutional rationale for its 
involvement in regional development (Sharp 1996). However, as a means to placate its 
National Patty coalition partner, and address the political backlash associated with declining 
setvice in non-metropolitan areas, the Government announced a 'whole of govenunent' 
approach to issues effecting 'regional Australia'. Moreover, the philosophical belief that 
dominates the Howard government's approach to regional policy is that market adjustments 
will ameliorate most problems over time {Productivity CDmmission 1999). This has resulted in 
what can best be descn'bed as an ad hoc and highly political approach to regional development 
policy and problems by the Howard government. 
This chapter begins with a brief discussion of the competing fon:es that influenced spatial 
development patterns in Australia's metropolitan and non-metropolitan regions since 
Federation in 1901. The latter discussion in the first half of the chapter is concerned with the 
distnbutional effects, policy tension and inconsistencies (inequalities) that have resulted from 
market driven changes to the national governance arrangements since the 1980s. 1his gives 
some more context to the spatial inequality issues discussed in the last chapter. The second half 
of the chapter looks at the various national govenunents 'implicit' and 'explicit' regional 
development polices. The main emphasis is on the period since 1983 under the 
Hawke/Keating and Howard governments. The discussion on the Howard government in 
particu1ar explores the politicised nature of policy development on regional problems in 
Australia and the difficulty this creates for promoting alternative policy ideas. 
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This chapter demonstrates that, with one or two exceptions, issues concerning regional 
development (or structural adjustment) have never been institutionalised in any systemic way 
into national economic planning. And, despite some attempts at regional policy, industry and 
regional policies have been treated as separate issues by successive national governments. 
When regional policies have been introduced they have rarely been coordinated between the 
tiers of government, and grossly underfunded (particularly 'When compared to the level of 
direct subsides given to industry in Australia). 
:Much of the detail in the second part of the chapter on the Commonwealth's approach to 
regional development policy since 1994 draws from the personal experience of the author. It 
has been confinned in several semi-structured interviews with former and/ or current officers 
of the Commonwealth government. These interviews were conducted either in person or by 
telephone. The officers interviewed were at the time intimately involved in the issues this 
chapter explores. Some were either Section or Branch Heads -who often acted as note takers at 
meetings when issues to be discussed arose. Similarly, in their positions they were often 
required to offer advice on these issues, prepare confidential briefs and answer correspondence 
for the responsible Minister's office. They included officers from the former Departments of 
Housing and Regional Development (DHRD) and Transport and Regional Development 
(DlRD) (some have moved to other portfolios or have left the public service). It also includes 
interviews with officers from the Department of Transport and Regional Services - D1RSviii -
the current portfolio responsible for regional development policy. 
The historical factors influencing Austr.dia's spatial patterns of development 
Federatiaz 1901: A ustra!Ul's ~ arrat1i!em!l1lS 
After a decade of protracted debate, Australia became a nation in 1901 'When a majority of 
voters in New South Wales, and each of the other five separate British colonies, ratified the 
draft constitution to forma Federal system of government in 1899 (Brodie 1984;Jaensch 1987; 
Hall1998). As Hall (1998) discusses, the decision on how to govern the Commonwealth of 
Australia split the powers and divided them between the national Parliament and the six state 
parliaments. For example, foreign affairs, tariffs, defence and immigration were to be federal-
education and health to be 'With the states. All other powers not specified in the Constitution 
(residual powers) accrue to the states, and if inconsistencies arise in the interpretation of 
Conunonwealth and state legislation, Commonwealth Jaw prevails. 
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In tenm of parliamentaty representation, all colonies agreed that the electorates for the Lower 
House would be based on population distribution, i.e. the Senate, the upper house of review, 
would require an equal number of representatives from each state to ensure the larger states 
did not override the interest of the smaller states. A High Court was established over the State 
Supreme courts. 1he result is a three-tier system of government, with the national Parliament 
in Canberra, state parliaments in Brisbane, Sydney, Melbourne, Hobart, Adelaide, Perth and 
Territory governments in D.uwin and Canberra. 1he third tier is local government, which 
includes shire councils and town councils and comes under state jurisdiction (by the year 2000 
there were 661local governments across the six states). 
1he legacy of the Australian constitutional arrangements is that it has embedded an historical 
tension between the powers of the National, state (and TerritoiJ? and local governments 
(Stilwell and Troy 2000:909). For the most part, the three tiers of government in Australia 
operate independently of each other, panicularly in terms of economic development policy. 
This remains the case despite an increase in cooperation at the various heads of government 
meetings begun in the early 1990s that evolved out of a perception of common problems and 
perceived benefits (discussed in detail latter in this chapter under CDAG and No>). It is worth 
quoting Painter (1998) at length on this issue. 
In Constitutional terms, the governments are independent of each other. 
Constitutionalised cooperative or joint decision-making arrangements are 
exemplified by the German Federal constitution: first in the composition and 
powers of the upper house, the Bundersat, to which the provincial governments (or 
Labder) nominate representatives, and which has equal law-making powers with the 
lower house; and second in the 'functional' division of powers with the principle 
law-making powers over most matters lying with the Federal parliament, and the 
provincial governments implementing Federal laws and a plethora of 'joint 
progr.um'. But the Australian Constitution (like the Canadian) set up wholly distinct 
governing systems ('parallel rather than interlocking) with separate sovereign 
parliaments and executive agencies. Any interaction or joint action has evolved out 
of practical exigencies of such arrangements, the original arm's-length relationship 
remains intact. Adversarial politics and joint administration coexist as a matter of 
course (Painter 1998:23). 
Farres s~pat·wtr gruuth: Australia's ~settlerrmt ex pam 
While Australia's early economic development was dominated by the expon of agriculture and 
mining products its metropolitan settlements were critical in arranging global trade for farmers, 
i.e. providing pott access and the business setvice needed to run the economy(O'Connoret a1 
2001:12). Already by 1910 fifty percent of Australia's population lived in its metropolitan and 
urban regions (BRS 1999). 'lbe population of metropolitan Australia accelerated during the 
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inter and post-war years driven by an expanding manufacturing base. In particular, 
multinational finns, whose strategy for their subsidiaries in Australia was one of supplying the 
domestic market and not export·oriented production, came to dominate Australia's industrial 
base. lhe generous levek of protection that prevailed in Australia attracted large amounts of 
foreign investment, and return on this investment was high by global standards (Guugh and 
Wheelwright 1983:3-4). Part of the govenunent's rntionale was to access the latest teclmology 
in manufacturing that was mostly controlled by foreign finns and to diversify Australia's 
manufacturing base. American companies that entered the Austtcilian market seeking and 
taking advantage of protection during these years included: Alcoa, Ford, Ouysler, Genernl 
Motors, Esso, Mobil Oil, Caltex, International Halvester and IBM (Crough and Wheelwright 
1983:3-4). 
So while domestic political arrangements enshrined the position of rural and mining capital as 
the export oriented wealth creators in the Austrnlian economy, employment and development 
became increasingly concentrated in metropolitan regions. :Manufacturing was seen as 
providing manufactured goods for the domestic conswnption and employment in urban (and 
some larger regional centres) with manufactured imports filling domestic demand for more 
sophisticated manufactured products. According to Bell (1993:24), an initial post-war surge (in 
which 149,000 manufacturing jobs were created between 1945 and 1949) was more or less 
sustained throughout the post-war boom with manufacturing employment growing from 
890,000 in 1949 to 1,315,000 in 1967. Between 1946 and 1960 the annual rnte of growth in 
manufacturing production averaged 65 percent (Bell1993:24). Most of this manufacturing 
investment went to New South Wales and Victoria (Edgington 1989:234). 
1he growth of domestic manufacturing had a significant spatial impact on Australia's social 
composition in tenns of the distribution of income, employment and demand for housing. For 
example, in the manufacturing heartland of Victoria, :Melbourne, by 1947, manufacturing 
accounted for 41 per cent of employment and it was common for blue-collar workers to live in 
the centrnl core suburbs (Port .Melbourne, South .Melbourne, Collingwood, Fitzroy and 
Richmond). Moriarty (1998:211-218) presents data that shows that 73.4 per cent of centrnl core 
households were low income, bh.Je.colJar wotkers, compared with 51.2 per cent across the rest 
of .Melbourne. Only6.4 percent of Centrnl core wotkers were in the high· income brncket 
(professionaV manageriaV administrative), compared with 17.1 per cent for the rest of 
Melbourne. 
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By 1964, 50.2 per cent of central core households were low income, blue-collar workers, 
compared with 33.3 per cent across the rest of Melbourne. While only 13 per cent of central 
core wotkers were in the high-income bracket, compared with 18.9 per cent for the rest of 
Melbourne. A trend emerged where manufactUring jobs (and low-income workers) were 
moving from the central core to the outer subwbs and Jarger regional centres, where factoty 
and land costs were cheaper and road access easier, while high-income earners were 
concentrating in the centre core. By 1976, the centre core only had 29.4 per cent of 
:Melbourne's manufactUring jobs or less than half the 1947 share. Manufacturing employment 
had IIX>ved to the middle and outer subwbs and with it low income, blue-collar workers -
again driving new patterns of settlement in metropolitan Australia. 
The distnbutional effects that flowed from manufactUring protection, centralised wage system 
and govenunent provision of services and infrastructure worked at many levels to ensure full 
employment, a decent living wage (and full-time wotk) and greater cenainty, particularly for 
middle to lower paid, less skilled workers. Research indicates, for example, that by 1982 some 
45 per cent of the Australian workfo:oce "WaS clustered on earnings of between 75 and 125 per 
cent of national median (or middle) earnings (NATSEM 2000). For most of the post-v;ar 
period there remained bi-partisan support for types of governance arrangements discussed 
above. While the terms of trade were in Australia's favour, and internationally its primary 
markets were guar.mteed, these institutional settings seemed to deliver Australia a standard of 
living the envy of many developed countries. 
A p!riai cf inwmi kxie~ irrlustrialisatim 
This is not to deny that there VIaS not a 'competitive' cost to Australia's chosen path to 
industrialisation in the post-war years. Gilmour (1982), for example, has described this period 
of Austra.lia's industrialisation as 'truncated industrialisation'. 
Truncated industrialisation occurs when the foreign subsidiaries which dominate 
the domestic market do not cany out all the basic functions from original design to 
marketing necessary for developing, producing and selling their goods, but instead 
rely on their parent companies for one or more of these functions (Bell1993:34). 
Typically, a number of structural char.tcteristics can be identified with this type of truncated 
industrial growth. First, the factors that usually make the subsidiary innovative and capable of 
developing new products for domestic or overseas markets are usually weak or absent, 
particularly with respect to R&D functions, which usually remains the domain of the parent 
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company. Second, this reliance on parent companies means that branch plants are often 
significant importers of goods, services and skills (Bell1993:35). Most alarmingly, often the 
linkages between endogenous and foreign capital remain weak in terms of inter firm 
interdependencies, the level of skill transfers, developing collaborative R&D and innovation 
relationships. National indusuypolicyfocused on import protection against finished 
manufactured goods, i.e. cars, footwear clothing and textiles. Yet there remained very little 
focus on Australia's dependency on high levels of import of capital equipment (inputs to local 
production processes) that characterised Australia's manufacturing base. According to Bell 
(1993:80): 
Thus, instead of responding to the increasingly capital and technology intensive 
pace of manufacturing being forged in the more advanced industrialised 
economies in the period, Australia saw an ageing of its manufacruring capital 
stock (from 7.8 ~ in 1966-67 to 102 years in 1983-84) with a rising 
expenditure on repairs and maintenance relative to expenditure on new 
equipment (from 28 per cent in 1972 to 68 per cent in 1984). 
Another consequence of these institutional arnmgernents has been Australia's failure to 
develop an entrepreneurial or investment risk-taking cuhure outside the traditional agriculture, 
mining and property development sectors (panicularly in high tech, value-added manufacturing 
and infonnation techno~. Australia remains criticised in many quarters for its small venture 
capital indusuy, its risk adverse financial institutions and for its inability to comrnercialise 
domestic research into viable new products and industries (Canh!rra Ttm:s 5 CXtober 2000, 
p.13). 
The fon:es shaping Australia's non-metropolitan settlements 
Several forces, including on-going technological advancements, have combined since the 1970s 
to effect population and industry change in Australia's non-metropolitan regions in particular. 
These forces include changes to the demand factors that resulted from Britain's entry into the 
Conunon Muket in 1973 and changing consumer preferences. It also includes the continuing 
decline in Australia's terms of trade as commodity prices fall relative to manufactured goods 
and rising farm costs. Other factors have been the decline (and contraction) of local 
manufacturing in some regions associated with deregulation. Finally, the continued reversal of 
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fonner government policies directed at encouraging farm settlement has been a major factor 
(Pritchard and McManus 2000). 
The so called 'Ooser Settlement schemes' were seen both as a means of rewarding and 
resettling returned soldiers after the two world wars and to increase Australia's population. The 
schemes involved the government purchasing laxge agricultural holdings and subdividing into 
smaller lots of land :Many of these smaller holdings proved economically W1Sustainable 
particularly through ~s of adversity (droughts and price slumps) and many required further 
assistance and/ or amalgamated during the 1930s through to the 1970s (Maddock and Mclean 
1987:153). The emphasis of government policy shifted from closer settlements to 
amalgamation from the 1960 and 1970s with the introduction of comprehensive state gr.mts 
(Rural Reconstruction) Act of 1971 (and the 1976 Rural Adjustment Scheme). Here the focus 
was to encourage further amalgamation (to medium and laxger land holdings) and assist in the 
exit of nonviable fanners and their families from the land 
A gradual shift from labour intensive fanning via the use of labour saving new technologies 
saw farm labour drop 15 percent between 1954 and 1976, while real farm output doubled 
(Maddock and :Mclean 1987:153). According to the Australian Bureau of Statistics, since the 
1980s agricultural establishments in Australia have fallen by more than 13,000- or 10.5 per 
cent (Anderson 2000:2). As a consequence since 1932 the number of people employed in the 
Austrnlian farm sector has fallen from 31 in every hundred to four (7he Bulletin 13 June 2000, 
Vol 118, p. 46). This trend in agriculture enterprise decline in Australia is, of COlme, 
consistent with trends in most developed economies, as the global terms of trade have moved 
against commodities to manufactured goods. Over the same period, for example, the US lost 
some 220,000 farms (at about the same rate as Australia), while, the EU lost 2 million farms • a 
staggering 22.5 per cent of its agriculture businesses (Anderson 2000:2). 
In short, since the 1970s, Australia's non-capital city regions had to rely increasingly on a 
combination of fluctuating world commodity prices, their strategic location in terms of 
transport or communication links, and their role as a regional service centre for their economic 
and social being (ABARE 2001). More recently there has been a growth in food and beverage 
manufacturing, tourism, services, and retirees' income driven settlement particularly along 
Australia's life.style coastal regions (Tonts 2000:54; Salt 2002). 
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Spatial distrihut:icn cf Australia's pcpulatim in 2001 
As the following popu1ation data indicates, with some variation in Queensland and Tasmania, 
most of Australia's development has been concentrated in its capital city regions. Indeed, most 
of the Australian popu1ation (83 percent) lives within 50 kilometres of the coast. Very small 
towns and localities of less than 200 people contain 11.5 per cent of the popu]ation while the 
remaining 2.5 per cent live in larger country towns (A<X>SS 2000:2; BRS 1999). 
While the popu]ation split between metropolitan and non-metropolitan Australia, as a whole, 
remained re1ativelysteadybetween 1971 and 1996 (Productivity Commission 1999:18), the 
demographic composition and industrial characteristics between the different states and 
Territories varied significantly. Two states (Queensland and Tasmania) and the Northern 
Territ01y have a majority of the popu1ation living outside the capital cities. Most of the states 
and Territories have large non-metropolitan regions that consist of urban centres that provide 
services to the surrounding districts. These larger regional centres have varying industrial 
compositions from those that are dependent on single (or a few} industry (ies) to those with 
quite a diversified industrial base. Moreover, the rapid spread of major metropolitan! non-
metropolitan centres and advances in modem transport and communications also acts to blur 
traditional boundaries between the urban fringe and rural areas across Australia. 
:Having discussed some of the general forces that have shaped Australia's spatial patterns of 
development, we now look in more detail at the Commonwealth's implicit and explicit role in 
regional development. These implicit and explicit activities continue to have important 
implications for development in Australia's regions. 
The Commonwealth's implicit role in regional development 
Fiscal firleralism- s[Utial «jUity in serzia! dtJi7.ery arristanlani5 
The Commonwealth's indirect involvement in spatial development patterns has occurred 
through national industry policy and infrastructure provision, transport, roads, ports, aiiports 
and communications. There has also been ti«i Commonwealth Specific Purpose Payments 
(SPP) and joint Commonwealth-state grant programs for public housing and rental assistance 
(Gmunonwealth State Housing Agreement), education, health and legal aid. More generally the 
Commonwealth has provided untiaigrants (Transfers) to states and Territories including 
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financial assistance grants (FAGs) to local government to spend on priorities as they see fit 
(Garlick 1999; Beer, Bolam and Maude 1994). The bulk of the funds are allocated through state 
structures and decision-making processes. Importantly, as discussed below, the guiding 
principles behind these tranfers historically have been to seek equity and/ or financial redress of 
geographic disadvantage across states, Territories and (through the states) to local goverrunent. 
A key element of Conunonwealth Tranfors to the states and Territories has been the concept of 
horizontal fiscal equalisation (HFE) where Conunonwealth grants are provided to each 
State/Territory to provide an average standard of services to their citizens (IndUS!JY 
Conunission 1999:311-313). The Commonwealth Grants Conunission was established in 1933 
to assess claims by states for financial assistance (special grants) under section 96 of the 
Australian Constitution (Grants Commission 2000). The Cormnission developed a fiscal 
equalisation system (fonnuJa) to distribute Tranfors based on state and TerritorypopuJation, 
expenditures and revenues and any disabilities facing panicu1ar states and Territories. With the 
introduction of uniform income taxation in 1942, the capacity of states to raise revenue 
sufficient to meet their expenditure was severely curtailed In 1976, general revenue sharing 
arrangements were introduced and the amnmt of assistance made available was decided by the 
annual Premier's Conference (prior to this assistance was determined on a state by state basis 
with the Commonwealth). 
Importantly, the Commonwealth determined the overall size of the pool of grants allocated to 
the state and Territorygovenunents. The Tranfors were also untied general revenue grants, 
leaving each state and Territory free to decide its own spending priorities (on a per capita basis 
the smaller states and Territories tend to receive more than the larger states). In 1999 -2000, 
for example, the Commonwealth distributed $AUD17.8 billion between the states and 
Territories in untied general revenue assistance Tranfors (Treaswy2000). As with the general 
assistance Tranfors, the Conunonwealth FAGs to local government component is also untied 
and consists of an equalisation and Jocal road component (local roads being about a third of 
the total}. In 1999-2000, for example, total FAGs represented about $AUD1.271 billion of 
general revenue assistance which was made up of an $880 million equalisation component and 
$390 million roads component - approximately $880 million of the total went to councils in 
rural and regional Australia (Treasury 2000). 
The revenue raising mechanisms for the Commonwealth to fund its untied grants pool 
changed with the introduction of a broad-based Goods and Services Tax (GS1) injuly2000. 
The Howard government pledged that all revenue genernted by GST would flow to the state 
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and Tenitorygovemments- estimated at $AUD24.1 billion in 2000-2001 (freasury2000:2). 
Specific Purpose Payments • $AUD17 billion in 1999 - remain unaffected by the introduction 
of the GST. The new financialAgm:mnt between the O>mmonwealth and states indicates that 
there is no intention of cutting aggregate SPP as pan of the reform processes - but does not 
specifically exclude such cuts in the future (Webb 2000). In effect the size of the grants pool 
grows under the GST, and therefore the O>mmonwealth no longer decides the total amount of 
Transfors, but the distribution mechanism {HFE) and the 'untied' nature of the Transfers remain 
largely unaltered. 
Interestingly, the O>mmonwealth does not require the states (or local government) to tell them 
in any great detail how SSP grants or GST revenues are spent. Nor is there any requirement to 
give a spatial breakdown on what spending occurred where in each state. Moreover, as Cltapter 
two highlighted, despite these massive transfers spatial inequalities continue to widen in 
Australia. Perhaps a more detailed look at the state of fiscal federal relations can give some 
insight into why inequalities continue to widen. 
Research by Gerritsen (2000:126) suggests that the level of general-pwpose grants to the states 
have in fact declined by 50 per cent in real terms between 1985 and 2000. This is because the 
indexation of financial assistance grants for population and inflation put a floor under the 
grants but did not provide for real growth (Webb 2000). The following Table (3.1) also 
indicates that since 1991-92 O>mmonwealth assistance to local government has been declining 
as a total percentage of GDP although the national economy has been growing. 
Table 3.1: Conunonwealth assistance 1D local go~mment 1991-2000 ($AUDM) 
Year FAGs Road Total GDP %of Total 
Grants Grants Grants to 
GDP 
1991-92 715.0 303.2 1,018.1 405 795 0.251 
1992-93 730.1 319.0 1,049.1 426708 0.246 
1993·94 737.2 322.1 1,059.3 449 416 0.236 
1994-95 7655 330.5 1,087.0 473180 0.230 
1995-96 806.8 358.0 1,164.7 507 096 0.230 
1996-97 833.7 369.9 1,203.6 532 401 0.226 
1997-98 832.9 369.6 1,202.4 564 580 0.213 
1998-99 854.2 379.0 1,233.2 595 716 0.207 
1999·00 880.6 390.7 1,271.3 632 391 0.201 
- '----- -
Source: Webb (2001:8) 
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Gerritsen concludes that subsequent cost shifting over this period between the tiers of 
government has impacted most severely in Australia's non~rnetropolitan regions and on local 
government. 
The cuts also have the advantage of being able to 'jurisdiction shift'; the burden of 
the unemployment created by state service shrinkage, falls upon the 
Cmrunonwealth budget. The states' environment duties can be devolved to local 
government. The consequence of the vertical fiscal imbalance in our federation 
bears disproportionately upon the residents of rural and regional Australia .... 
Declining state fiscal resources, exacerbated by the narrowing of their own resource 
revenues and reduced intergovernmental transfers, have interacted with the 
changing nature of government in Australia (Gerritsen 2000:126). 
According to Stilwell and Troy (2000:924 ~925), the marginal starus of local govemmentix is a 
historical reflection of a set of dee~ rooted legal, economic and political constraints that affects 
its capacityto respond to spatial and regional problems. They make the point that, 
economically, local government remains the least well~resourced tier of government, gaining 
only 4 per cent of the total income tax pool (with the state governments gaining 20 per cent 
and the Commonwealth 75 percent approxirnatel}Q. Politically and legally, local government 
remains a function of state government Qocal government is not mentioned in the Australian 
Constitution) and is periodically undermined by state governments, leading to restructures and, 
in the extreme, their dismissal (Gleeson 2001:137; Stilwell and Troy2000:925). Indeed, state 
government contnbution to local government revenue declined from 15 per cent in 1974-75 to 
around 7 per cent by 1997-98 (Tuckey 2002). 
The problem here is that the decline in Transfers to states and local government has occurred at 
a time of sweeping ideological-driven change to the functions and activities of governance 
arrangements in Australia. Taken together these factors are a significant cause of widening 
regional disparities in Australia. 
Neo-libernl inspired policy refonns since 1983 
The Hawke/Keating Labor governments (1983-96) were dominated by the dual objectives of 
creating an internationally competitive, export-oriented, industrial base and reorienting the 
Australian economy towards the matkets of the Asia-Pacific region. A key argument, put at the 
time, was that the liberalisation agenda was the right strategy to address Australia's perennial 
Balance of Payments (BoPs) problems/constraint (Gamaut 1989; Bryan &Rafferty1999).1his 
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political and economic strategy has been described as a period dominated by 'progressive 
competitiveness' (WJSeman 1999:21). 1his vvas the situation where: 
... the social-policy agenda was based on tugeting social-wage and income-transfer 
progr.uns to groups most disadvantaged by economic restructuring and 
deregulation. However, the core business of government remained the restructuring 
of and deregulation of the Australian economy so as to increase competitiveness in 
global markets (WJSeman 1998:21). 
In short the key elements to Labor's strategy during this period were as follows. First, 
deregulation of the domestic financial market and the floating of the Australian dollar to 
encourage the productive flow of investments. Second, deregulation of trade barriers and an 
increased emphasis of multilateral free trade negotiation and agreements, i.e. participation in 
GATT, development of the Cairns Group of commodity exporting nations for lobbying 
GAIT, and the regionally focused Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation Forum (APEQ. 
Average effective rates of assistance to manufacturing had fallen from 35 per cent in 1975 to 5 
per cent in 1994-95, while assistance to agricultural industries fell from 13 per cent to 11 per 
cent over the same period (Ste'W'cllt 2000:4-5). 1hird, an emphasis on microeconomic reform 
aimed at the dual objectives of improving the productivity of Australia's export sector and 
national competitiveness. 1his included sectorial adjustment industry plans for the automotive, 
textiles clothing, footwear and steel sectors. 1he purpose of these plans vvas to facilitate 
industry adjustment to the cold reality of international competition not to enhance the 
instirutional framework to develop innovative, export orientated, sustainable industries (Coney 
1998). 
Labor reforms also incorporated the privatisation of formerly public owned entities in banking, 
transport and telecommunication, public sector restructuring, expenditure cuts and reduction 
in grants to the states (Bryan and Rafferty 1999; AORRT 1999; Beeson and Firth 1998; 
WJSeman 1998; Argy 1998; Bryan 1995). The final element of Labor's progressive 
competitiveness sttategyvvas a pro-active labour market policy aimed at encouraging the 
unemplo~d into a range of labour muket progr.uns. As WISeman (1998:45) obsetVes 'this was 
driven by a belief that the encouragement of skills fonnation is one of the few "Ways in which 
national governments can activelyintetVene to improve national competitiveness'. Despite its 
range of options, the 1994 W1Jzie PaJX!r m U~ concluded, however, that the best "Way 
to attack unemployment vvas to continue the liberalisation of the Australian economy. 
It is important to note however that while clearly fixed on achieving the liberalisation of the 
Australian economy the Hawke/Keating governments maintained some elements of the old 
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post-war redistribution mechanism within its broader policy framework. That is Labor came to 
the understanding that the quest for economic efficiency could be tied to a broader reform 
agenda based on social equity and inclusion (Stilwell2000:50-51). 1his included a welfare safety 
net, the Accord with trade unions, pro-active labour market programmes, and, for the most 
pan, a commitment to universal health and education (Algy 1998:250). 
A1so changes to the nature of public management arrangements that were begun in the late 
1970s under the Fraser government were further institutionalised under Labor during this 
period This had the longer-term effect of heightening the power and influence of central 
agencies - TreasUI)', Finance and Prime Minister and Cabinet (Coney 1998). These agencies 
were at the vanguard in the push for liberal reforms and increasingly gained control over the 
activities of other line agencies that had expanded during the inter- and post- war years 
(Gerritsen 2000:134; Brown 2001; Pusey 1990). The diminution in the influence and activities 
of line agencies in effect 'distanced' the policy maker elite, not only from ahemative policy 
ideas, but also from the concerns of communities and workers most affected by the spatial 
impacts of structural change. 
A closer look at the introduction of Labor's National Competition Policy {N<J>) provides a 
case mpomt. 
Carpetitim pdicj am CDA G 
Part of Labor's liber.ilisation agenda inc01porated the commissioning of the HibrEr Repat 
(1993), which recommended opening up private sector competition in all areas of economic 
activity, and a new agenda of 'competition policy to drive public sector reform (Beeson & 
Finh, 1998). At the national level the Council of Australian Governments (CDAG), established 
by Hawke in 1992 as the body charged with the role to overcome the problem of 
intergovernmental overlap and duplication, became the vanguard for introducing N<J>. NQl 
was a 'stick' the Commonwealth wielded to align Commonwealth and state central agencies 
into a rapid phase of competition led reforms. Gerritsen (2000:134) argues: 
CDAG is in reality a set of institutions driven by central agencies at state and 
Commonwealth levels . . . each set of central agencies is united by a common desire 
to achieve whole-of-government control over their respective line agencies. 
The intentions of NQ> reforms were aimed at creating 'competitive neutrality' that is to reduce 
the supposed unfair advantages enjoyed by the public sector in the delivery of economic and 
infrastructure services. Accon:ling to 1-Iilrrer, the problem was that Australia's governance 
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structures - public sector regu]ation particularly in powert water and transport - were producing 
anti-competitive behaviour and artificially high prices. Industry O:munission modelling at the 
time indicated if Hilmer's reforms were adopted consumers would be better off by some 
$AUD1, 500 each year, and GDP would be 55 per cent, or $AUD23 billion, higher than 
otherwise would be the case (Toohey1995:9). 
A National Competition Cowtcil (N~ was established to monitor the implementation of 
NQ> and set obligations that states and Tenitories meet in orderto get their 'competition 
payments'. 1his means that state and Tenitorygovemrnents are penalised for not 
implementing reforms fast enough. For example, in 2000-01 competition reform payments to 
the states and Territories totalled $AUD463.4 million- in 1999-00 the total was $AUD647.6 
million (www.ncc.gov.au). However, both Queensland and the Northern Territory 
governments had payments suspended because of NO:: recommendations to the Treasurer 
that they had not met certain reform obligations (Treasurer 2000, press release no. 103). 
The problem with NQ> is that its implementation and spatial effects run contrary to the fiscal 
equity objectives that wtderpin Conunonwealth T1"1:1nfors payments to states and local 
government as discussed earlier in this chapter. According to Gerritsen (2000:135): 
... NQ> poses a fundamental contr.ldiction to the guiding principle of Australia 
federalism: horizontal fiscal equalisation {HFE). The NQl seeks 'competitive 
neutrality', or the creation of perfect markets and an end to cross-subsidisation. 
l-IFE seeks equity, or the financial redress of geographic disadvantage, of necessity a 
contrary principle to competitive neutrality. 
A few examples illustrate the contrary impact of NO' on regions. The case study on the Mid 
Murray Region in Otapter eight highlights N(]l reforms in the water industry undermining the 
capacity of some rural water authorities to finance future infrastructure needs. This is 
particularly where cross subsidisation of water infrastructure (charges in larger centres 
subsidising small population centres) remains crucial to service provision. Another example of 
the contrary impact of NCJl is its impact on the rationalisation of Australia's airports. Before 
NO' Australia's international airports, particularly Sydney, cross-subsidised the entire network 
(mban, rural and remote) of Aust.ra.lian airports (Gerritsen 2000:135). Before the 
Conunonwealth sold off its international airports Sydney, for example, charged a standard 
landing fee of $AUD3 per kilogram which subsidised the operations of less busy airports. In 
January2000t Sydney airport was charging $AUD0.60 cents per kilogram, while airports such 
as Rockhampton in Queensland, in order to maintain its infrastructure, were required to charge 
$AUD8 per kilogram. As Gerritsen concludes: 
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The overnll national welfare - in tenns of allocative efficiency of the economy- may 
be assisted by such refonns. But for business in regional centres (and Rockhampton 
with a population in 1996 of approximately 55,000 is a major regional centre, not a 
rural backwater}, it means significant cost penalties erode their competitiveness and 
profitability. 1his has important implications for the citizens of Rockhampton to 
have access to air travel and the convenience of airfreight (Gerritsen 2000:136}. 
The Commonwealth's explicit involvement in regional/ industry policy 194+ 2001x 
The O>mmonwealth' s explicit involvement in regional development policy has neither been 
consistent nor continuous in the post-war period Historically, as discussed earlier, some 
regions (metropolitan and non-metropolitan) have, from time to time, benefited directly from 
government decisions to (re-) locate industty, build infrastructure such as irrigation schemes, 
and/ or p1ace government agencies or seiVices in particular p1aces. Examples include 
CollliOOnwealth and state government expenditure on industry support for manufacturing, 
agriculture research and development, education, defence, housing, health and infrastructure, 
i.e. roads, rail, aviation, power, and water (supply, sewers, darm, irrigation). Specific indusny 
programs, examples include support of: automobiles in Geelong, Victoria, and Elizabeth, 
South Australia; energy in Victoria's La T robe Valley region; iron, steel and metal in Newcastle 
and Wollongong, NSW, and Whyalla, South Australia and the Snowy Mountain hydro-electric 
scheme in southern NSW. 
Moreover, state governments have traditionally been more intetventionist and ambitious with 
their plans for decentralisation than the Commonwealth (discussed below}. However, from 
time to time, state Premiers have asked for greater Commonwealth participation in regional 
development (Harris 1989}. 
Repjma1 ckuJqmmt pdicy, oo awzin, elf aWJin. .. 
As early as 1944 the Premiers' Conference called by the Labor Prime Minister John Curtin 
began to initiate a phase of intensive regional planning activity- this enthusiasm for national 
intetvention reflected the stronger fiscal position of the Commonwealth re the states in tenns 
of income tax revenue raising. Between 1944 and 1947 several Curtin-led O>mmonwealth-state 
conferences were held to discuss national economic development through coordinated regional 
planning. Australia was subsequently divided into ninety-seven regions each consisting of a 
grouping of local authority areas. As a result of this process regional development bodies were 
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established in New South Wales, Victoria and Tasmania with road district councils used for the 
same puxpose in Westem Australia (Harris 1989:108). As Harris details: 
In New South Wales, for example, the state was divided into twenty regions with 
regional development conunittees comprising twelve members, six from local 
government, three or four from offices of state departments placed in the region, 
and the remainder from the private sector. The function of the committees was to 
prepare development schemes for the region, undertake revieVJS of regional 
resources, indicate the kinds of seiVices that would be required to develop those 
resources most effectively, and to estimate the population that the region might 
support (Harris 1989:108-109). 
After Labor lost office in 1949, the Commonwealth abandoned its involvement in regional 
planning and development and individual states were left to their own resources to fund and 
sustain the processes they had established Both New South Wales and Victoria pursued 
elaborate schemes to decentralisation based on various fonns of subsidies to encourage 
industries to relocate or to remain in country towns. They were also quite unselective, 'treating 
the whole of the state outside the capital (and sometimes even parts of the capital) as eligible 
for Assistance' and often-local government was not part of the planning process (Ooney 
1990:2}. 
For the next twenty-three years under successive Ll"beral-Country party Coalition govemments, 
however, the Commonwealth showed no interest in any comprehensive involvement in 
regional development and spatial planning (Harris 1989:108; Garlick 1999). This reflected the 
traditional Liberal government philosophical view in Australia that regional and urban 
development issues are essentially state government responsibilities. :However, recognising that 
the Labor Opposition was politically capitalising on this neglect, the McMahon government 
established the National Urban and Regional Development Authority (NURDA) just two 
months before it lost office in 1972 (Harris 1989:109). 
Wtth the election of the Whitlarn Labor government in 1972 a change in economic philosophy 
saw urban and regional development issues again on the national agenda -however, this was 
very much a top down approach to regional development policy. The Commonwealth renewed 
its interest in regional development and spatial planning and established the Cities Commission 
(evolved from NURDA) and the Department of Urban and Regional Development (DURD). 
Moreover, proposed radical amendments to the Grants Commission Act intended to provide 
financial assistance directly to Australian local authorities. This was to be provided through a 
newly established regional organisation or body that represented local government in approved 
groupings of regions, i.e. cooperative networks of local authorities working at a larger regional 
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scale (Harris 1989:109). Other initiatives included the development of new 'growth centres' or 
satellite cities where the Commonwealth would work with local govenunent and state 
government in developing growth centres outside the capital cities. Although many centres 
were considered under the program the only one that formerly began under the scheme was in 
Albmy-Wodonga on the Victorian New South Wales border. 
Wtth the removal of the Whitlam govenunent in 1975, the Fraser-led Liberal Counuy Party 
government again rejected the Commonwealth's role in spatial planning and regional 
development. Similarly, the Grants Commission continued to consider the requirements of 
individual councils (authorities) and not Jarger groupings or regional organisations in its 
dehberntion of financial assistance. Eventually the Grants Commission's process devolved to 
each state having its own grnnts structure negotiating directly with its local government. 
Labals explial annitm?nt w spatial-pdiat5 1983· 96 
'With the election of the Hawke-led Labor govenunent in 1983 regional and urban programs 
slowly began to re-enter the national policy debate - reflecting Labor's tr.lditional philosophical 
concern for spatial development and social equity issues. In particular, with the recession of the 
early 1990s, the Labor government attempted to reinvent itself with its 1994 We»k~ N atim 
economic policy statement ($AUD6.5 billion over 4 years). Its aim was to reduce 
unemployment to 5 per cent by the tum of the century. This would be achieved by redesigning 
its labour mazket programs and introducing a raft of new measures in the areas of education 
and training, new income measures and support, indusuy science and tr.1de initiatives, 
infrastructure and regional and wban development. 
Labor's spatial programs and processes were aimed at opening up more direct conununication 
between regions and the Commonwealth (ABM 1995). It is interesting to note, however, that 
Labor's major regional and urban programs were introduced between 1991 and 1995, some 
eight years into its thine en-year reign. Again this reflects the fact that issues of urban and 
regional development policy played second to other major social and economic refonns. 
Moreover, each policy emanated from a different portfolio, which is consistent with the history 
of policy separntion in Australia between indusuy, employment and urban/ regional 
development issuesxi. Six initiatives in particular are worth mentioning here. They are, between 
1983-91, the CounuyCentre's Project (CXP), Office of Labour Market Adjustment (OIMA) 
initiatives, and, between 1991-96, Building Better Gties Programs 1 & 11, Local Government 
Development Program (IDGP), Regional Development Program (RDP), and the Area 
Consultative Committees (Acx:B) program. 
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CCP ani OLMA initiati:res 
The CXJ> program, whilst a modest initiative, focused Commonwealth attention on working 
with communities ( 11 colllltry centres in all) to develop self-help and local management 
approaches to address economic development issues. It began as a pilot project in 1986 and 
received initial fllllding of some $AUD500, 000 (Taylor and Garlick 1989:92). According to 
Taylor and Garlick (1989), it represented a move away from the 'top down' approach where 
national government policies were focused on problem regions, to one where government 
wotked "With local stakeholders ('bottom-up') to facilitate 'longer run social and economic 
growth' (quoted in Beer 2000:175). On the other hand, a more substantial program, yet still 
modest, OIMA sought to address unemployment issues in areas most adversely effected by 
structu.ral change (measured by above average llllemployment). 
Fllllding was provided for the establishment of business incubators, new local entetprise 
ventures and expanding existing business capacity. Fllllds were for both metropolitan and non-
metropolitan regions and were mainly targeted at labour muket ttaining and education 
initiatives. Total OLMA spending in 1994-95 was $AUD27 million, however, this was spread 
across 150 OLMA approved regions (Beer 2000:175). Local committees, made up of business, 
government and commllllity members, were fonned as part of the OIMA program (130 in all) 
and were eventually merged with Area Consultative Committees established in 1995 (and 
discussed below). 
Buiklirrg, Better Cities 
The Better Gties Progr.un (BC1) commenced in 1991 and sought to reform mban 
management processes by creating model partnerships between the three tiers of government, 
communities and the private sector to improve the urban environment (predominantly capital 
city but included non-capital city regions, i.e. Bllllbury, WA and Newcastle NSW). Some 
$AUD800 million was allocated to the program "With funds spent on a range of urban schemes 
including an advanced technology park, to medium-density housing redevelopments, and 
transport initiatives (Stilwell and Troy2000:914). Collaboration "With state and local 
governments during the BBC was achieved because Commonwealth fllllds were usually 
boosting state and local government priorities (Gleeson 2001:145). Some twenty-six-Area 
Strategies were developed llllder the BBC programs against the core objectives to: promote 
economic growth and rnicroeconomic refonn; improve social justice; promote institutional 
reform and ecologically sustainable development. Building Better Gties II (BBOI) was 
introduced in 1995 based on the new objective of growth management, urban renewaL and 
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economic gate\Vcl}'S (and included some non-metropolitan centres). The BBC program \VclS 
abolished with the election of the Howard Ltber.U government in 1996. 
The Lrod Gmemrrmt lJeuJqmmt Prutfam(LGDP) 
The LDGP had funding of $AUD50 million for four }e3fS from 1994-95 to encourage reform 
within local government. 
The &rplal lJeuJqmmt Prutfam(RDP) 
Through the newly created Department of Housing and Regional Development (DHRD), the 
RDP, despite its faults, embrnced a return by the Commonwealth to considering many of the 
spatial regional and industry concepts and problems that faced Australia's regions in the mid-
1990s. Labor's introduction of the RDP, drew its influence from the cx:p (discussed above) 
and a long history of international experience of spatial policy and practice (discussed in 
Chapter four). 
A process of community consultation that began in 1994 launched 47 Regional Development 
Organisations (RDOs) across Australia. These RDOs began exploring the impact change had 
on their communities and to develop strategies to stimulate regional development. The RDP 
provided $AUD150 million over four years to RDOs that had broad-based local membership 
capable of dealing with development problems and regional issues (Commonwealth of 
Australia 1994). Funds were available for infrastructure audits, planning and priorities 
($AUD70m), and for supporting organisation structures, smaller projects, skill enhancement 
and leadership ($AUD80m). In principle, infrastructure and projects funded were to have 
emerged from the strategic planning process in each region as identified priorities for regions 
to achieving long-term sustainabilityand heightened competitiveness. The objective \VclS to 
'cocktail' Commonwealth funds with matching dollar for dollar contributions from the region 
Qocal business) and other tiers of government. 
Despite its faults and critics, the establishment of the RDP began a collaborative process that 
enabled Australia's regional communities to assume a much greater responsibility for 
detennining their own futures. :Moreover, as opposed to the Whit1am government's re-entry to 
regional development and planning in the 1970s, the Keating govemment's RDP \VclS premised 
on establishing new institutions to facilitate a 'bottom-up' approach designed to help regions 
help themselves (Beer 2000; Garlick 1999; Forth 1996:7 6). 
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Ahhough marking a retwn to spatial policy, the financial commitment of Labor to 
the RDP was marginal in the context of the total Womi1gNatimexpenditure (some 
$AUD150 million from $AUD6.4 billion). Moreover, as others have argued, the 
Hawke/Keating government's fonybackinto regional policy was less ambitious 
than the Whit1am government's DURD experiment of the early 1970s (Stilwell and 
Troy2000:914). In any case, the RDP only ran for 18 months so no serious 
evaluation of its efficacy as a progr.un could sensibly be made (Forth 1996:88). 
A mt Gnultatire Cnmitta5 
Finally, tu1der Labor, Area Consultative Committees (Affi) were also introduced in 1995 to 
act as the government's key regional network for issues associated with employment, 
education, training and }Uuth affairs (from the Employment portfolio). Working in partnership 
with Government, community and the private sector Affi (through the development of local 
employment strategies) were to provide the leadership for communities to make the most of 
their economic and labour market strengths. Affi were envisaged to generate local support 
and facilitate the introduction of the Keating government's new labour muket programs. Their 
role was also to ensure that employment and training programs linked to regional development 
opportunities and where new regional development organisations fonned (tu1der the RDP) 
they could become subcommittees of such structures (Conunonwealth of Austr.ilia 1994:173). 
According to several DHRD officers intetviewed for this research, the Affi and the RDOs, 
both at the federal level and on the ground, acted for the most part, in isolation if not in direct 
competition with each other {Brown 2001a). 1he Affi were retained with the election of 
Howard government in 1996. 
The descent firm~ ro rural der.e1qJrrmt (1996-200 1) 
In 1996, the newly elected Howard government wasted no time slashing Conunonwealth 
expenditure in its first Budget - some $AUD9 .4 billion (a clear signal of its commitment to 
smaller government and a guiding neo-hberal philosophY). The new Treasurer, Peter Costello, 
most clearly outlined the government's specific and general policy targets and goals in a 
Menzies Lecture in 1997. These targets and goals comprised of bringing the tu1derlying budget 
into surplus in three years, a commitment to flexible domestic product and labour markets, 
increased trade liberalisation, reduced government ownership and opening capital markets 
(Costello 1997). The clear difference between Labor's and the Howard government's reform 
agenda was Labor's philosophical conunitment to continue to address issues of social equity 
and spatial development as part of its broader libenl reforms. 
1he clearest example of this difference is that in corning to office the Howard government cut 
Labor's regional development and wban programs, ending the Commonwealth's involvement 
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in regional development policy. In his media release the Minister responsible, the Hon. John 
Sharp, MP said that 'there is no rationale or constitutional basis for Conunonwealth 
involvement' in regional development (Sharp 1996a). The Minister instead announced a 'whole 
of government' strategy to address the issues affecting 'regional' Australia, i.e. initiatives for 
communities in non-capital city regions. In the absence of a national framework for regional 
development, the government subsequently announced a range of ad-hoc initiatives for some 
regional communities and industries affected by change (Gray and Lawrence 2002). What little 
suppon was forthcoming for these select communities was premised on a philosophic belief in 
self-help and market driven solutions to regional adjustment problems. 
The following demonstrates the descent of regional policy under the Coalition government and 
explores the politics and ideology behind this descent. This is presented by examining a series 
of Ministerial Statem!n/S on Regional Australia that have accompanied each of the Howard 
government's Budgets since 1996. 
Regjcnal pdicy unier Minister Sharp: 1996- 1997 
The Coalition government in the lead-up to the March 1996 election, among other policies, ran 
on an agenda to conduct a Conunission of Audit (to review all Commonwealth expenditure) 
and to abolish the Labor government's Jabour market and Better Gties (urban) programmes. 
In its pre-1996 election policy statement~ the Regj<n the Coalition indicated it would 
retain the RDP and shift the emphasis to assisting provincial cities and rural areas and away 
from capital city regions (Hawker 1996:3). 
It was not until its first Budget, following the Commission of Audit findings in June 1996, that 
the Coalition government took the decision to abandon the RDP altogether (it had already 
abolished the DHRD). The Minister's press release announced savings to his portfolio of 
$AUD150 million which was testament to the general political environment of early Howard 
years as seeing cost cutting as a policyvinue in its own right. As a result of this decision some 
220 staff in Canberra, state and regional offices were sacked and the network of regional 
organisations established had their funding ceased A small internal team (5 staff) remained to 
wind-up the outstanding RDP contracts as well as the Building Better Gties program (some 
other wind-up functions were out-sourced to the National Capital Authoricy1. A Regional 
Affairs Unit (7 staff) was subsequently established within the D1RD to handle matters re1ating 
to the government 'whole of government' to regional Australia (staff interview 2002). 
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I~ cbi'l£n 'budg!t ailS 
The size of the cuts of the first Howard government may have come as a swprise to many in 
the Australian electorate, but not to the Coalition that had planned cuts of this magnitude since 
1993. As discussed above, many of the cost cutting initiatives were identified in the 
government's Commission of Audit, completed and released a few months after the 1996 
election. In particu1ar, the Audit identified a $AUD10 billion deficit from the former Labor 
government (Costello 1996; Dullard and Hayward 1998). The point remains, however, that 
some $AUD10 billion cuts to Commonwealth expenditure of 'wasteful and unnecessary 
government spending' had been identified in F~l, the political and economic manifesto 
of the John Hewson-led Liberal patty at the unsuccessful1993 Federal election. 
Interestingly, Access Economics, a consultancy/forecasting organisation, had provided the 
economic analysis for F~!, and its director, Geoff Carmody, setved as executive officer 
on the 1993 Commission of Audit for the Liberal-led Victoria State government (Dullard and 
Hayward 1998:25). The chainnan of the 1996 Commission of Audit was Robert Officer, 
Deputy Director of AMP, Cltair of Finance at the Melbourne Business School, and former 
Olairperson of the Victorian Commission of Audit. Mr Officer was also a member of the right 
wing think tank, the Institute of Public Affairs, in 1993 and 1996 (Dullard and Hayward 1998). 
It is clear that cuts of this magnitude were on the agenda regardless of the Budget position 
inherited by the Liberals in 1996. The deficit simply provided the political justification to enact 
its ideological conunitment to smaller government - the regional and urban programmes were 
easy targets. 
1he 'Wxle if~' re:sp<ne smiee ard rrinm 
Having ended the RDP, and having nothing to offer in its place, the Minister of the then 
named Department of Transport and Regional Development (D1RD) wanted to reassure his 
rural and regional constituents that the government was not specifically discriminating against 
them in announcing its Budget cuts. Four retrenched officers from D1RD were assembled to 
write the forward and coordinate the August 1996 Budget Statement, Rebuildirf. Regjm:d 
Australia (staff intetview 2000). The Department of Prime Minister and Glbinet had been 
asked to search through Commonwealth progr.uns and make a list of those whose expenditure 
impacted on regional Austr.ilia. The Howard govenunent was attempting to sell the message 
that the benefits from its ambitious economic reform agenda, i.e. deregulation, waterfront 
refonns, lower interest ra.tes and lower inflation, would provide lower cost structures for 
increased investtnent for rural based industries. And, although it had no specific program for 
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regional development, Conunonwealth expenditure in non-metropolitan regions would be 
better coordinated and targeted under a Coalition govenunent. 
The four officers aniculated a 'whole of govenunent' strntegyforthe govenunent, pan of 
which was their recommendation to establish the :Ministerial Worlcing Group on Regional 
Affairs (MWGRA) to be chaired by the then Minister for D'JRD. The MWGRA was suggested 
as a peak ministerial fonun that the government could use to coordinate and give substance to 
its whole of govenunent approach. The MWGRA would give rural and regional Australians a 
sense that Ministers were coordinating their activities and focusing on their economic 
development needs across portfolios. After its first meeting in November 1996, Minister Sharp 
said in a press release that the government had established the MWGRA as one of its 'highest 
priorities' (Sharp 1996b). The officers were a'W'clre of the rising backlash against the government 
in rural and regional constiruencies as a result of cuts in funding and a loss of seiVices 
(discussed below). 
The MWGRA failed to get either Ministerial or bureaucratic support for its activities and 
subsequently collapsed through a general lack of interest after five or so meetings, over a 
period of about 18 months (staff interviews 2000). Despite the best efforts of the new 
Parliamentary Secretary for Regional Development, Michael Ronaldson, MP, who assisted 
Sharp in coordinating the MWGRA, Ministers began sending their jwtior ministers or advisers 
along to meetings; eventually the MWGRAs just faded away. Similarly officers of D'JRD, who 
were acting as secretariat to the MWGRA, faced strong resistance from other departments in 
their efforts to coordinate activities across portfolios given the government had ended its 
commitment to regional development (staff interview 2000). 
In the first eighteen months of the Howard government no new program funds flowed to the 
D'IRD, the portfolio responsible for economic development in regional Australia. Minister 
Sharp and his parliatrentary office were under constant pressure from various regional groups 
who had lost funding in the Budget cuts and were demanding action. The best Sharp could do 
was to announce andre-announce a series of major programs (from other portfolios) that 
focused expenditure outside the capitals to create the illusion that these initiatives were 
somehow pan of a coordinated, whole of government, regional development strategy. This 
included initiatives such as: $AUD125 billion Natural Heritage Trust (Environment portfolio); 
$AUD525 million Agriculture- Advancing Australia package (Primary Industries portfolio); 
$AUD250 million Regional Teleconununication Infrastructure Fund (Communications 
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portfolio); and, $AUD30-40 million Regional Assistance Programme (RAP- Education 
portfolio). 
The reality was that the Minister responsible for regional development had no input to the 
design of these initiatives and no say in how funds were to be allocated (for example he had no 
influence over RAP funding which operated across Australia's regions). The Minister was given 
a $AUD10 million fund to mop-up Coalition pre-election promises (made in key marginal 
seats) and to meet obligations for flood mitigation and a major salinity management project 
that had been inadvertently cut when the RDP was abolished (staff interviews 2000). The 
increasing backlash over government cuts and declining services in regional areas led Minister 
Shatp, on at least two occasions, to write to the Prime Minister outlining his frustration at 
being the Minister responsible for regional development with no program or funds available to 
specifically address regional issues (staff interviews 2000). 
In an effort to lift the Commonwealth profile in regional development Minister Shatp called a 
meeting in February 1997 of all state and Territory regional development Ministers to explain 
the Coalition's 'whole of government' strategy(staff interviews 2002). Department officers 
involved in the meeting recollect that it became very clear to State and Territory Ministers 
present that the Commonwealth had in fact nothing on the table to offer to assist regional 
development, infrastructure funding or structural adjustment (issues they had raised). Most of 
the conversation centred on how the Commonwealth devised its rationale for the allocation 
between the states of the Regional Telecommunications Infrastructure Fund -the 
responsibility of the Communications Minister who was not part of the meeting. While Shatp 
could give the government line on this issue in reality he had nothing to do with the program 
or its implementation. Nothing tangible came of the Ministers meeting other than an official 
Communique. 
As a reflection of the Howard governments total philosophical withdravral from urban and 
regional policy, another Ministers meeting was not held until November 200oxU (nearly four 
~arson). It not swprising perhaps that Minister Sha!p's focus during his term was on 
watedront, transport, rail and aviation muket-led reforms. He stood down as Minister in 
September 1997 over allegations he abused parliamentary entitlements. 
Ad hoc natwe if the ~'s apprr:rxh 
Three decisions during the period typify the Howard govenunent's highly political, inconsistent 
and ad-hoc approach to assisting some communities struggling to cope with structural change. 
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As part of the government's $AUD2 billion mil reform package, Cabinet agreed in November 
1996 to a $AUD20 million regional assistance package for workers and conununities most 
affected by the changes (Ronaldson, 1996). 1be mil refonns resulted in new private enterprise 
firms operating the former Australian National (AN) mil business and consequently resulted in 
large job losses. According to officers involved the $20 million package resulted from a deal 
brokered between the union movement and the government as a means to progress its mil 
reform package. Aside from this aspect, the decision followed due process in getting Cabinet 
approval before the Minister formerly announced it. In contrast, in May 1997, the Howard 
government agreed to allocate a $10 million assistance package to assist the Hunter region 
following the decision by BHP to phase back its Newcastle operations (Ronaldson 1997). 
Officers directly involved in the decision at the time confirm that Howard's action in this case 
was purely politicaL 1bat is, the NSWLabour government had announced a $10m state 
package in response to the proposed BHP closures. In this case the Commonwealth package 
was not considered or approved by Cabinet before the Prime Minister committed to match the 
NSW government grant - it was policy on the run. 
Another highly political regional assistance package involved a deal between the Howard 
government and Senator Harridine from Tasmania who at the time held the balance in the 
Australian Senate. 1be Coalition needed Senator Harridine's vote to pass its Legis1ation for 
partial privatisation of Telstra through the Australian Senate. Tasmania subsequently received 
$AUDSO million for various regional development initiatives and a further $AUD58 million 
from the $250 million Regional Telecommunication Infrastructure FWld (Shatp 1997:10). 
1bese packages were not part of a national spatial framework or institutionalised process for 
dealing with communities impacted by structural change. As the discussion in Cliapter two 
highlights, many other regions faced business closures and/ or massive industry restructuring 
during this period but received little or no assistance and attention from the government during 
this period. 
Re-fkUka#€ existing program 
1be Hon :Mark Vaile rep1aced Sharp as Minister for Transport and Regional Development in 
CXtober 1997, facing much the same dilemma- no program or funding for regional 
development. However, within the Trnnspott portfolio the government created a new junior 
Minister role for Regional Development, Territories and Local Government - as a means to 
heighten the public pen:eption at least of the imponance of regional issues. In tenns of 
regional development, the junior Minister, Alex Somlyay MP, followed Sharp's lead of trying to 
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more clearly differentiate existing Commonwealth spending between metropolitan and non-
metropolitan Ausualia (Vaile and Somlyay 1998). For example, in preparation of the 1998 
statement by Vaile and Somlyay, funding for the National Highway is identified as $AUD67 6 
million with more than 90 per cent of funding going to regional areas (Vaile and Somlyay 
1998:15). Similarly, of the total local government financial assistance gr.mts of $AUD1.229 
billion some $800 million is identified for councils in regional Australia. 
Mr Somlyayalso wrote to the Prime Minister in the lead-up to the 1998 Budget asking for 
funds from the second partial sale of Te1stra for a modest regional development program- this 
was again rejected (staff interview 2000). In the May 1998 Budget the D1RS received $AUD10 
million to develop a communications strategy to better understand regions and communicate 
government initiatives. As part of the May Budget process officers of the D1RD prepared the 
statement R.egjt:nJ Australia: Qu Camitm:nt. In this statement they coined a new phrase, the 
R.egjt:nJAustralia Strategj, which the government embraced and began to promote- even 
though, in reality, there was no strategy (staff interview 2000). 
Bll1r!aiC!'atic-kd initiatiu5: k~ the rr:gima1 deu:lqmrnt m ¥n 
Whilst there was not a willingness by the Coalition to support a specific regional development 
program in its first three yecm in office, officers from D1RS developed two separate low-cost 
initiatives for the Minister to consider. Both of these examples illustrate the difficulty of 
developing initiatives that run against the political tide and have not emanated from the key 
central government agencies. 
The first was the introduction of Regional Impact Statements (RIS) and, the second, the 
Regional Forums Program. The intention of RIS was to ensure that Cabinet Submissions 
would identify the likely regional impact- positive or negative -of any new policy/ program or 
significant changes, particu1ar in terms of impacts on setvices, employment and investment 
(staff interview 2000). Cabinet approved RIS in July 1998 yet it took until Februruy 1999 for 
their implementation. Officers involved in the development of RIS confmn that the delays 
came from their counterparts in the Prime Minister's department who felt the implementation 
of RIS was not a high priority (staff interview 2000). After protracted negotiation about the 
form and processes involved in preparing an RIS the Prime Minister's department rejected the 
requirement that Ministers prepare an ameliorntion strategy when a negative impact was 
identified {part of the original draft guidelines for RIS). 
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In other words the Prime Ministers' office watered down RIS to simply require Ministers to 
keep Cabinet informed of the potential regional impacts of proposals brought to Cabinet. 
There was not a requirement for them to amend their proposal or to suggest remedial action as 
was originally intended Again this is illustrative of the dominant government view that regional 
adjusunent was simply a function of market forces and that there was no role for government 
in addressing spatial adjusunent issues in a systemic way. 
The second initiative was the Regional Folllim Program that aimed at introducing institutional 
changes to give substance to the 'whole of govemment' rhetoric. Officers of the department 
prepared a brief to Ministers Anderson and McDonald seeking their approval to unclenake 
three pilot regional forums to facilitate the interaction between regional stakeholders and the 
Commonwealth (staff interview 2000). The program consisted of identifying stakeholders in a 
region and developing a Regional Futures Brief that identified key priorities for the sustainable 
future of the region. The Commonwealth would engage a consultant to undenake this regional 
collaborative process. As part of the processes a regional forum would be held where the 
Minister (and/ or junior Minister) would attend along with senior representatives of a number 
of Commonwealth portfolios. The intention here was to listen to regional concerns (identified 
in the Futures Brief) and to form stronger links with state and local govemment 
representatives. The Commonwealth would then have three months to fonnally respond to the 
regional priorities identified through the process as articulated in the Brief. 
The objectives of the Forum program were two-fold (staff interview 2000). Firstly, the Futures 
Brief was to become a living document to be revisited evetythree to four years reviewing its 
implementation, effectiveness and, consequently, establishing new priorities, i.e. a living 'State if 
the Regjm' repott. Secondly, that this process would overtime shape the programs and 
expenditure of the Commonwealth agencies involved in better reflecting regional needs. The 
processes included the Commonwealth talking to state, local govemment and local business 
about cost sharing arrangements and contributions to individual projects identified Paralleling 
this local process was the establishment of an interdepartmental committee (IDQ, or Working 
Group, at the Commonwealth level to facilitate a whole of government response across 
relevant portfolios. It needs to be emphasised that there was no new money being offered to 
the D'IRS to support this program (i.e. the Folllim were conducted with no set budget to go 
to the region). 
What was envisaged for the Fon.um program and what eventuated were two vety different 
things . .Ministers Anderson and Macdonald agreed to the pilots but perhaps not surprisingly, 
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suggested that Forums be held in regions that encompass their electorates and not the regions 
identified in the original brief. Three Forums were conducted under the program in Spencer 
Gulf, South Australia, New England region in New South Wales and Northern Australia-
encompassing North Western Australia, Queensland and the Northern Territory. 
Much of what flowed from the Forums in tenns of the Commonwealth's response was a series 
of conunitrnents from individual portfolios to accelerate the access of existing programs to that 
region (officer interview 2002). For example, in the Spencer Region the Department of 
Industry, Science and Resoun:es (DISR) under its Invest Austrnlia program placed an officer in 
the region to undertake an investment strategy. Similarly, the Department of Employment, 
Womplace Relations and Small Business (DEWRSB) were able to soun:e funding for several 
projects under its RAP programme. However, no new money as such came from portfolios to 
assist these regions (officer interview 2002). For example, all three regions identified increased 
road funding as a priority, however no new road funding came from DTRS as part of the 
Forums program. The Regional Forums trial ended with the Commonwealth response to New 
England Forum in October 2001. 
There was general frustration expressed by many who participated in the process that DTRS 
had no funds dedicated to the Forum Progr.un and this diminished its ability to leverage 
commitments from other Commonwealth agencies and local stakeholders (staff interview 
2002). The Futures Briefs became static 'repons' on each of the forums, to be shelved and 
archived rather than a living State if the Regjm. brief to be revisited and renewed However, 
ultimately, the process itself would strongly influence at least two new Commonwealth 
initiatives - the Rauls to RiJ:m£ry and the Sustainalie Regjln programmes - both programmes 
offering increased fleXIbility in funding directly to regions- (staff interview 2002). 
The announcement of these programmes reflected a general resurgence in regional issues that 
followed the appointment of Minister John Anderson, MP to the Transpon portfolio. 
However, what becomes clear is that this resurgence reflects a political response to potential 
electoral problems in non-capital city electorates for the Coalition and not a philosophical 
commitment to regional development policy. 
1he rise if ]chnA rmsaz, Minister fir TransJXKt ani RetJm;d Serdces 
The appointtnent of the then National party's deputy leader, John Anderson, as :Minister for 
Transpon and Regional Services (DlRS) in October 1998, was something of a turning point in 
the evolution of the Coalition commitment to non-metropolitan regional problems. Three 
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factors emerged that gave Anderson far more political muscle within Cabinet than his 
Ministerial predecessors and hence enhanced his capacity to get regional issues, in the political 
sense, back on the national agenda. 
The first factor was the threat posed to the Coalition government by the rise of Pauline 
Hanson's One Nation party- a right wing conservative and nationalist party. This political 
urgency was heightened by the result of the Queensland State government election of 
September 1998, where One Nation gained strong electoral support largely from the National 
panys traditional heartland of the rural and regional Queensland constituency (Anderson 
1999). Anderson, on becoming Minister, quickly ammged a tour of Queensland where One 
Nation had successfully tapped into the electoral disillusionment felt by many of declining 
seiVices and structural adjustment costs associated with Budget cuts and globalisation. As 
reported in the popular press, One Nation's campaign against the sale of Telstra alone won an 
estimated one million votes in regional areas (Ct:tnkrm Tim?s 5 Februaty2000:C1-3). 
Such was Anderson's concern that he would subsequently appoint a one-off Community 
Liaison Officer based in Longreach, Queensland, to better coordinate Commonwealth 
col1lll1W1ityrelations, seiVice delivery and gr.mt applications (staff interview 2000). At the time 
of writing no other Community Liaison Officers have been appointed in any other part of 
Australia. 
The second factor that began to elevate Anderson and regional problems during this period 
was the mounting public evidence of increasing regional problems. For example, during this 
period the government conducted, or was conducting, several Parliamentary inquiriesxiii in 
response to problems in non-metropolitan regions. The findings of these inquiries fuelled 
backbench pressure within the Coalition over a range of regional issues including a loss of 
services and infrastructure and the negative impact of NCP. Adding to the government's 
problems was the work of Australia's Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commissioner, 
Mr Cluis Sidoti. Through a series of Bush Talks, Sidoti was highlighting in a very public way a 
r.mge of social problems being fuelled by rising poverty in Australia's rural and remote 
communities and the failure of the Howard govenunent to address them (Sidoti, 1999). 
Moreover, internal nmket research undertaken by the Communications Branch in Do TaRS as 
part of the RetJtnd Australia Strategy had identified many of the same govenunent failings. The 
final report was handed to Anderson in September 1999 - earlier drafts of the findings had 
been fed to the Minister's Office on an on-going basis. The report by Quantwn Matket 
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Research (QMR 1999:6-11) was conducted by a phone interview of 1501 people asking their 
views on government perlormance in regional Australia. lhe major issue of concern according 
to those surveyed was unemployment {28 per cent) - this was more than triple the next two 
responses (roads and crime).lhe research found respondents expressed a strong sense of 
abandonment by the govenunent (govenunents in general) and a feeling of alienation reflected 
in an inability to influence decisions made by the Commonweahh. Over 90 per cent fek it was 
important that decisionmakers for regional and rural Australia actually live in the area (QMR 
1999:9). Fewer than one in ten respondents fek the Commonwealth was doing a good job in 
nearly all areas tested MOre than half had the opinion that a poor job was being done in tenm 
of giving priorityto local issues, consulting the conununityand showing genuine empathy for 
local needs (QMR 1999:11). 
It was against these types of mounting political pressures that Anderson called for a National 
Summit for rur.U and regional Australia (held in Cktober 1999). 
lhe third factor that elevated Anderson's ability to get regional issues back on the Coalition's 
agenda was his promotion to leader of the National Party on 1 July 1999 and then to Deputy 
Prime Minister on 20 July 1999 (following the resignation of Mr Tun Fischer). All previous 
Ministers in the regional development/ services portfolio were more junior, both in the 
National Patty and, in particular, within the Coalition ranks. 
Interestingly, the results did not come inunediately for Anderson. However, he did move 
quickly to enhance the Regional Services division of his portfolio. In the May 1999 Budget 
statement, Re[jau1 A ustraliaM~ the~ for example, the only new initiative for the 
Regional Services division was the $AUD70 million Rural Tr.msaction Centres programme. 
1his program funded by the social bonus of the second partial sale of Telsua provided small 
rurn1 communities with funds to establish access to basic services such as banking, post, phone, 
fax and Medicare Easydaim. 1his proposal, however, was put forward in the Budget process 
by another Commonwealth agency and given to D1RS in the last weeks before the Budget was 
announced (staff interview 2001). Again, the Minister responsible for regional Australia did not 
develop this program- he was, at the last minute, given the task to implement it (staff 
interview 2001). Some other funds came to local government areas of the portfolio in the form 
of the Local Government Incentives Program- $AUD7 million. 
Minister Anderson was successful in 1999 in bringing to his portfolio some small elements of 
the Prirnaty Industries portfolio such as the Rural Plan and Rural Communities programs and a 
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unit responsible for the production of the annual government information publication the 
Rural Bale. Anderson also established the Regional Women's Advisory Council and a Rural 
and Regional Women's unit with Regional Services division. However, as part of a far more 
ambitious attempt to increase the size of the regional seJVice division of his portfolio, he had 
sought to change the administrative arrangements to administer Am (and the Regional 
Assistance Programme) from DE'WRSB and the Regional Tourism Program from the Indusoy 
portfolio (staff interview 2001). As one officer interviewed recalls, the Ministers responsible for 
these programs rejected Anderson's proposal out of hand (staff interview 2001). Instead 
Anderson announced a series of Memorandums of Understanding with other Ministers over a 
series of programc; that affected regional Australia. 
Respatse to the Sumrit -the tide J:wm to tum 
In the May 2000 Budget statement Regjt:nd A ~tralkl Mak~ a Dijforfn:e Minister Anderson 
begins to articu1ate the government's response to the Regional Australia Summit. At the 
Summit the government announced the creation of the Foundation for Rmal and Regional 
Renewal a philanthropic oxganisation the Conunonwealth contributed $AUD14 million to 
establish. The Foundation, a semi-autonomous organisation, supports a range of initiatives to 
assist communities and business investment to work together to build local capacity and 
diversify their activities. This was followed in June 2000 by the announcement of the Regjt:nd 
Sdutims progr.unme - a $AUD90 million initiative over four years for communities to identify 
and implement development opportunities more specifically to meet their needs. 
HOwever, Regjt:nd Sdutims combined the elements and resources from two earlier programs 
Rural Communities and Rural Plan that had reached the end of their funding cycle in the 
Primuy Indusoy portfolio (staff inteiView 2002). Although touted as a new initiative by the 
Minister, Sdutims simply continued to target the same small rural communities struggling with 
the impacts of change as had it predecessors. In this sense it was not a new initiative at all. 
Moreover, others have pointed out that the bulk of the Sdutims programme's funds 
disproportionablyfavoured elector.ates of National Party members (Cherty 2002). 
Another initiative to emerge in late 2000 was the Rauls toRe:meryProtJam- a $AUD11 billion 
over four years program Rauls toRe:merywas important because for the first time funds went 
directly to local government ($AUD850 million of the total to rural and regional councils) and 
this allowed councils to spend on their local road priorities (Anderson 2000). Of most interest 
is that the Commonwealth enacted new Legis1ation to enable it to provide funding directly to 
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local governments for the first time thus avoiding having to go through the states (Anderson 
2001). Allocation between coWlcils within each state is in accordance with the formula adopted 
by the State Grants Commission for distribution of Financial Assistance Grants (FAGs) 
identified for roads (as discussed in Cltapter two). 
As mentioned earlier) additional and flexible roads fWlding had been identified as a priority on 
Anderson's visit to Queens1and when first coming to the Transport portfolio) again at the 
S~ and repeatedly through the Rertfrn:d Farnm program. The better than expected Budget 
position in 2000 provided the funds for Sdutims andRwds w&mu!ry. More to the political 
point, however) it highlighted the government's need to boost its profile in rural and regional 
electorates particularly for the coming 2001 Federal election. 
The May statement says 'this Governmenfs goal is to ensure that all Australians share in the 
wealth of the nation and the opportunities presented in the new century) regardless of where 
they live'. Moreover, 'we will focus our attention more strongly on the impact of economic and 
social policy on individual cornmWlities' (Anderson and Macdonald 2001:1 ). Interestingly, the 
statement overview (forward) makes no reference to the Howard government's 'W:xie cf 
~approach or its 'Rertfrn:d A ust:ralia Strateg/ the centrepieces of its four previous 
statements (between 1996 and 2000). 
A rrwfrarrElUJtk for rert}a1ai ~ 
In August 2001 Minister Anderson laWlched the Slm'f? Regjcn, a Slm'f? A ust:ralia statement at 
the National press Oub in Canberra which included a $AUD100.5 million over four years 
Sustainalie Regjcn Pfrwamri!. This package was made up of: 
• 1he Sustainalie Regjln Plr¥fa11'11T 
• A reduction in charges for agricultural exports 
• A Regional Business Development Analysis study 
• Enhancements to National Competition Policy; and 
• An Access to Government Infonnation Program 
According to officers of DoT aRS, the experience of the Regional Fonuns pilot program had 
an influence on the rationale and design of the Sustainalie Regjln Prqffamre. The Sustainalie 
R.e;jtn Jlrugmrrm! aims to help commWlities in eight 'prototype' regions to develop programs 
and test future development options. The selected regions were determined on a number of 
criteria including unemployment, family income) and interestingly, their commitment to take 
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charge of their own future (Anderson 2001). Interestingly, in a break from the first five years of 
Coalition regional initiatives, urban fringe areas outside the capital cities also qualify for funding 
under Sustainable Regions. Each of the regions would receive around $AUD4 million per year 
for three years (this varies between regions) for a range of projects including local 
infrastructure, skill building, encouraging small business and local enterprises as well as for 
social development and environmental issues. 
Following the re-election of the Howard govenunent in October 2001 Minister Anderson 
further strengthened his portfolio through changed administrative arrangements that finally 
brought Affi (and RAP funding) into Do TaRS. For the first time under the Coalition, this 
administrative change gave the Minister responsible for regional development an institutional 
and spatial framework to address regional development issues across metropolitan and non-
metropolitan Australia. 
These programmes and administrative changes p1aced the Commonwealth back into the area 
of regional development potentially at least in a more engaging way. However, in many ways 
they simply picked up on the spatial policies begun under Labor's RDP in 1994. For example, 
under the Sustaiml:ie Retftn Prfwam'!'E regions are given funds to establish a Local Advisory 
Conunittee, initiate plans for future development, identify priority projects (development 
options) and make recommendations to government for funding- all of which were part of the 
RDP process. Some significant differences are that under Sustainalie Regjms selected regions 
have a set budget whereas under the RDP regions competed for a share of national program 
funds. Sustainalie Retftn also only applies to eight prototype regions whereas the RDP 
established regional development organisations that covered all of metropolitan and non-
metropolitan Australia. 
At the time of writing Sustaiml:ie Retftn was being implemented and a new charter, enhancing 
their regional development focus, for the national network of Affi was being developed In 
keeping with the longer tradition of treating separately, indus tty and regional policy, DoT aRS 
has no fonnallinks to the industtyportfolio or its programmes. Moreover, the Govenunent's 
industrypolicystatement~ inAustralianlrriustryPdicy2001 has onlyone reference 
that links industrypolicyto regional development (DilR2001:14). 
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Conclusion 
Until the 1980s Australia's institutional arrangements worked to address issues of equity with 
economic development. Under this regulatoty regime there was bi-partisan support to 
guarantee full employment and a greater emphasis on the distribution of wealth particularly for 
Australia's low skilled, lower and middle-income earners. Part of these arrangements included 
tariff protection, cross-subsided services and infrasm.Jcture much of which benefited private 
investment. While these activities overwhelmingly favoured major projects and investment in 
Australia's metropolitan regions successive governments attempted at least to maintain 
institutional sm.Jctures that saw services and jobs flow to non-metropolitan regions. This 
remains implicit in the financial arrangements (HFE) between the Commonwealth, state and 
local government (although local government remains the least well-resourced tier of 
government within this arrangement). Yet, Australia's particular model of competitive 
Federalism continues to undennine attempts between the tiers of government to better 
coordinate urban and regional development outcomes - issues around addressing the fiscal 
imbalance continue to dominate Commonwealth state relations. 
From time to time the Commonwealth developed explicit regional development programmes 
but these were short lived - being introduced by Labor govemrnents and removed by 
succeeding LI"beral governments. There has been no sustained agreement between the tiers of 
govemrnent that regional/ industty policy could be used as a framework for achieving better 
spatial planning and balancing efficiency, equity and environmental concerns. 
Traditional institutional arrangements changed with the election of the Hawke/Keating 
governments in the early 1980s. And, as a consequence, the traditional buffers between 
workers and regions and the immediate impacts of capital resm.Jcturing were systematically 
eroded The Hawke/Keating governments adopted a 'carrot and stick' approach to entice state 
and local government to enter into a new range of spatial policy initiatives ('little' carrot 'big' 
stick). The carrot was Commonwealth money through various spatial programs such as BBC 
RDP, and Affi. As already explained, in tenru of the total Working Nation package, the 
Commonwealth's commiunent to regional development was a modest one at best. The sticks 
were the penalties imposed for failure to complywith competition refonru particularly in tenru 
of NCP payments to the states (the resources and penalties associated with this initiative were 
much larger in comparison). These more recent market-driven developments run connary to 
traditional equity objectives of the Commonwealth. 
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Between 1996 and 2001, the Howard govenunent attempted to promote its 'whole of 
govenunent' approach as its wa.y of addressing the concerns of regional Australia (nonM 
metropolitan regions). The approach proved to be a poor substitute for national regional 
development policy at it wa.s highly political, largely ad-hoc and inconsistent. Evidence of this is 
the widening gap between poor and richer regions and workers and general rise in spatial 
inequality discussed in Cbapter two. The National Regional Summit wa.s called in an attempt to 
appease an increasing rural and regional political backlash against govenunent in late 1999. This 
did not reflect an increased conuniunent by the govenunent to regional development policy 
but a response to mounting political pressure from various quarters and in panicular the rise of 
One Nation. By2001 the govenunent had dropped much of its 'whole of government' rhetoric 
and announced its first substantial regional programme - the Sustainalie Regja1s Progranune -
for eight select regions. This wa.s done in the context of the lead-up to an October Federal 
election and reflected the need for the Coalition to address a rising political backlash across 
non-metropolitan electorates. 
The fact remains however that between 1996 and 2001 the Howard Liberal government had 
no coherent policy rationale or framework for dealing with the spatial impacts of structural 
change. Nor did it have a national approach to regional development (or urban) policy relying 
instead on market forces to determine the national distribution of income, employment and 
economic opportunities. 
Given that the Australian govenunent had chosen for the most part to abandon regional 
development policy between 1996 and 2001, it is worth reviewing recent international 
academic analysis of different approaches to regional theory and ptactice. The next three 
chapters offer some alternative theoretical approaches to neo-liberal theory and policy that may 
form the basis for rethinking Australia's approach to addressing its regional problems. 
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Chapter 4 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS: A CRITICAL REVIEW OF POST -FORDIST 
AND ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY LITERATURE 
Introduction 
The pwpose of this chapter is to review and critically evaluate recent developments in 
industry/ regional development literature and ideas and consider their implications and 
suitability to the Australian case. The literature to be discussed has emerged in response to 
three interre1ated events: the stagnation of growth in the world economy during the mid-1970s 
to the early 1980s; the subsequent erosion of the institutions that undetpinned the Keynesian 
inspired post-war economic order, and the rise of the highly contested concept of 
'globalisation'. Of particular interest is that much of what is to be discussed offers a theoretical 
explanation of the structure of industry, innovation and economic growth that cannot be 
separated from the social, cultural and institutional structures of the nation, and sub-national 
'region' or location, in which the economic activity occurs. 
MOst salient, it offers an alternative approach to neo-liberal-led reforms and attendant policy 
prescriptions that emphasise the price mechanism and market efficiency as the sole 
determinant of international competitiveness. As the last chapter indicated, neo-liberal policies 
have dominated Australian economic management for nruch of the past two decades. Yet, this 
approach has had little success in addressing regional disparity in the Australian context (as 
discussed in Clapter two). In contrast, nruch of what folloVJS identifies successful collaborative 
processes and strategies where govenunent supports regions to better manage the impacts of 
changed market conditions on the local production system Most importantly, however, there 
is potential within this col1aborative framework to address a range of issues other than just 
market efficiencies: this includes human capital and learning, innovation, social and 
environmental issues (a key theme of this thesis). 
Specifically, it has been debates associated with post-Fordist lite.rnture that have significantly 
influenced international policy-makers to concentrate more on region (spatial) specific 
'capacity' and institution-building activities to achieve national/local economic development. 
This includes an increased focus by national and local policy-makers away from individual 
firms to a concern with the geographical site within which firms operate. It suggests that 
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national and local policy-makers have an active role in providing the supplr-side activities that 
m1derpin regional innovation and competitiveness; and, exploring new mechanisms and 
approaches to facilitate collective action and learning. In shon, it is argued that regions that 
have pertonned best over a sustained period of time are those that have developed the local 
socio-economic environment in which government, finns and communities share experience, 
build trust, collectively learn, and compete collaboratively (see Henton et al1997). Post-Fordist 
literature indicates that it is the strength and the synergies between national and local, fonnal 
and infonnal, institutional arrangements that determine a region's (and nation's) capacity to 
respond to change. As Macleod (1999:1) concludes: 
It is almost axiomatic now to proclaim that, as economic activity becomes more 
globalised and the nation state relinquishes its role as the 'natural economic zone', 
certain regions re emerging to become the key engines of wealth creation. A 
number of influential academic perspectives have contended that the political, social 
and geographical shaping of this regional resurgence is partly dependent on the 
existence or otherwise of a regionally based institutional thickness or an innovative 
milieu (quoted in Giordano 2001:26). 
More generally much of what follows challenges the dominant economic paradigm that 
suggests neo-liberal inspired policies premised on 'deregulation' are the only option for 
government policy-makers in an emerging knowledg~based economy. Indeed the broad 
conclusion to be dravm from the following is that more interventionist public policies are 
required to nunure regionaVindusttydevelopment in an era of increased globalisation. Public 
and public/ private partnerships that support the growth of endogenous SMEs, strategic 
infrastructure, local capacity and skills, institution building and promote continuous learning 
are required to capture opportunities in the emerging knowledg~based economy. This is 
because as the pace of technological change increases firms and communities need to be 
engaged in a process of continuous innovation and learning in order to adapt to the forces of 
change. Building a capacity to respond to change rests on a foWidation of increased public and 
private investment in, for example, education, training and R&D (innovation). 
Although the mechanisms for national regulation of the macroeconomy have changed in a 
period of increased globalisation, government's ability to facilitate economic activity and to 
influence and sustain economic actors within their boWidaries remains strong (Hirst and 
Thompson 1992). Moreover, as competition in the global knowledge-based economy 
intensifies it becomes increasingly incwnbent on government to foster a supponive national 
system of innovation that nunures a knowledge economy (Gertler 1992). 
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Many of these ideas are explored in the major theoretical subsets of the post-Fordist debate to 
be discussed below, namely: neo-Schumpeterian, neo-Smithian, and neo-:Marxist (and 
economic geograph~ literature (Amin 1994). Amin {1994) usefully reduces the debate to these 
three main contrasting theoretical streams (neo-Schumpeterian - techno-economic detennined 
change; neo-Srnithian - flenble specialisation or 'production' driven change; and neo-Marxist 
or French Regulation School- the role of 'embedded institutions' in economic development) 
(see also Malmberg 1997; Amin and Malmberg 1992; Elam 1990). 
This chapter begins with an ovetview of the post-Fordism debate and reflects on the diversity 
and difference of perspective within the broader post-Fordist literature. As will become clear, 
many of the ideas that underpin the following theoretical and empirical studies are interrelated 
and, consequently, on occasions overlap - this is particu1arly so with the economic geography 
and national systems of irmovation (NSI) literature. This is not surprising as most post-
Fordist/ economic geography literature has its origins in :Marxist political economy and as such 
brings to its study the usual critiques and debates contained in Marxist explanations (Waitt et aL 
2000, Cllapterthree). This literature differs in the way emphasis is placed on purely economic 
forces in shaping social life on the scope for autonomous action on the part of the state, on the 
importance granted to cultural and non-.nmket influences, and on the potential to reform 
capitalism (Waitt et aL 2000:76). As will become clear from the following discussion, post-
Fordism remains a debate and not a universally accepted theory as such (Amin 1994; Tornaney 
& Ward «1.. 2001, Olapter one; Gibbs et al2001). But, nonetheless, along with Porter's 
industry clustering agenda (discussed in Cllapter five), its contribution has had an important 
influence on international thinking in regional development and industry policy. 
Following this discussion we consider the implications of post-Fordism for regional 
development policy for small peripheral economies like Australia. Here we begin to explore the 
possibilities and challenges to spatial approaches to industry and regional development given 
Australia's particular model of competitive Federalism and its contemporary industrial 
structures. 
Post-Fordism: an altemati~ to neo-liber.dism 
According to post-Fordist logic, the driving force of the Fordist mode of capital accumulation 
is the mass production dynamic, pioneered in the US by Henry Ford during the 1920 and 
1930s. 1he Fordist management strategy is reliant on the intensification of work, the detailed 
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division of tasks and mechanisation to raise productivity, and various fonns of 'monopolistic' 
regulations to maintain this self-reproducing growth regime (Arnin 1994:9; Jessop 1991; 
Tomaney 1995). The post-war period in western economies was dominated by a Fordist mode 
of capital accwnulation. This mode of production can be charncterised by large industrial 
complexes, blue-collar wmk, tariff protection, full employment, centralised bureaucracies of 
management, mass production of standardised goods, the welfare state, the dominant position 
of mass political parties (Amin, 1994:2). 
What was unique about this period was that Keynesian inspired fiscal policies generated tax 
revenues sufficient to finance welfare expansion, and provide the material basis for the class 
compromise between capital and labour. As Jessop (1994:256) suggests, in so far as full 
employment was achieved in a unified labour ma:rket, it reduced the volume of primary poverty 
among working families. This in tum created room for more generous income maintenance 
programs for other groups that both sustained and expanded mass consumption. Jessop makes 
the point that 'if the Keynesian Welfare State helped to secure the conditions for Fordist 
economic expansion, the latter helped to secure the conditions for the expansion of the 
Keynesian Welfare State' Oessop 1994:256). Others argue that the distinguishing feature of 
post-war period was not so much that it was 'Fordist', but that it was undetpinned by 'the 
institutionalization of a particular ba1ance of class forces, in which rising wages and rising levels 
of social expenditure were the price paid for the industrial and political integration of the 
working class' (Tomaney 1994:183). 
Post-Fordism then is a debate about the transition from one dominant phase of capitalist 
accwnulation (Fordism) to another (post-Fordism), based on a fundamentally different set of 
social and political arrangements. 1hat is, post-Fordists' perceive that capitalism is at a 
crossroads and that new sets of forces -technological, muket, social and institutional- are 
taking different institutional fonns to those which dominated the western world's economic 
development in the post-war period (Amin 1994:1). In this sense one would have to agree with 
Elam's (1990) observation that, in manyways, the post-Fordist debate is a contemporary 
expression of a classic debate about capitalism's future, its dynamics and its survival. 
Important to this thesis, post-Fordist literature suggests that the economic geography of a new 
era of global capital accumulation is, at once, a global and a local phenomenon: 
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The new o~ational netwotks, involving foreign direct investment and alliances, 
are transnational in their operational structure. But, in contrast to Fordism, 
production in individual localities, it is argued, is neither footloose nor reliant on 
non-local linkages. 1his is because the achievement or fleXIbility and new 
economies through the decentralisation of management and production is said to 
favour the establislunent of strong ties and linkages at the localleveh the global 
integration of production, thus, could unleash powerful decentralising tendencies 
and raise the potential for greater local ernbeddedness of the division of labour 
(Amin and Malmberg 1992:228). 
In manyways post-Fordist literature attempts to understand the implications of the removal of 
the post-war institutional structures, and theorises about what new socio-political arrangements 
(regulation) might emerge. And, more particularly, what will be the implications for global, 
national and regional Qocal) economic development of these new arrangements, particularly in 
a period of increased globalisation. The point to what follows is that the global changes are 
creating significant pressures on nations in tenns of not only how they structure government 
but on the design and direction of regionaVindusttypolicyand program delivery. 
In the main, post-Fordist literature emerged as a reaction to the rise in neo-hberalism and its 
attendant matket-led policy prescriptions. As Amin {1994:5) notes 'an underlying theme in the 
post-Fordist debate is the search for political project which is more democratic, more 
egalitarian and more humane than neo-h"beral conservatism'. 
The major theoretical themes within post-Fordism 
A complement to the main post- Fordist theoretical themes (drawing influence from each) is 
the more contemporary economic geography literature, which focuses more specifically on the 
contribution of 'location' to the processes of learning, innovation and competitiveness. The 
economic geography literature seems to particularly attempt to answer the question: what are 
the precise characteristics or localised capabilities that distinguish innovative and competitive 
regions in a 'knowledge-based economy? {lvfalrnberg 1997}. The following sections give an 
introduction to each of these theoretical contnbutions to the broader post-Fordist debate 
utilising Amin's categorisation. The following analysis distinguishes between the micro and 
macro economic aspects of the post-Fordist debate, i.e. micro - neo-SmitlUan and fleXIble 
specialisation, and macro- Regulation and neo-Schurnpeterian perspectives. It begins with a 
brief discussion of neo-Marxist, regulation theory. 
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Neo-Marxist-R~ Sclxxl 
During the 1970s, political economist theorists in France began to stress how different 
development patterns characterised economic systems in an attempt to explain the dynamics of 
long-term C}des of economic activity (Arnin 1994:7). In particular, the French Regulation 
School (Aglietta 1979; Lipietz 1985 & 1987; Boyer 1988) presented a theoretical discourse on 
the organisational changes to the ~ Regirrl!, that were embodied in the transition from a 
Fordist to a post-Fordist modeL 1he 'Third Italy concept, a more empirical oriented analysis, 
was advanced as a new development model based on mediunrsized finns, in which there were 
highly flexible production processes and a highly specialised division of labour among local 
areas (more recent aspects of the economic forces shaping the 1hird Italy are discussed below). 
The post-Fordist economy, it is argued, is one characterised by a flexible production system 
that is able to cope with high matket volatility and customised goods, and has developed a 
flexible system of specialisation (Capello 1994). 
Regulationists work from the assumption that the histol)' of capitalism on the world scale is 
charncterised by a sequence of specific social formations, which differ from each other greatly 
depending on the underlying basic structure, or 'institutions' (Esser and Hirsch 1989:73). In 
this way they appose an interpretation of :Mancist theol)' that sees histol)' unfolding according 
to pre-determined economic tendencies of the dominant capitalist mode of production, i.e. 
Marx's theol)'of historiml mtterialism(Esserand Hirsch 1989; Elam 1990). That is, they reject 
the notion that the complex structure of society can be simply reduced to a base-superstructure 
model and point to the existence of a second constellation of dynamic forces in the historical 
development of capitalism; a largely autonomous sphere of 'politico-institutional forces' (Elam 
1990). These politico-institutional forces, or sets of embedded social practices, regulate and 
reproduce a given accumulation regime. 1bis is achieved through application across a wide 
range of areas, including the law, state policy, political practices, industrial codes, governance 
philosophies, rules of negotiation and bargaining, cultures of consumption and social 
expectations: 
The aim of the French regulationists was to develop a theoretical framework which 
could encapsulate and explain the paradox within capitalism between inherent 
tendency towards instability, crisis and change, and its ability to coalesce and 
stabilize around a set of institutions, rules and norms which serve to secure a 
re1atively long period of economic stability. This conceptual effon was underpinned 
by the observation that the stagnation of growth in the world economy after the 
mid-1970s amounted to much more than a cyclical lull, symbolizing a general crisis 
of the institutional forms that has come to guide the post-war world economy 
(Amin 1994:7). 
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Finally, it can be said that regulation theorists tend to point to the unique spatial characteristics 
of indusuy location, indusny configuration, as well as the non-economic institutional 
arrangements in an attempt to understand the dynamics of economic perfonnance. More 
recent economic geography literature, for example, is concerned with the interoonnectedness 
of finns (collaboration) in an attempt to understand indusny 'competitiveness', innovation and 
learning and the role location plays in the learning process (Lee and Wills 1997; :Maskell and 
Malmberg 1999). :Maskell et al. (1998), for example, identifies the characteristics of localised 
'capabilities' to include four main elements: the institutional endowment; the build structures; 
the natural resources; and the lmowledge and skills of an area (Malmberg 1997:577). 
In another study, Saxenian (1994) has also argued that the continued economic dynamism of 
Silicon Valley has to do with the collaborative industry networks that promote collective 
learning and flexible adjustment. It follows that this in tum is interdependent with 'the region's 
dense social networks and open labour markets that encourage experimentation and 
entrepreneurship' (Malmberg 1997:577). Other examples of regional collaborative learning and 
indusuy clustering include: industrial districts in semi-urban location (such as those in the 
Third I~; areas such as Baden-Wurttemberg in Gennany, where leading-edge engineering 
firms, such as Bosch, rely on sub-contracting and supply netwooo for their flexibility; and in 
inner-city environs such as motion picrures in Los Angeles, and the furniture indusuy in 
London (see Amin and Malmberg 1992). 
N~Srrithian 
1his second theoretical group approaches the topic of the determinants of indusuy 'growth' 
and 'innovation' from a microeconomic analysis of the firm, with an interest in agglomeration 
economics and the role of positive externalities. 
Piore and Sable (1984) in their work 1he S«DrilnUtrialDiritk, ultimately place the changing 
face of modem markets - a new development model based on mediunrsized firms, in which 
there are highly flexible production processes and a highly specialised division of labour among 
industrial districts- at the centre of the new global economy (see also Sable 1989). The new era 
in flexible production emerged in response to the contemporary instability, uncertainty and 
apparently irreversible fragmentation of core markets in the major capitalists' economies (Amin 
and Malmberg 1992). Industrial districts, it is argued, avoid the worst effects of economic 
stagnation because they are not dependent on income that is detennined on price competition 
and low-wage mass production techniques alone. Rather, these districts use flexible machines 
and skilled workers to make semi-customised goods that conunand an affordable premium in 
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the market, and they constandy renew their products and production methods (Sabel 
1989:106). Neo-Smithians contend that the continuing process of market fragmentation has 
fundamental consequences for the organisation of production and the choice of technique 
(flexible specialisation}. And that this in tum is facilitating an irreversible rise of locally 
clustered production systems out of the crisis facing Fordist mass production techniques (see 
Elam 1990; Amin and Malmberg 1992; Rosenfeld 1995}. 
Importantly, flexible specialisation can be achieved by restructuring either 'internally into 
autonomous production units, or 'externally by outsou.rcing selected components to smaller, 
independent finns (Rosenfeld 1995:16). As Tornaney(2001:5) summarises: 
A degree of finn specialisation means that the production process is contained 
within inter-firm linkages that guarantee external; and scope economies, often using 
new technologies. The nature of the inter-finn division of Jabour generates 
powerful agglomeration effects, hence the use of the term 'industrial districts'. 
Finns both compete and collaborate with each other- a situation that comes about 
because of the mutual trust of a shared craft and industty culture. 
Most salient, however, is that such a transformation is said to imply a return to place and a 
dependency on local proximity between stakeholders involved in the local production process 
(Sabel1989; Amin and Malmberg 1992). 
As Sabel (1989) and others document, the paradigm case of an industrial district is the so-called 
1hird Italy- identified in contrast to the impoverished South and the old industrial triangle of 
Genoa, Turin, and MJan. The Third Italy is said to stretch from the Venetian provinces in the 
North through Bologna and Florence to Ancona in the South, which produces among other 
things knitted goods (Caip~, special machines (Panna, Bologna), ceramic tiles (Sassuolo), 
textiles (Como, Prato), agricultural implements (Reggio Emilia), hydraulic devices (lviodena), 
shoes, white goods, plastic tableware, and electronic musical instruments (Ancona) (Sabel 
1989:107). 
Other examples of industrial districts includes the Second Denmark- Jutland, the traditionally 
poor agricultural region in the counuys West that now produces textiles, gannents, furniture, 
machine tools, and shipbuilding in various industrial districts. The Swedish metalworking 
producers in Smaland, West Gennanys industrial districts in the Lani of Baden-Wurtternberg 
that includes products in textiles, gannents, textile rnachinel)', machine tools, and automobile 
components. In the US there are the two high-tech industrial districts: the centre of 
semiconductor production in Silicon Valley, south of San Francisco, and the concentration of 
mini-computer producers along Route 128 circling Boston. In Los Angeles there is a 
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concentration of firms that specialise in processes closely related to the motion picture industry 
including television, video games, music recording industries, among others (Sabel1989:107). 
In northeastern :Mississipp~ in and around the rural region of Tupelo, some 250 furniture 
companies and SO-supplier finns work across a multi-county industrial district or industry 
cluster. Similarly, there is a heavy concentration of hosiery producers and suppliers in Catawba 
Valley of North Carolina, and around Fort Payne, Alabama (see Rosenfeld 1995). 
According to the neo-Smithian logic both the mass production and the flexible specialisation, 
or c.rnft production, models have coexisted since the nineteenth century, with neither gaining 
technological superiority nor inevitable dominance over the other on grounds of economic 
efficiency(Amin 1994:14). Piore and Sabel identify two industrial divides- the first associated 
with mass production techniques from the 1920s and 1930s, the second that began with the 
stagnation of the world economy in the 1970s leading to an emphasis on flexible specialisation 
production techniques. In short, the 1970s economic crisis (long recession and period of 
stagflation) posed a threat to mass consumerism because of the growth in demand for non-
standardised, better quality, short-she1f-life goods. As international competition increased finns 
became more reluctant to make long-term investments in product-specific machinery as the 
products muket often disappeared before the machines costs were recovered (Sabel 
1989:102.). These market trends gave prominence to a rise in non-specialist and highly flexible 
manufacturing technologies and flexible work practices that favoured smaller batch production 
without loss of scale economies or manufacturing efficiency(Amin 1994:14). 
Neo-Smithians ~ that the defining feature of the new flexible production accumulation 
systems has been the recent advancements made in information and communications 
technologies (ICfs) (Capello 1994:190-192). In short, advances in computer-aided design 
(CAD) and computer-aided manufacturing (CAM) technology have allowed firms to exploit 
different production outputs from the production process. With the advances in re-
programmable tedmologies, the same fixed capital can be used for different production 
processes allowing firms to exploit 'economies of scope'. Economies of scope can be 
characterised as those economies achieved in the production cycle that result from the use of a 
single set of facilities to produce or process more than one set(s) of goods. As Capello explains: 
Since the re-progr.unmable capacity of this technology facilitates a flexible use of 
capital in the production process, the pwpose for which capital is used has become 
general or non-dedicated As a consequence, capital investment is no longer tied to 
an individual product cycle (Capello 1994:192). 
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These neo-Smithian ideas run through the contempor.uy economic geography literature, 
particu1arly focusing on attempts to explain differences in regional learning in tenns of the 
specialisation and interrelatedness of the industrial base of the region (see Pyke and 
Sengerberger 1992; Markusen 1996; Kelly and Helpper 1997; :Maskell and Malmberg 1999). 
These authors suggest that from a spatial concentration of finns in similar industries 'there is a 
greater chance of contact with early adopters of new technology, more rapid circulation of 
information and specific technologies, and a greater susceptibility to bandwagon effects from 
the greater mass of potential adopters' ~rg 1997:577). 
Much of this literature is influenced by earlier theoretical work on industrial districts by the 
economist Perroux. For Perroux, what lifted an economy out of the 'stationary state' to which 
classical static theorists since Adam Smith had relegated it in the long run is the role of 
innovation (Harrison 1992:473). Industries making old and new products will, on average, be 
expected to grow at different rates. The different trajectories will, in tum, affect other finns and 
industries, initially through 'backward and forward' linkages at prevailing relative prices, and 
over the long run, through changes in relative prices, and in investors' expectations (Harrison 
1992:473). As Harrison argues: 
Although Perroux's 'gro-wth poles' (poles de croissance) referred to sectors rather 
than to places as such, it follows directly from his argument that locales in which 
the newer industries producing the innovative goods (and services) are situated will 
not only grow faster than the average for all localities or regions, but - through 
linkage and price effects - these growth impulses will be diffused and multiplied, 
making the complexes of linked industries and their locales more attractive to the 
next wave of investors (Harrison 1992:473). 
It was the French economist Boudeville among others that transferred Perroux's notion of 
'gro-wth poles' to geographic space by suggesting finns may cluster together and that spillovers 
maybe contained locally rather than over the economy as an whole {Mmphyet al. 1997:17). As 
Harrison argued, it can be said that Perroux' s theorising permitted the closing of a circle that 
associates innovation activity with the creation of agglomeration economics (Marshallian 
externalities and agglomeration theo.lJ?. There is also a link here between Perroux's work and 
neo-Schumpeterian thought, discussed shortly. According to Harrison (1992:473) this 
association is the key to explaining which places grow and which do not, and by what process 
that growth occurs. 
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S arE critUal d:Jseruu:ims if tk rro-S rrithian 'liew 
As Amin (1994) discusses, Piore and Sabel's theory has attracted its fair share of criticism, 
much of which centres on the fact that flexible specialisation theory is constructed armmd dual 
oppositions, i.e. mass production versus flexible specialisation. Under this scenario each 
industrial paradigm is caricatured as rigid past versus flexible future, unskilled Fordism versus 
skilled flexible post-Fordism (see Amin 1994:15; Tomaney 1994). Moreover, others suggest 
neo-Smithians are being too naive in imagining a large-scale return to a craft industrial 
paradigm, with critics arguing that the embedded structures of Fordism will adapt to new 
circumstances and persist (see E1am 1990; Tomaney 1994). In a more obvious challenge others 
suggest this approach makes the error of equating only industrial efficiency with 
competitiveness, thereby underestimating the power of 1NQ to continue to dominate markets 
via their grip over finance, distribution channels, market outlets and advertising {see E1am 
1990; Amin 1994:16). This observation is particularly relevant to the Australian case where the 
domestic economy is dominated by a large number of multinational firms (this point is 
explored in more detail at the end of this literature review). 
Meanwhile, others challenge the neo-Smithian notion that there has been a clearly identifiable 
break-up of the dominant mass markets (Fordist) paradigm at all According to E1am (1990), 
Piore and Sable can be seen as failing to distinguish between extensive product differentiation 
by established large-scale producers and rna!ket fragmentation favouring new small-scale 
producers (Elam 1990). While other critics such as Capello (1994:192) point out that while 
new technologies allow for economies of scope, nonetheless, high volumes of production, 
which exploit economies of scale, can still dominate the phase of production that deals with 
sub-assembly. Moreover, Schoenberger (1998) and Ducatel (1989) suggest that an increase in 
return to small-scale production is made problematic because of the high rates of capital 
utilisation required to fully amortise the high up-front cost of investment needed to set up 
flexible production processes (quoted in Capello 1994:19 3). Rather Capello and Williams 
( 1990) argue that finns must strike a new balance between the benefits that can be achieved 
between economies of scale and scope. An example here is to be found in the automotive 
industry where large car manufacturers, for whom economies of scale remain important, can 
also exploit economies of scope at the production level because the new re-programmable 
technology allows the use of the same production chain for different models of cars. 
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Similarly, Hollingsworth and Boyer (1997) make the point that both forms of organising 
principles - mass (standardised) and flexible production - have coexisted since the rise of 
Fordist production, and will largely remain complementary. 
For example, standardized systems of production have always required customized 
machines or some form of flexible production. And fleXIble production processes 
have required standardized equipment and therefore some standardized production 
processes. In other words, the customization of products has long been based on 
standardized production of component parts and equipment. (Hollingsworth and 
Boyer 1997:21) 
They also draw attention to the work of 1-first and Zeitlin, and Pollert, who argue elsewhere 
that firms engage in hybrid forms of production, producing both long and short runs of 
particular products engaging in both flexible and standardised production. These hybrids are 
usually embedded in a dominant type of social system of production (Hollingsworth and Boyer 
1997:21 ). While others have simply made the point that the neo-Smithian theoretical view 
paints too rosy a picture of the future under the fleXIble specialisation pandigm (Amin 
1994:16). 
Dres size -reaiJy 11'lltter? 
A further criticism of the neo~Smithian project is that much of the industrial districts and 
industry clustering literature seems to suggest that it is the activities and relationships between 
endogenous small to medium size firms (and their flexible production processes) that are the 
key to new economic development patterns. This begs the question, do the sizes of the finn 
really matter under a post~ Fordist paradigm? Some argue, for example, that as large firms 
establish relationships with local suppliers they can inadvertently become an anchor for cluster 
activity, however, it is the activity of the large finn that remains the key to posterity of the 
industrial district, not the flexibility of SMEs. Harrison (1992), for example, contends that, to a 
considerable degree, small firms lag behind large firms in the use of technology and in v.rage 
benefits, and that SMEs are led and dominated by the largest firms. He contends that the large 
firms create the many small firms as commodities; with the expectation they will merge into 
larger firms. It should be noted however, that Harrison's argwnent is not aimed at the concepts 
of clustering, industrial districts or at the importance of establishing networking relationships 
among firms. Rather he objects to the current public policy emphasis on SMEs arguing that 
large firms remain the main sourre of employment and economic growth (Rosenfeld 1995:33). 
The above obseiVation aside, public policy that supports the development of endogenous 
SMEs remains a key element of industry/ regional development strategies in many OECD 
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com1tries (Hugonnier 1999). In shon, the reasons can usually be reduced to three interrelated 
assumptions. Firstly, that SMEs on average are more labour intensive than are larger finns; 
secondly, that SMEs in gener.d accoW1t for more of the economic activity in regional 
economies particularly, in rural and remote economies; and thirdly, that supporting the 
development of endogenous SMEs is a way of developing local entrepreneurship and 
innovation, and that this will in tum ensure long-term economic growth. However, Harrison is 
right to question the superficial distinction policy-makers often make between the benefits to a 
national economy between large finns and SMEs activity(see also Parlter 1999). 
Perhaps in many ways the distinction between large and small finns is becoming irrelevant 
because, in an effort to remain competitive, large finns are increasingly disaggregating their 
production processes (see Tornaneyand Ward 2001:5-6.) A recent academic exchange in the 
journal Irrlust:rial ani CafxmJe G:Jatw perhaps captures the point to the above discussion. The 
following stems from Saxenian's (1999) comment on an article by Kennedy and von Burg 
entitled 'Technology, Entrepreneurship and Path Dependence: Industrial Oustering in Silicon 
Valley and Route 128'. Specifically, she rebuts their arguments that Silicon Valleys economic 
dynamism can be explained by the 'technological tr.ljectories or path-dependencY of its leading 
finns, and that its regional dynamics are best m1derstood through an analytical separation of 
established finns and the environment supporting new firm formation (Saxenian 1999:105). 
Kennedy and von Burg sought to challenge the findings of Saxenian' s 1994 book, Regja1al 
Adumtag>: OtkureaniC'nrp!titiminSilian Vallejs aniRalte 128, in which she argued that Silicon 
Valleys regional advantage stems from an institutional environment that supports continuous 
innovation and collective learning among its finns and community. In their article, Kennedy 
and von Burg offer their own model for m1derstanding of the determinants of economic 
growth in Silicon Valleys and Route 128. Their methodology approach rests on dividing the 
economy into two sectors: (Economy 1) large established firms; and (Economy 2) entrepreneur 
and small finns. Each segment is associated with set a of institutions: the former with 
universities and corporate research Jabs, the latter with venture capital and other business 
services that support start-ups. According to Saxenian (1999), this is not a useful distinction 
and is not representative of the development path of many Silicon Valleyfinns. She argues 
instead that firms like Nets cape and Yahoo are the most recent examples of the rapid pace at 
which start-up firms become established firms and, therefore, blur the boundaries between 
Kennedy and von Burg notions of what constitutes new and old; large and small. 
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Saxenian makes the point that in Silicon Valley large finns such as Sun and Hewlett-Packard 
decentralised to the extent that many of their smaller divisions are hard to distinguish from 
new start-up finns. Furthermore, individuals in Silicon Valleyregu]arly leave jobs at established 
finns to form start-ups, and vice versa, all the while maintaining networks of crosscutting 
personal and professional relationships (Sax.enian 1999:108). Accordingly, it is not unusual for 
individual engineers wotking at established finns to act as business angels for new finns, or for 
established finns to organise venture capital for start-ups in related ventures (Saxenian 
1999:1 08). Moreover, entrepreneurs in Silicon Valley col1aborate regu]arly with universities and 
corporate resean:h labs, while established finns rely heavily on local investment banks, venture 
finns, lawyers, muket resean:h finns and consultants (Saxenian 1999:108). In short, Saxenian is 
arguing that there is no meaningful distinction between Economy 1 (large established) finns 
and Economy2 (start-ups) as the Kennedy and von Burg model would prescribe. lntimately, 
for Saxenian, Silicon Valleys and Route 128 success remains in the institutional and social 
structures that embody intense interlinn communication and learning processes (Saxenian 
1999). 
The message to take from Saxenian is that the challenge for policy-makers wishing to stimulate 
strong and innovative firms (S:MEs or larger finns) is to focus on improving the institutional 
environment in which the finns are embedded Whereas the neo-liberal policy approach to 
industry support focuses on issues such as getting the macro setting right, tax reductions and 
labour market deregulation, a post-Fordist approach suggests another path is warranted This 
approach focuses on spatial programs for the delivetyand development of R&D support, 
networks, indusuy clusters, education and training, strategic infrastructure, technology and 
infonnation diffusion and on issues such as regional access to capital. As Parker (1999:16) 
concludes, a neo-hberal approach to industtysupport is 'more likely to create an environment 
in which low quality, low wage employment is generated in S:MEs with little future'. 
Just as neo-Marxist and neo-Smithian thought challenges the neo-liberal approach to industry 
development and policy so too does neo-Schumpeterian theoty. However, as with the earlier 
discussion neo-Schumpeterian theoty also has its critics. 
Neo-Schunpeterian: arri mtia1al (l«al) S)Sfem rf inrmm:icn 
Neo-Schurnpeterian theotydiffers from Regulation and neo-Smithian theotyin the waythat it 
gives prominence to technology and technical standards in initiating, sustaining and separating 
individual long cydes of economic development/growth. As Elam (1990) concludes, thus, the 
history of capitalism is the histoty of technological revolution, and the post-Fordist era is 
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synonymous with the dictatorship of information technology. From this perspective, the main 
focus of neo-Schumperterain economics is not on aggregate demand (Keynesian economics) 
or competition and free markets (neoclassical economics), but on the role of 'innovation' in the 
process of capitalist growth and accumu1ation (Philliroore 1998:50). A return to Schumpeter's 
ideas was assisted by the fact that neoclassical economics has no clear explanation for 
economic growth and consequently lacked a theoxy of technology in that process (see 
Phillimore 1998:51; Rosenberg, N. 1982). 
Much of pioneering work on neo-Schumpeterian theory is credited to the research Freeman 
and Perez and their colleagues undertook in the mid-1980s at the Science Policy Research Unit 
(SPRU) at Sussex University(see Elam 1990; Amin 1994:12). Freeman and Perez's (1998) ideas 
on innovation built on the earlier work of Kondratiev and Schumpeter, but do not blindly 
follow them (see Phillimore 1998). Kondratiev in the 1920s focused his research on the long-
wave (fiftr-J-ear) boom and bust cyde that characterised economic development of the 
capitalist economy. Schumpeter developed Kondratiev's work further in the 1930s through his 
work on the role of innovative entrepreneurs in giving birth to a new paradigm for economic 
growth (Amin 1994:12): 
. . . the successful transition from one long wave to another is dependent, first, on 
'quantwn leaps' in indusuy productivity, which are secured once pioneering 
advances in technology diffuse across the economy. Second, it is dependent on 
'matching' innovation within the framework of socio-institutional nonns and 
regulations, in order to facilitate such diffusions. Once these conditions are 
achieved, a new long wave of growth can said to be in full swing, with a distinctive 
techno-economic paradigm that establishes across the economy(Arnin 1994:12). 
A key theme of neo-Schumpeterian literature is that it adopts an institutional and historical 
approach to its analysis that implies policy implications and preferences that will be, for the 
most part, determined by the specific circumstances and histories of the companies, industries 
and nations concerned (Mytelka 2000; Somn-Friese 2000; Phillimore 1998). Consequently, as 
Phillimore (1998:55) points out, for neo-Schumpeterians policy prescriptions are generally 
more varied and 'there is no one policy which can fit all circumstances, in contrast to 
neoclassical economics where general rules are often applied'. In a swveyof recent 
development innovation literature, Phillimore (1998) makes two funher observations in tenns 
of the links between innovation and national and local instinnional structures that are worth 
quoting here. Firstly: 
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. . . innovation is best Wlderstood as a system, in which innovative finns operate 'in 
the context of the institutions, government policies, competitors, suppliers, 
customers, value systems, and social cultwal practices which detennine their 
opportunities' ... These systemic features constitute the 'selection environment' in 
which finns find themselves and evolve. 
And second: 
. . . national systems of innovation are extremely significant, despite globalisation, 
since it is national institutions, values and culture which govern the behaviour of 
many actors and the quality and extent of linkages between them .. (Phillimore 
1998:54). 
These themes are best captured in the ideas associated with national systems of innovation 
{NSis) literature, a notion first coined a decade ago by Freeman, LWldvall and Nelson (Somn~ 
Friese 2000:1). In an attempt to explain the detenninants of innovation, the NSI approach 
breaks down a firm's environment into user-producer relationships and their relationships to 
the production system NSis provide a conceptual framework that sees innovation as an 
interactive process in which firms interact with other firms and are in tum supported by 
national and local institutions and organisations (or an 'innovation system}. These institutions 
and organisations incorporate indusuy associations, R&D, innovation and productivity centres, 
standards setting bodies, universities and vocational centres, information gathering 
organisation, financial services, the regulatory and policy environment, and cultural norms and 
practices (Mytelka 2000:17). 
:More recently, regional policy, panicularly in the European Union (E~, has emphasised the 
importance of developing regional innovation system (RIS) in its less favoured regions as a 
priority of its Structural FWlds Guidelines 2000-2006 (Landabaso et al1999:1). The RIS pilot 
project differs from its predecessor S1RIDE- Science & Technology for Regional 
Development in Europe - which was a largely linear program providing supply-side inputs to 
the local innovation system such as physical infrastructure and technology capabilities to 
stimulate the innovation process. RIS, on the other hand, acknowledges that innovation is 
more complex and depends on the day to day activity of local actors {competing firms, 
suppliers and customers) as well as the networks that link those actors and the institutional 
setting in which they are embedded (Landabaso et al1999). In other words RIS links the 
supply:-side factors {S1RIDE program) with the demand-side factors (social capital and firm 
activit}? at a regional level by deliberately improving the structural-competitive side of 
endogenous firms, S1v1Es in panicular. The RIS program emerged from the Wlderstanding by 
EU policy-makers that a lack of social capital explained, in many instances, the poor record of 
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EUless-favoured regions in conve:tting scientific and technical knowledge into conunen::ial 
products and service. For these regions simply supplying knowledge infrastructure was deemed 
insufficient when often the demand factors were absent. 
As :Mytelka concludes, 'from a policy perspective the innovation system approach draws 
attention to the behaviour of local actors with respect to three key elements in the innovation 
process: linkage, investment and learning {Mytelka 2000:18). 
Inter-firm and public sector co-operation and the institutional framework within 
which these relationships take place are the key soun::es of regional innovation. 
Innovation being the end-product and the regional 'learning' dependent on the 
quality and density of the above relationship, being the process (Landabaso et al 
1999:7). 
Importantly, Somn-Friese makes the point that the NSI concept is different to earlier 
theoretical contnbutions centred on national science systems and technology policy 
approaches. The distinction is particu1arlysalient to small- to medium-sized economies wishing 
to improve their economic perfonnance. According to Sorm-Friese: 
In a big countty such as the USA with dominating finns operating at the 
technological and scientific frontier, fonnalised scientific knowledge and high-tech 
investments are the most direct soun::e of economic growth. In many of the old, 
industrialized small and medium-sized countries fonnalized scientific knowledge 
and high-tech investments, while still of some importance, are not the most 
important direct soun::e of economic growth. Here investment in 'low-tech' sectors 
with long national and institutional history may indeed contnbute more to 
economic growth and perfonnance. Also, at least in small open economies 
economic growth depends more on a wide range of facto.rs besides fonnalized 
scientific knowledge and technological development. It also depends strongly on 
the interaction between education, knowledge diffusion, structural flexibility, 
innovation, and competition (Somn-Friese 2000:3-4). 
These neo-Schumpeterian themes have much in common with recent developments in 
economic geography literature that explores the extent that synergies between universities, 
research and technical facilities and finns within a region are committed to collaborative 
learning and innovation processes (Malmberg 1997:577). Zuckeret a1. (1994), for example, 
studied the relationship between university-based 'star scientists' and biotechnology firms in 
California to conclude scientific discoveries in that location exhibit a natural excludability 
(quoted in Malmberg 1997:577). In other words, discoveries that emerged in that particu1ar 
location could only have occurred there because of the institutional arrangement that facilitated 
interaction and the sharing of research knowledge within that community. Feldman and 
Florida (1994) have also presented SUIVeyresults that demonstrate a connection between 
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'industrial creativity and the regional supply of external technological resow-ces, such as 
concentrntions of industrial and university R&D; agglomerations of manufacturing firms in 
related industries; and netwooo of business setvice providers' (Malmberg 1997:577). 
Although Freeman and Perez gave recognition to some socio-institutional factors, the neo-
Schumpeterian approach has been criticised by some for being too technologically determinist. 
For example, Elam ( 1990) argues that technologically induced changes in products, processes 
and col111ll.Wlications systems are given prominence in neo-Schumpeterian themyover social, 
organisational or market changes that might also influence economic efficiency and growth. 
Similarly, Ntelsen (1991) argues that neo-Schwnpeterians reduce notions of the macroeconomy 
to a narrow focus on its technical attributes only (Amin 1995:13). 
"While not elaborated here, many of the above themes have much in conunon with the 
developments in the 1980s in evolutionary economics (Dosi et al 19 88). This literature seeks 
to understand the process of innovation and growth in modem economies by understanding 
the actual systematic linkages between firms and other institutions (Sheehan 1999a:2). 
Moreover, this literature puts emphasis on the understanding that technological change is 
cumulative and path dependent relying as it does on tacit knowledge accumulated through 
past experience and past institutional structures (Sheehan 1999a:4). 
E annie gugraphy 
Earlywban economic geographywriters such as Harvey(1973) utilised class analysis to 
understand the social processes that were producing inequalities within cities in relation to the 
dominant means of production (Waitt et al2000:76-80). Others, such as Castells (1983), looked 
at spatial patterns of development to understand the way labour (class relations) were 
'stabilised' and 'socialised' to reproduce the condition that helped sustained the economic base 
(structural determinism). In other won:is, as Waitt et al. (2000:78) argue, these geographers 
attempted to 'trace out how capitalism shapes the form and organisation of cities and the 
consciousness of their inhabitants'. :Masseys (1984) w01k on regional development challenged 
the concept that 'place' was simply a 'passive stuface' on which capitalism and its productive 
processes took their toll. Instead Massey argued that the particular characteristics of place help 
to differentiate regional conditions and shape the local process of capitalist restructuring, social 
development and class relations (Waitt et al. 2000:79). 
More contemporary, economic geography thought focuses more explicitly on the importance 
of 'place', learning and issues to do with the emergence of the 'knowledge-based economy' (see 
101 
especially Antonelli 1999; Maskell and Mahnberg 1999). The knowledge-based economy can be 
characterised by increasing investment in R&D and intangible investments, as well as rapid 
qualitative change and a growing element of customisation and design (flextble specialisation) 
in the production of goods and semces (Malmberg 1997). It follows from this understanding 
that the competitive nature of finns has shifted from 'static price competition towards dynamic 
improvement, favouring those which can create knowledge more quickly than their 
competitors' (Malmberg 1997:574; Maskell and Malmberg 1999). 
The k~klsed ~ uhat da5 it rrmnl 
It is important to reflect on what we mean by the concept of knowledge in a knowledge-based 
economy, as apposed to concepts such as data and information. As Riem-Tam (BRW23 June 
1999, p57) explains, data are transactional records created by the operational activities of 
business, while information is aggregation of data into meaningful compositions. Knowledge, 
on the other hand, is the interpretation of information into meaningful actions and decisions -
the intuitive element. Reim-Tam e1aborates on the concept of knowledge as follows: 
It is also possible to define what knowledge is not. It is not process-driven. It is not 
an outcome or product. It exists in every successful business. It is not information, 
but the interpretation and application of information, something that is made by 
individua1s: people. On this basis, knowledge resides in an individual, and outcomes 
come from knowledge successfully applied by an individual (BRW23 June 1999, 
p.57). 
lhe concept of a knowledge economy then refers not to the availability of data sets or 
information, but to the institutional environment that supports individua1s and finns in the 
process of learning. According to Sheehan: 
The process by which knowledge becomes incorporated in economic activity is 
referred to as innovation, which has recently been defined, at the finn level, as 
'applying ideas new to the finn in products, processes, services, organisations, 
management and marketing' ... Hence innovation is a much broader concept than 
R&D or even the application of technology, as that term is commonly understood, 
and covers a wide range of ideas-based improvement processes. Romer (1992) has 
stressed that here the ideas refer not just to a few major discoveries or changes but 
to a million little things which improve the operation of finns or other institutions 
(Sheehan 1999a:1). 
In this learning environment companies become knowledge enterprises that can best sense and 
interpret the future needs and wants of the market, design commercial solutions and deliver 
directlyorvia strategic alliances (BRW23 June 1999, p.57; see also Meskell andMahnberg 
1999; Larcombe 1997). 
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Two more important distinguishing features of the knowledge-based economy need to be 
made. First, the knowledge-based economy is premised on the notion of increasing rates of 
returns, as knowledge inputs do not diminish with use. This contrasts with the traditional 
resoun::e-based economy (agriculture, bulk-goods production and so on) where inputs are 
subject to diminishing returns, a concept that better fits conventional economic equilibrium 
modelling. Second, the process of globalisation tends to transform much formerly localised 
input into ubiquities, while knowledge and learning processes tend to remain unique, or sticky, 
to particular regions despite the intemationalisation process. As Malmberg observes: 
... the classical Weberian distinction between localized and ubiquitous production 
factors has not lost its relevance in the wake of the ongoing internationalization 
process .... a continuous process of 'ubiquitification' leads step by step to the 
erosion of the advantageous effect of most previously localized factors of 
production. Thus, a large local market becomes less of a locational advantage when 
transpon costs are gradually lowered; when customers become less loyal to local 
suppliers; and when trade barriers are eroded Similarly, local suppliers of machinery 
cease to be a locational advantage when equipment of identical quality is available 
worldwide, at more or less the same price. One of the few remaining genuinely 
localizes phenomena in this increasingly 'slippery' global space economy is precisely 
the stickiness of some forms of knowledge and learning process (M"alrnberg 
1997:574). 
It is also important to note that knowledge in the context of the above refers to tacit 
knowledge, which is embedded in the minds of individuals and firms, and the routines of 
organisations, of a given place. The suggestion here is that tacit knowledge is not as easily 
transferable as codified knowledge (that relies on formal learning at educational institutions) 
and this fact undetpins the importance of the learning characteristics of 'place' in the 
knowledge-based economy. 
The discussion so far has looked at the post-Fordist sub-themes nee-Marxist, neo-Smithian, 
neo-Schumpeterian and economic geography theories in some particular detail The following 
offers some broader observations and criticisms of post-Fordist thought in general. 
Critical observations on post-Fordism literature 
The weak point of much of the post-Fordist literature remains empirical validation (see 
Tomaney & Ward eds 2001; Malmberg 1997:578; Malmberg et al2000). Glasmeier and 
Fuellhart ( 1996) and Staber ( 1996) for example, have undertaken case studies that raise 
questions about the learning qualities of regionally embedded clusters of firms. In pethaps a 
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more fundamental way, Amin and Malmberg (1992), challenge the implication of fleXIble 
specialisation theorists' that this new approach (transition to local production complexes in a 
post-Fordist era) constitutes a change in direction of the dominant mode of capital 
accumulation (Fordism). It is worth presenting their critique in some detail as it captures a 
range of problems associated with post-Fordist literature in general, and neo-Smithian 
theorising in particular. 
First, they argue that the often-cited examples of the flexible specialisation and Marshallian 
tendencies, such as Silicon Valley, the Thini Italy, for example, do not always capture the true 
dynamics driving economic success (Amin and Malmberg 1992:232-233). They cite the success 
of cities such as London, Milan, Frankfun and Paris as major centres that have achieved 
growth through their control of finance, management, innovation, business services and 
infrastructure. And major provincial centres such as Binningham, Turin, and Manchester have 
achieved growth through new combinations of industry, office relocation, and their 
intennediate roles in the financial and service sectors. :Moreover, certain rural areas have 
achieved growth through new combinations including further capital intensification in 
agriculture, the development of light industry, and immigration by wealthier commuters 
looking for a pleasant life-style. 
Secondly, the post-Fordist flexible specialisation model is said to be both static and too short 
tenn Here Amin and Malmberg (1992) argue that Silicon Valley, for example, is exhibiting 
symptoms of internal fragmentation as the regional economy matures. That is, Silicon Valley is 
increasingly being drawn into a wider spatial division of labour because of the impact of 
intensive inward investment by non-US firms, and because of the export of labour-intensive 
and intermediate production functions to areas of cheap labour and emerging markets. 
Similarly, Italian industrial districts are undergoing change as they begin to substitute external 
linkages for local ones as they fight the threat of takeover of local banks by foreign financial 
institutions. Also, in these districts there has been a rise in local industrial consortia seeking to 
integrate vertically or export capacity and know-how overseas due to increasing competition 
from newly industrialising countries. 
1hird, they argue that the spread of localised production complexes is restricted by the fact that 
many of the conditions for success are not easily transferable. 
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Localisation of the division of labour requires a gradual build-up of know-how and 
skills, cooperative traditions, local institutional support, specialist services and 
infra.suucture. These not only take time to consolidate, but also escape the 
traditional instruments of policy intervention owing to their ephemeral and 
composite narure (Arnin and M"alrnberg 1992:232-233). 
Finally, they question the ability of regions to coordinate and act autonomously in the interests 
of international capital (ie.-1NQ ) in locations where international capital dominates. Some 
argue, for example, that large firms are able to intemalise critical production and service 
functions, and as a consequence do not necessarily form complementary' relationships with 
other local finns (see Norton 1992; Enright 1993; Tomaneyand Ward 2001). For Arnin and 
Malmberg, the central question here is 'whether the functional status of the branch plants and 
local divisions of the 1NQ has changed so much that they can now act as growth poles for 
regional development. For this to occur, at least two basic conditions would need to be met: 
first, a significant improvement in local buyer-supplier linkages and second, a genuine transfer 
of function and strategic authority to local management' (Arnin and Malmberg 1992:246). 
The importance of embeddedness and trust in post-Fordist thought 
1he following begins to explore the founh theme identified in the introduction by looking 
more closely at the relationships that characterise institutional networks and industry clusters. 
Harrison (1992) obseiVed, at a theoreticalleve~ that the keyto understanding the dynamics of 
economic activity in the post-Fordist paradigm resides in the active role given to concrete 
personal relations and social structures or 'netwotks' (Hmison 1992:477). This contrasts with 
traditional neoclassical economic theory that assumes relations of production and distribution 
of goods and services are essentially untouched by sociologic~ cultural, and political 
considerations (Gordon and McGum 2000). Neoclassical theory excludes notions such as 'the 
size of the finn, its location and the history of one's community, family and ethnic ties, the 
presence or legacyof attachment to guilds, or commitment to place' (see Murphyet al. 
1997:19). In a similar way, H>llingswonh and Boyer(1997:3), argue that whereas the 
neoclassical paradigm assumes that individuals are sovereign, they argue that individual action 
is influenced by the hold that 'institutions'- the social system of production- have on 
individual decision-making. 
105 
By a social system of production, we mean the way that the following institutions or 
structures of a country or region are integrated into a social configuration: the 
industrial relations system; the system of training workers and managers; the 
internal structure of cotporate firms; the structured relationships among firms in the 
same industry on the one hand, and on the other finns' relationships with suppliers 
and customers; the financial markets of a society; the concept of fairness and justice 
held by capital and labour, the structure of the state and its policies; and a society's 
idiosyncratic custo~m and traditions as well as nonns, moral principles, rules, laws, 
and recipes for action. 
While each of these components has some autonomy and may have some goals that 
are contradictoty to the goals of other institutions with which it is integrated, an 
institutional logic in each society leads institutions to coalesce into a complex social 
configuration. This occurs because the institutions are embedded in a culture in 
which their logics are symbolically grounded, organizationally structured, technically 
and materially constrained, and politically defended (Hollingsworth and Boyer 
1997:2). 
This would indicate that current theorising in post-Fordist literature appears also to go beyond 
traditional M:arshallian externality (agglomeration) theoty and the Industrial-Complex models 
of Isard et al (1951) noted in Gordon and McCann (2000). An Industrial-Complex model is 
concerned primarily with trading links between finns and it is these inputs and output 
relationships that principally govern their locational patterns (Gordon and Me Cann 2000:3). 
That is, an Industrial-Complex occurs when spatial clustering is the result of finns aiming to 
reduce trcli1Saction and production costs by co-locating and thus ensuring monopoly profits for 
the finns in the complex. The putpose of the earlywooo on Industrial-Complexes was to 
provide insights into how expenditure patterns and the spatial behaviour of firms were 
interrelated. Typical of this model are Oil Refining, chemical and pharmaceutical and 
automotive complexes (Gordon and McCann 2000:4). 
What separates the contemporaty industrial district literature from this more traditional 
agglomeration, industrial-complex stream is the notion of 'embedding'. 
The idea that economic behaviour has become increasingly disconnected - disembedded -
from social relations since the development of industrial capitalism was first popularised by 
Polanyi (1944). Embedding describes the situation where finns relate to one another by better 
understanding one another's fonnal organisational boundaries, rather than solelythrough the 
price-mediated exchange of commodities (Harrison 1992). For Harrison, where finns p1an and 
bid on contracts together, receive technical, financial and other setvices as part of the common 
local pool rather than on a firm-b1'finn basis, is what distinguishes industrial districts 
(1992:478). Because ownership remains in private hands, firms in industrial districts continue to 
aggressively compete with one another and with finns in other regions. Finns that are 
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neighbours are said at least by Sabel (1989) to compete on quality and technique, but less on 
price. According to Harrison: 
Whilst emphazing the mutuaV shared benefits to individual 
firms/ plants/ production units of co-location (such as access to a larger, more 
specialized local labour poo~ and the realization of scale of economies in 
infrastructure provision), both agglomeration theory and transaction cost 
economies nonetheless follow standard neoclassical logic in conceptualizing local 
economies as collections of atomistic competitors, formallyavvare of one another 
solely through the intermediation of price/ cost signals, embodied in contracts of 
varying completeness. By contrast, contemporary industrial districts theory 
emphasises the contextual significance of communal non-economic institutions and 
the importance of relations of 'trust' in reproducing sustained collaboration among 
economic actors within districts (Harrison 1992:469). 
Harrison develops his ideas on the importance of embeddedness and trust by drawing on 
Granovetter's critique of Williamson's ( 1975; 1985) theory of explicit and implicit contract. The 
Williamson-inspired neo-institutionalists presented elements of imperfect competition, namely 
the problems of bounded rationality (imperfect knowledge) and oppommism, especially in 
large hierarchical cotparations, as being consistent with the basic premise of neoclassical 
reasoning (Harrison 1992:476-477). Granovetter (1985) argues that a Williarnsonian notion of 
trust, achieved through contract, is rather a functional substitute for trust. A closer examination 
by Ganovetter suggests that there is ( 1) more order to interactions across the boundaries of 
independent firms and (2) more disorder within (even hierarchical) organisations governed by 
rules and contracts than has been generally recognised. As Gordon and McCann (2000:4) 
discuss, there are three key features to Harrison's notion of trust behaviour exhibited among 
firms in an industrial district. Firstly, firms within the social network are willing to undertake 
risky cooperative and joint ventures without fear of oppommism. Secondly, firms are willing to 
re-organise their relationships without fear of reprisal. Thirdly, firms are willing to act as a 
group in support of common mutually beneficial goals. 
Harrison uses Lorenz's study of the evolution of subcontracting relationships among the 
mechanical engineering firms around the French towns of Lyons to illustrate the above point. 
According to Lorenz (1988; 1989), in his interviews with owners and managers, an emotive 
vocabulary emerged that continually emphasised the importance of infonnal ties that go 
beyond contract relationships. This included notions such as partnerships, loyalty, morality, and 
mutual trust (see Murphyet al. 1997:20; Gordon and McCann 2000:4). Harrison also highlights 
the work of Sabel's 1990 study of the industrial districts of France, Germany and Italythat 
emphasised the role of trust in wage negotiations. Formal collective bargaining at the regional 
and national level set only minimum pay scales and working conditions, with local adjustments 
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being negotiated between actors linked to the district competitiveness. Sabel acknowledges that 
strikes occur but they are usually shon lived, 'and the resulting compromises between 
management and 1abour produce agreements in principle rather than detail rules' (Harrison 
1992:478). 
To characterize this as Williamsonian 'incomplete contracting' would be a mistake. 
Sabel's point is precisely that the 'incompleteness' of these 1abour-management 
agreements is not an unfortunate constrnint on the patties, but rather a desirable, 
intended, perhaps even necessary pan of the process (Harrison 1992:478). 
The types of international dynamic discussed above led Harrison (1992) to observe that the 
social re1ationships that Wlderpin the Italian industrial districts collaborative competitiveness, 
may not be sustainable Wlder the constant pressure of competitive forces from larger, more 
powerful, more distant and impersonal global economic forces (Harrison 1992:479). A brief 
examination of both the history and contemporary dynamics of the Italian industrial districts 
appears to suppon many of Harrison's observations and concerns. 
Italian industrial district -The Third Italy 
As indicated above, much of the contemporary economic success of the Third Italy can be 
traced to the institutional arrangements, or regional approaches to collective action between 
government, communities and finns, struck in the immediate post-war period (Potter 1990; 
Harrison 1992; Putnam 1993). Imponantlyto what develops below is that membership of an 
industry cluster in the Emilia-Romagna region has a direct bearing on finns internal 
governance structures (its size in panicular). A vibrant co-operative movement emerged in 
Itaiys Emilia-Romagna region, for example, in agriculture at the end of the World War Two 
{WW11) that was followed by co-operatives in associated activities that included financing, 
technical assistance, training, and marketing. Officials in Emilia-Romagna sometimes refer to 
their system of public economic development agencies as 'incubators "Without walls' (Harrison 
1992:475). 
Many of these institutional structures were nwtured and supponed by the two dominant 
political patties of the day, the Ouistian Democrats and the Italian Communist Patty, both as a 
means to ensure electoral suppoit in the North and to promote economic development 
(Giordano 2001:26). For example, fonned after WW11, the National Confederation of 
Attisans (CNA) defines its member finns as those that consist of fewer than twenty employees, 
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excluding family members (Harrison 1992:475). The Italian government also created regional 
governments in the 1970s, devolving many fonner central government responsibilities to the 
newly established regional governments (Putnam 1993). 
Since the early 1970s, many of Italys regional governments adopted the use of co-operatives, 
trade associations and small business assistance programs as policy instruments to stimulate 
regional economic development. The first of these public-private partnerships in Emilia-
Rornagna was ERVET established in 1974 with support from local banks and trade 
associations such as rnA Other sector specific service centres established in this region 
include Q1ER(1980), which assists the knitwear and fashion sector, CESMA (1983), for 
agricultural machinery, CERCAL (1983) for shoes, and QUASOO (1985) for the construction 
sector. And RESFOR (1986) that was created by the firms of the region to find qualified 
subcontractors from within the region rather then having to draw in labour from outside 
(Harrison 1992:475). 
The region has a population of 4 million living in urban centres of between 100,000 and 
380,000 and is home to over 340,000 SMEs, 200,000 of which are one person operations 
(fsipouri 1999:29). Twenty-five thousand of these SMEs are manufacturing finns that employ 
around 30 percent of the workforce in the region (fsipouri 1999:29). The region has always 
had a strong export focus and all efforts of regional and local government are aimed at 
developing the strength of industry clusters (through assisting with technology diffusion and 
education and training for example), and not at directly subsidising individual finns. Moreover, 
the goal has been to assist in the growth of endogenous firms and not to chase foodoose 
foreign finns to re-locate to the region. 
The success of the Third Italy region is also attributed to the strength of its industry clusters of 
specialised machine-tool manufacturers. Italys machine-tool manufacturers sector is the fourth 
largest in the world behind Japan, Germany and the US, with sales of $3.45 billion in 1997 (Th! 
Ea:n:nist 2 January 1999, pp.57-58). The average size of Italy's tool making £inns is small 
compared to the other major players. Italian machine-tool firms total450 with an average of 70 
employees, while in Germany, for example, 320 firms have an average of 200 employees (Th! 
Ea:n:nistJanuary 1999, pp.57-58). Elena Fenaro of IEOO, which makes machines for melting 
and electrofonning gold, points to the importance of collaboration and customer feedback as 
keys to understanding her firm's success (The Ea:nnist 2 January 1999, pp.57-58). Most of the 
firm's sales ( 60 per cent) are within Italy, and are largely customised machines tailored to the 
need of Itaiys sophisticated goldsmiths. Between IECO and the nearby firm Sisma, they 
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supplynearlyeightyper cent of the world's market for machinery used in making gold jewellery 
(Th>E~t2January1999,pp.57-58). 
Herein lies a problem for many machine-makers and other successful industry clusters in Italy. 
Many Italian industrialists believe that increased competition, both from firms within the 
clusters and from rival international firms, largely brought about by changes in 
commwlications and trade regimes, has the potential to weaken the very collaborative 
foundation of Italy's industry cluster success. 
For example, Barilla, the world's largest pasta manufacturer, prefers to utilise its 100 people 
strong engineering division to develop and modify its machinery and computer software in 
order to maintain its competitive edge on its rivals. Similarly, Safilo, the second largest 
producer of spectacles with a turnover of $345 million in 1997, also has a 50 people strong 
engineering division. Its chainnan, Vittorio Tabacchi, is not comfortable at the thought of 
letting local machine-tool manufacturers modify their machines to Safilo specification, as this 
would allow the information to fall into the hands of competitors (Th> E~t 2 January 
1999, pp.57-58). At the same time, according to others, this threat acts as a stimulus for more 
innovation and the desire to move to the higher value-added end of markets. For example, 
Italy maintains an edge in quality products even in industries where other nations have a 
comparative advantage. Ollnese firms have successfully imported Italian looms and other 
technology in the development of their cashmere industry, and they continue to improve the 
quality of their products. However, the best cashmere garments still come from Biella in Italy. 
Similarly, Southeast Asia dominates the mass market for spectacles, but Italy remains the 
dominant player at the top end of the market. According to 1k E ~t (2 January 1999, 
pp.57-58) cheap glasses (mass-produced) cost $4 to make and sell for $15, whereas Italian 
designer glasses cost $12 and sell for $150. In gold jewellery; leather and tiles, Italian firms 
remain the dominant player at the high value-added end of the muket, even as others have 
come to dominate the lower end (Th>E~t2January1999, pp.57-58). Part of the 
explanation for this lies in the fact that new technologies (IT&Q have allowed the intimacy 
that used to be possible within Italian clusters to take place over longer distances. That is, 
foreign customers are becoming an important source of feedback in their own right to leading 
Italian firms (Th> Ec:r.nm"st2 January 1999, pp.57-58). 
Only time will tell if the institutional structures that have nurtured the development of highly 
successful and innovative industrial districts of the Third Italy will be able to withstand and 
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respond to the increasing pressures of globalisation. Pethaps post-Fordist theory can offers us 
some funher insights to the economic challenges and opportunities that lie ahead. 
What does the post-Fordism debate imply for the future of regional development 
policy? 
N ro-SdJurrpetarians 
For neo-Schumpeterians, developments in infonnation technology, ie. microelectronics-based 
products, processes and communication networks lie at the centre of the next long phase of 
capitalist economic development. 1his fifth Kondratiev is to be characterised as the 
infonnation economy paradigm and will forever alter patterns of wo:rk and consumption, and 
the location and mode of production (in this way the following is also consistent with neo-
Smithian logic of flexible specialisation). 
The fifth Kondratiev is speculated to be innovation and knowledge intensive and based on 
infonnation technology canier branches such as computers, electronic capital goods, software, 
telecoms, robotics, electronic data banks, and infonnation services. It also involves a shifting 
emphasis in production from scale economies, rigid technologies and compartmentalization, 
towards scope economies, flexible manufacturing systems and integrated design, production 
and rnazketing. It involves the development of new computer netwo:rk-based forms of intra 
and inter-organizational collaboration and communication and has seen the rise of new 
patterns of wo:rk including tele-wo:rking, home-wo:rking and flextble hours. The fifth 
Kondratiev involves new patterns of consumption such as tele-shopping, enabled by advanced 
teleconmrunication systems and gives rise to new geographies of production and consumption 
based on distance-shrinking technologies (Amin 1994:17). 
Understood in these terms, neo-Schumpeterian economics (NSE) is not a theoretical 
movement that seeks to fundamentally challenge the Wlderlying dynamic of the capitalist 
productive system. As Phillimore argues: 
NSE starts and ends with the dynamics of capitalist growth, but attempts to harness 
them more effectively by using collective policy instruments and actors and by 
setting a relatively high social and economic floor to the competitive processes 
inherent in the system, thus imparting a more progressive character to it (Phllimore 
1998:66). 
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Importantly, from a public policy perspective, the transition to a neo-Schumpeterian model for 
growth is not assumed to be inevitable, but r.ather to be predicated on profound changes in 
attitudes and behaviour, and in institutional priorities (Amin 1994:17). Indeed government is 
seen as a key agent for facilitating change to the new infonnation economy via its role as 
provider for many of the supply-side inputs necessary to consolidate the necessary social, 
economic and structural change. :MUch of the government's role evolves around developing 
policies and programs that stimulate the take-up of new technologies and production 
processes, and encour.ages an environment for continuous innovation and learning. 1hese 
supply-side policies and progr.arns include: training and education to encour.age research, 
innovation and new skill infonnation; support for technology upgrading and indusuy-
university research links; initiatives to develop advanced telecommunications networks; 
str.ategic support for new industries and new services; and support for learning and adaptation 
of new management and organisational cultures (Amin 1994:17). 
In the Austr.alian context, these neo-Schumpeterian vie"WS and policy recormnendations were 
championed in the Austr.alian Business Foundation's (ABF) 1997 report 1he Hij; Raul ar the 
LawRoui 1he report, prepared by the University of Western Sydneys Professor Jane Marceau 
et al. ( 1997) proposed a number of policies and pathways for the transition of the Austr.alian 
economy into an innovative rich, knowledge intensive learning economy. 1his included 
measures aimed at encouraging business and industry networks, promoting R&D, building 
global rnaiketing and distribution channels for local industry, and dramatically increasing 
investing in public infr.astructure. More recently, in February 2000, some 500 participants 
assembled in Melbourne to attend Australia's first National Innovation Summit -a joint 
business Commonwealth government initiative. :Many of these neo-Schumpeterian vie"WS and 
ideas were discussed and an Innovation Summit Implementation Group (ISIG) was established 
to report to government by August that year. At the time of writing the Howard government 
was yet to respond to the ISIG recommendations. 
N eo-Srrithitms 
Neo-Smithians would also be comfortable 'With much of the above, however, because they 
place more importance on the role of finns in endogenous development and the spread of 
industrial districts, they tend to emphasize rnicroeconornic reform; via local collaboration and 
local fleXIbility. As Sabel argues: 
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Like the finns, the localities know that they must survive in a turbulent economic 
environment; like the finns, they must accommodate volatility through flexibility, 
though for localities this naturally means facilitating the recombination of resources 
among companies, so that the latter may better redeploy them internally. And as 
with the finn, many localities will renovate themselves onlywith the greatest 
difficulty(Sabel1989:129). 
Labour market reforms (flexibilit}1, for example, could occur through greater collaboration 
between trade unions and employers' associations as they work to develop pools of local craft 
labour, i.e. an increased focus on vocational and technical training, with particular attention to 
re-qualification of the senU..skilled workers (Sabel1989:144). National education and training 
institutional arrangements could be integrated into the local by these same collaborative bodies 
in order to maximise their impact on the particular specialised flexible finns in a given locality. 
The implication is that the same collaborative processes could work across a range of other 
areas such as education, health, infrastructure, the environment and social welfare, for example. 
As discussed in dtapter one, this is the mechanism used to balance questions of efficiency, 
equity and environmental sustainability. These 'high trust' collaborative arrangements would 
have the effect of strengthening both supra-local institutions and, at the same time, create a 
macro-regulatory system of flexible specialisation (Sabel1989:145). Unlike the neo-
Schumpeterians that see government as a key agent for change, neo-Smithians would be more 
comfortable with government as a 'facilitator' of change. One suspects Sabel and others would 
be more in tune with Henton's (1997) notion of the resurgence of 'civil societ)l, and the role of 
'civic entrepreneurs' as the agents of change (to be discussed below). 
Regu/atim throry 
Regulation theoruts, on the other hand, tend to have more socialist inclinations than the other 
streams of thought discussed above. Accordingly, they are far less certain and, therefore, less 
prescriptive on the shape of a new era of capitalism founded on rapid technological change and 
more fleXIble modes of production. Esser and Hirsh (1989) for example paint a very 
pessimistic picture of the furure of new models of capitalism based on their obsetvation of the 
impacts of change on workers in communities in Germany. Wtthin the new mode of 
accumulation they outline five tendencies or patterns that are emerging: 
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... newtechnology:-based work, representing lay-offs, worker segmentation and 
social marginalization; a strengthened industrialization of the service sector, 
representing changes in the social structure towards white-collar strata, and the 
erosion of collective identities via the use of new technologies; enforced mobility in 
labour nmkets provoked by new geogrnphies of employment, resulting in a 
breakdown of family and conununityties; growing social polarization between high 
productivity/high consumption strata and low-wage or no-wage strata; and an 
individualization and pluralization of life-styles as the result of the preceding 
tendencies (Amin 1994:18). 
More fundamentally they see dramatic changes in the regulatoty framework governing this new 
mode of accwnulation and argue that this process would entrench inequality at the heart of the 
new system 
1his they characterize as a strengthening of monopolistic regulation and governance 
of the economy. They stress the role of advanced technologies in integrating finns 
and industries, of new small finns networks and of processes of international 
concentration and coordination in the hands of major finns and financial 
institutions. They signal the weakening of trade unions as a "regulatory' institution. 
They envisage a scaling down and a reorientation of welfare services towards the 
'economically active' groups in society. Finally, they anticipate a new cotporatism 
involving state and industty alliances in the high technology sector and select groups 
of privileged workers (quoted fromAmin 1994:18). 
Jessop (1994) warns that with the transition to this new mode of capitalist production 
trnditional policies associated with the Ke}Tlesian Welfare State are increasingly becoming 
subordinate to the state's needs to promote innovative, flexible production and an open 
economyQessop 1994:263). That is these processes are placing increased pressure on states to 
create flextble labour markets and/ or remove the constraints to international competition as 
well as provide the supply-side inputs to underpin economic competitiveness. Jessop descnbes 
this restructuring and reorientation of the economic and social function as a type of 
'Schumpeterian workfare state'. He cautions, however, that unlike the Fordist era that had a 
strong reinforcing ideology seeming the rules of the game, a role played by the US as the 
dominant hegemon, post-Fordism as a self-reproducing growth regime has yet to secure a 
dominant ideology of its own. Impoztant to the argument of this thesis, what Jessop does 
obsetve, however, is the 'hollowing out' of the nation state in the emerging context of a 
simultaneous internationalised and regionalised post-Fordist mode of accumulation Qessop 
1994:264-266). According to Amin: 
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The process is said to represent a reordering of state· economy relations and state 
functions in a dual direction. The first is an enhanced role for supranational 
institutions and political configurations in providing regulatory authority and 
strategic guidance for the world economy. The second is a transfer of authority 
downwards to the local state, which increasingly asswnes the role of customising 
local supply--side conditions to undetpin Schwnpeterian competitiveness (Arnin 
1994:28). 
The second aspect of the 'hollowing out' thesis is most salient to this work Quoting Arnin and 
Robins (1990), Jessop makes the following points: globalisation of the world economy means 
that 'the local economy can only be seen as a node within a global economic network [with] no 
meaningful existence outside this context' Qessop 1994:271). As discussed in Cllapter one of 
this wotk, it would appear that although the notion of the nation·state is being challenged at 
many levels by the process of globalisation, somewhat paradoxically, its activities and influence 
at the regional and local level are in many ways being heightened. Even within an increasingly 
global economy we can observe a greater focus by policY" makers on local and regional 
development, particularly with regard to forming regional parmerships, regional labour market 
policies, education and training, technological transfer, infrastructure, local venture capital, 
innovation centres, science pa00 Oessop 1994:271; OECD 1997 &1999). 
Jessop characterises the emergence of local 're·engagement' by the nation state as a shift in 
functions downward towards issues associated with local 'governance' and away from 
traditional concerns of local govenunent. 
Thus local unions, local chambers of conunen;e, local venture capital, local 
education bodies, local research centres and local states may enter into 
arrangements to regenerate the local economy. This trend is also reinforced by the 
central state's inability to pursue sufficiently differentiated and sensitive 
programmes to tackle the specific problems of panicular localities. It therefore 
devolves such tasks to local states and provides the latter with general support and 
resources Oessop 1994:272). 
In terms of the governance of the Schwnpeterian workfare state, according to Jessop, three 
possible regulatoryfonns could emerge. The first is nea.liberalism, i.e. market· led reform; 
seconclly; nea.coxporatist, i.e. strategies that draw on selective institutional interests mediated 
bythe state; thirdly, nea.statism, i.e. state guided economic reorganisation Oessop 1994:266--
267).1he point Jessop is making is that anyone of the three regulatoryregimes is as likelyto 
emerge as the other, depending on the institutional legacy and the balance of political forces in 
specific social fonnations. Moreover, as in the case of the activities of the European Union, for 
example, he observes elements of the three regulatory regimes combined within and across 
different levels of political organisations Oessop. 1994:266). 
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Cdlaharatim the ke:~ building saial capitd 
Much of what Jessop observes above is confinned in a series of case studies undertaken in the 
US by Henton et al in 1997. In Grassrats LeddersfraNewE~, Henton eta! profile four 
communities- Austin, Texas; develand, Ohio; WIChita, Kansas; and Silicon Valley, California 
- and the two states of Arizona and Florida, to conclude their success is built around new 
collaborntive approaches to achieving regional development. 
Communities across America are figuring out that world-class economies need 
world-class communities. They are experimenting with new types of public-private 
relationships and organizations to keep moving forward in a time of change. They 
are building a new type of community- an economic community. Economic 
communities are places with snong, responsive relationships between the economy 
and community that provide companies and communities with sustained advantage 
and resiliency. Economic communities integrnte the economy (the world of work) 
and the community (the world of living). These communities have learned that the 
secret of successful regions is effective collaborntion among business, govenunent, 
education, and community leaders in addressing new challenges and opportunities 
(Henton 1997 :5). 
In a similar finding Putnam's ( 1993) study of Italian regions concludes that the economic 
performance of Italys northern regions is historically better than its southern regions because 
of the community links and relationships which are a key component of the northern regions 
'social capital'. According to Putnam, social capital is made up of the networks, norms, and 
trust that enables community collaborntion in the pursuit of shared regional objectives (Putnam 
1993:167). For Putnam, a community in which trust and networking (social capital) is strong, 
and where leadership, organisation and problem solving (human capital) is high will be better 
placed in terms of grasping oppottunities than communities where one or both forms of 
capital is missing (Grny&Lawerence 2002:283). 
In contrast to Jessop, however, :Henton sees not the 'state' but a new class of 'civic' 
entrepreneurs as being the major catalysts for new collaborntive arrangements that underpin 
the economic community model discussed above. Gvic entrepreneurs often come from 
business, but can come from govenunent, education and other sectors. They provide 
leadership and build relationships between the economy and the community and bring people 
and institutions together across jurisdictions to work on the long-term development of their 
region (Henton 1997:6}. :Henton drn'WS on the earlier observations of Drucker (1995} in 
developing his concept of the renewal in emphasis on the civil sector and civic entrepreneurs. 
According to Drucker. 
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The knowledge society has to be a society of three sectors: a public sector, that is, 
govenunent; a private sector, that is, business; and a social sector ... it is in and 
through the social sector that a modem developed society can again create 
responsibility and achieve citizenship, can give individuals (and especially knowledge 
people) a sphere in which they can make a difference in society, and a sphere in 
which theyre·create community(quoted in Henton 1997:17) 
A common thread that runs through the work of Henton and Jessop is the notion of an 
emerging 'Schumpeterian wotkfare state'. And in the case of Henton, a direct link also exists to 
Schurnpeter' s earlier work on the role of entrepreneurs acting as agents of economic change, 
which undetpins Henton's notion of civic entrepreneurs (Henton 1997:31). 
Perhaps one of the most salient aspects of the spatial approaches to economic development 
policy discussion thus far is that, because of the changes to the nature of global production, 
enhancing the competitiveness of sub. national economies has become an increasingly 
important political issue. 1his process has increased the activity of the state in the sense that in 
most cases it is the major provider of the supply-side public goods needed to lift the 
competitiveness of regions in areas such as facilitating greater collaboration, education, 
telecommunications and transport infrastructure (OEQ) 1997 & 1999). To achieve this end 
politicians, in democratic states at least, have to pay greater attention to the varying 
performance of their regional economies in the need to both lift competitiveness and influence 
employment and living standards in an effort to gain continued electoral support (WISeman 
1998:38). 
Implications for small-industrialised nations 
Much of what has been discussed so far draws examples from regional economies in Jarge 
industrialised nations where endogenous capital remain dominant. Yet globalisation and the 
spread of MNG activities have particular implications for key industries and knowledge 
intensive sectors of small-industrialised economies (Marceau 1999:4-5). 
Understanding the structure and innovative capacity of firms operating in the domestic market 
is essential to understanding the potential of applying ideas associated with post-Fordist 
literature, i.e. networking, clustering partnerships, collaboration. The problem here is that 
industrialised economies like Australia, New Zealand and Ireland are characterised by small 
populations, small domestic markets and, compared to Jarge industrialised economies, have 
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limited private funds to spend on innovative re1ated expenditures such as R&D (a role 
traditionallyp1ayed bythe public sector). 
Austr.ilia's industry base is made up of three types of businesses: large domestic oligopolies, 
foreign multinational companies, and small- to medium- sized enterprises. Given the high 
:MNC finns presence (discussed in Otapter two), the historical absence of an export culture in 
manufacturing, a weak venture capital market and the distance to key markets, most Austr.ilian 
owned finns remain small by international comparison. According to the ABS statistics, for 
example, in 1995 of the 393,000 finns operating in Austr.ilia 93 per cent had less than 20 
employees and 7 per cent or some 27,000 finns had 20 or more employees (Sheehan 1999b:2). 
The share of Australian finns with less than 20 employees is almost twice that of the US, and, 
conversely, the US share of finns with 500 or more employees is twice that of Austr.ilia 
(Sheehan 1999b:2). 
The difficulty for Australian policy-makers is that foreign owned or controlled finns have 
traditionally had limited commitment to innovation, R&D and export activity in Australia, 
operating as they do through vertical linkages and intra firm supply chains (and management 
hierarchies). A recent OEQ) report on the Australian economy concluded a major structural 
problem remains its weak inter-industry linkages due in part to the over dependence on 
multinational finns (Lucarelli 2003: 84). According to the same report this creates the situation 
where production and knowledge flow links are not embedded in the local education, training 
and resean.:h institutions. The problem here is that multinational finns have dominant 
positions in Australian high-technology and medium-high-technology manufacturing industry-
the very target of much of policy development tools espoused bypost-Fordist literature eg 
industry dusters and regional innovation systems (Sheehan 1999b:7; DI1R2002). 
Given the structure of Austr.ilia's industry base and the importance of technology finns to the 
knowledge-based economy, a policy to increase high technology exports and R&D expenditure 
would need to target and rely on the commitment of foreign-owned finns. The dilemma here is 
that, for the most part, these finns' priorities are guided by their global production strategy and 
head office concerns and not, necessarily, by domestic concerns for the need to foster 
innovation and a knowledge-based economy in Austr.ilia. Resean.:h also indicates that although 
small Australian finns as a whole tend not to export or spend on R&D those that do have a 
much higher export and expenditure on innovation ratio, particularly in manufacturing 
(Sheehan 1999b:5; DI1R 2002). Industry and regional policy in Austr.ilia' s case would need to 
consider how to specifically target and win the commitment to the process of small high-tech 
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Austr.ilian finns that exhibit a higher propensity to export, undertake R&D and commit to 
local collaborative process. 
Moreover, the central question here is whether many of the foreign finns that dominate nruch of 
Australia's industrial base are willing to act collaboratively'With other endogenous finns, 
government and local communities to achieve broader regionaV industry development objectives. 
It is perhaps the case that 'Will be determined by how a region fits into the supply and value-chain 
activities of particular MNCs (and/ or where the value-added activity is located). 
Much of the often cited examples in post-Fordist and economic geography literature, in 
contrast, are characterised by regional economies where the industrial base is 'home base' to 
finns that are often export focused and/ or have ready access to large consumer 111a.1kets. 
Moreover, in the US and Italy, for example, local and regional governments are more powerful 
than is the case in Australia's particular model of competitive Federalism (discussed in Otapter 
two). The three tiers of government in Australia tend to operate in isolation and compete for 
foot-lose capital, which often mitigates against greater government collaboration in areas such 
as regional, and indusny development and planning. Perhaps in regions such as the Third Italy 
there is sufficient critical mass and vested interest to support the necessary institutional 
structures that underpin local collaborative processes for economic renewal and ongoing 
innovation. Issues such as sufficient level critical mass and the balance between endogenous 
and foreign finns remain more problematic in a small-industrialised economy like Australia, for 
example, particularly in high technology manufacturing (the next chapter also highlights the 
same problem in the New Zealand econonlJ'?. 
Conclusion 
As this chapter has argued, post-Fordism remains a debate, rather than a universally accepted 
theory. \Xohether we are currently 'Wimessing a genuine transition from one dominant mode of 
capital accumulation and mode of regulation to another remains highly problematic. We can 
obsetve the world's transition from an industrial age to infonnation age with the advent of 
rapid advances in infonnation technology and shrinking transaction and transport costs. On 
balance, however, modem finns, and in particular MNCs, exh.tbit a propensity to engage in 
hybrid forms of production, producing both long and short runs of particular products 
engaging in both flexible and standardised production. Therefore, a more evolutionary 
interpretation of change, which stresses a mixture of continuity and change from one period to 
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another, is perhaps a more appropriate interpretation of current changes in the international 
political economy (Arnin 1994:3; Tomenay and Ward 2001). 
Under this scenario the particular mode of production, flexible specialisation or mass 
production, is the result of the profit maximisation strategy of individual firms, and is 
determined by its 'place' in a particular pattern of international or domestic production. Place 
in this instance refers to a firm's geographical location and institutional environment, as well as 
its place in the value chain of production. A key characteristic of globalisation is that 
production can now be broken down into its component parts - design, manufacturing, 
assembly and distribution - and firms can spread these activities across countries (or within 
national boarders) to exploit transaction and production cost differences. 
What the preceding discussion on post-Fordism tells us, from its competing theoretical 
viewpoints and various case studies, is that the institutional structure of a particular location is 
often the detennining factor in this process. Whether the institutional structures are a state 
construct, the result of private sector or civic collaboration, or a combination of all three, is 
dependent on the histotyof a given coWit:l)ls (or region's) particular institutional legacy and 
balance of socio-political arrangements. While the forces of globalisation have reduced state 
activity in many areas, it has also heightened the role of government in enhancing the national 
and local institutional environment to support individuals and finns in a continuous process of 
learning. 
1he question that remains, however, is can these types of successful supportive institutional 
arrangements be created, or transferred, from one region to another? The discussion on the 
1hird Italy, and Henton's case study of industtyclusters in the USA demonstrates success 
depends on the level of commitment and support, in tenns of personneL time and resources, 
of the stakeholders engaged in the local collaborative planning processes. Whether it is 
government the private sector or a regional organisation that leads this process depends on the 
particular socio-political histoty of a given jurisdiction. However, government maintains a 
dominant role in shaping the national and local institutional environment in which change 
occurs. What seems important is the creation of a local transparent and collaborative decision-
making framewmk that draws knowledge, expertise, resources and leadership into a shared 
long-term planning process to manage change. However, as Otapter two and this Cltapter 
argue, Australia's particular type of competitive Federalism, with each tier of government for 
the most part working in isolation, and its industrial composition, tend to work against the 
development nationaVlocal collaborative processes. 
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The most salient point to post· Fordist literature is that it elevates the importance of the 
instirutional environment, concrete personal relations, social capital, collaborative networks and 
soft and hard infrastructure in undetpinning innovative, economic activity. From this 
understanding regional development policy represents a collective response to support 
strategies for ongoing economic and social renewal. The strategy in many instances is to stop 
leakages and the erosion of the financial, physical, social and human capital and to enhance 
value·added activity in the local production system. This contrasts with traditional neoclassical 
economic themythat assumes spatial patterns of development, and relations of production and 
distnbution of goods and services, are determined by rrmket forces and price relationships 
alone, and are, therefore, essentially untouched by sociological, cultural and political 
considerations. As Arnin (1994:3) has suggested elsewhere, socio·economic history is best 
considered a complex and heterogenous process of many determinants. 
Contributions from the economic geography literature have been particularly important in 
identifying the localised capabilities that distinguish innovative and vibrant regions from poorer 
performing regions. Similarly, nea.Schurnpeterians emphasize the importance of the role of 
'innovation' in the emerging infonnation age and stress government's active role in facilitating 
the take--up of new technologies and production processes to encourage an environment for 
continuous innovation and learning. These supp}r-side policies and programs include: training 
and education, innovation and new skill infonnation; support for technology upgrading and 
industry-university research links; initiatives to develop advanced telecommunications 
networks; strategic support for new industries and new services; and support for learning and 
adaptation of new management and organisational cuhures. This approach suggests that 
learning is not the sole province of finns nor is it the sole product of market relationships but 
of equal if not more importance is social structures and relationships. 
Moreover, but perhaps not sutprising, the same collaborative processes that undetpin post· 
Fordist theory and approaches can also better balance concerns for efficacy, and equity. These 
similarities are in the emphasis both place on the importance of 'bottom-up' connnunity-driven 
initiative and the development of local planning processes that better link government, the 
private sector and communities to jointly address social and economic problems. 
Cllapter five presents a look at the role of industry dusters (and networks) in more critical 
detail and particularly :Michael Porter's contribution to the more recent international resurgence 
in regionalism. It would appear that many national governments (and regions) around the 
world are turning to industry clusters as policy tools to address issues of regional disparity, 
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indusuy and regional development in an era of increased globalisation. The themes explored in 
this next chapter include the inherent tension in Porter's cluster analysis, seeing where 
industrial clusters sit in terms of the broader neo-liberal post-Fordist debates, and the problems 
for policy-makers of introducing a cluster-led development strategy in small peripheral 
economies dominated by foreign capital and a neo-liberal regulatory regime. 
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Chapter 5 
PORTER AND THE SHIFT FROM 'COMPARATIVE' TO 'COMPETITIVE' 
ADVANTAGE: MAKING SPATIAL ECONOMIC ANALYSIS MAINSTREAM 
Introduction 
An important theme in international approaches to industry policy and regional development 
has been the emergence of the in:lustry duster throry that draws much of its theoretical basis from 
Potter's seminal book 1be Cmp!titire A dum!a~ ifNatims ( 1990). Whilst Potter popularised the 
concept of an industry cluster, its origins as an economic development tool remain uncertain 
(Anderson 1994; Henton et al1997; Rosenfeld 2001 a &b). Nonetheless, it seems that policy-
makers around the world, across the political spectrum, have modified elements of the cluster 
framewoxk in developing micro policies that enhance economic development opportunities for 
their 'regions' (Anderson 1994; Henton 1997; Porter 1998a; Enright 2000; Rosenfeld 2001 a&b). 
A cluster development framewoxk is concerned with the way a nation organises its economic 
activity on a spatial basis. In this sense it is an organising strategy that links agglomeration 
(externalities) and industrial complex (input-output models) effects with post-Fordist 
approaches (discussed in <llapter four). A cluster development strategy is concerned with 
industry structures (of related firms) including their technical input-output relationships, as well 
as economies of scale, scope, and infonnation flows and knowledge spillovers (or untraded 
interdependencies). At the same time a mature cluster, -what Enright (2000} descnbes as an 
'woxking or overachieving cluster', is concerned with focusing stakeholder attention on the 
ongoing improvement of the collaborative environment (institutional framework) of the region 
in which firms operate - as well as the human and physical infrastructure of the local 
production system. 
The main appeal of cluster-based approaches is a that they focus public policy away from 
directly assisting firms (the 'picking winners' problem) towards private/ public collaboration 
aimed at building and stimulating the innovative capacity of people and industry in a given 
locale. Government's role is to improve the institutional supports of the cluster, i.e. education 
and training, research and business services. It also has a role in supporting the productive 
inputs of clusters - the human resources, physical infrastructure, scientific infrastructure, the 
level of intervention will be determined by the particular historical political arrangements of 
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given states (regions). It has been Porter's wotk that has in manywa.ys been responsible for 
popularising post-Fordist ideas into mainstream business economic literature and policy. 
The major part of this chapter seeks to critically evaluate Porter's cluster theory and position 
his analysis in tenns of the broader debates with the post-Fordist literature discussed in the 
previous chapter. It highlights its limits arising from its association with neoclassical theory and 
the neo-libernl policy agenda. In particuJar, the New Zealand case study is used in the second 
part of this chapter to highlight the problematic nature of the adoption of an industry clusters 
approach for policy-makers in small periphernl economies where the regulatory regime is 
dominated by a neo-libernllogic. The emphasis here is on exploring the necessary (pre-) 
conditions conducive to developing industry clusters and the problems for policy-makers that 
emerge when these conditions are absent. The final part of this chapter explores the 
relationship between business and institutional netwooo and industry clusters, which for the 
most part are treated as separate and/ or used interchangeably in spatial literature. The question 
here is whether the former is a necessary, but not sufficient, precondition in developing the 
latter. 
The global/local paradox 
Interestingly, the adoption by policy-makers of industry dusters has occurred during a period 
in which the growing mobility of international capital and globalisation has, according to the 
neo-libernl view, challenged the state's ability to manage industry and regional policy in the 
national economy. In contrast, Porter's insights on the detenninants of international 
competitiveness suggest a role for government in promoting industry by supporting the supply 
side inputs (microeconomic) to local production processes. Porter's wo:rk highlights an 
inherent paradox that has come to chatacterise the globalised economic activity of the last 
decade or so. On the one hand, globalisation appears to diminish the importance of both the 
nation-state and location because of the increasing mobility of international capital, changes in 
global production processes (chatacterised by the emergence of global corporations) and 
advances in communication and information technology. On the other hand, as others have 
obsetved, there has been an increase in the concentration of industries and economic activity in 
particular regions and increased state support of industry activity. This is what Enright (2000) 
has described as the simultaneous globalised and localised tendency of globalised activity and is 
a re-occurring theme of this thesis. 
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This apparent paradox reflects the fact that as capital expands some firms maintain hierarchical 
controls and concentrate value-added activities in their home market and some other key 
centres. In contrast, others firms adopt a less-hierarchical mode of operation, combining local 
and global fonns of industrial networking entrenching themselves in the local production 
process (see Amin and :Malmberg 1992:245). Finn-state re1ationships (and policy approaches) 
differ depending on whether interaction is between a finn in its home market or a host counuy 
govenunent dealing with foreign capital (see Dicken 1994). There will be a mix of corporate 
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governance structures of finns operating in a given location and this will dete11Iline the 
parameters of government/ market interdependencies at the regional level as well as the type of 
cluster approach to be emphasised (Olaiton et al2001). 
Wby Por.ter? 
Potter's w01k on indusuy competitiveness, in particular, is important to this research for five 
reasons. First, Porter makes the obseiVation that it is regions and their firms that compete in 
the global economy not nations (consistent 'With the above). Consequently competitive 
advantage is created and sustained through a local process where national economic structures, 
values, cuhures and histories contnbute to competitiveness (Potter 1990:19). Secondly, he 
elevates the theoretical concept of 'competitive advantage' over the dominant economic 
analysis of international competitiveness of comparative advantage. Third, he advances the 
importance of the spatial phenomenon of 'indusuy clusters' as a key to explaining why some 
regions' industries are more successful than others. Fourthly, he makes the point that you don't 
have to be big (a multinational) or into 'hi-tech' to be successful in the global economy. He 
argues that the core of the Gennan economy consists of $25 million to $100 million companies 
while in Italy it is $10 million to $50 million companies (Potter 1998b:15). Finally, Potter's 
work makes the links between indusuyand regional development policy and the need for 
specialised infrastructure (soft and hard) as a key to the development of internationally 
competitive regions. 
Moreover, Porter's cluster thesis warnmts separate consideration from other spatial approaches 
because there remain key differences in these approaches both at the level of policy and theory. 
Although sharing much in common 'With manypost-Fordist observations, Potter's theoretical 
approach is, nonetheless, steeped in a neo-liberal, business management discourse that 
promotes market outcomes and cautions against government intervention. Unlike post-
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Fordism, Porter is not seeking to offer an alternative to the dominant neo-liberal economic 
paradigm Rather, he seeks to understand the 'local' determinants (the indusuyconditions, i.e. 
inputs, competition, demand and linkages) that undetpin the competitiveness of finns in a 
global market. Like Regulation and neo-Schumpeterian theorists, Porter acknowledges the 
importance of the institutional environment (collaboration and macroeconomic stabilitY} in 
developing sustainable indusuy clusters. Most importantly, however, for Porter the institutional 
environment only provides the context for finns to pursue wealth; institutional conditions will 
not create wealth in themselves onlyfinns do this by producing high value products (Porter 
1998a:4). Like neo-Smithians, Porter believes that wealth creation depends on the 
microeconomic foundations of competition in the economy and, ultimately, this resides in the 
innovative capacity of its finns as they move to more productive strategies and increased 
creaUVlty. 
Of particular importance to small-industrialised peripheral economies, unlike neo-Smithians 
and neo-Schumpeterians, Porter argues that creating higher value for products does not 
necessarily mean moving to high-technology goods or flexible specialisation production 
techniques (nor does it preclude this). Rather, Porter makes the point that a nation can be 
prosperous and productive in vinually any field because what matters is how a nation competes 
not what indusuyit competes in (Porter 1998b:3; Stevens 1995). He uses Italian shoes and 
tourism as examples of 'mundane products' that can create value added through strong brands 
(and image), marketing, design, and quality of products (and experience). He makes the point 
that to suppon high wages (and this is the goal of indusuy clustering) nations need to apply 
better levels of technology to develop unique products and production processes that 
competitors can not easily produce or can only produce after delay (Potter 1998b:3). So in 
terms of small peripheral industrialised economies, such as Australia, Porter's insights are 
particularly salient. 
Ouster txarrp/es 
According to Porter, dusters provide the building blocks of a productive, innovative economy 
(Porter 1998b:8). Examples of clusters used in his works come from Holland, Norway and the 
US. Holland's flower industry has over 60 per cent of the world's fresh cut flower expon 
market yet Holland has very little arable land and very unpredictable weather (Potter 1990:85-
86). Pan of Holland's success, according to Porter, is to be found in the five institutions 
dedicated to research and development of flower growing, and in its specialised glasshouse, 
flower handling and shipping-related industries. The Dutch financial sector also offers 
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specialised financial services tailored to fresh cut flower industry needs, including the gr.m.ting 
of loans using bulbs as collaternl. Another industry cluster example can be foWld in Norway, 
'Which accoWlts for 10 per cent of all the world's seaborne transportation despite being a small 
economy. According to Porter, the reason is to be foWld in the variety of related industries and 
suppliers and specialised institutions that have come to support and shape Norways maritime 
industries. This includes the banking and financial sector that provide specialised financing to 
Norwegian ship builders and the Norwegian universities that support and Wldertake substantial 
maritime R&D. 
In sum, there is a critical mass of unique lmowledge and capability in Norway in the 
maritime field that carne together from the chain-reaction effect of combining a 
group of finns, industries, and institutions in the same field in the same place 
(Porter 1998b:8). 
Finally, Porter cites the wine industry cluster in California that consists of about 440 wineries 
and approximately 3,000 independent growers of grapes that supply those wineries and a large 
array of institutions that support both groups (Porter 1998b:8-9). Specialised trade associations 
collect data about the industry from aroWld the world and specialised trade journals, 
ne-wsletters, and magazines published in California build the industry reputation locally and 
internationally. The University of California at Davis supports the cluster and is regarded as 
one of the world's leading centres for wine-making technology. Through these processes and 
linkages a critical mass has emerged that supports ongoing innovation and wealth creation 
within the Californian wine cluste~". 
Porter's obsexvations have been a major catalyst to the resurgence in spatial policy approaches 
to industry policy and regional development - yet important tensions and contr.ldictions remain 
in his analysis. 
Critique of Porter's model 
The critique of Porter's wotk focuses on, firstly, the theoretical assumptions of his modeL 
secondly, on the inherent tensions within it and, finally, on his policy prescriptions. 
PbilacpbU:al orign if Parter's Ukas 
Wtth the publication of his best selling books Cnrpet:iJir.e Strale[!l (1980), Cnrpet:iJir.e Adatnta~ 
{1985) and 7be ~AdumfawifNatitn (1990) Porter elevated the 'region' as centtal unit 
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of contempor.uy economic analysis and establishes himself as one of the world's leading 
authorities on the notion of competitive advantage. It could be argued that the primary 
purpose of his 1990 work, including case studies in ten high performing nations, was to 
provide the empirical case to elevate his ideas on a 'new economic paradigm' of competitive 
advantage, over the dominant Heckscher and Ohlin's model of comparative advantage. 
As Porter discusses (1990:10-30), according to Adam Smith's notion of ahduteadvantage, a 
nation exports an item if it is the world's low-cost producer. David Ricardo refined this notion 
to that of~ advantage, recognising that market fon:es "Will allocate a nation's resources 
to those industries where it is relatively more productive. 1his means that a nation may still 
import a good where it is the low-cost producer if it is even more productive in producing 
other goods. In Ricardo's theory, trnde was based on labour productivity differences between 
nations. The most dominant contempor.uynotion of comparative advantage stems from the 
work of Heckscher and Ohlin. Their approach is based on the notion that all nations have 
equivalent technology but differ in their endowments of factors of production such as land, 
labour, natural resources and capital. Consequently, nations gain factor-based comparative 
advantage in industries that make intensive use of the factors they use in abundance. However, 
for the theory to work there are assumed no economies of scale, that technologies everywhere 
are identical, that products are undifferentiated, and that the pool of national factors is fixed 
Moreover, the theory assumes that factors such as skilled labour and capital do not move 
among nanons. 
In an era of increased globalisation many of these assumptions simply do not reflect 
contempor.uy industry structures or patterns of international trnde. The assumptions that 
undetpin factor comparative advantage were, as Porter (1990:10-30) argues, more persuasive in 
the eighteenth century and nineteenth centuries. During this time many industries were 
fragmented, production was more labour and less skilled intensive, and much trnde reflected 
difference in economic conditions, natural resources and capital. These factor conditions may 
remain important in industries dependant on natural resources, in those where unskilled or 
semiskilled labour is a dominant portion of costs, and in those where technology is simple and 
widely available. However, many modem finns are characterised by the use of sophisticated 
technology (and face constant technological change), economies of scale and have highly 
skilled and specialised labour. Moreover, most products are differentiated and buyer needs vary 
in different rnarkets. Most finns are knowledge-intensive with the role of factors being less 
significant to costs, and capital and labour is highly mobile. Therefore, according to Porter, the 
theory of comparative advantage in an era of increased globalisation is rendered obsolete. 
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According to Porter, govenunent' s role is to develop and promote policies that enhance what 
he has identified as the universal 'attnbutes' of competitive advantage. From his 1990 wmk 
Porter concludes that there are four fundamental attnbutes of competitive advantage of a 
nation (region): 
1. FactorOJnditions- access to specialised pools of talen~ technology, infrastructure and 
capital; 
2. Demand OJnditions- sophisticated demand in the home market; 
3. Related and Supporting Industries- a critical mass of local suppliers of critical inputs; and 
4. Finn Stntegy, Structure andRiv.Wy- local competition. 
Porter ( 1990:71-72) represents these four attnbutes diagranunatically as points on a diamond of 
interacting competitive forces. Porter explains that to be competitive, a region must continually 
upgrade itself, become more sophisticated in how it competes, move to a higher level of skills 
and technology to continually improve the quality of its services and other inputs to its 
productive base. lherefore, ultimately for Porter, competitiveness is all about increases in 
productivity; regions that are able to increase the value of outputs for each of their inputs will 
be more competitive relative to other regions. It should also be remembered that Porter's work 
on the determinants of competitiveness were developed by examining regions that were already 
economically vibrant and whose industry sttucture is dominated by the activities of 
endogenous capital. 
Porter only briefly discusses his idea of industry clusters in his 1990 publication (see Porter 
1990:164-175). Indeed, there is a long tradition of economic thought tha~ in a far more 
sophisticated way, deals with many of the themes touched on by Porter's analysis, i.e. 
externalities, agglomeration, innovation and cluster theory (see Cllapter four; Murphy, Pfister 
and Wu 1997; Gordon and Ward 2001). What Porter does is promote industry dusters as a 
means of understanding the processes regions (and their firms) need to focus on if they are to 
lift competitiveness in an era of increased global competition and rapid technological change. 
Nonetheless, according to Porter the ultimate challenge to regions and their firms is to get their 
price right (i.e. increase their prod~ so they can be more competitive in a relative sense 
to other firms and regions. 1his creates an unresolved tension in Porter's analysis. 
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T ~ioos in Parter's ana};5is 
Porter's analysis begins with the assumption that the lllalket best allocates resources; that 
economic growth is the primary policy objective; that state intervention is best kept to a 
minimum; and, wherever possible, muket principles should prevail in all spheres of public 
policy. As will be demonstrated, his policy prescriptions to government remain consistent with 
the assumptions outlined above and are presented to government as being in the general good 
That is, there is the claim of social and economic neutrality where in the long run economic 
gains from the prescnbed policy will flow and benefit all (the implication here is that increased 
competitiveness equates to a better standard of living). From this understanding Porter sees 
globalisation as a process that offers almost limitless competitive opportunities and the goal of 
policy is then to improve 'competitiveness' and push for growth. 
However, a rigid Porter approach justifies a particular set of social and political arrangements 
that benefit some interests, 'winners', or successful regions, over 'losers', or poorer perfonning 
regions. Moreover, a strict adherence to this approach makes non-lllalket concerns of 
communities, such as social justice, income redistnbution, employment and the environment 
subordinate to the ongoing objective of wealth creation (i.e. productivity gains). 
However, the central unresolved tension in Porter's work is between his acknowledgments that 
institutional factors (non-market factors) matter as a detenninant of relative competitiveness 
and his suggestion that ultimately competitiveness depends on productivity (price) gains. A by-
product of his analysis is that he observed that govenunent policy, business and community 
processes (institutional arrangements), were as important a detenninant of industry success in 
the 1990s, as was price in the ten nations studied (Porter 1990:19). Through his case studies he 
observed the benefits that accrue to finns through working collaborativelyto enhance the 
productive base of the region. Paradoxically, however, whilst offering his analysis of industrial 
development as a 'new economic paradigm', Porter remains, nonetheless, constrained by the 
vety orthodox neoclassical view he is attempting to challenge. Porter's conclusions, and policy 
prescriptions, emphasize policies that highlight the positive effects of market competition and 
productivity growth, and cautions against government 'intervention'. Government's role, 
according to Porter, is to 'push and challenge its industries to advance, not provide 'help' so 
industry can avoid it' (Porter 1990:30). 
Yet the question remains, if the attributes of competitive advantage (discussed above) that 
Porter attributes to successful clusters are absent, what are regions and governments meant to 
do? The New Zealand case srudy at the end of this chapter sheds some light on this dilemma. 
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A mt so perfo:t 'UlJYid 
A problem for Porter is that although he acknowledges real world economic activity, such as 
scale of economies, monopoly and oligopolistic finns, muhinational finns and institutional 
{non-market) factors he, ultimately, has no theoretical framework to deal with them. As already 
discussed, this is because his new paradigm rests on the neoclassical paradigm that assumes 
markets operate best when there is 'perfect competition'. 
The world of perfect competition is one of multiple srnal1/ producers and sellers, all price 
takers, where there are assumed no economies of scale; Le. monopoly and oligopoly are 
considered an aberration in this perfect world For Porter, for example, the domination of an 
indus tty in a given nation by the manufacturing activity of a foreign-owned firm would be seen 
as a competitiveness weakness. Yet many small- to medium-sized advanced industrial 
economies {like Australia and New Zealand) are dominated by the presence of :MNEs. More to 
the point, in these nations it is the decision-making of the subsidiary activities of :MNE that has 
a large effect on many of the universal attributes of Porter's competitiveness diamond in the 
domestic economy. This includes the level of competition, critical mass, supply chains Qevel of 
value-added activit0, exports, infrastructure investment, training, sourcing inputs, the levels of 
collaboration with local industty, marketing and R&D. As Enright {2001:88) reminds us more 
than a third of international trade consists of shipments or transactions {intra-industry) 
between the world's 500 biggest companies. 
One could argue that, rather than being an aberration from the perfectly competitive modeL 
monopolies and oligopolies are a natural consequence of unfettered market capitalism and 
indeed are the driver of the capitalist accumulation process. 
This reflects the fact that under a capitalist model of accumulation empirical observation 
suggests that finns, ultimately, seek to maximise (global) market share and maximise 
{monopolY) profits. As early as 1942, for example, Schumpeter, among others, argued that 
capitalism was in fact being driven by oligopolistic markets; a market situation that enabled 
large finns to earn sufficient profits to undertake the necessary levels of R&D and market 
development to drive further innovation. Schumpeter made the point that the capitalist system 
is driven by innovation - in products, processes, work organisation, finance and markets - and 
the ability of entrepreneurs to secure monopoly profits from these innovations, at least in the 
short term, is the key in expJaining capitalism growth. 
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The search for such profits was the main cause of the process of 'creative 
destruction' which Schurnpeter saw as endemic to capitalism. Oeative destruction -
the replacement of product and process (and their owners) byother, invariably 
superior products and techniques - propelled capitalist growth, primarily through 
the imitation and diffusion of innovations and through the efforts of entrepreneurs 
to improve on them in order to secure a share of the newly created or altered 
market. Competition was crucial to the process, but it was competition between 
entrepreneurs aiming to securing monopoly profits (or a share of them), not 
competition in the neoclassical sense of perlecdy competitive markets (quoted in 
Phillimore 1998:51). 
Parter's anit6m arKi pdicy ~ .. W'lStrairBi by utilitarian ~cphy arKi rBXiassiml 
ean:»ncs 
The problem is that Porter's conclusions and policy recommendations remain consistent with a 
long tradition of neoclassical economic theory and the philosophical origins in which it is 
situated Proponents of the neoclassical view determine that competitiveness in the end is all 
about relative price and factor endowment Porter simply redefines the traditional notion of 
factors from land, labour and capital to a more broadly defined set of factors/inputs. He 
groups these new factors of production into human resources; physical resources; knowledge 
resources; capital resources and infrastructure (Porter 1990:74-85). Neoclassical economics can 
be seen as a subset of a broader political-economic philosophical tradition of neo-libenilism 
where advocates believe, as a genetal rule, that the prescription for short-run optimal resource 
allocation is also the core recipe for maximising the rate of long-term growth (see Wade 
1992:271). That is, neo-libetals see getting the price of the different factors of production (land, 
labour and capital) right as the keyto long-term economic success: 
'getting the price right' is both a necessary and a nearly sufficient condition for 
maximising the rate of long-term growth ('getting' in the sense of letting prices find 
their right levels, and 'right' in the sense of the relative prices established in the 
freely operated domestic and international market (Wade 1992:271). 
The tensions in Porter's work reflect the inherent tension in origins of neoclassical theoty itself. 
The neoclassical paradigm finds its philosophical origins in Benthemite utilitarianism. It was 
the English philosopher Jeremy Bentham who argued the amount of pleasure an individual 
receives is the best measure of value and price. From this understanding the role of 
government should be minimal, as economic activity is best left to individuals to decide (see 
Nobbs 1997, Hunt 1979). Utilitarianism was the starting premise from the 19th centuty 
'rnarginalist revolution' in economic theory, which challenged the classical economists, Ricardo 
and Smith's, dominant 'labourtheotyof value' (see Hunt 1979:237). The labourtheotyof value 
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showed how productive labour was the source of surplus labour and it was the contribution of 
surplus labour that made the expansion of capital possible, i.e. surplus labour created profits. 
The most important point here is that the labour theoty of value highlighted the inherent 
nature of the class struggle in the capitalist model between capital and labour by focusing on 
the social context within which economic activity occurred This explanation had, to that point, 
setved the interest of the industrial capitalists of the day in that it provided an understanding of 
the source of their capital accumulation {Hunt 1979:269). However, otherfractions of capital, 
namely the merchant capitalists and landlords who received their income from ownership and 
market exchange, required an explanation of capital accumulation that would better setve their 
interests in their economic and political struggles against industrial capital {Hunt 1979:269). 
According to Hunt (1979:269), this required an economic theotythat 'sanctioned private 
ownership of capital and land, while extolling the social beneficence of exchange'. 
Originating in the 1870s, economists such as Jevons, Menger, Walras and later :Marshall 
contributed an economic theotythat seemed to acconunodate merchant capitalists and 
landlord needs (see Gamble 1986:25·54). The rnarginalist revolution provided a theotythat 
reduced the notion of value to a mathematical problem that involved the usefulness of a good 
underpinning of the consumer demand for it. Neoclassical economics determined that all 
economic behaviour could be explained by the actions of rational, utility maximisation 
individuals considering prices in a free muket of exchange. This economic behaviour was also 
the most efficient means for a society to allocate resources as all supplies and demands are 
brought into equilibrium through price flexibility. 
In this vety deliberate way neoclassical economists moved the focus of economic analysis to 
questions concerned with price and mukets, and away from the social context within which 
markets operate. In other words, the debate moved from a study that emphasised the nature of 
capital, its social relationships and institutions, to one that studied the determinants of price 
(Dobb 1973; Gamble 1981 & 1986). 
Regitn a:nist if 11'lJre than rrwkets 
Another problem with a pure Porter's approach is that it fails to recognise that regions are 
made up of individuals who are often, at the same time, consumers, constituents, parents and 
workers and not just inputs to the production process. That is to say a region is derived from 
the complex interactions and associations that develop between economic, socicrcultural, 
political and institutional actors (Giordano 2001:26). The fact remains that in any given place 
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individuals often have quite different and competing concerns over issues as diverse as 
employment, income distribution, health and education, social justice and the environment. 
For example, in a study by Foster-Beyet al (1999) on the optical cluster in Lawrence, 
:Massachusetts, they found 30 per cent of the popuJation lived in poverty and the city had the 
lowest per capita income in the state. Most people in this region were employed in low-skilled 
jobs such as janitor seiVices for the high tech optical industries (Rosenfeld 2001a:S). The 
problem here is that these types of equity concerns quite often clash with the interests of 
achieving muket efficiencies, i.e. allowing market forces to allocate resources that determine 
social and economic outcomes. 
As the Otapter two discussions indicated, resolving the above equity and employment issues 
are at the heart of the interrelationship (unresolved tension) between government and the 
private sector in gener.U. In an era of increased globalisation, the nation-state and the private 
sector both have an interest in capturing greater market share and more val~ added activities, 
the nation- state, however, is responsible and more concerned with the spatial costs and 
benefits of these activities on the horne production system. This is because, in democratic 
states at least, ultimately, govenunents are judged not only on their economic petfonnance but 
also in relation to their record on issues such as employment, health, education, social justice 
and the environment, for example. 
Common themes in international cluster development strategies 
Having noted the contradictions and tensions in Potter's analysis, the notion of clusters as an 
organising strategy for industry and regional development has been carried forward by other 
policy-makers, practitioners and theorists around the world (Sabel1993; Saxenian 1994; 
Rosenfeld 1995; 1996; 2001a&b; OE<D 1997; Enright 2000; Brown 2001; Green 2001). In 
many ways it has been developments in post-Fon:list literature (discussed in the previous 
chapter) that has put the emphasis of understanding industry growth and innovation back on 
the importance of personal relationships and the institutional environment within which 
economic activity occurs. Moreover, it has been those that have adapted Potter's cluster 
observations to make better use of institutional networks (ie. collaborative non-market 
organising strategies) that are leading the resurgence in spatial and regional policy 
internationally (discussed below). 
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It would appear that it has been the nationaVlocal organising and collaborative processes that 
underpin the clusters approach (drawn largely from the Northern Italian experience) that has 
been embraced (and modified) to facilitate local economic development and manage change. 
As discussed above, the objective of a mature industry cluster is to create an institutional 
framewotk that focuses stakeholder attention on building the human and physical assets of the 
local production system. In short a mature cluster-led development strategy requires the 
following organising processes. 
• Stage 1, Mobilisation- building interests and participation among stakeholders and a 
shared vision; 
• Stage 2, Diagnosis - mapping and assessing the firms and interdependencies that 
~omprise the cluster and the human, physical and institutional infrastructures that support 
It; 
• Stage 3, Collaboration and institution building - convening stakeholders in working groups 
to identify priorities, challenges and actions to address shared problems and create change; 
and 
• Stage 4, Implementation- building commitment among stakeholders to take action and 
identify or create intermediary organisations to sustain and implement the cluster strategy 
(modified and taken from EDA 1997). 
Interest in clusters for example has seen the recent establishment of private sector entities such 
as The Competitiveness Institute in Spain and Ousters Asia Pacific in Australia - whose role it 
is to promote the benefits of clusters-based initiatives to industry, government and community 
groups. The emergence of industry clusters has led many national governments to re-examine 
the issues of spatial industry and regional development both as a means to address structural 
adjustment and to stimulate innovation and economic rejuvenation in poorer performing 
regions (discussed in chapter six). For example, in a survey of the way governments have 
developed and modified Porter's obsexvations to suit their own cluster development strategies, 
Enright (2000) lists the following common themes that appear across nations, noting that the 
degree of intexvention varies from government to government. Enright suggests that as part of 
a cluster development strategy governments have tended to develop policies that seek to: 
• improve the general business environment, i.e. review taxes, streamline administration; 
• provide information and data specific to particular clusters; 
• provide basic infrastructure, education and training; 
• foster business networking and inter-finn collaboration; 
• provide business services; and 
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• foster commwllty-building activities (Enright 2000:310-311). 
:Many countries have sought to focus on the expansion and deepening of their endogenous 
economic base, by defining local clusters and trying to promote and develop them further 
(Austria, the US, Spain, and Italy are typical here). While, other countries have sought to 
actively import or transplant outside firms in an attempt to build clusters (supplier networks) 
around them (Ireland, Scotland, Wales, Northern England, Malaysia and Singapore, for 
example). Enright (2000:312) suggests that government attempts to target specific cities and 
regions as preferred regional headquarters is a more recent p1ayon this same cluster-led 
development theme. Some governments have adopted a ~or indirect role in their 
approach to cluster facilitation with an emphasis on promoting private sector participation. 
Here Arizona in the US and Quebec, Canada, where the government has invested in research, 
education, training, infrastructure and networking programs and offers only limited direct 
support to firms, are examples (see Rosenfeld 200 1a & b; Henton 1997 for clusters in the US). 
Other govemments, in contrast, have taken a more interventionist path to cluster facilitation. 
Several European govemments and Malaysia, for example, have actively sought out potential 
firms and offered them infrastructure, tax breaks, direct subsidies and training grants and so 
on, to aid cluster development (Enright 2000:313-314). 
While many nations have embraced a cluster-led development strategy others have attempted 
and failed; New Zea1and between 1991 and 2001 offers a case in point. The following 
discussion on New Zea1and offers a comparison for Australian policy-makers of the challenges 
of adopting a cluster-led development strategy in small peripheral economies. New Zea1and 
offers a particularly useful comparison because like Australia its national economic regulatory 
regime, until very recently, has been dominated by a neo-liberallogic. New Zea1and, like 
Australia, has very few global firms (in tenns of leading exporters and endogenous 
multinationals) and therefore Jacks the critical mass and domestic demand Porter's cluster 
model requires. Also, like the Australian case, successive New Zea1and governments for the 
period under consideration devoted very few resources to implementing a national regional 
development framework. They have instead relied on the same self-help development 
philosophy that has characterised the Australian government approach to regional 
development since 1996. Yet successive New Zea1and governments since the 1990s have 
actively sought Porter's ideas and attempted to implement his policy prescriptions. For these 
reasons a consideration of the impact (barriers and challenges) in the New Zea1and case of 
implementing post-Fordist refonns offers some useful insights for Australia policy-makers. 
Porter's own observation (discussed at the end of this chapter) on what changes need to occur 
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for the New Zealand economy to benefit from a cluster-led development agenda are panicular 
insightful Material for this section was gathered as pan of a research trip taken to New 
Zealand in Man:h 2000 "". 
Adopting a cluster agenda and the challenges for small peripheral economies: 
Porter in New Zealand 
The reform:;mrs 1984-1999: the rise if the Was~ Cmsensus 
New Zealand has a land mass the size of the United Kingdom (divided between two islands) 
and a population of 3.8 million - approximately the size of the city of Birmingham, UK 
(Hickling 2000:9). The New Zealand economy is a small advanced economy with high 
concentrations of foreign ownership and remains largely dependent on the expons of 
agricultural products for its national income. By international standards its business sector 
remains vety small- only 1200 companies and organisations have 100 employees or more, 800 
are in the private sector (Hickling 2000:9). The economy has gone through a period of rapid 
domestic 'deregu]ation' and economic intemationalisation over the past 15 years. 
In 1984 the newly elected Labour government, with Roger Douglas as the Minister for 
Finance, adopted neo-h"beral reforms to intemationalise the New Zealand economy (Lamer 
1998; Argy 1998). The New Zealand period of economic reform was inspired bywhat New 
Zealand academics have come to describe as the so-called 'Washington Consensus' (see 
Eichbaum 1999; Harris 1999:20). These reforms began under Labour and were continued 
under subsequent National party governments. The first phase 1984-90 tackled economic 
issues such as monetary policy, tr.lde and tax distonions and the NZ financial market (Argy 
1998:185). The second phase 1991-96 was more radical in nature and tackled labour market 
and welfare reforms, the liberalisation of the coastal navigation, and was premised on fiscal 
consolidation (Argy 1998:185; Kelsey 1995 & 1993). However, as Harris has observe~ 
The 'WC became a formula that was applied regardless of time and place, structural 
conditions, political circumstances, administrative competency, instiwtional 
sophistication or even cause of economic malaise. . . . The elements of the WC tend 
to focus on redefining the role of the state in economic life (Harris 1999:20). 
NZ ~s apprr.w:h to rer)mal ~ 
In general the period was dominated by a government (and Treas~ view to hberalise the 
national economy and to oppose measures of financial support for business and to regional 
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development programs. A specific regional development progr.un had operated in New 
Zealand between 1972 and 1986 but was axed as pan of the new reform agenda. The Progr.un 
was administered through the Department of Trade and Indusuy(DTI) and consisted of two 
components. The first was suspensory loans for the purchase of new plant and equipment and 
buildings through DTI. The second component was the Development Finance Corporation 
(DFQ, which acted as a development bank for indusuy development in priority regions. 
Between 1973 and 1978 some $NZ240 million was spent on regional development under these 
two initiatives (Alliance 2000:51). The Program objectives were as follows: 
• to achieve a more even distribution of development having regard for regional aspirations; 
• to consider alternatives to the growth of Auckland and Wellington metropolitan areas in 
order to reduce the adverse social and economic effects of large-scale migration; 
• to foster growth in regional areas with rates of growth below the national average; 
• to enhance the quality of life in rural and urban areas through increased opportunities in 
employment and improving housing and education, social, cultural and recreational 
amenities; and 
• to improve the quality of wban development, particularly in areas of major population 
growth (paraphrased from Alliance 2000:50-51). 
The DFCproved to be a profitable business, however, in 1986 it lost its regional development 
role and was convened into an ordinary investment bank. As pan of the government's 
financial reform agenda, it was subsequently taken over bythe National Provident Fund and 
Solomon Brothers and crashed (went bankrupt) during the financially speculative times of the 
late 1980s. The Labor Patty introduced the Business Development Program in 1991 and 
established a national network of Business Development Boards to facilitate regional business 
development ($NZ50,000 maximum grant). This program was also axed in 1998. 
In 1998-99, about $NZ100 million per annum was being spent bythe National Patty 
government on enhancing indusuy and economic development. This included about $NZ20 
million for technology grants; $NZ10 million for the BIZ programme -business training and 
advice shop -and about $NZ60 million for the activities of TradeNZ ('Jh! Irr:kperrmt 22 March 
2000, p23). When one considers the majority of TradeNZ funds were for export facilitation, 
enhancement and promotion, and not specifically for SME and/ or regional development, one 
can see how little consideration regional development was afforded by the national 
government. It also indicates that TradeNZ had to wotk very hard (with little resources) to do 
what they could in this area of policy. 
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Th! Porter Prqe:t 
On the invitation of TrndeNZ (New Zealand's Department of Trnde), Poner visited New 
Zealand in 1991 to advance his competitive advantage (cluster framework) approach to the 
New Zea1and government. The findings were published in Gocombe, Enright and Potter 
(1991) and became known as the 'Ponerproject' (Wtlliarns 1995). The researchers attempted to 
apply Potters competitiveness diamond analysis to the New Zealand economy using his 1990 
work and international case studies to benclunark New Zealand's international 
competitiveness. Researchers began by identifying clusters of indusny in which New Zealand 
perfonned and had the largest share of the world market (that is, where New Zealand has a 
share of world exports that exceeds its national average share of 0.3 per cent between 1985 and 
1987) (Gocombe et al1991:42) 
The following details the Poner project major findings: 
• New Zealand has failed to broaden and upgrnde its competitive advantages to cope with 
increasing international competition; 
• New Zealand specialises too much in resource-based activities such as agriculture, these 
have low enny barriers and face powerlul buyers; 
• The education system had too little participation and insufficient focus on vocational 
needs; 
• R&D and innovation spending by the private sector was too low. NZ finn strategies were 
too shon term and demonstrate little investment in humane resource development; 
• Capital cost consoaints exist, i.e. low household savings with social welfare and 
Government deficits undermine savings; 
• Past government subsidies and protection have stopped the development of competitive 
supponing industries needed in clusters (with the exception of fanning and honiculture); 
• Finn rivalry has been limited; 
• Finns need to develop clusters, focus more on knowledge and innovation, invest in human 
resources development, corporate leadership and adopt more global strategies; and 
• Govenunent needs to avoid protecting industry, continue institutional change, encourage 
innovation, upgrade skills, reduce flow of skilled emigrants, stimulate more domestic 
competition, maintain an open economy, improve transpon and communications 
infrastructure, improve access to capital and stimulate clusters (as summarised in Galt 2000). 
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The Porter project had a two-pronged impact on policy-makers in New Zealand. For many the 
Porter project justified the hands-off, rna.tket-led intemationalisation of the domestic economy 
that had been under-way since 1984. Several of those interviewed in New Zealand as pan of 
this thesis felt that this was particu1arly so in the key national government portfolios of 
T reaswy and Conunerce - where there was little or no support, or funding, for more strategic 
business or spatial development initiatives. They expressed the view that treaswy believed that 
once government had extrncted itself from its oaditionally interventionist role in the domestic 
economy that the private sector and entrepreneurs would do the rest. 
For others, at the national and local government leve~ the Porter project legitimised the 
development of a broader national industry clusters agenda. It also justified a role for the state 
in supporting the supply-side inputs to enhance and grow successful industries and, at the same 
time, facilitate regional economic development. Led by Ifor Ffowcs Williams, general manager 
of the Strategic Development Unit in TradeNZ, a small and committed few began to build on 
their understanding of the duster agenda and began to share their learning with different 
indusnyand businesses leaders across New Zealand's regions over about eight years. This 
included actively promoting clusters to local government and regionally based development 
organisations as a useful collaborative and coordination economic development tool (Williams 
1991). 
:Many of the local government and regionally based development organisations interviewed for 
this thesis confirmed that with little or no suppon coming from the national government for 
business, indusny or regional development, the industry clustering agenda offered at least 
something to address their local economic and employment deficiencies. Between 1992 and 
1997, officials from TradeNZ visited high-perlonning clusters in the US, Denmark, Norway, 
Valencia in Spain, and Emilia Romagna in Italy. They drew on a vast array of academic 
influences and engaged Professor Mike Enright from Ha.rvani, a co-author of the Porter 
project, to funher develop New Zealand's cluster and local economic development agenda 
(Williams 1997:26). A workshop was arranged in Auckland on indusnyclustering which 
included Stuan Rosenfeld, from Nonh Carolina, author of the highly influential199 5 
publication In:Utrial St:rf!rlfJh ani St:rategj.es: ~ Busms Ousters ani Puliic Pdit:y. This 
workshop drew together TradeNZ understanding of the duster approach and presented the 
findings to regional development agencies, Business Development Boards and local 
government officials. 
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TradeNZ also encouraged New Zealand businesses (expotters) to work together for their 
murual benefit through the development of what Williams (1995:3) coined as informal 'soft 
networks' or, more formerly, Joint Action Groups GAGS, of which there were 35 nationallJ-1. 
The JAG initiative v;as complemented by the establishment of Hard Business Program that 
supports networks between small- and medium-sized businesses (expotters) to achieve 
objectives that would not be achieved working as individua1s. This includes such activity as 
jointly establishing an office, warehouse overseas, sharing common export brands, joint 
investment in plant and equipment, or sharing the costs of hiring specialist staff (Williams 
1997). Each of these programs v;as funded on a 50/50 basis between Tr.u:leNZ and the firms 
or economic development agency involved 
From the interest raised by Trad.eNZ, clusters were identified and/ or formed across New 
Zealand regions with local government, local development agencies and practitioners taking a 
leadership role in their development. Since 1997, industty-clustering consultants such as Paul 
Frater, of the firm Innovation and Systems, and Ifor Ffowcs Williams's, now of Ouster 
Navigators New Zealand, together with organisations such as Business and Economic 
Research Ltd (BERL), took a led role in stimulating and identifying industry cluster across New 
Zealand 'While most industry cluster activity is still in its formative stages (varying stages of 
maUJrit0 the collaborative, organising strategy and ideas that undetpin cluster-led economic 
development have been widely spread across New Zealand's regions. 
The reasons why local government and regional organisations embraced this new approach to 
address regional problems become clear when one looks in more detail at the spatial impacts 
(income and employment) of national reforms between 1984-1999. 
1be rise if spatidl inqua/ity in New ZaJarx1 
The increase in New Zealand's income inequality has been proportionally larger than in most 
developed countries and is one of the highest in the OEQ) (O'Dea 2000). Between 1984 and 
1996, according to research by Otatterje and Podder, the top 20 percent of income earners in 
New Zealand benefited most from market-led economic reforms. Indeed the top 10 per cent 
of income earners increased their income share from 25.6 to 29.6 per cent of national income 
with most of this increase concentrated in the top 5 per cent (Alliance 1999: 17). Even more 
strikingly, the remaining 80 per cent of income earners actually experienced a reduction in their 
share of national income. As is the case in Australia, New Zealand Treasury research shows 
that the proportion of middle income households have fallen while the low income and high 
income bands have both increased (ODea 2000). According to the same research, 60 per cent 
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of the increase in income equality is structural in nature. That is, the increase is accounted for 
by widening income differentials in occupation, education, industry and age (O'Dea 2000). 
The rise in the leve1s of poverty in New Zealand during the reform years had a distinct spatial 
dimension particularly in terms of employment and income (Philpott 1999:93-94; O'Dea 2000). 
There has been a stark difference in the spatial distribution of employment and income activity 
across New Zealand's regions (with 75 per cent of residents living in New Zealand's North 
Island and the remaining in the South Island). For example, Auckland in 1996 had a population 
of just over 1 million and a median income for males of $NZ24, 401. In contrast, New 
Zealand's West Coast of the South Island had a population of 30,000 and medium income for 
males of $18,521. Between 1996 and 1998 Auckland experienced a 14.6 per cent rise in full-
time equivalent employment (FIE) while the West Coast experienced a 0.3 drop in FTE (Box 
2000:8). Auckland has a wage premium over its non-metropolitan regions in New Zealand of 
around 13 per cent (Box 2000:19}. The Deputy Government Statistician, Dianne Macaskill, 
recently confirmed that population increases continue to concentrnte in the north of the North 
Island and in Auckland in particular (Statistics New Zealand 1999). 
An analysis that looks at the four major cities of Auckland, Wellington, Hamilton, Ouistchurch 
and their environs makes the picture of concentration appear even starker. In 1999 an 
estimated 52 per cent of New Zealand's population lives in one of these localities and each 
continues to grow as fast or faster than the national average of 05 percent (Statistics New 
Zealand, 1999). According to Statistics New Zealand of the 70 territorial authorities that cover 
New Zealand, twenty-three had growth rates above the average in 1999. Four recorded positive 
population growth, but below the national average, four had no change and 39 recorded an 
estimated decrease in population growth 1999 (Statistics New Zealand 1999). According to an 
Alliance Party policy paper, employment and population trends in New Zealand between 1986 
and 1996, perhaps not surprisingly, moved together. Auckland experienced the greatest growth, 
and the central North Island, East Coast, South Island West Coast and Otago-Southland 
experienced the lowest increases or absolute declines (Alliance 2000:25). 
In terms of the New Zealand national labour lllalket, FTEs grew by 3.81 per cent between 
1986 and 1996 (or by 52,977 FlEs) and employment opportunities remained divided along 
ethnic lines. Between 1986 and 1996 the nwnberof unemployed grew from 62,000 to 140,600 
with the official unemployment rate of7.6 percent in 1998 being double the 1985level 
(Alliance 2000:27). Moreover, as the following table indicates, there was a strong ethic 
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dimension to New Zealand's unemployment statistics that implied that the burden on 
structural adjustment had fallen disproportionately on New Zealand's non-European citizens. 
Table 5.1: NZ Unemployment rate by ethnic groups- September1998 
Ethnicity Employed Unemployed Total Labor Unemployment 
force rate% 
European 1,433,500 81,400 1,514,900 5.4 
:Maori 134,100 29,100 163,200 17.8 
Pacific Is1and 64,500 11,700 76,200 15.4 
Other 85,000 12,200 97,300 12.6 
Total 1,717,000 134,500 1,851,500 7.3 
~~- -----. 
Source: Alliance (2000:8) 
There was a1so a spatial element to the distribution of New Zealand's ethnic unemployment. 
For example, in September 1998, in a total1abourforce of 571,000 the unemployment rate in 
Auckland was 6.6 per cent, or .6 per cent below the national avernge. However, for the :Maori 
community of Auckland it was 14.4 per cent, Pacific Islanders 15.4 per cent, while for 
European Aucklander's it was 3.6 per cent (Alliance 2000:29). The Maori and Pacific Island 
communities represent about only 8 and 9 5 per cent of Auckland's total labour force 
respectively (European workers account for 73 per cent). In Clrristchurch a simi1ar story 
unfolds. ForOuistchurch the unemployment rate for September 1998 was 7.1 percent, for the 
:Maori community it was 10.4 per cent, Pacific Island 10.6 per cent, while for Europeans it was 
6.8 per cent. The Maori and Pacific Island communities represent about 3.8 and 12 per cent of 
Clrristchurch's total labour force respectively (European workers account for 91 per cent). The 
higher levels of unemployment for non-European New Zealanders undennines the economic 
base and the social and family structures of these groups as well as challenges the process 
towards reconciliation in New Zealand (Alliance 2000). 
Irdustry dusters arxi rertJooal ~ oo the grani 
For the period under consideration, the major banier to establishing industry clusters, or 
undertaking regional development initiatives, remained the Jack of vision by national 
government and a Jack of public/ private finance to support regional organisations, projects and 
infrastructure. Most local governments and economic development agencies had to rely on 
their own ratepayer base, or increased borrowing, for their funding regional initiatives. 
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Naturally this tended to favour cluster/ regional development initiatives in the larger cities and 
more populous regions over the smaller regions and local government areas. For example, in 
Palmerston North, in the central North Island (population 73,000) a new super regional 
development agency, Vision :M'anawatu, was fonned in 1998 to combat regional decline and to 
maximise, streamline and better coordinate the region's approach to regional economic 
development. Vision :M'anawatu is a partnership of funding and resou.rces between the 
:M'anawatu Commerce Centre, Central-Power Co, the Palmerston North Enterprise Board, the 
economic development units of both the Palmerston North City Council and :M'anawatu 
District Council and the Knowledge Centre at Massey University (with an initial budget of 
$NZ1.5 million). 
John Hickling, chief executive of Vision Manawatu, stated that he had no doubt that the need 
for the organisation emerged from the 'inequality left by 15 years of economic refonns, where 
the cities (Auckland and Wellington) grew at the expense of the regions' (personal interview). 
According to another interviewee 'a protracted period of industry contraction and corporate 
takeover has seen jobs, industries and services leave the regions and/ or be relocated to the 
largercities'.'lbe same person indicated that in the last five months of 1999 five companies in 
Palmerston North had been taken over by Australian-based finns at a cost of 360 local jobs. At 
the time this research was undertaken Pacific Dunlop, another Australian-based multinational 
finn, had taken over a local gannent manufacturer and was announcing plans to rationalise its 
operations. This local finn produced 1 million garments (thermal underwear etc) a year, 
employed one hundred people, and exported 50 per cent of its production. lhose interviewed 
felt very pessimistic about its place in Pacific Dunlop's global operation and were preparing a 
case to approach its management to promote the factory's importance to the region's future. 
Before Vision Manawatu, and without national government participation, according to those 
interviewed, the region simply did not have the resou.rces or strategic tools to address its 
regional problems (the point was also made that it is still deficient of investment for major 
infrastructure projects). A new business plan and a focus on enhancing the region's appeal and 
advertising its cost and logistic advantages, as well as expanding its industrial base through 
indusuy clusters, form key planks of Vision :M'anawatu strategy to attract investment (from 
indusuyand government). Industry clusters have been fonned in defence (25 firms) with both 
an airforce and army base in the region, food (20 firms) and call centre (12 firms) sectors. lhe 
local defence cluster is now linked to the defence indusuy JAG established 10 years earlier by 
TradeNZ to enable finns involved in the defence exports sector to better share their 
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knowledge of the market. Vision :M'anawatu is also keen to develop Palmerston North as a 
strategic cargo hub which includes upgrading the international airlreight capacity of its airport. 
Interviewees suggested that the forming of the food cluster was instrumental in convincing 
Goodman Fielder not to rationalise its newly acquired Ernest Adam baking and milling 
operations in Palmerston North. Instead they azgued Goodman Fielder should instead base its 
distribution and production locally. After a presentation by the Vision Manawatu' s chief 
executive to the manager of Goodman Fielder's New Zealand operations, pointing out the 
distribution and cost benefits of Palrnerston North, jobs have actual expanded from 120 to 
140. However, interviews also confinned that this was at the cost of the loss of one hundred 
jobs in Goodman Fielder's Ouistchurch operations. Whilst the initiatives by VtSion :Manawatu 
are in their infancy they indicate a community strongly conunitted to collaborative regional 
economic processes to best coordinate resources, conunit to a strategic vision and attract 
mvestment. 
Across New Zealand there are numerous examples similar to the above where local 
govenunent has led efforts to build public/ private networks to begin the process of greater 
collaboration. But there remain very few, if any, examples of mature industry clusters - in most 
cases the focus is on increasing dialogue between local government and business, i.e. 
appointing regional development officers, developing hard business netwotks and raising the 
regional profile (marketing strategies). The exceptions are perhaps film/television and marine 
exports in and around Auck1and, the Earthquake Engineering Services in Wellington, and the 
defence industries in Palmerston North. All these localities, perhaps not surprisingly given the 
above discussion, are in New Zealand's North Island 
Parter returns in 1998 
Against this type of background, Porter returned in 1998 to revisit where New Zealand stood 
in the global economy and to see what progress had been made on indusuy clusters since 1991. 
In a way, Porter returned to New Zealand and argued for many of the same miroeconomic 
interventions that he had outlined in 1991 - -with some notable, and quite surprising, 
exceptions. Much of the following demonstrates in a practical way the inherent tensions and 
contradictions in Porter's cluster model for small peripheral economies. 
On the macro side, Porter thought New Zealand had accomplished a great deal in tenus of 
struCtural change that had created a stable macroeconomic, legal and political, environment 
(with low inflation and interest rates). According to Porter, government had also removed itself 
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from areas of the economy that it ought not to have been (deregulation, corporatisation). 
Porter, however, argues that macroeconomic policies alone do not create wealth and that real 
wealth is created with reforms of the microeconomic foundations of the economy. Accordingly 
he suggested the government set a 'positive' and 'affinnative' vision for the New Zealand 
economy (Porter 1998b:140). 
However, Porter was disappointed by New Zealand's economic pertonnance over the 
interceding }ears, i.e. declining or static real incomes and GDP per capita, poor exports, poor 
R&D and innovation levels (Porter 1998b:13}. He argued the government had no vision for 
the country, other than to 'libernlise', and was acting as if the reform agenda had ended (Porter 
1998b:14). This view was confinned by a New Zealand Treasw:ywmking paper that concluded 
that economic growth had been less than was hoped for at the outset of the major reform 
process began in 1984 (Galt 2000}. The author concluded that there were 'no obvious policy 
options' that would dramatically improve New Zealand's growth pertonnance. Perhaps 
swprisingly (or not so swprisingly, perhaps) the author argues that the failure has been one of 
individuals and firms to take the opportunities created by the macro reform agenda (Galt 
2000:13). 
Porter argued that the New Zealand government needed to make a greater cornmiunent to 
innovation, R&D, training and in general create a system that could substantially improve 
human resources. He called for continued reform of the tertiary sector so New Zealand 
universities (and Gown Institutes) could not only generate new teclmologies but also generate 
new companies and generally better collaborate with industry (Porter 1998b: 15}. 
:More to the point, Porter called for the New Zealand government to make a cornmiunent to 
an aggressive indusuy cluster policy and to not be so hamstnmg by the concept of 'neutrality 
particu1arlywhen it comes to corporate investment (Porter 1998b:15). 
New Zealand, so far, is not }et fully harnessing the cluster approach to drive 
industries to the next level In many industries there are many small industty 
associations that are looking out for their one piece of the puzzle. They do not talk 
to each other, they do not want to work together, they do not want to come under 
the same umbrella to think about concerted strategy for building assets, capabilities 
and skills. Th.is is the next agenda (Porter 1998b:17}. 
Porter also called for the New Zealand government to become more 'interventionist'. In terms 
of corporate investment Porter argued the government should consider tackling the task of 
increasing corporate investments that have a social benefit, such as R&D and training, by 
offering 'incentives' (Porter 1998b:16}. 
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I am not advocating that the government gives grants or pays for corporate 
research projects, this is not the right way to go about it. The right way is to focus 
on providing incentives for all firms, not favouring a few. If a company in New 
Zealand wants to double its R&D budget, however, a tax credit for part of the 
increase is a powerful incentive. If a company wants to expand its tiaining, the 
government ought to be willing to chip in something because this creates an asset 
for the nation that will allow it to move to much higher levels of productivity 
(Porter 1998b:16). 
On the demand side Porter suggests the government change its procurement policy and use 
this to stimulate domestic industry (a Keynesian demand poligry. Because of the small 
domestic market, Porter suggests the government could stinrulate innovation through its own 
procurements by shopping on quality- setting high domestic standards - and not simply to 
shop on price (import replacement). 
New ZedarJs prrJiem 
The problem until2001, was that a neo-liberallogic informed the national regulatory 
environment in New Zealand and this ran contrary to many of the interventions the national 
government needed to make to stimulate the pre-conditions for a cluster-based development 
strategy. Whilst hard networks became established across New Zealand's regions investment 
by the state in the supply side inputs, institutional 'soft' structures and collaborative networks 
were ignored. As Macleod (1999) points out the prosperity of a region is not exclusively 
dependent on the processes occurring in the region. That is national expenditure in areas such 
as welfare, heahh, defence, housing, education and tiaining, infrastructure and business support 
etc, also impacts on the local production system. As does the governance structures of local 
firms (how they plug into the global market) in terms of the depth of the local 
interdependency. 
The problem is that the New Zealand economy remains dominated by its agricultural sector, 
has a high level of foreign ownership, a small domestic market, and very few global export-led 
medium-sized endogenous firms. These structural factors continue to effect universal 
'attributes' that determine Porter's notion of competitive advantage. It is not surprising then 
that on his return visit to New Zealand in 1998 that, given the economy continued its poor 
perfonnance, Porter would call for the type of interventions descnbed above. 
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Ouster and networks 
The discussion on soft networks, or JAGS, in the New Zealand case study gives an 
opportunity to explore the links between clusters and institutional networks in a little more 
detail. This is important because often the liternture on industry and regional development 
confuses, or uses interchangeably, these tenns. 
The confusion emerges because the catalysts for both business netwooo and cluster-based 
development strntegies originated from various studies undertaken by academics and policy-
makers of Northern Italy in the 1980s (Rosenfeld 2001a:1). In particular, Denmatk's Ministry 
for Trnde and Industry announced the first business networks program ($25 million) in 1990 
which quickly became the benchmuk for similar progr.uns in the US (the .Manufacture 
Extension Partnership- Rosenfeld 2001b), Norway ($25 million. 1991) and Australia with the 
Business NetworkProgr.un, 1995. 
The success ofNorthemltalys regions was intetpreted byresearchers (Sinclair 1999:1) as 
being attributed to the inter-firm collaborntion (and the suppon services) that gave the regions 
SMEs access to external economies of scale (Rosenfeld 2001a:1). These business netwoik 
progr.uns- what Ifor Ffowcs Williams (1996) describes as 'hard' netwotks- were primarily 
concerned with training brokers (facilitators) to develop the horizontal linkages between finns 
of three or more (Rosenfeld 2001b). In the Australian case the emphasis was on joint 
marketing alliances for increased expon (Sinclair 1999:4). Business netwooo were often the 
beginning of a process that focused firm attention on the potential to form strntegic alliances, 
pannerships, joint ventures and other fonns of contract re1ationships. Ultimately, the objective 
of the business networks program is to benefit profits and/ or shareholder value of the finns 
involved; business networks had no specific spatial objectives other than business outcomes 
(Rosenfeld 2001b). 
In contrnst, researchers, such as Putnam, Hanison. and Saxenian et al, continued to spend 
more time exploring the social suppon structures (formal and informal institutional netwooo), 
which unde1pinned successful industry clusters of Northern Italy (Rosenfeld 2001a; Hanison 
1992). From this further analysis it becomes clear that the emphasis of industrial districts in 
Northern Italy Jay not in the role of business networks but, rnther, on 'stakeholder' 
collaborntion or institutional netwooo. This is what Ffowcs Williams (1996) describes as 'soft' 
netwooo to distinguish them from the hard business networks, or JAGs, discussed above. 
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This understanding is consistent with the importance of enhancing institutional thickness as 
means to facilitate sustainable regional development as discussed in chapter one. 
The objective of 'soft' or institutional networks is to support the collaborative framework and 
inputs, hwnan and physical, for the ongoing development of the local productive system. A 
stakeholder in this sense refers to players such as government, higher education institutes, 
finance sector, regional development authorities, labour representatives, environmental bodies, 
industry and conununitygroups and individual finns (suppliers and distnbutors). By "Way of 
example, in 1997 in Lumezzanne, Italy, local stakeholders established a non-profit entity 
Lurnatel to act as a key development agency for the region. The new agency also delivered 
government programmes and services in the region. The local regional bank, Banca Popolare 
di Brescia, the local council, supported Lurnate~ as did teleconnnunications firm Italtel Telesis, 
which undertook industrial policy interventions to support local enterprise and capacity 
development (Brown 2001:81). Lurnatel grew to around 15 staff and established a business 
incubator adjacent to its premises and provided a range of services to local finns including 
marketing, financing, and innovation, training and IT support (Brown 2001:82). 
The point here is that individual firms may come and go within an industry duster (and/ or 
industrial district) but the institutional framework (soft networks) that underpins the local 
production system is the 'continuum' that nurtures the next generation of entrepreneurs and 
new start-up firms (Tsipouri 1999:29-30). 
Moreover, these institutional networks not only include business networks but also can include 
employment, education and training, health, technology, environment, innovation and finance 
networks. In other words institutional networks are formed as an organising means to better 
plan and target resources at the gaps and/ or strengthen the weaknesses of the local socio-
economic production system. It is the organising processes and the intermediary groups 
established to plan and identify the hwnan and physical inputs that distinguish a mature 
cluster-based development strategy from an a-spatial business network approach. This also 
takes the concept of industry clusters beyond neoclassical inspired agglomeration and industrial 
complex theoretical explanations of the detenninants for the spatial concentrations of 
industrial activity(i.e. beyond the notions of externalities, price and input-output relationships). 
Importantly, however, as OWton et al (2000) observe, although a cluster-based development 
strategy has a geographical focus, it has no set boundaries as such. This is because industry 
value chains extend internctions and interdependencies beyond the cluster's geographical limits 
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- patticu1arly in places 'With a high level of MNCs activity (either foreign or endogenous firms). 
The challenge of stakeholders is to create the horizontal linkages that deepen (or embed) as 
much of the interdependencies (value-added activities) in the local productive system. The 
more value·added activity undertaken enhances the local human and physical asset base and 
consequently its innovative potential. This is also consistent with Green's (2000) analysis of a 
'boundaryless' cluster emerging 'With the lTC sector in Ireland where MNCs playa major role. 
Porter's cluster approach argues that it is the characteristics of 'place' aided by proximity that 
underpin competitive advantage and this competitive dynamic between firms and other 
stakeholders ~enforces the internal dynamic of firms (Cllaiton et al2000). As argued earlier, 
this is so because globalisation and advances in technology create conditions where speed, 
fleXIbility, variety and innovation form the foundation of a competitive local productive 
system. This in rum relies on the learning capability of firms and increasingly the learning 
capabilities of the 'place' firms are located - particularly tacit knowledge, which is embedded in 
the minds of individual and collective organisations that is not easily transferable from place to 
place (discussed in chapter four). From this understanding it is clear that institutional 
netwotks, and not hard business netwotks, are a necessary precondition in developing industry 
clusters and a defining organising mechanism in a cluster· led development strategy. 
It is also clear from the New Zealand case study that clusters failed to emerge because 
government, particularly in a small peripheral economy, needs to support the growth of 
institutional networks and the intermediary bodies that drive them. Porter's call for greater 
inteiVention on his rerum in 1998 is about developing institutional networks and increasing 
domestic demand as the foundations for a cluster-led development strategy in New Zealand. 
Conclusion 
Porter's contnbution to industry clusters and a cluster-led development strategy remains a vital 
one - many of his obseiVations on industry size and the continued importance of low-tech 
industries remain salient for small peripheral industrialised economies. Moreover, Porter's work 
more than any others has popularised the concepts of regionalism and industry clusters to 
policy-makers and business alike. However, within Porter's model of regional competitiveness 
there remain many unresolved tensions and contradictions. These are the legacy of the 
philosophical tradition within which Porter's (neoclassical) theoretical approach is based 
These tensions are between the unresolved contradictions that local institutional factors shape 
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the pre-conditions for competitive finns with the observation that, ultimately, it is price 
relationships (microeconomic, productivitygains) that matter most. For this reason Porter's 
policy prescriptions promote rruuket outcomes and caution against government intervention, 
which reduces the ability of communities to address non-matket concerns, i.e. employment and 
unemployment, income distribution and the environment, for example. 
Because of these reasons Porter's work within the broader post-Fordist debate sits most 
comfortably within the neo-Smithian stream. Neo-Smithians assume that wealth creation 
resides in the micro-foundations of competition and finns. It has been other theorists and 
policy-makers that have taken the notion of industry dusters to focus more on the institutional 
factors, the collaborative processes that shape the pre-conditions for competitive regions, as 
the key to a cluster-led development strategy. This latter approach is more consistent with neo-
Schumpeterian, neo-Marxist and economic geography insights (discussed in chapter four). 
The example of New Zealand highlights the problems of adopting a Porter approach to 
cluster-led development for small peripheral industrialised economies. The lesson from New 
Zealand is that it is difficult for regions to capture value-added activity in the local production 
system when the activities of MNG and a neo-liberal national economic regulatory regime 
dominate the economy. The dilemma for Porter is that these two factors dramatically impact 
on the very factors, conditions, demand and competition, on which he builds his competitive 
advantage modeL In chapter four, we are reminded, for example, that in Emilia-Romagna, 
Italy, the National Confederation of Artisans (CNA) defines its member finns (those that 
receive benefits from the association) as those that consist of fewer than twenty employees. 
This institutional factor (along with others) goes a long way in shaping the size, 
interdependencies (horizontal linkages) and nature of competition in Northern Italy's industry 
clusters. In New Zealand these types of institutional networks, regulatory supports structures 
and processes, as well as state funds for regional development, were absent for much of the 
period between 1991-2001. 
The discussion on the distinction between business and institutional networks highlights that it 
is institutional networks that matter most to regions trying to compete in an increasingly 
knowledg~based global economy and that choose a cluster-based development strategy. 
The next chapter explores national approaches to addressing regional disparities and regional 
development problems across a range of selected countries. The emphasis here is on the 
institutional and financial commitment of national governments to this process as well as the 
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general trend toward devolution and decentralisation in enhancing locaV national collaboration 
and planning. The point of the last two chapters and the next is to laythe ground for further 
comparison between international developments in spatial polices and practice and the recent 
Australian experience. 
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Chapt~r 6 
INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES TO REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
Introduction 
Thus far we have argued that, since the 1980s, there has been resurgence in the view that the 
development of 'regions' (sub-national economic units) necessitates policy consideration and 
analysis in its own right and that many governments have become more active in facilitating 
regional development outcomes as part of national macroeconomic planning. This chapter 
presents examples, up to the year 2001, of different ways national governments are responding to 
the challenge to formu1ate regional policy. In particular the emphasis is to understand the 
mechanisms (policy, programme and legislative) used by national governments to achieve regional 
development goals. This is presented under two headline themes. The first theme looks at 
examples where an overreaching national economic strategic framework is enacted to address 
issues of regional disparity. The emphasis under this theme is to drive a national approach to lift 
the perlonnance of poorer regions toward higher identified benchmarks of social and economic 
performance. The European Union's (EU) approach to regional development is perhaps the 
exemplar of this approach (discussed below). 
The second theme seeks to focus national regional policy and programmes on the drivers of 
local competitiveness, i.e. building on entrepreneurship and innovation at the sub-nation level 
The United States best illustrates the second approach where a strong strategic federal 
government framework (or peak institutional structure) is not part of the regional development 
policy agenda. In swn, the EU approach is a more institutionalised, prescriptive and 'top down' 
approach to regional development while the US is a more 'botto~&up' approach. However, as 
the following demonstrates, the absence of a strong national institutional framework does not 
necessarily imply less intetvention, which is often asswned, particularly in the case of the US. 
Although coming from a different starting point, the common trend under both themes 
discussed here is that both focus on devolving and reorganising national, state and local 
relations in an effort to promote the development of local capacity and resources (and achieve 
national goals). As will be discussed, there are also numerous program variations within this 
conunon trend 
153 
1his chapter does not an attempt to offer a critique or measure the efficacy of the individual 
programs or policy approaches mentioned; its more limited purpose is to give an indication of 
the general policy trends and mechanisms used to facilitate greater devolution/ decentralisation. 
Nor does the following include in any great detail the various agriculrural support programs 
that also operate in each counuy- which are themselves quite substantial and effect capacity 
and resources in non-capital city regions. The rationale here is that if one included agriculrural 
support programs one would also need to look at other portfolios such as heal~ environment, 
education and defence in greater detail and then likewise determine their direct or indirect 
impacts on regional development. Similarly, state and local government activities in local 
economic development are not the central focus here- although, again, they too remain 
substantial and are referred to from time to time. 
Examples in this chapter are drawn from the EU and the countries of England, Ireland, 
Canada, and the US. These examples have been selected because the author travelled to each 
and conducted intetviews with policy-makers, regional leaders, and regional development 
practitioners as a public servant on a fact-finding mission on regional policies in September 
1997. Some of the background material was collected during this visit from the various 
government agencies and in semi-structured intetviews with officers from the departments 
concerned :More recent material comes from various department web sites, personal intetviews 
and academic papers. 
The discussion begins by looking at examples of regional development policies and 
progr.unmes consistent with the first theme, i.e. a national strategic framework approach to 
address regional disparities. 
Theme one: a national framework approach to address regional disparities 
The exemplar of a national strategic approach to address regional disparities is the E U 
approach (Giordano 2001). Since EUPresidentDelors' 1993 White Paper on Groulh, 
E rr[inpent ani Carpetitir.en:s, there has been a resurgence of regionalism within Europe. In 
particular, the EU has operated a financial instrument called the Strucrural Fund to address 
long-term social and economic problems among EU member states (EC 1998). The two 
common philosophies that unde1pin the Structural Fund are, firstly, the goal of equalising the 
perfonnance of Europe's regions by raising the perlonnance of the poorer performing regions. 
Secondly, the notion of subsidiary- the idea that decision should be taken at the lowest 
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appropriate level So in the case of the E U 'regional' generally refers to geographical areas 
within member states. 
The EUs Structural Funds and Framework Programmes are aimed specifically at building 
regional capacity in industry clusters, research and education, entetprise adaptability, lifelong 
learning, infrasttucture and cultural development (Green 2000:2; EC 1998). Grants allocated to 
member states (and their regions) between 1994-1999 were in the order of 1545 billion EUR 
(approx $AUD300 billion) (EC 1998). Anew Structural Funds Guide for the period 2000-
2006 -was announced in early 2000. 
In tenm of deciding its funding and distribution, the EU sets a GDP and per capita income 
average, ranks each state and region and allocates resou.t'Ces accordingly. The EU works with 
member states and regional authorities to promote development and reduce inequalities 
(regional disparities) and promote cohesion. The grants are channelled through two to six year 
development programmes that are negotiated between the European Commission (EQ and 
each member state, and implemented in cooperation with regions and local authorities 
concerned These programmes detail the specific priorities and measure eligibility for financial 
support. "When programmes for each country have been agreed, the relevant national authority 
announces the availability of funds and calls for project submissions (i.e. it is the national 
authoritythat makes the vast majority of funding decisions, not the EU). 
The four elements of the fund between 1994-1999 (EC 1998) were as follows: 
• The European Regional Development Fund (ERDF-48% of Fund) 
-mmrorrt emirartrmt, dmtim, hwJhh,jcbaw:imimestm?nt, SME senia:s, lazd ckuicprrmt 
• The European Social Fund (ESF- 24%) 
.m1~,;m ani rrx:ruilm!nt s<hem?s for ~ani disadamtagd ~ 
• The European Agriculture Guidance Fund (EAGGF- 16%) 
• The Financial Instnunent for Fisheries Guidance {FIFG -2%) 
EU funding is targeted according to specific 'objectives' that recognise the diversity in 
perfonnance and condition of member countries and their industries and regions (su~ 
economies). These objectives include (EC 1998): 
• regions whose development is Jagging behind (objective 1 - accounts for 70% of total 
funds) 
• regions seriously affected by industrial decline (objective 2) 
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• rural areas (objective Sb) 
• regions with an extremely low popu1ation density (objective 6) 
• long-term Wlemployment and the socio-economic integration of excluded groups 
(objective 3) 
• unemployment associated with industrial change (objective 4) 
• structural adaptation of agriculture and fisheries (objective Sa). 
Imponantly, all projects that receive EU funding must also receive co-financing from state 
and/ or other sources (underlying the principle of partnerships). The EU contnbution to any 
one project will vary from 25 to 85 per cent. On top of these grants the European Investment 
Bank supplies loans for development projects. The main point here is that the E U focuses its 
grants programs on large geographical regions (or entire countries) while individual member 
states operate across smaller geographical areas. 
The advent of the EUs St:ructural and Cohesion funds have had, and continue to have, a 
significant effect on regionalism within member states particu1ar in terms of industry and 
regional development policies and programs. For example, in 1993, in addition to the 
Structural Fund, the EU Cohesion Fund (per cent of total EU grants) was established to 
finance transpon and environment related infrastructure in four countries that were deemed 
most in need: Greece, Portugal, Ireland, and Spain. 
A key pan of the trend in E U policy (and the effect of its funding) has been to instigate the 
move to greater devolution and regionalism among its member states. This is perhaps most 
developed in the United Kingdom 
Devolution in the United Kingdom 
The most visible sign in the UK of a national commitment to devolution was the establislunent 
of ten Government Offices of the Regions (GOR) in 1994 (.11awson 1999). Before this time 
regional governance arrangements in the UK were divided by overlapping functional and 
institutional boundaries (.11awson 1999:73). 
The establishment of the GOR institutionalised distinct geographical defined units that 
integrated the delivery of programs and services from the Departments of Trade and Industry 
{DTI), Employment, Education, Environment and Transport (.11awson and Hall2000). The 
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National office of DTI set the policy framework and GOR and Business Links Offices deliver 
programmes and bid for regional and business grants (against national criteria). The task of the 
GOR "\VaS to deal with business issues, improve regional competitiveness and encourage 
partnerships between regional organisations including the development of regional strategies 
(wban renewal and economic development). 
Importantly, as Gibbs et al (2001:107) argue, GOR were part of the T01yadministration's 
strategyto satisfy EU requirements of having an effective regional body to design and 
implement Single Progr.unming Documents (SPDs). A Single Regeneration Budget (SRB) 
operated in each GOR that combines 20 programmes into one budget directed towards 
partnership projects for local regeneration and economic development based on an agreed 
strategic vision {Mawson and Hall2000). The SRB also acts as a mechanism to attract 
Structural Funds from the E U. 
The creation of the GOR gave each region a local mechanism and funding pool to shape 
government activity toward agreed regional priorities across a range of policy areas. For 
example, GOR Directors could approve projects up to 2 million pounds before seeking 
ministerial approval, however, the Minister would approve individual government grants over 1 
million pounds (Rundle 1997). Moreover, the Director "\VaS responsible for the delivery of a 
wide range of government services through the GOR, including export advice and regional 
selective assistance (RSA). In designated Assisted Areas (determined by levels of 
unemployment and industrial decline) the availability of RSA (these grants range from 5 to 15 
per cent of start-up costs for fixed assets) played a major part in facilitating invrard investment 
and promoting SMEs (Rundle 1997). Other grants available through the SRB include the 
English Partnership programme that promotes regeneration of derelict, vacant under-used land 
and property for attracting new investment, and urban renewal Training and Enterprise 
Councils (1ECs) played a similar role in attracting and offering assistance to inward 
mvestment. 
Under this approach there existed (potentially at least) strong links between industrypolicy, 
regional development and urban development across UK regions. For example, acting in 
concert with the activities of the GOR are organisations called Urban Development 
Corporations established by the Conservative government in the 1980s (Mawson 1999). These 
12 corporations, with a geographical spread across the UK, grant planning permission for 
development in their area; acquire, manage and sell land; provide utility services and roads and 
require local authorities to adopt them; provide various forms of aid to developers and 
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businesses. They have played a major role in atuacting EU funds, inward investment and 
stimulating regional development to the regions where they are situated. 
Irr:reasfd deuiutim· The Blair)W'IS 
In 1997/98 the Blair Labour government commenced an even more ambitious programme of 
devolution that saw regional governments established in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. 
In England eight new semi-autonomous Regional Development Agencies (RDA) were 
introduced Under this new arrangement the fr.unework within which GORs opernte were 
redefined (Robens and Uoyd 2000). GORs are now seen as the voice of centrnl government 
in the regions (D11R 2001:3), and their function is to coordinate the delivery of the program 
and services of severnl government agencies and to inform centrnl agencies of their local 
impact. This oven:omes criticism by some that GORs did little more than increase centrnl 
government control in the regions and indeed undermined local input into the regional 
development process (see Gibbs et al2001). RDAs, that cover the same geographic area as 
GORs, on the other hand, are semi-autonomous development agencies, with an independent 
Board, made up of local leaders, whose function is to develop and implement an agreed 
regional development strntegy. 
In reality centrnl government maintains influence over RDAs, for example, by approving 
appointments to RDA's Board and shaping the frnmewetkfor strntegydevelopment. RDAs 
have five functions: economic development and regeneration; the promotion of investment 
and competitiveness; the promotion of business efficiency; the promotion of employment; to 
enhance employment skills in the region; and, to contribute to sustainable development (D1LR. 
2001; :Mawson 1999:75). 
The point to the above is that in the UK the national government has undertaken significant 
decentralisation/ devolution and institutional reform to support local development objectives 
empower regions and promote local capacity and resoun:es. This has included the 
establishment of RDAs that focus on enhancing strntegies for local economic development. A 
large pan of this institutional restructuring has occwred because of funding criterion that is 
attached to receiving E U Structural and Social Cohesion Funds. 
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Devolution in Ireland 
Ireland also has gone through a process of devolution as a means to address its nation's 
regional disparities and to be consistent with the larger El.Ys planning fr.unewmk In the late 
1980s, Ireland was in dire straits economically. An over dependence on rural production, high 
1.U1employment, low GDP growth, high debt and continued emigrntion of its youth, had come 
to characterise much its economy (fommey 1995; Adshead and Quinn 2000; Turok 2001). It 
was from this malaise that the first four-year National Development Plan (NDP) was prepared 
to address Ireland's economic future and, importantly, to meet the EU criteria for programme 
funding (Adshead and Quinn 2000:214). According to Adshead and Quinn (2000), it was not 
until the second NDP, for the period 1994-99, however, that local urban and rural 
development became a 'key element' of the national planning process (see also Turok2001). 
The second NDP did not introduce local urban and regional development to Ireland but 
rather, for the first~. it incorporated regional-based development strategies (and local 
partnerships) within a coherent national planning framework (Adshead and Quinn 2000:271; 
Turok 2001:137-139). 
A highly influential repon, the OJ/ittnRepat, identified two major problems associated with 
Ireland's economic development path of the 1980s that would subsequently shape its approach 
in the 1990s. Firstly, in order to entrench and gain long-term benefits from invvard investment 
for the national economy, Irish finm needed to improve their 'competitiveness' across all 
aspects of their activities, i.e. management, technology and innovation, production, training, 
distribution and R&D. Secondly, Ireland's long-term economic success would depend less on 
EU funds and new inward investment, and more on growing endogenous Irish firms and 
increasing the value of the supply linkages between the overseas and Irish firms (moving down 
the path of indusny clustering) (T omaney 1995:106-1 07). 
Inst:itutimJ rr/rnn kgin 
A number of government initiatives were set up during this period to facilitate the growth of 
endogenous Irish firms, greater devolution, increased inter-government collaboration and 
coordination. Pan of these changed governance arrangements included the establishment of an 
Inter-Departmental Policy Committee on Local Development; a Minister of State for 
European Affairs and Local Development was appointed and a Devolution Commission was 
established charged with investigating all aspects of decentralisation (Adshead and Quinn 
2000:220). 
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The second National agreement 1990-1993 saw the establislunent of 38 local partnership 
companies across Ire1and (20 urban areas and 18 rurnl) which was monitored by a national 
organisation called Area Development :Management (ADM) P /L The focus of the 
partnerships was how the existing physical and instirutional resources in a region can be better 
focused on the needs of the poor and Wlemployed ADM had a Wlique role of facilitating 
dialogue and negotiation between partnerships and the government. It a1so allocated funds 
based on approved regional plans of partnerships (furok 2001:140). Several agencies were 
involved in partnerships usually through their regional offices. These include the Department 
of Entexprise, Trade and Employment, Department of Social, Conununityand Family Affairs 
and the Department of Education and Science (furok 2001). 
In 1993 the government a1so established 35 County Enterprise Boards across Ireland that 
report to the Prime Minister's Department (Department of Taoiseach). These Boards, 
supported through the Department of Enterprise, Trnde and Employment, focus local activity 
around strategies to address key issues of local small business, employment, services and 
enterprise development. The Boards are a partnership between local business, local 
government, interest groups (trade unions etc.) and state agencies (DE1E 1997). Each Board 
provides a single point of contact at the local level and is responsible for small business and 
investment areas not covered by state agencies. They develop their own Co\Ulty Enterprise 
Plan and strategies to address local enterprise development (typically firms up to 10 people) 
and job creation. Boards work closely with the Irish government and its Agencies in the 
delivery of national priorities. For example, in their first three years of operation, the Boards 
approved more than 6,000 local enterprise projects from 50 million (Irish) pounds in grants 
and provided 9,000 full-time jobs and 1,800 pan-time jobs (DE1E 1997). The funding of each 
Board is related to an annual performance agreement, with targets and performance indicators. 
There are a1so Partnership Panels made up of comm\Ulity, local government, trade Wlions and 
industry that focus on planning strategies to address the key issue of long-term unemployed 
Along with these refonns, the Industrial Development Agency (IDA) was given the explicit 
role of facilitating inw.ud investment (including its spatial direction and targeting supply 
linkages) and Foroairt was established to grow endogenous Irish firms (SMEs). To achieve 
these ends, the IDA was restructured in 1994 as an Agency of ForFas - the policy and advisory 
board for industrial development in Ireland (IDA 1996). Forl>airt set itself the ambitious target 
of increasing sales of endogenous finns to 15 billion pounds and to double endogenous finns' 
commitment to R&D by the year 2000. By 1996, sales had reached 135 billion and R&D 
expenditure bythe EU'Measure1' initiative had increased four times its 1994levels (IDA 
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1996). The IDA reporting to the :Minister for Enterprise, Employment and Trade (DEE 'I) 
along with its sister Agencies - ForFas and Forbairt (now part of Enterprise Ireland) - became 
the primarily players responsible for regional development in Ireland. 
The IDA is an autOnomous state agency funded through government grants and supported by 
various EU programmes. It operates through a nine-people Board made up mostly of the 
private sector (banking, finance, manufacturing sector representatives) with one senior 
academic and government bureaucrat. The Board is responsible for setting the strategic 
direction of the Agency and uses sub-committees to support its work The Board has authority 
to approve grants to a certain statutOry defined level, and recoimnends to government grant 
requests above this level The objective of the IDA is to contribute to Ireland's economic 
development by encouraging the expansion of the existing base of overseas companies in 
Ireland. This also includes convincing new overseas companies of the value of investing in 
Ireland, in manufacturing and internationally traded service, and fostering the national 
objective of regional industrial development. The IDA encourages firms to look at various 
locations when considering investment but leaves this role to the local organisations to ensure 
it has the necessary skills, infrastructure and investment environment to be competitive with 
other locations. The IDA has 8 regional offices throughout Ireland, which are linked 
internationally to 6 offices in the USA, 3 in Europe and 5 in the Asia Pacific including Sydney, 
Australia. 
It is from the activities of these agencies, the IDA, Enterprise Ireland, ForFas, County 
Enterprise Boards, Partnership Panels and some non-govenunent agencies that the bottom up 
- top down nexus for regional development and EU grants in Ireland are coordinated to assist 
industry growth and spatial development patterns. 
Ex~ thegruuth 
Ireland has experienced an unprecedented level of economic growth over the last decade -
averaging 8 per cent (Green 2000). With its rapid employment growth, high wages, high skills, 
and high value-added exportS many commentators have descn"bed it as the 'Celtic tiger' of 
Europe (paralleling the rapid rise of the East Asian tigers of the 1970s and 1980s). As with the 
Asian tigers, Ireland's growth has been export-led with 90 per cent of its GDP sold abroad- it 
has averaged annual increase in exportS vohunes of 12 per cent (Green 2000:4). Two thirds of 
all its manufactured output and 80 per cent of its manufactured exportS were driven by direct 
foreign invesunent (DFI) - Ireland gained 23 per cent of all Europe's FDI in 1997 (Green 
2000:5). 
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Two schools of thought are emerging among academics in explaining Ireland's success. For 
some it has been the development of the Flexilie Der.e/cprrEnt State in Ireland that has been a 
major factor in explaining its economic success in the 1990s. 1he thinking here is that various 
governance arrangements, as described above, have been introduced by the Irish government 
to nurture post-Fordist networks of production and innovation as a means to facilitate 
international investment and broader national and local development goals (O'Riain 1999; 
Green 2000). As O'Riain explains: 
Growth in Ireland is driven not just by foreign investment therefore but by two 
relatively distinct modes of integration into the global economy- the partial local 
embedding of global corporate networks and the increasingly successful integration 
of local networks of endogenous firms into global business and technology 
networks. 1hese two globalizations are further embedded "Within a set national neo-
corporatist institutions which have managed the relation to the global economy of 
both the macro-economy and of unionized workers. Since 1987, a series of national 
"social partnership" agreements have negotiated wage restraint, public spending 
limits and some efforts to bridge exclusion at the local level (O'Riain 1999:np). 
However, whilst not underestimating the importance of changed institutional arrangements, 
others make the point that the explanation of Ireland's success remains somewhat more 
problematic. Other factors that need to be included are that Ireland benefited from footloose 
US investment during the 1980s because of the UK's late entry into the EU, before which 
Ireland "WaS the only English-speaking location in the EU. Other sets of contributing factors 
include Ireland's 10 per cent cotparate tax rate for foreign firms, its capital expenditure 
associated with telco facilities and EU membership, and its well educated and organised labour 
force (Gunnigle and McGuire 2000). 
Despite Ireland's economic success over the last 10 years spatial disparities continue to widen 
and the Irish government continues to adjust its plans. It has been Ireland's central region that 
has attracted development while other areas lag behind. Dublin and the surrounding Mid-East 
region saw an increase of 51 percent of employment between 1991 and 1998. During the 
same period its population grew by 13.5 per cent compared to the national average of just 5 per 
cent (OECD 2001). In response the IDA has set a target to direct one half of all new jobs 
from inward investment to the Border, Midlands and West Regions. 
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E U trend to support 'competitiveness' and 'innovation' in regions 
The E U puts a lot of emphasis in its regional development policies and prognunrnes in support 
of lifting the competitiveness of it regions including promoting the use of development tools 
such as indusuyclusters (EC 2002). According to Landabaso (2001:6), 73 of the 107 responses 
for funding from less favoured regions for 2001-2006 European Regional Development Funds 
have identified institutional networks, innovation systems and/ or industry clusters as key parts 
of their development strategy. For example, Entetprise Scotland, Scotland's peak development 
agency, has committed 38 million pounds over four years to a biotechnology cluster and 46 
million pounds to its semiconductors cluster (Brown 2001 :67). In Northern Ireland, the Centre 
of Competitiveness (fonnallythe Northern Ireland Growth Olallenge) is a not for profit 
company that drives an ambitious cluster agenda. Following work by the Monitor Company in 
the mid-1990s, seven key sectors have been identified for cluster development in Northern 
Ireland. These include engineering, food processing, health, software and telecommunications, 
textiles and apparel, and eduction, training and human resources (Brown 2001:58-59). Each 
sector has a dedicated secretariat (working group) that drives a vision for that indusuythrough 
a strategy that incotporates business networks, conferences, workshops, mentoring, R&D, 
collaborative resean:h, studyvisits, to name a few. 
More recently, the Irish government, through the Higher Education Authority, established a 
Ont1e fr IrTIVWim ani St:rtK:tural ~ (OSQ at the National University of Ireland, in 
Galway. OSC was established as a key p1ank of the Irish government's commitment to 
innovation and regionaV industty development as part of the E U supported National 
Development Plan 2000-2006. The OSCs takes an interdisciplinary approach reflecting the 
strong influence of post-Fordist ideas (discussed in chapter four) on its research agenda. The 
asc will draw on the economics of innovation, technological change and industrial 
organisation, geography, the analysis of information systems, management, industrial relations, 
marketing, information technology and engineering. In particular, it will focus on the five key 
research areas of systems of innovation, industry clustering, international traded services, inter-
organisational systems and high perlonnance work systems (www.mijgalway.ie/ cisc). 
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Theme two: supporting the drivers of local competitiveness 
As stated earlier it is the United States (US) that best captures the contrnsting approach to 
regional development away from a national top-down approach that narrows the gap in 
disparities across regions to an emphasis on investing in the drivers of local competitiveness. 
Interestingly, although the emphasis of policy is on ways of building local competitiveness, the 
US government has a longer history then the EU of programmes that specifically target its 
'distressed regions'. In the US case, however, the driver isn't regional disparities as much as 
addressing issues associated with st:ructuial adjustment pressures in panicular regions. From a 
high point of direct federal intetvention in regional and urban policies in the 1970 and 1980s 
there has also been a gradual devolution, or transfer of responsibility, to state and county 
governments (Carlisle and Scharer 2001:215). As will be discussed, the US Federal 
government's commitment to regional development is estimated at $12 billion per anum with a 
further $1.4 billion annually for tax incentives to assist states create jobs, build infrastructure 
and support commen:ial development (OMB 2002:2). 
Oeated in 1965, the Economic Development Administration (ED A), part of the US 
Department of Commen:e, provides grants for infrastructure development, local capacity 
building, and business development to help communities in economically distressed areas lift 
their competitiveness (ED A 2000a). According to the ED A, a distressed region is one that is 
experiencing long-term economic decline, i.e. high unemployment or low per capita income 
(ED A 1999). Regions could have been affected by military closures or defence industry 
downsizing, sudden and severe economic impacts (mono-industry closure, globalisation, 
natur.U disaster), or could be attempting to achieve economic self-sufficiencyto compete with 
more internationally competitive regions. 
The US government enacted a raft of legislation in 1965 that would fundamentally re-shape 
federal and state government institutional arrangements in relation to regional and urban 
planning and development. For example, the Public Works and Economic Development ACf 
of 1965 established the EDA and with it some 320 regional development organisations known 
as Economic Development Districts (EDDs). EDDs operate through boards that are 
composed of locally elected officials, business leaders and minority representatives. The EDDs 
are involved in developing a coominated planning strategy that fosters a partnership between 
economic development professionals and the community for the purpose of identifying local 
priorities that promote economic growth and creates jobs. US state governments could not 
receive EDA funds without agreeing to form regional districts and, in most cases, match 
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federal funds (Carlisle and Scharer 2001:217}. All public works and economic adjustment 
grants given under EDA programs also need to be consistent with an approved 
Comprehensive Economic Development Sttategy (CEDS) - regional development plan -
administered by the state government. In the fiscal year 2001 public work grants represented 
$286 million of the total appropriation for the EDA programs of $410 million ($AUD820 
million approx.) (EDA 2000b). 
1he EDA works with other key US agencies and peak non-profit organisations to coordinate 
its objectives and to influence the national wban and regional development agenda. This 
includes the Departments of Defence, Labor, Energy, Agriculture, Housing and Urban 
Development, the Environment Protection Agency, the US Cotps of Engineers, and the 
Appalachian Regional Commission. The federally funded Appalachian Regional Conunission, 
for example, funds 69 Local Development Districts (IDDs) across 13 states (ED A 2000a). 
There is also the District of Columbia program and the Mississippi Delta Region programme 
that covers 236 Counties across eight US states (O:MB 2002:6). 1he EDA also supports a peak 
national body called National Association of Development Organisations (NADO) that 
represents all these groups, and is itself a major lobby group to the US govenunent on the issue 
of regional development. 
According to Department of Commerce 1999 Fact Sheet, in 35 years the EDA has completed 
over 40,000 projects and invested more than $16 billion in grants. It is estimated that the EDA 
has generated more than $36 billion in private sector investment and helped create or sustain 3 
million private sector jobs. Some of the key elements and funding (approximate) of the ED A's 
program for 2001 were: 
• Public Works - $289m - public works infrastructure to upgrade physical infrastructure and 
establish and support private sector investment; 
• Economic Adjustment- $49m- to assist state and local interest design and implement 
strategies to adjust or bring about change to an economy. This program supports three 
types of activities: sttategic planning, project implementation and revolving loan funds; 
• Defence Adjustment- $31m -to communities where major defence facilities have closed or 
down sized; 
• Research and National Technical Assistance - $15m- to develop a comprehensive base of 
infonnation to measure economic perfonnance and program impact. To gather 
infonnation about economic development issues and to disseminate infonnation to local, 
state, and national economic development practitioners; 
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• Partnership P1anning Grants for Economic Development Districts, Indian Tribes, & Other 
Eliglble Areas - $24m- to provide ongoing support to the formulation and implementation 
of local economic development programs that build local instirutional capacity; and 
• Trade Adjustment- $10m- EDA supports a nationwide netwoxk of Trade Adjustment 
Centres (12). These Centres offer assistance to trade-injured firms. This includes flexible 
adjustment assistance to firms injured by imports, i.e. help them to compete globally again. 
Grants are nonnallyfor 50 percent of identified need or $75,000 whichever is less. 
The EDA also has a Revolving Loan Funds where one-off grants are given to communities to 
stimulate commercial development and create jobs and where, upon repayment, the principal 
and interest stay in the community for re-lending (ED A a&b 2000). 
The US ~'s rrJe in shaping the institutimal st:nK:tures 
The US government's historical role of contributing to the institutional thickness that governs 
regional development activities is unique in tenns of the other countries studied in this chapter. 
So while it remains true that it is local, county, and state authorities that play a more explicit 
(and public) role in indusoypromotion and regional development, often with the private sector 
acting as the key drive~, it is equally true that the US Federal government continues to 
influence and shape the institutional fabric and capacity building activities that drive regional 
development in the US. 
This is particularly so in the role the tertiaty sector plays in regional development as well peak 
regional development organisations in tr.Uning and educating economic development 
practitioners and organisations. For example, the EDA supports 69 University Centres to 
integrate programs of higher education into the local communities across the US (ED A 2000a). 
:MOreover, according to the President I CEO of International Economic Development Council 
(IEDQ, Jeffery Finkle, in his experience in the US it is the land-grant universities and colleges, 
and not the Ivy League universities, that are the major contnbutors to local economic 
development (Finkle 200 1). The land-grants colleges and universities emerged from the Morill 
Acts of 1862 and 1890. These Acts were concerned with, according to Bonnen (1996), the 
social role universities played in bring opportunity to disadvantaged agrarian and urban 
(industrial) workers and communities across the US. 
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Most leaders of the land grant movement were populists who saw a small powerful 
elite of Mellon, Rocketfeller, Carnegie, Gould, Fisk and others amassing great 
fortunes while fanners and industrial workers were being reduced to the status of 
peasant. 1his concentration of industrial and political power, they believe, 
threatened to destroy democratic institutions and the existence of the middle class 
from which they carne (Bonnen 1996:2). 
The Act authorised the granting to each state of 30,000 acres of federal land, the revenue from 
which was to be used as an endowment, support, and maintenance of at least one college 
(NASULGC 2001). According to National Association of State University and Land-Grant 
Colleges (NASULGQ state and land-grant universities now generate $5 average return for 
every $1 of government grant received More importantly, in each state of the US they act as a 
major stimulus to the regional economies - generating jobs, attracting investment in new high-
tech businesses, educating the work-force and increasing state tax revenue (NASULGC 2001). 
As Finkle (2001) suggested, from an economic development perspective, it is inevitably the 
land-grant universities that have offered their land to establish business incubators, research 
and technologypruks across US regions. Interestingly, the land-grant university and colleges 
program is administered through the US Department of Agriculture. The EDA is also a long-
term supporter of peak regional and urban development bodies in the US in their role of 
disseminating infonnation and techniques for improving business and employment growth and 
in assisting distressed communities (by delivering government contracts from various federal 
agencies). 
In May2001, the Council for Urban Economic Development (a.JED)- funded by the EDA 
since 1967 - and the American Economic Development Council- AEDC (the oldest peak 
economic development association in the US) joined forces to create the IEDC. The IEDC 
has over 4000 economic development professionals as members and offers a range of 
economic development tools and training courses to help professionals build the capacity of 
local economies (Sampson 2001). The IEDC recognises professional development through its 
Certificate Economic Developer (CED) course and regional development organisations 
through its Accredited Economic Development Organisation (AEDO) accreditation scheme. 
Federal government contracts (to deliver government programs) accounted for about 80 per 
cent (orapprox. $900,000) of a.JED's $12m annual revenue base in 1986 (Finkle 2001). 
However, after the Reagan government years, when federal grants to non-profits groups were 
severely curtailed, a.JED actively sought to increase its membership base and raise its 
members fees to become less reliant of federal funding. Under the new merged entity, the 
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IE DC, Finkle says that Federal government contracts accounts for about 20 per cent of its 
$42m annual revenue base (or approx. $840k). 
Despite a growth in CEUD's (IEDG) revenue base, the US government has made a consistent 
contribution to this peak regional development organisation for nearly four decades. 
Other US agencies that influence regional development 
As well as the ED A, a number of other US agencies and federal str.:ttegies have a large impact 
on spatial development patters in the US. For example, the Department of Agriculture (USDA) 
has initiatives that seek to maintain and create jobs in rural communities Qess than 50,000 
populations). USDA has some 40 agencies responsible for programs and over 2000 regional 
bureaus across the US. Most of the USDA's g:rants are for loans to communities of less than 
20,000 people. The USDA in 1995-96 allocated $161 million for this purpose. In the early 
1990s, the US Federal government formulated the National Rural Development Partnership 
that led to the establishment of the following two councils the National Rural Development 
CoWlcil ('NRDQ and the State Rural Development CoWlcils (SRDG). The partnership 
operates by the SRDQ bringing folW'd.l'd strategic issues to the NRDC whom then together 
implement strategies to address these development priorities (www.rurdev.usda.gov/nrdp). 
The USDA's Rural Community Advancement Program give grants, loans and loan gua:rantee 
to rural communities under three fooding streams for Water and Wastevrater, Community 
Facilities and Business and Industry development {OMB 2002:4). The USDA allows 25 per 
cent of the fooding of the allocation under each stream to be moved between streams 
depending on the demand and priorities of individual states. 
Another important US community development programme is the Community Development 
Block Grants (ffiBG) administered by the Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(HUD). Established around the same time as the ED A, Q)BC is now the premier and largest 
grant programme for assisting larger, smaller cities and Counties to address community 
development and revitalisation issues. At around $5 billion annually ffiBC is a massive grants 
progranune (HUD 1999:15; OMB 2002:2). In 1998, for example, some $4.675 billion of 
ffiBG were distributed to 968 entitlement communities (large, small medium and small cities 
and counties) across the US and some 3,000 small communities (HUD 1999:15). These grants 
are directed primarily at low and moderate-income persons in poorer communities. 'While the 
federal government sets national programme goals and eligibility requirements, CBDC g:rants 
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are administered by state government who are free to set additional objectives, establish 
priorities, develop new programmes and detennine what projects will be funded (Carlisle and 
Scharer 2001:220). 
Interestingly, the 2002 US Budget allocated an additional $1.8 billion for HUD's Home 
Investment Partnerships Program in an effort to expand the supply of affordable rental and 
increase homeownership for low and moderate-income families across the US (OMB 202:2). 
dearly, as in the Australian case (discussed in chapter two), the US also has increasing social 
problems associated with the falling levels of homeownership among its low-income earners 
and the issue of housing affordability in general 
Another federally funded organisation with a significant spatial impact on innovation in US 
manufacturing is the National Institute of Standards and Teclmology (NISl). The NIST assists 
industry to develop teclmology to improve product quality, to mode mise manufacturing 
processes, to ensure product reliability and to facilitate rapid connnercialisation of new 
products (Eberts and Erickcek 2001:268). It operates through a network of 75local 
manufacturing extension partnerships (MEP) that assist SMEs to improve their production 
processes, management and financial systems as well as acting as a local infonnation service. 
Apart from these, the Department of Interior (DOl) and the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) 
also have a range of economic and social development programs that specifically assist Native 
American Tribes and organizations. 
From an administrative point of view, what distinguishes the US approach to regional and 
wban development is that often loans, block grants or revolving funds stays in the community 
being assisted and are acquitted over time against an agreed highly flexible plan. This approach 
contrasts with the Australian experience. In Australia progrannne funds are the responsibility 
of the lending agency and if not spent according to the Parliamentary Appropriation (as agreed 
with the Department of Finance) they are returned to consolidated revenue. 
US tax irK:entiw tiJ fa&itate ~nand regialal deuiopmmt 
Federal and state governments in the US use massive tax incentives schemes as policy tools to 
shape urban and regional development outcomes. Both the US Federal (through HUD) and 
state governments have programs that designate particu1ar regions as renevra.l communities, 
entetprise and/ or empowennent zones (RO'EZ/EQ. These RO'EZ/EG extend tax 
exemptions (income, land, payroll and corporate) and other state, federal and county benefits 
(public infrastructure, wage subsidies and cheap loans etc) to firms operating or that re-locate 
169 
to designated regions {Manning 2001). These are massive tax assistance packages by any 
measure. For example, in December 2001 40 wban and rural RCs and 8 new wban EZs were 
designated who combined will benefit from $22 billion in tax incentives 
(www.hud.gov/offices/ cdp/economicdevelopment/programs/ rc.). These RC/EZ/ECs 
programs usuallyopernte fora given period (10 years in the case of the federnl progrnm) and 
regions are determined eligible by meeting certain poverty, unemployment and other criteria 
determined by the panicu1ar state or federnl program. Again, in order to qualify under the 
federnl progrnm regions must produce a long·tenn strategic plan including measurable 
objectives that are benchmarked {Manning 2001). 
Industry dusters: a key regjmal deu:kprrmt tai in the US 
As discussed in chapter 4, indusuy clusters have become a key economic development tool 
across the US over the last few decades (Henton et al, 1997). Henton has documented the rise 
of indusuyclusters in the US in Austin, Texas; Oeveland, Ohio; Wichita, Kansas; and Silicon 
Valley, California· and the two states of Arizona and Florida. More recently, Rosenfeld (2001 
a&b), revie-ws an additional14 mature indusuyclusters across the US and the peak 
organisation driving their analysis (driven by/ or state, local or privately funded organisations). 
He emphasises that their vitality is contained in their fonnal social and institutional 
frnmewotks. Accordingly, clusters in the US are Wlderstood both as a process, a way to better 
understand how an economywotks and to organise strategies, and, an outcome, or a critical 
mass of geogrnphically bounded interdependent finns {Rosenfeld 2001a:17). Much of what 
Henton and Rosenfeld describes is consistent with nea.Schumpeterian and nea.Smithian ideas 
discussed earlier. 
A third way? The Canadian experience 
While most the above two themes represent the dominant approaches to regional development 
the Canadian experience perhaps offers insights into a third way. In many ways the Canadian 
approach to regional development falJs between the national frnmework- regional disparities · 
and building competitiveness themes already discussed The Canadian's drnw on both 
approaches (implementing institutionalised devolution and promoting local competitiveness) 
with an emphasis on the US approach of supporting SMEs, innovations and clusters as a 
means to assist regions develop. They do this utilising a variety of public and private sector 
(state supponed) mechanisms. 
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Instit:utimal arrarmn!nls in Omada 
In Canada the Federal government's approach to regional development is both decentralised 
and differentiated within a well-defined institutional structure - as in the EU and UK examples. 
However, within this structure, the Canadian government varies its programs and policies 
through four peak regional development Agencies. The geographical coverage of these 
Agencies incotpOrates all Canada's provinces, i.e. each Agency incorporates more than one 
province. The four key Agencies, which report to the Industty Canada portfolio, are: 
• The Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency (A<DA); 
• Department of Western Economic Diversification (WD); 
• The Federal Office of Regional Development- Quebec (FORD-Q); and, 
• The Federal Economic Development Initiative in Northern Ontario (FedNor). 
As in the US case, however, the emphasis of each Agency is to support SME development, 
entrepreneurship, community netwOiks and p1arming, human and physical infrastructure (i.e. 
partnership between federal, provincial and municipal governments). There is a particular 
emphasis on overcoming market failures in tenns of financing SMEs and regional 
infrastructure and development projects, i.e. meeting the needs the commercial financial sector 
will not serve because of high risk and poor rates of return. 
Interestingly, and unique to Canada, each of the federal agencies constitutes an independent 
ministty, located in the region and headed by a Secretary' of State for the region that reports to 
Industry Canada. There is also a coordinating Bureau for each agency in Ottawa, the national 
capital. The federal government adjusts its funding to each Agency based on that region's given 
development strategy (programs), regional potential and resources. In the Canadian example 
federal government program and policy fleXIbility is the key to its devolved regional 
development model 
Oher key fkl11S in the rr!l)mal ~ frarri!UIJYk 
There is an emphasis in Canada on institutional arrangements and programs that target 
oven:oming market failures particuJarly in tenns of supporting and financing the growth of 
endogenous SMEs. Important players in this regard are the Community Business Development 
Corporations (CBDQ and the Business Development Bank of Canada (BDBQ. There are 240 
CBDQ across rural Canada, which are fully funded by the federal govenunent (ACDA 2000). 
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They are non-profit organisations and comprise a board mostly of local business leaders that 
provide technical and loans support for local SMEs and entrepreneurs. Their lending success 
to date is on a par with private sector loan perfonnance in tenns of failure rates and lending 
perfonnance (Aa:JA 1997b). CBOCs also deliver the federal government's Self-Employment 
Assistance (SEA) progr.un (ACDA 1997b). lhe SEA progr.un was established to provide 
financial assistance to unemployed workers who want to start their own businesses (average 
cost to government for each business of $20,000). Each province and Agency utilises CBDCs 
in different ways to deliver various programs. 
The Business Development Bank of Canada also plays a key role for the Canadian government 
in assisting the financing of regional development initiatives. It is one of two key policy tools 
unutilised bythe Canadian government in this regard. The Bank's mission is to help create and 
develop Canadian SMEs by offering relevant financial services such as venture loans and 
capital as well as extensive business counselling, training and monitoring services. The 
Development Bank compliments the services offered by private-sector financial institutions by 
working closely with them to facilitate the needs of SMEs. It has a network of (approximatelY) 
78 branches across Canada and is part of the Industty Canada portfolio. In 2000, for example 
the federal government allocated an additional $80 million to the Development Bank to 
specifically support the growth of lmowledge-based export oriented small businesses (RC 
2000). 
lhe second policy tool that helps the Canadian government promote SMEs growth and 
regional development across Canada is the Canada Small Business Financing Aa (CSMFA). 
This Aa and its program have been modified since its introduction in 1961 yet its main 
pwpose remains the same. In essence the goverrunent of Canada guarantees loans to small 
business, which have been assessed and recommended by banks and other financial 
institutions, to the value of 85 per cent of the amount of a lender's loss (ACDA 2000). Since 
1995, borrowers have paid for the program through user fees as part of the guarantee 
conditions (Aa:JA 2000). 
As well as these entities and initiatives there are also Regional Development Boards that are co-
funded by federal and provincial governments - these involve local govenunent (municipal 
government) and focus on strategic regional economic planning and community development. 
It is wonh looking at a Canadian development Agency to see how regional development works 
in practice; particularly in tenns of national, Agency, and state government relations. 
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The Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency (ACOA) 
Fonned in 1987, the goals of ACDAare to create jobs, build a strong economy, encourage 
greater entetprise, support business growth, build local capacity, facilitate greater economic 
diversity, and maintain incomes. This is achieved across six strategy areas: 
• entrepreneurship development; 
• trade; 
• irmovation and technology; 
• tounsm; 
• business management practices; and 
• access to capital and information (ACDA 2000). 
Background information from ACDA (1997a) indicates the Agency covers four Provinces of 
Canada with a population of 2.5 million, with an area the size of France (500,000 sq. kms); it 
has some 40 CDBCs operating within its jurisdiction. The region is sparsely populated and has 
a heavy dependence on the resource industries, i.e. agriculture, fishing, forestry and mining. 
Some export-oriented manufacturing industries include fish product and ne-wsprint (pulp and 
paper and wood products). Unemployment in the region has been consistently higher than the 
national average ( 14 per cent compared to 10 per cent national average) and income per capita 
has been well below the national average -$17,800 compared to $22,800 national average -
(ACDA 1997a). Many of the regional problems of Atlantic Canada can be characterised by 
structural change affecting the fishing indusuywhere Northern Cod fish stocks are declining 
and as a consequence quotas and restrictions nowapply(ACDA 1997b). Since the early1990s, 
there has been a five-year shutdown of commercial salmon and restrictions on caplin fisheries-
this has impacted directly on 20,000 jobs in Newfoundland, alone (ACDA 1997). 
ACDA has three major budget activities. Firsdy, to oversee the federal-province agreements 
for economic development; each of the four provinces enters into a series of cost-share 
agreements to fund strategically important initiatives in their province (that are deemed in the 
national/ provincial interest). This may include infrastructure, market and trade development, 
irmovation and technology transfer, human resource development, and environmental projects. 
Secondly, ACDA (in partnership with the provinces) gives support to a network of 
coll11IlUility-based organisations that focus on economic planning and business counselling 
(Cooperation Agreements). These organisations are independent bodies governed by a board 
appointed by the municipalities Qocal government). They were set up to build partnerships at 
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the local level between business, communities and govenunent to assess the needs of each 
region in the provinces, develop strategies and implement economic development projects. 
The third major program under ACDA is the Business Development Program (BDP). This 
comprises a package of assistance (grants, loans, interesH-ate subsidies, equity support) for 
SMEs as well as the provision of infonnation, advice and consultancy and access to 
technology. Eligible S:MEs may be provided assistance up to 50 per cent of invesnnent costs. 
These funds can be used for commercial and non-commercial operations of the finn business, 
i.e. innovation, business studies, capital investment, supplier development, market 
development, and business support (ACOA 2000). 
Other initiatives that support regional development includes maintaining a network of four 
Canada Business SeiVice Centres that offers business a one-stop shop to government and 
various business services to SMEs and entrepreneurs. 1here is also the ACF Equity AtJantic 
Inc which is a $30 million joint venture capital fund between ACDA, the provincial 
governments and several chartered banks (managed by the private sector and making equity 
investments of between $150,000 and $750,000 for growth-oriented finns). The ACOA also 
acts as an advocate for national procurement strategies for the region that between 1987 and 
2000 helped generate $800 million in goods and products purchased from local businesses 
(ACOA 2000). 
Industly Ouster approach embraced in Canada 
More recently the Canadian government announced a major national investment in spatial 
cluster-led development. For example, in its Innovation White Paper (2002) the government 
committed to establish at least 10 internationally recognised technologyindusnyclusters by the 
year 2010. The Canadian government through the National Research Council (NRQ believes 
that the nation's innovative potential depends on regional capacity building that ensures 
regions across Canada have the potential to exploit the opportunities of the knowledge-based 
global economy. In June 2000, the govenunent announced $110 million over five years for 
comnrunitytechnologyclusters in Atlantic Canada including, an e-commerce cluster in New 
Bnmswick, a life science cluster in Nova Scotia, and an ocean technology cluster in 
Newfoundland. It announced an additional $110 million over three years in 2001 for clusters in 
the nanotechnology centre in A1berta, the advanced alurniniwn centre in Saskatoon and fuel 
cell technology in British Columbia (www.ic.gc.ca/cmb/ wekomeic.nsf). 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has not attempted to offer an analysis of impact or effectiveness of the various 
programmes and policy approaches from the case-study countries. Its more limited purpose 
has been to give an overview and explore the common trends cwrendy operating in each 
jurisdiction under two broad regional development themes: i.e. firstly a national approach to 
redress regional disparities, and secondly, an emphasis on lifting local competitiveness. The 
above examples indicate that under these themes each counuy has a highly organised approach 
that nurtures regional-level institutions and focuses resources to address regional development 
issues. And, with the exception of the US that began much earlier, since the 1990s, each state 
has developed practices and mechanisms for greater decentralisation and/ or devolution, 
including the creation of semi-autonomous economic development organisations. From the 
above discussion, and allowing the different starting points, some common trends can be 
obsetved 
The first is the Canadian and UK decentralised/ devolved approach - with the Canadian peak 
Agency in practice combining the functions of the UK's GORs and RDAs into a single 
regional-based entity. Both governments give local analysis, planning and coordination 
responsibilities and varying degrees of program and funding functions to these entities. The 
Canadian Agencies and the UK's GORs also devolve the activities and budgets of several 
govenunent agencies, and decision-making authorities, to the regional-based entity (in the case 
of Canada full authority while in the UK authority within defined limits). 
The second approach, in contr.lSt, as practiced in the US and Ireland, is where the national 
government works through a network of approved regional Boan:ls and depanrnent offices, 
which undertake local analysis, planning and coordination role under the direction of the 
central agency. The central agencies, in this case the EDA and IDA, maintain control over 
policy, program and funding functions. Remembering, of course, that Ireland's IDA is a semi-
autonomous orgarusanon. 
What also becomes clear is that in the case of Ireland, the UK, and Canada national 
governments are often the lead agent, and/ or a partner, with other levels of government and 
the private sector, in promoting indusuy/ regional development. They also actively engage in 
local partnerships and provide funding to support endogenous SME growth, build local 
capacity (social capit30, support planning and collaboration, and attract inward investment {i.e. 
building institutional thickness). Moreover, central to their strategy is to provide finance to 
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SMEs, regional development projects and infrastructure (addressing market failures in the 
domestic financial markets). The most institutionalised of these is in Gmada where both the 
Business Development Bank of Canada and the Canadian Small Business Financing Act ensure 
the availability of state-backed funds for SME development that is not readily accessible from 
private sector sources. While, in the US tax credits and wage subsidies seem the preferred 
instrument by fede~ state and county governments to achieve the same ends, i.e. enterprise 
zones, Uiban renewal, and technology patks, for example. The EDA also maintains its 
revolving loan fund that offers one-off gr.utts to conununities to stimu1ate commercial 
development that when repaid stays in the community for future re-lending. 
The above suggests that these various states are actively (some more intexventionist than 
others) trying to replicate the local 'success conditions' often-cited in post-Fordist literature 
(and discussed in chapter four). The state, through a process of devolution and/ or 
decentralisation, is an active pla)er in building loca1/ national trust networks, partnerships, 
collaboration and supporting the supply-side inputs to local innovation and indusuy 
development. In the US, for example, the federal government, through its funding of peak 
regional development organisations and universities, supports the institutional fabric within 
which collaborative economic development ideas and approaches are developed and shared 
It is also the case both in the US and the E U that there has been a long history of designating 
regions according to a set of national social and economic indicators (regional data sets) for the 
purpose of better spatial analysis and identifying disparities in regional petfonnance. Unlike the 
Australian experience, there is a clear understanding in the US and EU of what constitutes a 
region for urban and regional development purposes and a deliberate attempt to understand 
and monitor social and economic progress of regions over time. In both cases regions are 
benclunalked and ranked and funding is contingent on regions undertaking regional 
development planning and enacting agreed development strategies (with the other tiers of 
government and the private sector). Oearlya key part of the success of motivating regions and 
other tiers of government to participate in these processes in both cases has been the massive 
financial assistance offered by the national jurisdiction in support of its urban and regional 
development objectives. This is the case whether the motivation is to narrow regional 
disparities, as in the EU experience, or, to lift local competitiveness, as in the US approach. 
The obvious question arising from this review of international experience with regional policy 
is what are the implications for Australia? The following two case studies explore the 
problematic nature of this question. 
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Chapter 7 
CASE STUDY ONE: THE MID MURRAY REGION 
Introduction 
The main pwpose of the case study of the Mid Murray Region (MMR) is to explore the 
intricacy of government, indusuy and community interdependencies in the MMR and highlight 
some of the competing barriers and tensions. The intention is to contrast current governance 
arrangements in the MMR against the structural and institutional factors that characterise 
successful regions often cited in post-Fordist literature. These characteristics include: a 
presence of highly 'innovative' finns (endogenous and/ or foreign) with strong connection and 
conunitment to the local economy(depth of interdependencies); economies of scale and access 
to mukets (domestic/international); level of community skills, education and trnining; 
availability of venture capital; extent of fonnal and infonnal instirutional arrangements 
(interaction between government, indusuyand higher learning institutions); presence of strong 
(high-profile) community and business leaders (entrepreneurs and/ or champions); 
public/ private support of planning, entrepreneurs, networks and innovation; and specialised 
world class infrastructure (soft and hard). 
Methodology 
During a seven-day visit to the region in :March 2001 some 25 separate interviews (consisting 
of one to six people) were conducted with representatives of indusuy (small and large), higher 
education, local government, regional development bodies, catchment authorities, large utilities, 
community and social welfare groups. These interviews were spread across the region from the 
largest regional centre (the Gty of Greater Shepparton with 50,000 people) in Victoria to small 
rur.U towns in NSW such as Berrigan (with 1,000 people). Issues discussed during the case 
study included local regional problems, barriers to business and employment growth, local 
collaborative structures (business to business, between community, government and business), 
engagement with local, state and federal govemments, innovation, education, social and 
environmental concerns. 1he researcher drew on several previous regional studies and some 
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personal contacts made on previous visits to the region whilst working for the Commonwealth 
govenunent between 1994 and 1999. Several follow-up phone interviews were conducted to 
confirm the infonnation gathered 
The discussion begins -with a look at the economic, geographic and social characteristics of the 
MMR. This is followed by current examples of the pressures that affect the region's social and 
economic development conditions. Finally, based on the interviews and materials gathered, an 
evaluation of the 1vfMR performance against key development characteristics of often-cited 
successful international regions is presented before conclusions are drawn. 
The 1vfMR offers an interesting a case study for several reasons. Firstly, the MMR. is a rural 
region -with a large presence of multinational and endogenous finns that are key players in the 
global agrifood industry. The region's economy has over the last three decades moved from a 
dependence on broadacre fanning to value-added food processing, panicu1arly in dairy, 
horticultural and wine products. As such, it offers a chance to study an Australian rural region 
that is actively responding to the forces of domestic h"beral refonns as well as capital 
restructuring and which continues to attract investment. In tenns of Porter's competitiveness 
model the MMR appears to be an internationally competitive region in tenns of its current 
investment, demand and supply characteristics. 
However, although the region continues to attract investment and prosper it faces many 
regional development challenges that have the real potential to undermine its long-term 
success. For example, currently the region is one of Australia's largest exporters of value-
added dairy products yet its irrigation system and water waste management systems are 
inefficient. The region's major food manufactures rely on water from open channels that are 70 
to 80 years old and prone to considerable water loss and dramatic fluctuations in water quality 
(CMACC: 1999:17). 
Another reason the MMR offers an interesting case study is because a significant amount of 
industry interdependencies and business flows in the region move across two state and several 
local government boundaries. The case study highlights the particular challenges of applying a 
national approach to regional development policy across multi-layered jurisdictions. 
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Economic and geographic profile and intetdependencies 
The area of the case study is the same that was covered by the fonner Mid Murray RDO 
established in 1995, funding for which ended in 1997 as a result of the Howard govenunent's 
first Budget cut backs in 1996 {see map below). The :MMR incmporates portions of two 
separate irrigation areas, the Shepparton Irrigation Region (SIR) in central northern Victoria 
and the Murray Irrigation Region (MIR) in southern New South Wales. Yet the MMR. as a 
whole is part of the Murray Darling Basin and each catchment shares many of the massive 
environmental problems identified with the Basin. The :Murray River is what defines the state 
govenunent borders and separates the SIR from the MIR The region covers an area of over 
30,000 square kilometres from the local government area of Strathbogie in the south (north 
central Victoria) through to Wmdouran andJerilderie in the Southern Riverina (in southern 
NS'W). The MMR.has a population of 135,000 and covers 10 local government areas (Table 
7.1). The major town in each area is the Gtyof Greater Shepparton (Victoria) with a 
population of 50,000 and Deniliquin (NSW) with 8000 people. 
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The region's major food processing plants are situated in and around the SIR, with the rice 
indusnythe most significant industtyin the MIR (much of the MIR's produce flows south to 
be further processed in the SIR- see below). The major agriculture and horticulture industries 
in both regions are primarily dependent on irrigation. 
Table 7.1: Statistical profile of Local Government Areas ( ALGs) in the MMR - 1998 
LGAs Population Avenge adult Average Gross regional 
(State) income household product 
SAUD income $M 
SAUD 
G. Shepparton(VIC) 55,157 16,200 33,271 1221.1 m 
St:rathbogie (VIC) 9,313 13,619 25,909 152.9m 
Campaspe(VIC) 35,.348 16,140 32,626 693.9m 
Moir.t (VIC) 26,203 15,399 30,900 .S53.0m 
Benigan (NSW) 8,241 15,654 31,314 144.9m 
Jerilderie (NSW) 1,892 17,236 34,995 69.2m 
Wakool (NSW) 4,802 15,716 31,598 114.1m 
Conargo (NSW) 1,482 19,284 40,816 6l3m 
Deniliquin(NSW) 8,153 16,365 31,334 158.3m 
Munay (NSW) 5,688 15,104 30,320 113.2m 
--·- -- -- -- -
~-
Source: YourPlace (December 2000), version 1, National Econonucs. 
The four Victorian LGAs resulted from the amalgamation of seventeen previously separate 
local government areas in the mid 1990s. This explains the large variance in population and 
gross regional product between Victorian and NSWbased LGAs. As well as highlighting all 
economic activity in the region, the table also indicates that much of the region's production 
and processing occurs in the Greater Shepparton, and Victoria in general 
The MMR has had a sustained sequence of restruCturing episodes over the last thirty years 
promoted by changes in government policy, the impacts of globalisation and a growing 
environmental awareness (see Gibson et al1999). The major impacts on restructuring in the 
MMR include Britain's enny into the EEC and the dr.unatic loss of overseas markets for its 
agriculture products in the 1970s. The recession of the early 1980s saw the closure of the 
Henry- Jones !XL cannery-at Kyabram and SPC and Ardmona under threat of closure. Also 
there has been a growing awareness of the threat of rising salinity and increasing land 
degrndation since the 1980s (discussed below). More recently changes associated with a large 
influx of capital (foreign and endogenous) investment and technological change in the food-
processing sector has seen the wine, dairy, rice and food processing sectors improve 
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productivity and expand xapidly. Yet despite these impacts the MMR population has remained 
steady over the last decade with a slight decline (.6 percent) from 1993 to 1998 (CMACC 
1999:6). 
At the time of writing there were over twenty major food processing facilities opexating in the 
MMR including, Ardmonaxvii, Bonlac, Heinz-Watties, Kraft, Murray Goulbum, Tatura Milk, 
Nestle, Ricegrowers, Simplot, SPC and Unifoods. In a case study of sustainable development 
activities in the SIRandMIRin 1999, Dore and Woodhill produced the following Table as a 
comparison of the two irrigation areas that form the MMR (fable 7 2 - slightly modified for 
this thesis). 
Table 7.2 Shepparton and Murray: general char.lcteristics 
Region Shepparton inigation Murray inigation 
Ricerl:usin Murra}" Darling Murra}" Darling 
OttdJm:rt Goulburn-Broken Murray Valley 
State VICtoria New Somh Wales 
Tad a1W (km2) 5,200 7,400 
Prpulatim 100,000 35,000 
Ltrrf~Sttmm Shepparton 45,000 Deniliquin 8,000 
E stimlla:J uJue if !(Urn wrte $700m $280m 
ad:fJUt 
Main iniustries Food processing, dallying, Rice, dallying, woo~ 
· , cropping, horticulture tounsm 
Estimllai?Ps ~ prrxU:t $2.4 billion $0.6 million 
Source: Dore and Woodhill, slight1ymodified (1999:158). 
The industrial characteristics of the MMR are typical of many non-metropolitan inland regions 
in Australia. That is, accon:ling to ABS classifications, the highest proportion of the workforce 
is employed in the agricuhure and forestry followed by manufacturing, health and community 
services and retail sectors (as indicated in Table 7.3). 
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Table 7.3 MMR industJy and employment by industly characteristics 
INDUSTRY No. MidMurnty 
EMPLOYED % 
Agriculture, Ro.restry and Fishing 11732 28.3 
.. 
"' 
52 0.1 
Manufacturing 3931 9.5 
Electrictty, Gas and Water 682 1.6 
Construction 1961 4.7 
Wholesale Trade 1881 4.5 
Retail Trade 5171 12.5 
Accommodation, Cafes, Restaurants 2110 5.1 
Transport and Storage 1441 3.5 
Commwlication Setvices 487 12, 
Finance and Insurance 741 1.8 
Property and Bminess Services 1541 3.7 
Government, Administration and Defence 1375 3.3 
Education 2378 5.7' 
Health & Community Services 3318 8.0 
GUtw-al and Recreational Services 604 1.5 
Personal and Other Services 935 2.3, 
Non-classified and not stated 1175 2.8 
Total 41515 100 
Soun:e: CMACC 1999 
Apart from the Corrunonwealth funded Central Murray Area Consultative G>rnmittee (ACQ, 
which operates across state borders, the geographic area under analysis at the time of -writing 
had no peak regional body representing it. The Central M'um.y AC£ has representatives of 
local industry, NSW State government (Murray Development Board) and local government 
from NSW and Victoria; it has no Victorian government representation. Yet, as will be 
discussed shonly, the ongoing economic, social (lifestyle) and environmental interdependencies 
suggest that there is more that unites this region than the political boundaries (and groupings) 
that currently divide it. 
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s a:io-«X111.1?'ic prr:file in rrD1! detail 
Although the MMR has had sustained investment and growth for the last three decades there 
remains a large spatial variance in tenns of the distnbution of those benefits across the region. 
Research by CMAO::: identified that although the regions avernge unemployment was 
consistent with the national average at around 6.4 per cent for some LGAs and some particular 
groups of unemployed it was as high as 11 to 25 per cent respectively(CMAO::: 1999:18). For 
example, in 1999 the unemployment rate in Jerilderie and Wakool was around 4 per cent while 
in Berrigan and Balranald it was 7.3 and 10.8 percent respectively. In particular, youth and 
indigenous unemployment remains a key problem across the region. For example, for those 
between 15 and 19 years the unemployment rate avernged 16.58 per cent, between 20 and 24 
years it was 1322 per cent, while indigenous unemployment avernged 25.49 per cent. 
It needs to be said that the MMR has a proportional higher population in percentage tenns of 
17 year olds (and over 60 year olds) than metropolitan Sjdney or Melbourne, 'Which perhaps 
goes someway to exp1aining its consistently high youth unemployment problems. However, 
another explanation may be that in areas such as Greater Shepparton and the Shire of 
Campaspe the school retention rates for youth in years 7 to 12 are consistently some of the 
lowest in Victoria (ABS 2002:53). 
There is also a much higher dependency on welfare payments in the MMR and lower levels of 
mean taxable income than the Victorian and New South Wales State avernges (ABS 2002). 
Across the MMR the total contnbution of welfare payments to regional income was 19.3 per 
cent, 'Which was four percentage points higher than the total avernge for both states (CMAO::: 
1999:30). In the Greater Shepparton and Campaspe, where much of recent agri-food 
rnanufacruring and possessing investment has flowed, dependency on Commonwealth funded 
Job Search, Newstart and sickness benefits is one of the highest in Victoria (ABS 2002:30). In 
2000 in Greater Shepparton the proportion of taxpayers on these benefits was 5.3 per cent, 
'Which was the highest in the state and well above the Victorian State avernge of 3.8 per cent. 
The Shire of Campaspe faired slightly better at 4.2 per cent. Moreover, in 2000 Greater 
Shepparton's mean taxable income of $AU28, 929 placed in the bottom half of mean taxable 
income of non-metropolitan LGAs in Victoria (the state avernge was $AU34, 578). The Shire 
of Campaspe was in the bottom third at $27,823 (ABS 2002:32). 
Moreover, the :M:MR faces environmental challenges that have a real capacity to undermine the 
sustainability of its economic base particularly in relation to dryland salinity (discussed in 
chapter one). Put simply the health of the regions water systems and its water quality are key to 
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its future as a global food-processing region. Salinity undermines water quality and adds costs 
to production in tenns of ongoing treatment and abatement measures. Dryland salinity arises 
through rising groundwater levels that leach salt out of the soil and concentrate them in surlace 
water systems. In the state of Victoria, for example, land is deemed to be at risk of dryland 
salinity if the groundwater level is less than 2 meters from the surlace (ABS 2002:96). The 
Gou1bum-Broken catchment in the MMR has 10.3 per cent of its land with less than 2m to the 
watertable making it the worst catclunent in Victoria. Moreover, over 80 per cent of the 
condition of the river systems in the MMR was deemed to in the moderate to very poor 
condition range by the Victorian Department of Natural Resources and Environment in 2000 
(ABS 2002:97). Much of this is due to reduced water floVoTS, rising salinity, waste from industry 
and effluent nm off from irrigation which is associated with intensified food processing and 
production (CMACX::: 1999:17). 
The thirf§ that unite the MMR 
In 1998 Mid Murray Development (formerly :Mid Murray RDO) commissioned the Australian 
Cltarnber of Manufacturing (ACM) to undertake an analysis of the economic transaction floVIS 
of the major food processing industries in the MMR. The region has approximately 8,500 
businesses with the food processing industry accounting for 41 per cent of all manufacturing. 
In 1998, the food processing industry contributed over $AUD4, 540 million in economic 
transactions in the MMR covering purchases of raw materials, labour and capital, and sales to 
customers (see Table 7.3). This comprised of 109 businesses producing 24 categories of food 
products worth annual sales of $AUD2, 800 million; half ($AUD1, 450 million) for export 
(MMD 1998:1). The information was gathered from a survey sent to 109 firms of which 52 
finns responded - the survey responses, nonetheless, represented some 85 per cent of food 
processing activity in the region (MMD 1998:6). 
Table 7.4: MMR. food processing transaction flows 
Finance Raw materials Capital equipment 
% % % 
Local 67.8 71.9 21.3 
Outside region 182 13.6 31.0 
(NSW/VIC) 
Another State 13.4 11.1 7.1 
CM:rseas 0.6 3.4 40.6 
Total 100 100 100 
SoW'Ce: MMD 1998. 
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The region exhibited very strong economic, social and envirorunental interdependencies. Over 
85 per cent of the raw material used by the 1argest food processors is sourced locally (i.e. 
locai!NSW Vic). Over 86 per cent of finance the major food processors use comes from the 
local economy (i.e. locai/NSW, Vic) as does 52 per cent of the capital equipment used (MMD 
1998). Moreover, although separate catchment areas, the SIR and the MIRform part of the 
:Munay Darling Basin and share the Mumy River and its tributaries (and the salinity and flow 
problems associated with the Basin). From the intetviews conducted, in terms of local and state 
government contact and setvices, the movements are mostly east-west along the MWTay 
between the 1argertmvns. While life-style flows, sport, leisW"e and shopping are both east-west 
and, as transport and setvices have improved, north-south across state borders. There are very 
strong commercial and transport interdependencies north-south across state borders (MMD 
1998). 
The following explores in more detail how international, national and state forces and decision-
making impact on industry structure and regional development opportunities and potential in 
the :MMR. It also highlights the need for a more collaborative institutional framewotk 
involving indusuy and the tiers of govenunent to address what are a complex range of forces 
that are shaping change on the MMR. It is clear that many of issues to be discussed cannot be 
adequately addressed by firms or the community working with one or two levels of 
government alone, or by simply by relying on muket forces to facilitate adjustment. 
Industry pressures 
Cdlabaratun: the la:al ex~ 
As discussed in chapter four, the level of local interdependencies will depend in part on the 
internal governance struct\U'es of the firm involved (i.e. the importance of the region and plant 
in that struct\U'e). This in tum often depends on the personality and commitment of local 
managers to the local community- certainly the earlier discussion on the success of the Third 
Italy indicates this. In this sense firm ownership (foreign or endogenous) does not matter. 
What does matter, however, is the commitment of a firm to expand horizontal linkages (supply 
chain) to local firms and to engage in the broader regional development aspirations of the 
regton. 
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Intetviews undertaken in the region found evidence of capital (foreign and endogenous finns) 
actively engaged in community networks and broader development issues as well as examples 
where there "WaS minimal collaboration or engagement. Yet it is the action of local managers 
that seems to matter most, not ownership - although local perceptions on this issue remain 
mixed On the one hand, as one intetviewee working in regional development said, 
'multinationals, on the whole, are here to make a product at its lowest cost, they have little 
engagement with the region and are hard to access'. For even the most modest requests 'local 
plant managers need to contact :Melbourne, S}dney, US or Switzerland for approval of 
expenditures to support community initiatives from as little as $500 to $1000 dollars'. 
On the other hand, a CEO of a large Australian finn said, 'I could spend all my time and would 
need to create an economic development division to adequately respond to calls for 
panicipation on various community and government initiatives. My Board does not always 
appreciate the companies' resources being utilised in this way. In contrast a fonner manager of 
a multinational food company, and now CEO of a large Australian dally cooperative, said that 
'his fonner employers were very accommodating to local concerns and gave him the autonomy 
to spend on plant and equipment and local R&D etc'. Interestingly he said that this was not the 
case at other plants within the parent company and "WaS not necessarily consistent with the 
corporate governance structure of the finn concerned He put it down to twO factors. The first 
was that his plant perfonned well in relation to other plants in the global network and, second, 
to his 'personal relationship' with a senior figure within the finn's top hierarchy who acted as a 
mentor and advocate. 
As discussed earlier the problem here is not ownership but the corporate governance decision 
of finns and how they impact on local institutional arrangements. As an intetviewee explains, 
'many of the plant managers (of MNCs and endogenous finns) are here for two to three years 
and usually to do a specific job, Le. reduce costs- which is code for down sizing staff or 
reducing the price paid to suppliers. They are simply not here long enough to become part of 
our community and our development aspirations'. 
As well as corporate governance structures of finns and the commitment of individuals 
involved there were other external forces that influence the potential of the region's long-term 
economic development as well as leve1s of collaboration and netwmks of trust (social capital). 
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As discussed in chapter two, the same external factors (i.e. aspects of globalisation and 
domestic hberalisation) are affecting many of Australia's regions, metropolitan and non-
metropolitan alike. A brief look at capital restructuring of the tomato industry in the :MMR, a 
key industry sector in the local economy, offers another case in point. 
1he following is not attempt to present an intimate understanding of fon:es shaping 
international restructuring of the global tomato industry. Rather the lesser task is to provide a 
brief background to issues rnised by interviewees on the impacts international restructuring of 
this industry is having on local investment decisions in the :MMR. In particular, it gives a 
context for the types of pressures the local agri-food industry operates in. It also provides some 
insights to the challenges for achieving a cohesive regional development planning in the 1vflv1R 
in the absence of an agreed governance framework (between the tiers of govermnent the local 
community and industry). 
T cmJ1lJ JXlSfe - EX temal factors at play 
The tomato industry is a major contributor to the industrial strength of the MMR yet, despite 
deregulation, and its international reputation as being world's best practice, segments of the 
industry remain under threat. 1he big players in the Australian tomato paste industry, and 
:MMR, are Cedenco, Heinz and Unilever, with Ardmona and SPC producing paste as a by-
product of their other tomato-based products. One such threat comes from the entry of Cltina 
into the global tomato paste industry. 
Interviews in the region confirmed that Australian-based firms produce tomato paste for 
around $AUD1100 a tonne for both domestic consumption and expon. Industry-sources in 
the region indicate that the Chinese land tomato paste in Australia for $AUD700 a tonne (at 
the time of writing there was a glut in the world supply of tomato paste so this price varies). 
However, as one interviewee pointed out, 'the landed price of Chinese paste is not the 
international benchmark for tomato paste production as it reflects a subsidised price'. Cltina 
subsidises its rural sector and has dedicated regional programs to suppon its 900 million 
agriculture population; aimed at keeping them out of the major cities (Bolt 2001:18). Another 
industry representative who has travelled extensively in Cltina for the Australian tomato 
industry confirmed that, 'some 37 tomato factories have been established in China's 
NorthWest province of Xijiang since the late 1980s. China has moved from the ninth to the 
thini largest tomato producer in the world' (interview with local industry representative). 
According to the same interviewee, three organisations - Tunhe, Tienye and Cha1kis - control 
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much of Cllina's tomato production. Tt.enye and Cltalkis are military'-owned enterprises based 
on state fanns where workers are, at best, paid subsistence wages'. As the interviewee 
concludes, 'so how an~ne can detennine the real cost structure in Ollna tomato indusuy is 
be~nd me'. He also questions the profitability of many of these finns and worried about the 
longer-term impact of indusuy re-structuring in ClUna on global markets (see for example 
indusuy discussion piece at www.chinafruimews.cornlnews/2002-3-15-05-50-38.shtmD. 
The Australian government for its pan treats Ollna as a transition economy and is relying on 
Clllna's enttyinto the World Trade Organisation (WfO) to get a reduction in its tariff and 
non-tariff barriers. These multilateral and bilateral negotiations have been going on for some 
fifteen years {Bolt 2001:18). Meanwhile, Australian tariff barriers on tomato paste are currently 
5 per cent (down from 35 per cent), while Australian exporters face tariff barriers of 19.8 per 
cent into the EU, 16 to 18 per cent in the US and up to 40 per cent in Asia. According to a 
recent Tomato Land publication, Austr.tlia is the most deregulated tomato sector in the world 
(www.tomatoland.com). So while Australia's price represents world's best practice in a 
deregu]ated domestic matket, the Otinese, E U and US price continues to reflect subsided 
production. Australian indusuy soun:es confirmed that, utilising Italian technology and 
expertise, Ollna's tomato indusuywas established primarily as an export industtyto attract 
foreign CUirency and development into the Xinjiang Autonomous Region (phone inteiView 
2001; see also industty discussion piece at www.chinafruitnevvs.com/news/ 2002-3-15-05-50-
38.shtml). 
T1x! /a:al irrp:za m ~ ~ 
Because of these types of international market pressures Ardmona, which has spent $AUD14 
million upgrading its tomato processing area over the last year, decided to focus on canned 
whole peeled, chopped, puree and other high value niche tomato products and avoid its planed 
expansion into the international tomato paste market. It has invested over $AUD52 million in 
the upgrnde of its plant and equipment in the last five years in an effort to better control fruit 
flows and achieve a more specialised and flexible manufacturing process. According to its 
CEO, 'it's hard enough competing with Europe and the US with their subsidies and rnarket 
restrictions, but we do. But when Ollna puts so much effort into supporting tomato paste, 
with no one in govenunent recognising the impact of that distortion on rnarkets, the whole 
market segment just becomes unprofitable'. He also noted that it is not just the tomato paste 
sector affected by these market distortions but various Inalkets for a range of different goods. 
For example, 'Greek canners control80 per cent of the world's canned peach market with 
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outmoded tedmology, but are well protected behind EU barriers'. His main point is that 'these 
market distortions are particularly important to Australia because 75 per cent of the food and 
fibre it trades is processed, not raw'. 
The need to re-focus it production base, change its market segments, and achieve greater 
economies of scale in order to compete in the global agri-food sector was perhaps a key 
determinant in the subsequent decision for the merger between Ardmona and SPC in early 
2002. 
The entry of Ollna into the global tomato market is playing itself out in other ways in the 
region, particularly in tenns of growers, grower prices and grower rationalisation. According to 
another interviewee (confinned by several industry soun;es), tomato growers in the .MMR. 
recently received a letter from a local MNC food processor saying they would only buy from 
growers that can produce larger tonnages and pay for freight for suppliers within 30 km of the 
factory. In reality this would eliminate the smaller average suppliers from outside the 30-km 
radius, leaving three Jarge suppliers. Moreover, industry soun;es confinned that the same 
company in question is using the emergence of the Clllnese industry as a means to drive down 
local growers' prices. As one interviewee, a supporter of deregulation in the tomato sector, 
commented 'the rationalisation of the tomato industry in Australia (the MMR) will continue 
until probably there is only one of the three big processors Cedenco, Heinz or Unilever left. 
But there will be no loss of volume, volumes will probably increase'. The interviewee saw this 
as a good outCome. 
Adding more weight to the concerns expressed in the MMR case study has been the more 
recent restructuring of Heinz tomato paste operations in Australia. As part of its 1999 QJeratiln 
ExaJ the global food giant HJ. Heinz announced a $12 billion plan to restructure and refocus 
its global operations {www.heinz.com/2001anmmlrepon/fin excelhtrnl). The company dosed 
or exited 21 factories or business around the \VOrld over t\VO ~' including rationalising its 
Australian and New Zealand operations. Part of the rationalisation saw Heinz Wattie's 
Australasia formed (combining Australian and New Zealand operations) and the closure of 
Heinz's Dandenong factory in July 2000. The Dandenong factory had been a major user of 
tomato past from the finn's other plant at Girgarre in the MMR. In closing the Dandenong 
plant Heinz's c01potate affairs spokesman told media that part of the plant would be moved to 
New Zealand and ingredients (tomato paste) for the New Zealand operation soun;ed from a 
variety produces including Girgarre (www.abc.net/aulworldtoday/ s15379Z.htro). One assumes 
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that, given the global nature of Heinz's supply chains, tomato paste would also be sourced for 
its New Zealand operation from the world's lowest cost producer, namely, dllna. 
As well as these international indusnypressures a series of domestic policy changes also 
highlight current structural and political barriers that increase the complexity of the issues 
affecting regional governance struCture in the :MMR. The impact of National Competition 
Policy (NQ> - discussed in chapter two) in the MMR provides a case in point. 
1be ~ c{Natimal Carpetitim.Pclicy am tk MMR 
The differing regional impact of NQ> has caused Australia's major political parties to review 
their stance on its implementation. One of the most recent inquiries into the impact of 
competition policy, for example, concluded that while the benefits to the national economy 
remain positive the cost of these refonm have been felt hardest in rural and regional Australian 
(Productivity Commission 1999). This is panicularly so in the case the job losses associated 
with the introduction of compulsory competitive tendering provisions that often favoured 
large corporation (city based) over local companies and/ or local council employees 
(Conunonwealth of Australia 2000:166). 
For example, at the heart of NCP refonm, the Council of Australian Governments (CoAG) 
requires the water sector, as well as rail, shipping and electricity, to be open to greater 
competition and to generate a rate of return commensurate with other private sector industries. 
1his remains the case despite the fact that many of these types of businesses, not all, remain in 
public ownership. 1his continues to create spatial problems in several industry sectors. One of 
the problems is that each state has inteq>reted NQ> differently with the spatial impacts varying 
for business and communities (particularly between capital and non-capital city regions). 
The following two examples highlight the problem. In a simple example, one interviewee 
pointed out that NQ> in Victoria only applies to government enteq>rises with a turnover over 
$AUD10 million, whereas in NSW this was set at $AUD2 million. In practical terms in NSW 
this meant, for example, 'that water charges rose $45 per head as a direct result of applying 
NQ> compliance across all NSW local governments. In less populous parts of the state (in the 
NSW part of the MM.R) the impact was proportionally higher because the additional cost was 
imposed across fewer industries and people' (Glesson 2001). 
Meanwhile, in 1997 in Victoria, as part of NQ> refonns, the then state government directed its 
non-metropolitan wban water (NMUs) authorities to reduce water chcu:ges by 18 per cent in 
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exchange for a one-off injection of funding to accelerate capital wotks program and retire debt. 
This had the effect of freezing water tariffs in that state ootil Jooe 2001 (Glesson 200 1). At the 
time of writing a pricing review was ooder way in Victoria to detennine an appropriate rate of 
return for its water sector- a rate of 6 per cent on capital invested is being recommended 
regardless of location or type of business. This reflects a consistent criticism of NCJ> across 
Australia's non-metropolitan regions (National Economics 2001:8}. 1hat is, NCP has limited 
public investment in infrastructure where the public benefits may be high but the rates of 
return are below private sector benchmarks. 
Laurie Gleeson, CEO of Goulbum Valley Water (GVW), a major employer and provider of 
water infrastructure in the MMR, argues that 'this rates of return criteria totally ignores the 
spatial differences that exist between urban and regional water businesses'. He makes the point 
that return on investment by GVW may not be 6 per cent but its contribution to community 
and business development goes well beyond pure financial measures. 
'GVWhas a significant role to p1ayin regional development through the provision 
of high quality/low cost water and waste water services to the processing indusuy 
that undetpins their (and Australia's) international competitiveness. Much of this 
requires increased investment that cannot be recovered under the present tariff 
freeze. In regional areas the cost of suppl}mg water and sewerage services to small 
communities is subsidised by customers of the larger systems. Most projects 
undertaken by GWV are aimed at minimising environmental impacts and protecting 
public health by increasing water quality standards. These types of investments 
would not have been tmde by a private water business because the rates of return 
aren't there' (Glesson 2001). 
His point is that the current N<J> arrangements, as intetpreted by the Victorian government, 
don't allow for flexibility in tariff pricing or in determining appropriate rates of return in 
accordance with spatial characteristics. According to Gleeson, 'an appropriate rate of return is 
between 0 and 2 per cent and this depends on the different characteristics of the operation i.e. 
its location, debt levels, age and condition of assets, costs drivers, popu1ation and distances etc'. 
The decision of the Review in Victoria is critical to the GVWs future capital wotks program 
and to the sustainabilityof the MMR's economic base. The GVW authorities ~Prcfile 
Gune 2000) identifies $AUD95 million of capital expenditure over the next five years that are 
in jeopardy because of the rate of return requirement. 
lmportandy, for Gleeson (and to the earlier discussion) this includes wotks to assist water 
quality enhancement to World Health Organisation standards, environmental sustainable water 
treatment and disposal processes and waste minimization, to mention a few. As discussed 
already, these investments in quality water treatment infrastructure are key to underpinning the 
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MMR long-term competitive advantage as a world·dass value-added food producer and 
exporter. 
The problem highlighted by the above discussion on international and domestic pressures that 
impact on investment decisions in the M11R is that these problems often require a coordinated 
government response in terms of their affects on local the local production system Local firms 
working with either and! or local or state governments alone cannot address complexity of 
these issues, i.e. the impacts of unfair trade, high welfare dependency, low incomes, or the 
varying spatial impacts of competition policy on local infrastructure investment. Nor can issues 
such as these be adequately addressed by a national approach to regional policy that leaves 
regions to development strategies based on self-help. 
Oearly, the Conunonwealth has a role to p1ay given its powers in terms of tariff and trade 
policy and its role in implementing and determining the direction of micro-economic reforms. 
Historytells us that state governments in Australia more often than not act in their own self-
interest, which often leads to conflicting state institutional and regulatory (pricing) frameworks 
(as the above discussion highlights). This is a particular problem in regions such as MMR 
given its economic and social independencies and cross boarder characteristics. As the 
discussion below indicates, according to those interviewed, there is cwrently no cohesive 
regional governance structure (or network) within the :MMR that regularly brings business, 
local, state and Conunonwealth government actors together to address what is a vast and 
complex amy of regional problems. 
Having discussed some of the problems that currently impact the regional development 
potential of the MMR, we now tum to look at some of its strengths. In panicularlywe look at 
its strengths in terms of those characteristics often associated with post-Fordist-led regional 
development (discussed in chapter four). 
The MMR strengths 
A strength of the MMR is intellectual (human) capital in terms of community, commitment, 
leadership and vision, industty and state funded resean:h facilities (better developed in the SIR 
and emerging in the MIR). In the area of land and water management both formal and 
infonnallinkages between industty and the tertiary sector are strong. For example the 
Victorian govenunent's Department of Natural Environment and Resources, the Kyabr.un's 
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Dairy Centre and Tatura's Institute of Sustainable Irrigation Agriculture are active in research 
and development and have a strong track record in assisting industry innovation. The 
Goulbum Ovens Institute of TAFE in the last two years had begun to expand and develop 
stronger links with industty- the focus here remains on training to suit current and future 
industry needs. Melbourne University's Dookie College is an agricultural institute of excellence 
and actively engages primaty producers. There is work being undertaken by the Greater Gty of 
Sheppanon to tum Shepparton into a University town in its own right. This remains in its 
infancy but is gradually gaining momentum with local stakeholders. Similarly, in NSW, Riverina 
TAFE College (Deniliquin campus) actively engages local employers to shape its training 
programs, while Cllarles Srurt University, based in Wagga Wagga, is becoming increasingly 
interested in the Deniliquin region. On balance, collaboration between industry and the tertialy 
sector across the region is developing into a key part of MMR. knowledge asset base. 
Interestingly, however, to the author's understanding, there has not been an attempt to 
document and/ coordinate the knowledge-base assets and activity of the region and link this to 
a broader regional innovation system (RIS) approach (as discussed in chapter four). A RIS 
approach seeks to better link knowledge-based actions (focusing on supply inputs and demand 
factors) in an attempt to embed innovation and capture value-added activities. As discussed 
earlier, the MMR. remains a net importer of capital equipment and technology and it would 
appear there has been little coordinated attempt to conven the region's collaborative research 
outputs into locally-based new start-up SMEs. 
For example, Ardmona, at the time, had an annual turnover of $AUD165 million including 
expons of $AUDD45 million, was a highly innovative and internationally competitive food 
processing finn According to its 1999 Annual Repon, it had been cenified with the 
international quality system ISO 9002 till2004 and the international food safety system 
HACXJ>-Codex Alimentarius 97 I 13A It was an industry leader in the innovation of long life 
snack pack plastics (1985) and internationally recognised for its fruit imaging and soning 
technology. This technology had ensured a steady stream of international visitors through the 
Shepparton plant and was recognised at industry gatherings as world's best practice. 
Interestingly, according to its then Q'.O, Ardmona Foods had no inunediate plans to spin-off 
its technological innovations into other separate conunen:ial opponunities Qocally based or 
otherwise). The emphasis of discussion with its CEO was to focus on its core business (food 
processing and product differentiation) and its people and not to be distracted from this path. 
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In contrast, SPC at the time a rival local food-processing finn, under the leadership of its 
American managing director Peter Thor, has set on a deliberate strategy to move from a 
commodity-based canner to a technology-based processor and marketer (www.spc.comau). 
SPC, with sales of $AUD241 million p.a., had entered into licensing and strategic partnerships 
in the US and Europe to exploit its unique plastic cups filling and sealing technology. It has set 
up a subsidialy- P AK Technologies P /L- to be run by Thor who will return to the US, to 
California, with SPC engineering manager Bob Laing, to manage and establish the business. 
Thor was previously Executive Officer with the US growers cooperative Tri Valley Growers 
(which went bankrupt in 2000) and President of Redback Foods USA Tri Valley Growers had 
strong links to Delmonte Corporation USA The US based Delmonte Corporation has now 
installed Pak Tech plastic cup line and technology and negotiations are underway for Siam 
Foods Thailand and Delmonte Food International Europe to follow suit. In July 2000, 
Duetsche Asset management (Australia) Limited and River Capital P /L took a 30 per cent 
equity in Pak Technologies while SPC retains 70 per cent equity 
(www.spc.comaul company _pressdetail.cfm?prlternlD=24). 
The point here is that the current governance structures in the :MMR. work well to attract new 
investment in the agri-business sector but fail to support innovation into local spin-off value-
added activities. Perhaps part of the explanation lies in the absence of mature institutional 
networks and collaborative fr.uneworks of the type that seem to be present in the 
internationally competitive regions discussed in chapters four and five. 
Institutimal a~ in the MMR 
Interviews with leading industry figures indicate that networks that operate in the region tend 
to be focused on the interests of individual finns (firm to finn) or at an industry level, ie. 
dairy, food processing, water etc. That is most networks tend to business networks as opposed 
to institutional networks that as discussed are more characteristics of industry clusters and/ or 
RIS approaches to regional development. As a consequence the links between firms in the 
region outside business networks are ad hoc and largely informal. A CEO Group formed in 
the mid-1990s used to meet infrequently to look at a broader range of regional development 
issues but has since ceased to exist (discussed below). The linkages between industry and 
government are on an individual basis, either direct with state and federal government agencies 
in Melbourne and Canbena, or through various peak industry bodies. At Ardmona, for 
example, the CEO at the time was a member of the Food Industry Advisory Committee and 
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the Australian Food and Grocery Council, which had links to the Commonwealth's 
Supermarket to Asia initiatives (since abolished). 
1he above is not denying that there are nwnerous regional (development) organisations or 
groupings operating across the MMR.region (Dore and Woodhi111998:part 7.1). Organisations 
such as Area Consultative Committees (Affi), Voluntary Regional Organisations of Councils 
(VRc:x::'.s), local government economic development agencies, catchment management groups 
and state government development boards are active across the region. However, their impact 
and focus varies dramatically across the region as does their relationships with industry and 
particular levels of government. 
Some like the :Murnty VR~ for example, are dormant until issues arise or new life is borne 
into them. The state government's support of the Murray Region (one of 13 NSWState 
goverrunent regional zones) brings together such a Jarge geographical grouping that many of 
those interviewed thought it had little significance to many in the MMR at all. As one local 
govemment representative from NSW conunented, ' the Murray Region covers an area east to 
west along the river from Albury to Wentworth (stopping at the South Australian border-
ahnost 92,000 sq km). We might as well deal directly with Sydney because all the Murray 
Board's (the state government appointed board for the Murray Region) focus is on the biggest 
regional centre of A1bury and not on any of us in the middle'. As an industry representative 
commented, 'the state government Development Board is designed to keep the bureaucrats 
and politicians in Sydneywarm and fuzzy about economic development in rural and remote 
areas. As far as I'm concerned it has no practical impact in this region'. 
The Central Murray AO::. .is the only cross-state organisation in the region and is now funded 
by the Coiillmnwealth to deliver its Regional Assistance Program (RAP) through the 
Department of Transport and Regional Services (at the time of this research funding carne 
from the Department of Education, Workplace Relations and Small Business - DEWRSB-
discussed below). It has a Board representative of local govemment and industry from both 
sides of the Murray (but no Victorian government representative). Some of the other groups 
have industry representatives on their Boards (in some cases the same industry people) but the 
problem remains that there is little collaboration amongst these groups. Interviews with various 
representatives of these groups confirm that most operate in line with the criteria of their 
primary funding agency. 
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Perhaps of most concern was that many interviewees confinned that they compete with each 
other for government funding. This is consistent with the historical fact (discussed in chapter 
two) that the tiers of government in Austr.ilia for the most part operate in isolation and this 
creates structural barriers that often inlubits achieving broader regional collaboration in 
practice. 
The following two examples highlight the legacy of the lack of govenunent coonlination in the 
:MMR which tends to tu1dennine regional cohesion and less than optimal regional development 
outcomes. 
M qre btm?aucracy- /a;er upoo /a;er, upoo ... 
The first example involves the Cennal Murray AC£ based in Echuca (it geographical botu1dary 
covers most of the MMR) and its dealings with DEWRSB. At the time of writing, DEWRSB 
had responsibility for a national network of Affi - 56 in total Affi operate throughout 
metropolitan and non-metropolitan Austr.ilia and work through boards with representatives 
from industry, government and the community. Each AOC has an executive officer that carries 
out the daily functions and meets the reporting requirements of the Department, i.e. 
developing business and regional strcltegic plans. Under the RAP program seed funding is 
provided to suppon projects aimed at generating employment, creating small business 
opportunities and building the regional skills base. 
In the case of the Cennal Murray ACC it had to report through a DEWRSB regional office in 
Bendigo (some 90 km awaJ-1 that in tum came tu1der the control of the Department's state 
office in :Melbourne. The :Melbourne office ultimately reports to the Canberra office that in 
tum informed the Mnlster responsible. Each time Central Murray AOC acts it needed to 
satisfy each layer of DEWRSB bureaucracy. According to one interviewee in the region 'often 
the various layers of DEWRSB were in conflict and the internal politics of the organisation 
seemed to be more important than the activities of the ACC. Moreover, 'the advice and 
requirements from the regional, state and national office is not always consistent and this leads 
to confusion and duplication of processes and effon'. The AOC executive officer said 'that 
most of her time (and her staff's time) is taken up writing applications (most applicants simply 
do not have the skills or time to complete applications) and meeting bureaucratic reporting 
requirements that seem to change on a whim every six months'. Moreover, many of the RAP 
applications were co-funded with other Commonwealth agencies. Despite the various 
Department layers DEWRSB required separate application from the region to the other 
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(})mmonwealth departments in Canberra (i.e. the regional and state DEWRSB offices didn't 
wtdertake this function- the executive officer of the AOC did). 
Moreover, many funding requirements from government have compliance conditions that 
frustrate the grant application processes and lead to less than optimal outcomes. An 
interviewee for local government explains that a recent successful funding application under 
the (})nunonwealth' s Netwotking the Nation Program required the (})uncil to open a separate 
bank account to receive the funds. Given the number of grants the {}}wtcil received from both 
state and Commonweahh govenunent 'it would need to set up a 50 separate accounts a year to 
satisfy this requirement if allleve1s of govenunent applied this criterion. The bureaucrats just 
don't wtderstand the compliance costs and implications and inconvenience of such 
requirements'. 
Another interviewee commented, 'often we are required to acquit grants to meet the funding 
deadlines of the agency or the program involved. In practical tenns this often means rushing 
projects and/ or rearranging them which leads to half-baked outcomes - but satisfied reponing 
requirements'. One of the problems here is that the Department of Finance and 
Administration (DoFA) will claw back-unspent funds from Commonwealth agencies and 
return these monies to consolidated revenue. 
The current Murray Bridges Program that the Commonwealth chose to fund from its 
Centenary of Federation Fund provides a case in point. As an interviewee pointed out, 'these 
funds now need to be spent by the end of this year (a DoF A requirement). This means that the 
bridges that were originally prioritised for funding, through a long local consultative process 
(discussed below) and confirmed in an independent study, are not necessarily going to be 
repaired/ replaced as planned because funds can't be expended on these bridges in the program 
time frame. So now the state and local govemments along the Murray are engaged in a new 
rowtd of debates about which bridges can be repaired/ replaced to ensure that the 
Commonwealth's funds flow to the region and don't go back to Canberra'. 
Interim sununary: interpreting the key characteristics of the MMR 
As outlined in the introductory chapter, international experience suggests that some regions 
respond to the fon:es of change better than others according to the presence, absence and level 
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of maturity of certain spatial development charactemtics. From the infonnation gathered for 
this case study, we can now gauge the MMR. potential against these chancterutics. 
1. hiiJy <inmwJice'fom (~ani/ ar {uteigr; Wth s~ anmtia1s atri armitm?nt to the kral 
~(~; 
c· 1J'lnJlJ1Jicn' 
Innovation is particuJarly relevant in the value-added food processing sector and VJater 
industry sectors. Some individual finns are high innovators, i.e. Freestone and Benny 
Instruments, Ardmona Foods, Tatura Milk and Goulbum Valley Water, for example. Daity 
fanners, wine makers and food processors, rely heavily on innovation and productivity 
increases to sustain their industry competitiveness. With high levels of expons the region is 
plugged into global mukets and the competitive pressures this brings to the local 
innovation system 
'kral~' 
In tellllS of purchases of rnw materials, finance and some capital equipment the region 
clearly benefits. However, in tenns of a commitment to enhancing the 'regions' asset base 
as opposed to the interests of individual finns, or particular industry sectors, economic 
interdependencies remains poor. It should be remembered that 80 per cent of the region's 
capital equipment comes from outside the region. The region's poor perlonnance in this 
regard is consistent across many of Austrnlia's regions. A survey of regions by the 
Austr.ilian Indusay group in 2001 indicated that on average only 41 per cent of rnw 
material and 24 per cent of capital equipment were sourced locally (Ai Group 2001). 
2. «:aUTies if scale atri aa:ESs ro rrmkets ( damtidinterrtatitnd); 
Both these characterutics are vety strong - the distance to markets does not seem to have 
been a barrier to industrial expansion in the region. 
3. hijJ ler..eJ if amrunity skills, «iumtiaz atri t••Hi.,i.n· 
Most of the keyfmns have highlytrnined emploJ-ees; however, distance and trnvel remain 
barriers for others across the :MMR. As discussed above, there is a strong knowledge 
industry base in the region in tellllS of tertiary (TAFE education and training) and 
research institutions. Although unemployment in the region remains low there remains 
high demand for skilled labour. 
4. tWJilaJiliry if 7l!r11U1r! CdpiJal (fir R&D and ro ~ s~ and spin-iff om); 
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Given the amount of capital investment in the MMR over the last five years, and the fact 
that the AMC survey indicates that around 68 per cent is sourced locally, one would 
cautiously conclude that access to finance is not a significant bani.er to economic 
development for the large finns. However, there appears to be no local attempt to 
nunure endogenous growth in SMEs (rather the reliance seems to be on attracting 
footloose capital to the region). One suspects that a cluster approach to economic 
development with its emphasis on nunuring the synergies between venture capital and 
new start-up finns, to take advantage of the high concentration of research and 
development undertaken by specialist research institutes in the MMR is required. 
5. 7lli1 det£/qJed formd ani irfrnnd instiJut:im11 arratJPrmts rani interactim ~ umtry ani 
¥er lmmirg institutia1s); 
On would conclude that this characteristic is moderate to strong. There are clear 
examples of indusoytertiarysector collaboration, but this is developing on a project-by 
project basis rather than part of an overa.rching institutional collaborative framework. 
6. strrrg(hig,.pr</ik) cmmtnityanibusims 1Rad:rs (~ ard/crd:wrpiats); 
A very strong characteristic driven by a high representation of industry leaders including 
in large public/ private utilities. 
7. puliic/priuue suppcn if retw:Kk~ inmwtim ani ailaluratim; 
There appears an absence of governance structures that would support a lasting 
collaboration approach between the tiers of government and industry in this regard 
8. sp«ialis«i 'UlJrfd dass irfrastMJwe (sift ani~;. 
Although the region has world's best technology in water treaunent, food processing, 
packaging and transport, the condition of roads, bridges, energy, teleconununications 
and health infrastructure remain poor .. 
Potential for greater collabomtion in the MMR 
Is there the potential for adopting post-Fordist approaches to economic development in the 
MMR? Could this redress the deficiencies identified in the above analysis? The following gives 
two examples where the regional stakeholders carne together to achieve significant regional 
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development outcomes in the recent past that incorporated aspects of a post-Fordist's 
approach. 
E mirrnmntal mmag:rrmt 
The f~t example is to be found in the structures and processes that dealt with land and water 
management issues through the establishment of the Shepparton Sustainable Regional 
Development Board (SSRDB) and Secretariat in 1994. It focused on strategic projects and 
infrastructure that would repair and improve the environment and give support to sustainable 
agricultural and processing in the region. This included major drainage works, micro-water 
filtration plants and ways to treat waste from industry. This initiative received funding as a 
demonstration project under the Labor government's Regional Development Program (RDP). 
It was managed by the SRDB Secretariat (Young 1999) on behalf of the Murray Darling Basin 
Commission (MDBQ and had contnbutions from the Commonwealth, state, local 
government, local indusuy and landowners. 
This project, on the Victorian side of the region at least, produced collaborative processes that 
transcended the more transient arrangements established to secure one-off competitive 
government grants that dominates regional development activity. For example, a CEOs Group, 
with representation from the 20 or so major processing plants, was established as a key part of 
the SSRDB's planning and consolidation processes. This group met periodically with 
community, major utilities and government representatives to drive the process and set 
priorities. This collaborative structure was considered by many as one of the major strengths of 
the SSRDB's initiative. 
The reasons for the success factors of the SSRDB's water and land management project in the 
:MMR. were very clear. Earlier initiatives associated with the local Catchment and Land 
Protection Board (CAIP Board), and the Shepparton Land and Water Salinity Management 
Plan (Anon 1989), convinced indusny, community and government Qocal and state) that 
addressing rising salinity and waterqualitywere keys to combating the region's environmental 
crisis on the land As a consequence of Commonwealth funding, and the participation of the 
MDBC, fonnal and infonnal institutional arrangements were established that were transparent, 
clear in focus, and had a high level of community involvement and acceptance. This was 
achieved because there was no one individual or single finn directly benefiting from the 
activities of the SSRDB - as the bulk of the funds flowed into environmental infrastructure 
from which the community as whole benefited It was also the case that the key drivers were 
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recognised as local leaders in their various fields across indusoy, conununity and government 
and this gave credibility to the project's objectives. 
Of equal imponance was that the priorities of the SSRDB were also supponed by the activities 
of the Mid Munay Regional Development Organisation (REDO) established ooder the 
Conunonwealth's RDP in this region at the same time. The REDO played a catalytic role in 
expanding the SSRDB's focus northward into NSWs MIR by highlighting the synergies, 
problems and interdependencies between the two regions. The REDO focused on building 
networks and linkages around conunon issues such as infrastructure and transport, education 
and training for indusoy, and regional export capacity building. It was successful in gaining 
additional funds for accelernting the consuuction of a series of micro -water treatment plants 
across the MMR. 
Equally important to the success of the initiative, however, was the $AUD6 million 
commitment by the Commonwealth to the project which meant the initiative was well funded. 
As a former Board member of the SSRDB put it, 'the Commonwealth's money made it 
happen. Without that contribution state gove111lllent, local landholders and business would not 
have committed the time and funds they did. It (the Conunonwealth grnnt) accelernted the 
whole process by years - and gave our (SSRDB) activities enormous credtbilityand 
momentum'. 
The activities of the SSRDB concluded in 1998, with the end of Conunonwealth's agreed 
three-year funding (see Young 1999:279-300). The legacyto the region, however, was that 
these activities meant that as new sources of government funds came available (through the 
Naturnl Heritage Trust, for example) the region had the networks, data and strntegies in place 
to take advantage. In other words, these collaborntive activities had enhanced the region's 
instirutional thickness in tenm of addressing its environmental problems. 
A ~trofar 
Ironically, the same bridge project mentioned earlier offers an example of strong regional 
collaborntion - despite interlerence by bureaucrntic forces in its implementation stage. Under 
the leadership of the former Commonwealth REDO a River Crossing Group (Rex;) was 
formed in 1997 to identify and prioritise bridges that were in need of urgent repair or 
replacement along the Murray River. The issue emerged because of the dramatic increase in 
trnnsport flows (and tonnages) in the region and the declining state of bridges (road and mil 
crossings) that had to support them The PKK Environment &Infrastructure P/ L was 
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commissioned to investigate the flow and tonnage and to assess the economic importance of 
those crossings. They estimated that $AUD33.5 billion of commodities were carried across the 
Murray River by road and rail each year (PKK 1999). One third of the bridges carried 95 per 
cent of all freight and road freight represented 84 per cent of this amount (PKK 1999:A). The 
Rffi was made up of local and state government representatives as well as business and 
industry leaders. 
As a consequence of this collaborative process the :May 2000 Federal Budget announced a 
$AUD44 million Murray River Bridges programme (using money from the Centeruuyof 
Federation Fund) to build new bridges over the Murray River at Cowra, Echuca and Robinvale 
(DTRS 2000:31). These funds were to attract matching funding from the state governments. 
Oearly the pressure brought to bear to expend funds earlier and change construction/ repair 
priorities undermined much of the goodwill, collaboration and consensus achieved by the 
process. 
The point to draw from these two examples is as follows. Both projects emerged from a shared 
sense of crisis and the need for action from within the region. Both drew a wide range of 
stakeholders into collaborative planning processes (infonnal netwolks) and formed a steering 
group (fonnal netwmk) to drive the process. Both, in the beginning, attracted small amounts of 
government funding Qocal, state and Commonwealth) to investigate the extent of the problem 
and to devise the best strategies to address the issues - they had good data. Both took the 
opportunity of gaining access to the Commonwealth, through the local REDO, as well as local, 
state and federal politicians and engaged them in the process as it unfolded (a more conducive 
collaborative environment). 
The REDO and the SRDB were important because they acted, as intermediary groups not 
constrained by traditional local and state government boundaries and parochialism. Both these 
groups also offered channels to the Commonweahh, the REDO through the then Department 
of Transport and Regional Development and the SRBD, through the Murray Darling Basin 
Conunission, the Department of Primary Industry and the Department of Environment. Both 
projects were also transparent processes that gained a lot of local support and interest because 
they atticulated a strategic commitment to improve the region's asset base that overcame 
political barriers and borders. 
There exists among many community and industry leaders interviewed for this thesis a strong 
willingness to the concept of 'regionalism' that these two projects represent. And a very clear 
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understanding of what regionalism implies. As the CEO of a large corporatised government 
utility eloquently stated, 'regionalism means a cormnitrnent by business, govenunent and the 
community to work across political boundaries and through parochialism to achieve agreed 
regional priorities - for the long-term benefit of the region'. The problem is these types of 
projects remain the exception rather than the rule across the MMR. The fact remains that 
govemrnent(s), because of its various layers, different regulatotyand bureaucratic processes, 
and general Jack of coonlination, remain a significant banier to the establishment of genuine 
long-term cohesive governance structures in the region. 
Conclusion 
1he question this chapter has explored is whether there is the potential for a post-Fordist 
approach to economic development in the MMR. This was achieved by exploring some of the 
international and domestic forces shaping economic development in the region and by 
highlighting structural and political challenges that currently operate. 
The discussion has highlighted that, while the region has highly innovative firms and has 
attracted large flows of investtnent into the food-processing sector, there remain as many 
challenges as opportunities for its future. In particular, there are a range of complex and of 
often competing pressures, social, environmental, political and market, that impact on 
economic decision-making across the MMR. For example, many interviewees noted that while 
some towns, industries and individuals were benefiting from the sustained growth, others 
across the region are missing out (youth unemployment, education standards and welfare 
dependency were identified as key problems). While other industry and community leaders 
pointed out that the capacity of the region's environment (ecosystem) to sustain the rapid 
growth in the food-processing sector (i.e. quality of water to industry and coping with industry 
waist) remains a major challenge. 
H:>wever, one of the largest barriers to greater regional collaboration appears to be the absence 
of an agreed governance structure and the political boundaries and processes imposed 
differently by the three tiers of government. In the MMR many of those interviewed saw 
government processes as an obstacle to the pursuit of community-driven collaborative action 
and this results in poor regional development decision-making. 
The problem remains that there is no overarching institutional framework that builds support 
for the types of cooperative action needed to facilitate a post-Fordist approach to economic 
development. In tenns of Putnam's earlier observation discussed in chapter four, while the 
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region is high in human capital, its social capital is not so well developed Collaboration, when 
it does occur, operates on an ad hoc basis reflecting the various jurisdictional boundaries and 
layers of bureaucracy of the three tiers of government. There were several business networks 
across the region but these were more about business relationships rather than stakeholder or 
institutional networks. In the current environment, the synergies between the endogenous 
private sector, conununity and the three tiers of government remain undeveloped and 
opportunistic rather than being part of a collaborative institutional framework aimed at 
enhancing the region's long-term productive base. This is not to deny that some of the larger 
local councils (Shepparton, Campaspe, Moira, and more recently Deniliquin) are pro-active in 
economic development. Some were engaged in attracting investment and industry to start up, 
expand or relocate in their local govenunent area. However, most are under resourced and 
operate in isolation from the other tiers of government. 
Pexhaps of most concern is that this case study presented examples where state and, to a 
greater extent, Commonwealth activities (and/ or~ in the region in fact mitigate 
against the fonnation of a more collaborative approaches to address regional problems. The 
top-down processes devised to suit state and Commonwealth program reporting and funding 
criteria often create barriers to bottom-up collaboration in the MMR. The fact that each layer 
of government has different responsibilities and often represents the policies of different 
political parties means that regions have to work within an environment of competing and 
overlapping political and bureaucratic agendas. 'Moreover, it remains the case that state and 
Commonwealth officers in the MMR represent a particular department and program and are in 
most cases are not the decisionrnakers (referring applications to head or regional office for 
approval). As a consequence, policies and programs, no matter how well intended, are often 
inflexible as decision-making is removed from the local sensitivities. Local stakeholder 
engagement with Commonwealth and state government is reduced to a 'reactive' process 
where the real art, as one interviewee put it ' is to be the best at monitoring grant programs, 
completing applications and playing the political and bureaucratic processes'. 
The drainage and bridge projects discussed showed that local stakeholders are willing to engage 
in collaborative processes when the institutional framework is more conducive to strategic 
planning and where the government suppons the processes. In these cases the processes were 
transparent and focused on enhancing the region's asset base to better ensure its long-run 
productive potential. Given the regional economies of scale, diversified industries base and 
knowledge resources (human capital and R&D) an industty clusters and regional innovations 
systems approach would appear to have significant potential in the MMR. A well-resourced 
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intermediary organisation supported by all stakeholders would need to be the driving force for 
this type of policy approach. It would need to be supported by an increased presence by the 
Commonwealth in the region and closer linkages between tiers of government and indusuy as 
a means to address what is a complex range of issues currently affecting change in the region. 
A key emphasis would be to maximise the synergres between indusuy and the tertiaty (research 
institutes) sector to spin-off innovative start-up finns. This would have the long-term effect of 
deepening the economic interdependencies in the region and increase value-added activities. 
This would also have the effect of instigating a strategy for mitigating against the more 
immediate impacts of capital restructuring in the region. Moreover, as discussed in chapter 
four, the collaborative processes that undetpin post-Fordist theotyand approaches can also be 
used to better balance concerns for efficacy, and equity. Local p1anning processes could be 
used as a mechanism to better link government, the private sector and commwlity leaders to 
jointly address social and economic problems in the MMR. By bringing stakeholders together a 
more concentrated long-term focus could be brought to addressing inequalities in income, 
raising education standards and retention rates, and youth unemployment across the region. 
Other key areas of focus for the peak body would be to continue the environment work that 
deals with the issues of salinity, water to industty, industty waste and the health of the river 
systems. These issues have the real potential to undermine the long-term economic 
sustainability of the MMR. What is required is a collaborative approach between the three tiers 
of govermnent, local indusuyand the community, to systematically address these issues. The 
above changes to governance ammgements would give the MMR the capacity to shape its 
future and focus its energies and resources on dealing with the ongoing challenges of change. 
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Chapter 8 
CASE STUDY TWO: GREATER WESTERN SYDNEY 
Introduction 
The main pwpose of the case study of the Greater Western Sydney (GWS) is to explore the 
potential and barriers for policy-makers in applying spatial approaches to industty/ regional 
development (that is the potential for public/ private partnerships, industty clusters, networks 
and regional innovation systems in a metropolitan-regional context). As with the case study on 
the MMR, the intention is to assess the presence and condition of stn.JctUr.1.l and institutional 
factors in GWS against those cited in international spatialliternture. These charncteristics 
include: a presence of highly 'innovative' firms (endogenous and! or foreign) with strong 
connections and commitment to the local economy(depth of interdependencies); economies 
of scale and access to markets (domestic/international); level of community skills, education 
and trnining; availability of venture capital; extent of formal and informal institutional 
arrnngements (internction between government, industry and higher learning institutions); 
presence of strong (high-profile) community and business leaders (entrepreneurs and/ or 
champions); public/ private support of planning, entrepreneurs, networks and innovation; and 
specialised world class infrastructure (soft and hard). 
The GWS region -was chosen as a case study for three reasons. Firstly, GWS highlights the 
importance of metropolitan/ urban fringe regions to the national economy and as such 
underpins the point that such regions ought not to be excluded from national regional policy 
and analysis. Secondly, GWS is part of the Hawkesbwy-Nepean catchment and recent regional 
strntegies to address environmental concerns highlight the parallels in approaches to issues of 
sustainability and regional development (discussed in chapter one). Thirdly, more recently, the 
NSW State government has established an Office of Western Sydney (OWS) that, on the 
surface at least, is consistent with the international trends toward devolution/ decentralisation 
(as discussed in chapters four and six). For this reason, although in its formative years, the 
OWS offers some important insights into the challenges and opportunities of 
devolution/ decentralisation for Australian policy-makers. 
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Methodology 
During a seven-day visit to the region in July 2001 some 15 separate interviews (each consisting 
of one to four people) were conducted with representatives of indusuy (small and large), peak 
business groups, higher education, state and local government, and regional development 
bodies. These interviews were spread across the region from Penrith in the west to 
Campbelltown in the south. The discussions focused on regional problem;, barriers to 
business and employment growth, local collaborative structures {business to business, between 
community government and business), engagement with local, state and Commonwealth 
governments and their activities and education, social and environmental concerns. The 
researcher also drew on several previous regional studies. Several follow-up phone interviews 
were conducted to confinn the infonnation gathered 
The discussion begins with a look at the economic and geographic characteristics of the GWS 
region. We then explore the region's industtystructure looking at industry interdependences 
and inter-finn institutional cooperation. Next, data is presented that reflec~ the diversity of 
socio-economic conditions (employment, income, and relative disadvantage) across the GWS. 
We then look at regional organisations and regional frameworks that operate in GWS. This 
includes the role of government in fostering regional development - with emphasis here on the 
role of the OWS. Finally, we briefly explore recent collaborative strategies in GWS to address 
issues of environmental sustainability. This example, amongst other things, highlights the 
ongoing tension between 'responsibility and 'financial capacitY that exists between Australia's 
tiers of government {as discussed in chapter three). 
Economic and geographic proftle 
Tlx!rtfim 
The traditional understanding of the geographic area of GWS {see map at Appendix 3) 
represents the outcome of the NSWState government's 1968 Sydney Region Outline Plan 
(National Economics 2001 :27). It combines the area covered by two peak local government 
groupings, the Western Sydney Regional Organisation of Councils (WSRC>C) and the 
Macarthur Regional Organisation of Councils (NIACRC>C). The region is unique in that it is a 
'declared' region and as such is not clearly separated from adjoining regions (GWSRDB 1999). 
As Table 8.1 indicates, GWS incorporates the 14xviii local government areas of Auburn, 
208 
Bankstown, Camden, Campbelltown, Wollondilly, Baulkham Hills, Blacktown, Blue 
l\.1ountains, Fairfield, Hawkesbury, Holroyd, Liverpool City, Parramatta and Penrith an area of 
about 8800 square kilometres {Gooding 1999; GWSEDB 2000). 
Table 8.1: Population spread across GWS local government areas (LGA) 
LGA Population 1998 
Auburn 57,204 
Banks town 167,839 
Blacktown 248,525 
Baulkham Hills 130,302 I 
Blue l\.1ountains 75,855 
Camden 37,767 
Campbelltown 149,489 
Fairfield 190,920 
I 
Holro}d 86,280 
Hawkesbury 60,884 
Liverpool 137,066 
' 
Parramatta 144,366 
Penrith 171,420 
Wollondilly 35,489 
Total 1,693,406 
Soun::e: National Economics (2001:26). 
Over the past 50 }ears GWS has been uansfonned from a largely rural area characterised by 
small population, poor infrastructure and small towns to one of Australia's fastest growing and 
economically significant regions. Consequently, there is a wide variance between Councils from 
high-population and high-density areas such as Parramana, Fairfield, Holroyd and Blacktown 
to areas dominated by natural bushland and lower-density housing like Hawkesbury, Blue 
l\.1ountains and Penrith. 
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IrrlustrystnKt:Ure ani~ 
Traditionally, GWS derives much of its economic demand and industrial capacity from its 
proximity to metropolitan Sydney. And, despite some recent attempts to promote greater 
regional identity and sense of regional self-sufficiency, the economic and employment links to 
Sydney(and outside the region) remain strong. For example, GWS continues to supply90 per 
cent of metropolitan Sydneys fresh food produce (TwnW~t 2001). A swvey by the Australian 
Industry Group found that industries in the region only sold 28 per cent of goods, sourced 
27.8 per cent of their raw materials and 20.5 per cent of their capital equipment from within 
GWS (Ai 2001). However, another swvey by National Economics suggests that around 70 per 
cent of the GWS workforce work in the region, which, they argue, undetpins the notion that 
self-containment is improving in GWS (GWSEDB 2000:25). Certainly, the formation in the 
1980s and 90s of regional organisations such as of MACR.~ WESR~ the Greater Western 
Sydney Economic Development Board (GWSRDB), Ta:unW~t and OWS, amongst others, are 
conscious attempts at creating greater regional identity and economic and social autonomy 
from metropolitan Sydney. 
As a sub-economic region GWS exhibits a population base and level of economic activity to 
rival any other region in Australia. For example, GWS generates some $AUD54 billion in 
economic output per annum, or 9 per cent of national income, making its economy the third 
largest behind Melbourne and Sydney (GWSRDB 2001). The current population is over 1.7 
million (Table 8.1), which represents 26 per cent of NSW population and 9 per cent of the 
Australian population (National Economics 2001:26). According to National Economics 
(2001:26), the GWS region abs01bed 58 per cent of Sydneys population increase between 
1986-96 (from 3.46 million to 3.84 million) and its employment base expanded from 358,000 in 
1991 to 419,000 in 1996. There are some 72,000 finns (NSW Government 2000), made-up of 
some 63,000 small businesses employing less than 50 people (TeamW~t 2001), operating across 
the region. Industry sectors include: agriculture, agnbusiness, construction, manufacturing, 
pharmaceuticals, tourism, wholesale/ retail, property, finance and business setvices, education, 
telecommunications and IT, health care and medical research, transport, community services 
and government. A burgeoning IT industry has been identified by the NSW State government 
that consists of some 1,500 finns which conmbute $AUD2.7 billion to the national economy 
(OWS 2001). 
While more recently there has been increased emphasis by the state government on promoting 
the local IT industry, the manufacturing (at $AUD20 billion a year) and retail sector remain key 
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parts of GWS's economy. The sectors with the biggest annual turnover include 
pharmaceuticals, chemicals, petroleum and coal products at $AUD3.2 billion and food, 
beverage and tobacco at $AUD 3J billion (TaznW~t2001). The top industries in tenns of 
employment in the GWS region are wholesa1e/ retail (23.4 per cent), manufacturing (20 per 
cent), and conununitysetvices (17.8 percent). While, manufacturing can further be broken 
down by employment in the sector groups of machinery and equipment - 16.3 percent, food, 
beverage and tobacco- 12.8 per cent, and fabricated metals -11.4 per cent (TmmW~t 2001). 
While the GWS region continues to go through a period of structural adjustment, 
manufacturing and wholesale/ retail remain irnponant, employing nearly half the region's 
wotkers (GWSEDB 2001). 
Otherearmicforra ~spatial~ in GWS 
Another factor driving industrial development in GWS has been the more recent emergence of 
industriaV commercial parks since the 1980s. Part of the explanation has been the increased 
demand by business for cheaper, setviced, industrial land (on established transpon routes) 
outside the high cost Sydney metropolitan region. 
In particular, the development of the Huntingwood Industrial Estate, with finns such as Sharp 
and Sony, and in Gunberland ForeSt, where IBM is located, has offered a means for GWS to 
compete with Sydney's Nonh shore areas of Willoughby, Lane Cove and Nonh Ryde for 
footloose capital (GWSEDB 2000:47). In Baulkam Hills, for example, the N01west Business 
Park combines proximity to high-income residential areas with high skilled workers and access 
to culturnl, recreational and entertainment facilities all on one 377-hectare site (Norwest Ltd 
2001). It has attracted over 241 individual businesses to the Park with 23 per cent of these in 
the IT and property setvices business and has some 2000 people working in the Park, a 
number that is expected to double in the next two }ears (BHSC2001:6). Businesses operating 
there include Gtble &W~.reless Optus, :Mercantile Mutual Investments, Texas Instruments, 
Cathay Pacific, Schneider Electric, Le Reve Cosmetics and Wyeth Pharmaceuticals. Nonhwest 
is one of three industrial/ commercial precincts opernting in Baulkam Hills Shire alone - the 
others are the Gtst1e Hill Trading Zone (920 businesses) and Nonh Rocks Industrial Area {161 
businesses). Notwest Limited, the organisation that manages the Patk, promotes itself by 
highlighting its proximity to the M2 Hills MotoiWclyand that it is 15 minutes to Nonh Ryde 
and 30 minutes to the SydneyCBD (Norwest Ltd 2001:6). 
Before the discussion rums to look at the spatial socio-economic aspects of development in 
GWS some further points need to be made about the types of industrial/ commercial parks 
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operating across GWS. In particular, industriaV conunercial parks in GWS appear to operate 
more as property development oppottunities rather than as industty clusters and/ or industrial 
districts associated with post-Fordist literature discussed in chapters four and five. That is, the 
emphasis by the developers is on capital appreciation through increasing property prices, which 
is achieved by attracting well-known finns that raise the over.ill prestige of the development. 
For example, there appears to be no overarching institutional fr.unew01k 
(business/ government collaboration) that governs the innovative dynamics of the Norwest 
industrial park. That is, there is no evidence of technical, managerial and service support., 
networking initiatives and/ or deliberate support for emerging SME.s in tenns of R&D, 
business incubator, legal or venrure capital needs (as suggested bypost-Fordist approaches). 
For example, a Council representative from Baulkam Hilk Shire commented that 'O>uncil role 
in tenm of Norwest has been to fast track development approvals and to promote the Park in 
its tourism business information packages, and little else'. Indeed, the Council's economic 
development unit in its draft economic development plan identifies as an ongoing weakness 
the low level of communication (networks) between businesses operating in its area. It also 
identifies poor communication between Council and business, as well as the fragmentation of 
business organisations representing keyfinns as a major weakness (BHSC2001:7). This general 
lack of collaboration between industty and government and absence of networks among key 
finns in GWS was also confirmed in a series of workshops conducted by the Australian 
Business Foundation as part of its review of the regiorial infrastructure needs in 2001 (ABF 
2001). 
In this sense, the growth of industriaV conunercial parks in GWS appears more closely 
associated with lower cost structures and business incentives the state and local government 
offers to attract finns. Once established their ongoing dynamic is associated with traditional 
externalities (agglomeration effects) and Industrial-O>mplex (input/ output) effects that flow 
from co-location (described in chapter four). 
S<Xio-axnaric in1imtnrs 
Despite GWS economic dynamism and diversity, there is a clear spatial dimension to its socio-
economic composition - particularly in tenns of the distnbution of income, employment, and 
disadvantage (Table 8.2 below). The region includes in its catchment some of the highest and 
lowest petfonning regions in NSW (and Australia). 1his reflects differences in the access and 
availability of infrastruCture and services and the industrial and social composition of p1aces 
and households (ABS 1998:53). Unemployment across the region remains higher than the 
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state average particularly in what others have termed the Sydney Production Corridor, which 
includes Liverpoo~ Fairfield, Holroyd and parts of Parramatta, B1acktown and Campbelltown 
(GWSRDB 2000:19). The disadvantage index in Table 82 utilises a range of data including low 
family income, people without education qualifications, unemployed people, people in low-
skilled occupations, and people entering public housing, to measure disadvantage across GWS. 
Using the index, regions with a high score are relatively advantaged while low scores indicate 
relatively disadvantaged 
Table 8.2: Variance in socio-economic indicato~ across the GWS region 
LGA Unemployment Number of Labow- force People Household 
Rate (1996 and relative participation higher mcomeper 
2000) disadvantage rate degrees capita 
% No. % % $ 
Auburn 14.3/6.9 932 54 8.8 242 
Banks town 6.4/6.9 969 56.4 6.4 279 
Blacktown 8.9/6.9 964 64 7.3 275 
Baulkham Hills 3.5/2.1 1019 66.6 10.5 425 
Blue Mountains 6.6/5.4 1071 62.7 14.7 320 
Camden 5.4/4.9 1051 692 7.8 327 
Campbelltown 9.4/9.0 964 66 5.8 273 
Fairfield 162/8.7 905 59.5 4.9 235 
Holroyd 82/3.5 982 60.9 7.6 293 
Hawkesbwy 5.4/3.5 1036 69.9 7.8 308 
Liverpool 102/5.5 956 63.4 6.2 276 
PatTamatta 8.6/3.1 1004 60.3 12.8 323 
Penrith 7.3/5.1 1009 68.8 6.1 295 
Wollondilly 6.7/4.9 1028 66.3 6.6 293 
I 
Source: adapted fromABS (1998) &ABs {2000). 
For example, in 1997 Fairlield's disadvantage index was 905, ranking it in the bottom twenty 
disadvantaged regions in Australia, while Baulkham Hill's index was 1128 making it Australia's 
11th relatively advantaged region. Fairfield was also in the top ten regions for employment in 
manufacturing with 26.6 per cent of its workfon:e in that sector which is some 13 per cent 
higher than the national average (ABS 1998:45). In 1997, Fairfield was in the top twenty 
regions for unemployment (16.2 percent compared to the national rate of 9.2 in 1997) and had 
a labour fon:e participation rate below the national average, 57 per cent compared to 62 (ABS 
1998:46). Fairfield also had a higher proportion then the national or NSW State average of 
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migrants born in a non-English speaking background (over 33 per cent). lhe average 
household income per capita was $AUD253 compared to the national average of $AUD310. 
In conttast, Baulkham Hills had an unemployment rate of 35 per cent, an average income of 
$AUD425 and a labour force participation rate of 66.6 per cent. 162 per cent of Baulkham 
Hills popu)ation had a higher education degree compared to Fairfield's 4.9 per cent (compared 
to the NSWState average of 10.5). 
A clearer picture of the diversity of income across GWS is gained by looking at Table 83, 
which includes a sample of some LGA's from GW'S. It can be seen that Auburn and Faitfield 
have the highest percentage of household incomes in the lower brackets, while Baulkham Hills 
has the lowest by a wide margin. Conversely, Auburn and Faitfield have the lowest percentage 
of household incomes in the over $AUD2000 bracket, while Baulkham Hills has three times 
higher than the next nearest LGA (Parramatta). 
Table 8.3: Weekly household income, proportion of households, WSROC region 
Weekly household Weekly household Weekly household 
Local Go~mment Area income between income between incomeo~r 
$AUD300-700 SAUDl000-2000 $AUD2000 
(%) (%) (%) 
Auburn 31.4 182 2.7 
Baulkam Hills 15.8 33.0 16.8 
Blacktown 26.9 24.9 3.4 
Blue Mountains 27.0 23.3 4.8 
Fairfield 30.0 20.4 3.0 
Hawkesbury 26.0 25.5 4.5 
Holroyd 27.3 231 3.7 
Live1p00l 27.5 23.1 3.7 
Parnunatta 25.8 23.9 5.5 
Penrith 251 27.5 4.0 
Source: modified from WSROC (2001) 
Oearly, the above indicates that the region has high variations in income, employment, 
education and health standards and services, and remains quite diverse in its indusuy structure 
and dynamic. For example, in terms of health services the University of Western Sydney was 
recently granted $1 million dollars by the state government to combat the chronic shortage of 
mental health nurses in the GWS (edge 2002:3). Moreover, it is over 2000 largely immigrant 
workers (80 per cent from non-English speaking backgrm.mds) that produce 90 per cent of 
Sydney's fresh vegetables. There has been a series of reports on these workers noting the 
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ongoing health problems associated with their poor prnctice in handling chemicals and 
pesticides (edge 2002:9). 
Spatial planning and regional groupings in GWS 
Having discussed the diversity of indusuyand socio-economic composition and conditions of 
the region, the following explores the history of spatial planning and groupings in GWS in 
more detaiL Although there is a long history of spatial planning for Western Sydney, in terms 
of state government provision for public infrastructure and services, it has only been recently 
that regional groupings have begun to have an impact on locally- led economic development 
planning. 
State~~prrms 
A GWSEDB report documents several state government plans that have been designed over 
the years to influence spatial patterns of development in the GWS region beginning in 1949 
with the County of Gunberland Plan 1949-51 (GWSEDB 2000:33). Under this Plan, in an 
effort to contain outward growth of urban development, a greenbeh was declared outside a 
22km radius from Sydney GPO (GWSEDB 2000:33). Any expansion beyond the greenbelt 
would be in 'new to'WilS' focused on areas such as Penrith and St Marys and to a lesser extent 
B1acktown, and Campbelhown. The Gnnberland Plan was abandoned as a resuh of the impact 
of the Commonwealth's post--war immigration program where the popu1ation increases to 
Sydney, and GWS in particular, undennined many of the population forecasts of the planners. 
Due to rising land prices and unavailability of land, land was opened up in Notth Ryde, 
Dundas and LivetpoOl (GWSEDB 2000:33). In 1968 the Sydney Region Outline Plan 1970-
2000, based on the European growth corridors model was devised with forecasts of a 5 
million population for the Sydney Region by 2000 - much of which was planned to take p1ace 
in the former rural areas in GWS (GWSEDB 2000:34). 
While many state government plans have been prepared over the years, none have had an 
explicit regional development focus rather they concentrate on the role of public infrastructure 
and services in facilitating population growth. Examples of state government plans that 
specifically incorporate a Western Sydney focus have been summarised by the GWSEDB 
(2000). These include the Otit5 fir the 21st Century- 1995, Shapirg atr Oties- 1998, the 
MetrqxJitanStrategy- 1998, the 1998 StratEgy- Shapirg WestemSy.bry, andActimfarTranspart-
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2010 (GWSEDB, 2000). All these P1ans have in conunon a goal to achieve higher densities and 
make the major centres in the conidors self sufficient in terms of transport, health, education 
and employment etc (GWSEDB 2000, Cltapter 3). Yet, none produced strategies to 
specifically develop and diversify the region's industty base, expand its R&D or value-added 
activities. 
As the following indicates, it is has been the influence and activities of regional groupings such 
as the three former Commonwealth RDOs, GROW, TeamWest, the GWSEDB and the OWS 
that has put the emphasis on the imponance of developing 'local' and 'regional' economic 
development strategies. 
Retftml~ 
As one would expect over such a vast area as GWS, there have emerged a number of regional 
organisations representing a range of interests and issues: by one estimate alone there are over 
80 organisations and 20 major regional strategies are currently in operation (Gooding 
1999:260). It is be)Qnd the scope of this thesis to list them all but in tenm of regional 
economic development the following are seen as key peak organisations. Some of the key peak 
organisations include the already mentioned local government groupings of MCROC, 
WSROC, and the state government funded GWSRDB and OWS. Others major players 
include TeamWest, which evolved from WSROC, the GROW Employment Council, the 
Greater Western Sydney Clwnber of Commerce, Australian Business Ltd Western Sydney, 
University of Western Sydney, the :NSW Institute of TAFE and three Area Health Boards. In 
terms of the environment the three major players include the statutoty authorities of 
HawkesblllY' Nepean Catchment Management Trust (HNCM1) and the Western Sydney and 
Macarthur Waste Boards (Dore and Woodhill1999). It should also be remembered that each 
individual council operates some regional development unit or function. It is worth looking at 
some of these lead groupings in more detail. 
Team West 
A more strategic focus to regional development in the GWS region emerged from the creation 
of the TeamWest initiative and the establishment of the state govenunent's GWSEDB in the 
early 1990s. TeamWestemerged in response to WSROCs' participation in the New South 
Wales government's 1988 (finished in 1995) MetrqxiitanPlar!nirgSt:mllgyforSydney(Gooding 
1999:259). A lobby group (lead by WSROC and joined by MACR<X.) was fanned to tty to 
firstly give the region a distinct identity and a higher priority in terms of state government 
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planning process. TamtW13t's second function "WaS to create a bottonrup locallydetennined 
vision for GWS. Thirdly, to better coordinate and focus the regional organisations and state 
government departments that operate in GWS (Gooding 1999:259-260). Interviewees from 
MACROC and WSROC indicated that they had had a regional development focus for a long 
time but Jacked private sector and political support for their activities. They argued that 
TamtW13t offered an 'independent' mechanism to heighten pressure on the state government to 
better support local solutions to development issues. 
Part of TmmW13t's rationale "WaS that regionally-based institutions at the time tended to have a 
narrow focus and have limited authority or power in terms of decision-making outside the 
influence of the state government's hierarchical planning processes (Gooding 1999:260). Until 
the TmmW6t initiative, there "WaS no overarching local mechanism to coordinate regional 
bodies across the GWS region - each operated in isolation largely from a state government 
perspective. TmmW6t had success in influencing the NSW government to establish a GWS 
Regional Sub Conunittee as part of the finalised 1995 Metrqxlitan Stmtegy and, more recently, to 
appoint a Minister for Western Sydney and open an OWS (discussed below). Interestingly, 
funding for the TmmW6t project came form the Commonwealth under its Integrated Local 
Area Planning (!LAP) program and "WaS supplemented by various individual state government 
agencies and local government. 
While many in GWS have supported the work of Team West others have seen it as a threat. 
For example, the state government funded GWSEBD in its 1999 Gwter W13tem S)liny Irxiustry 
Stratigy, while applauding TmmW6t's Re;jfndAgn:ia, suggests the Agenda 'WaS formed with 
insufficient private sector support. And, despite TamtW6t effons, it "WaS seen as an advocacy 
group while it (the GWSEDB) remained the peak economic development organisation in 
GWS (GWSEDB 1999}. 
TheOWS 
The OWS was established in 1998 and repons to the Minister for Western Sydney and forms 
part of the Department of Infonnation Technology and Management. Its goals are to deliver a 
whole-of-government and whole-of-region approach to addressing the issues of families, 
communities, business and the environment in Western Sydney. Its role is to: 
• provide high level advice to government on Western Sydney issues 
• provide strategic leadership to the region, and 
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• develop and drive strategic, innovative initiatives to address economic development, social 
and environmental priorities for the region, in partnership with industry, government and 
other keypla~rs {OWS 2001:8). 
The use of a regionally based government office and funding of the GWSEDB by the NSW 
government follows similar international trends towards greater decentralisation and the use of 
autonomous development agencies {discussed in chapter five). However, important 
distinctions remain. The first is in the international examples used in this work emphasising the 
national govenunent support through a process of devolution/ decentralisation. For example, 
in the UK model the government office has a significant budget to draw on across a range of 
portfolios to spend at its discretion against an approved regional plan. The OWS received a 
Budget allocation of $AUD1 million in 1999~2000 and $1.4 million in 2001~2001 (NSW 
Government 2001) much of which is absorbed by salaries and hosting various regional awards 
and other promotional activity. The OWS has a modest budget to assist employment and IT 
development in Western Sydney- it has no project/ program dollars of its own for regional 
development. Apart from its own portfolio funds, it does not draw on or direct the funding of 
other state government agency expenditure nor does it genernte new policy directions. 
The NSW government established the OWS to provide a political presence in Western Sydney 
with a panicular emphasis on promoting the diffusion of IT and the expansion of IT firms. 
State agencies such as Tr.tnsport and Urban Affairs and Planning and Health continue to 
opernte as separate entities in the region with their own regional strategies - a point that 
brought about the Ta:mWl5t initiative discussed above. As one local government intetviewee 
concludes, 'the OWS spends most of its time ~ badging other state govenunent agency 
activities and promoting and developing the IT sector in Western Sydney ~ which is a function 
of the portfolio to which it belongs'. An example of the type of badging activity referred to 
above comes in the form of an environmental strategy put out by the OWS which, in effect, is 
littJe more than a publicity and infonnation brochure. 
E mirmnmtal strategJ for Wl5tem S-;rhy 
The Minister for Western Sydney launched theE mirrnnrntal Str'af1:t& fir Wl5tem Sy}n!y in late 
1999 following the findings of an environmental conference held in 1998. The strategy has 
been coordinated by the OWS and released under its name. However, much of the work was 
undertaken by the Environmental Protection Agency, the University of Western Sydney {the 
work of Professor Valerie Brown), Ta:zmWl54 the Hawkesbwy-Nepean Catchment 
:Management Trust, the GWSEDB and other government agencies. The strategy has no 
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project/ program funds itself but rather seeks to better understand and coordinate the priorities 
of stakeholders that most impact on the environment in GWS. The three key outcomes of the 
strategy seem to be as follows. Firstly, it is to conduct a range of conmnmity awareness 
activities in re1ation to the environment. Second, to prepare an annual state of the GWS 
environment report to NSW Cabinet, through the Minister for Western Sydney. Thirdly, to 
establish a Western Sydney Environmental Taskforce which includes representatives of 
Conunonwealth, state and local government, industry, the resean:h sector and the community. 
There can be little doubt that the region needs to address some vecy serious environmental 
issues. Some of the environmental problems that face GWS include the health of the 
Hawkesblll}'and Nepean river systems and their catchment areas: much of Sydneys drinking 
water comes from the Warragamba and Cataract Dams in the GWS. A histocy of land clearing 
on the Gunberland P1ain, where now only 10 per cent of the original vegetation remains, has 
added to salinity and soil erosion as well as a decline in native fauna (OWS 2000:3). Another 
issue is air pollution emanating from industry and congested traffic from the rapid growth in 
car dependence (GWSEDB 2000:27; Latham 2002). According to one study, car ownership in 
GWS is growing faster than popu1ation growth that in tum exceeds current public transpon 
capacity (National Economics 2001:9). Because of job deficits in some p1aces in the region, 
Penrith and Campbelltown for instance, long car journeys to Sydney tend to congest the roads. 
The point here, however, is that the approach adopted by the OWS through the strategy is 
seen by many in the region as largely symbolic. While strategies of this t)pe have their p1ace, 
activities such as establishing new colllll1ittees, releasing grand 'glossy docwnents and 
establishing new frameworks dealing with environmental issues across departments are not 
seen by many to promote genuine institutional reforms. Institutional reform requires changes 
by government that affect the enduring rules (formal and informal), traditions, customs and 
routines that guide local actions. As discussed in chapter one, the ultimate test for successful 
environmental policy, particularly in relation to regional development policy, is whether policy 
actually alters the decision-making processes (locaV nationaVintemational) that have created 
past problems. There is little in the strategy that suggests it has the capacity to do this. 
This is because without a radical change, the institutional structures that affect environmental 
management in GWS are well entrenched and are unlikely to be reshaped by the OWS strategy. 
The following Table (8.1) lists some of the international, national and local conventions and 
strategies that shape GWS environmental institutional structures. 
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Table 8.4: Relationship of Western Sydney enviromnent strategy to other processes 
International Conventions: 
Agenda 21; Convention on Biological Diversity; Convention on Climate; Convention on 
Protection of World alltural and Natural Heritage; and Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species, Flora and FaWla 
.1 
i 
National Strategies: 
National Strategy of Ecological SUStainable Development; Nttional Strategy for the Conservation 
of Australia's Biological Diversity; National Greenhouse Strategy; Australian Natural Heritage 
Trustl<llaner; and National Forest Policy Statement. 
.1 
i 
NSW Government: 
Air Quality Management Plan and Action for Transport 2010; Water Reforms and Establishment 
of S}dney Catchment Authority; Waste Management Act 1995 and establishment of Regional 
Waste Boards; Reform of energy sectOr and establislunent of Sustainable Energy Development 
Authority; NSWBiodiversityStrategy; Protection of the Environment Operations Act 1997; and 
DUAP Shaping Western S)dney Planning Strategy . 
.1 
i 
O'WS ~srem Syclncy Environment Stnregy 
Source: modified from information obtained in OWS (1999), W~ Sy}n!y E nU7rnrut Stmttgy, NSW 
Government. 
The Table also demonstrates an earlier point about the imba1ance in Australia between 
responsibility and resol.ll'Ces allocation among the tiers of government. It can be seen that the 
least resourced level of government in Australia, local government, has most responsibility in 
tenns of the day-to-day impact on the environment in GWS - but has least influence in setting 
the envirorunental framewOik Local Councils in Western Sydney are responsible for 
environmental planning and management, land use planning, environmental heritage, 
development approval, implementation of regulation, and community education (OWS 1999). 
Local governments are also local stonnwater managers and responsible for waste from 
domestic, cornmen::ial and indusny sol.ll'Ces. While, the NSW State government, for its part, 
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develops and implements environment legislation, sets strategic direction through research, 
policy development and planning and has some 30 agencies with a direct role in environmental 
management across GWS (OW'S 1999:9). Added to this you have the federal government 
entering international conventions and setting national environment policy in areas such as 
water, biodiversity and greenhouse. It is local government, the least resourced level of 
government, which is asked to implement and meet these legislative and international 
convention requirements. 
While the impact of the OWS E mirrrrm!ntal Stmtegj remains somewhat problematic, the OW'S 
has devised an IT Ouster initiative that in a sense is its most significant contribution to regional 
development in GWS. 
OWS IT Ouster: duster or busin!ss rmmrk? 
The more significant project of the OW'S, particularly in teffilS of regional development, is its 
IT cluster initiative. The OW'S IT Ouster initiative draws on the cluster experience of nations 
such as Scotland, Ireland, Finland as well as Cambridge in England where IT clusters are most 
developed (OW'S 2001). Following the international examples the OW'S has established a 
steering conunittee to drive the IT cluster in Western S}dney. The intention is to establish a 
nwnher of 'how to' forums for GWS based S:ME IT finns around issues such as networking, 
exports, winning contracts, tendering and identifying emerging markets. Central to developing 
the ideas and suppon for the IT cluster has been the Advancing Infonnation Technology in 
Western Sydney Indusuy Conference held in 2000 and 2001. Although only in its formative 
stage at the time of writing, the objective of the IT cluster is to encourage 
synergies/ pannerships/ joint ventures among finns and stakeholders to funher develop IT 
businesses and activity in the GWS region (OW'S 2001). 
In other words, the OW'S IT cluster is more a business network programme which, as 
discussed in chapter five, is not in itself a sufficient pre-condition for developing a mature 
indusuy cluster. For example, there are no ongoing working groups established as pan of the 
IT cluster to address industry barriers or facilitate legal, venture capital, managerial type services 
that nunure the growth of endogenous IT finns in GWS. 
Perhaps of more concern is that other studies have identified the potential of a cluster-led 
development strategy in a number of indusuy sectors in GWS yet, to date, the emphasis of the 
OW'S remains on high tech IT finns only. Potential clusters have been identified in food, 
tranSpon and advanced manufacturing in Blacktown, chemical and engineering in Parr.unatta-
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Auburn, IT and advanced manufacturing in LiverpooVMoorebank, horticulture in 
Hawkesbury, Camden, Baulkam Hills, Penrith, Wollondillyand medical, biomedical 
technologies in Westmead (GWSEDB 2000:13).1he NSWState govenunent spends some 
$AUD1.2 billion on health and health-related infrastructure and setvices in GWS each year 
(NSWGovenunent 2001:13) which could be used to leverage a cluster-led development 
strategy in the health sector. :Many of these other industries are more developed in tenru of 
critical mass than the IT sector in GWS. Another of GWS regional organisations, the 
GWSEDB, has acknowledged this vel}' point. 
GWSEDB 
The GWSEDB is a semi-autonomous organisation that relies on a nwnber of other state (and 
Commonwealth) agencies to enact its initiatives. These state agencies included: State and 
Regional Development, Housing, Urban Affairs and Planning, Transport, Roads, and 
Employment. The GWSEDB received $AUD300, 000 in 1999-2000 and $AUD200, 000 in 
2000-2001 and has no significant funds to suppott major regional development projects. 
Established in 1994, the GWSEDB has a much more focused regional development agenda 
than the OWS (as Table 8.4 indicates). The GWSEDB gathers information to better 
Wlderstand the industl}' dynamics of the GWS region and works to disseminate this across 
industl}'. Its main focus is in activities such as investment and business attraction and 
nwketing GWS. While it also looks at issues such as impott replacement and S:ME 
development these are ~elyfunded byotherstate government agencies. The GWSEDB has 
undertaken several longer-term strategic planning activities to enhance economic development 
including the Gnmer Wt5tem Syirey Industry Strategy -1999 and Strate;jc P/anrrirfs ani T rarr;Dat 
Vism an1Dir8:tims Stat.eJrmt. Through such planning activities the GWSEDB seeks to more 
actively participate in the planning structures of individual state government agencies. The 
GWSEDB also coordinates its activities with the Commonwealth funded GROW 
Employment Committee which, at the time of writing, drew its funding from the Federal 
Employment pottfolio (the only Commonwealth player with a significant presence in the 
region). 
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Table 8.5: Activities of GWRDB and OWS ( 1999-201) 
ows GWSRDB 
Coordinate the WesternS~ Jobs Plan GWS Marketing Program, including GWS 
(coordinating state agencies to better deliver jobs in 
the region) 
Marketing Council 
Western Sydney Industry Awards (focus on Publication GWS Investment Profile, 
awarding local firms in areas of innovation, IT and Publication GWS Economic Bulletin, and 
expon) Economic Po~rhouse Newsletter 
Corporate Panners for Cbange (panne~bjp 
betv.een state government and local industry to 
Oeation online newsletter "Media Net". 
offer jobs, traineeships and apprenticeships to 
}{)ung people) 
Sponsor and convene IT Forum for Western 
s}dney 
Compile GWS statistics 
Develop ITDirectoryfor Western Sydney Implementation of GWS Industry Strategy 
Technology diffusion strategy for IT firms Impon replacement analysis 
I 
Establish IT Ouster for Western Sydney GWS Call Centre Promotion 
I 
Manage and coordinate the Environmental and Sponsor GWS Industry Awards and 
Ans Strategies for Western Sydney Australian Design Awards 
Initiative for Women in WesternS~ Suppon GWS Investment Centre 
Prepar.ttion of state government response to Industry suppon payments (state 
TmmWtst's Rer;jmzl Agenda: and prepar.ttion of government grants) 
I Western S}dney Budget Statement. 
Source: Western S)dney Budget Statements (1999-2000) and (2000-2001). 
The ~·s rde in GWS: GROW 
The Commonwealth's explicit role in regional and indusoy development in GWS has had a not 
well coordinated past and, at the time of writing, is not represented 1hree regional 
development organisations (RDOs), established by the Department of Housing and Regional 
Development, and two Area Consultative Conunittees, by the Deparunent of Education, 
Employment, Training and Youth Affairs, were introduced in 1994 and 1995 independent of 
each other in the GWS region (although some members overlapped). That is, each of these 
organisations, as with the state government's GWSRDB established in 1994, required separate 
Boards, separate executive structures, and had different regional boWldaries. The three RDOs 
collapsed when the Howard government withdrew funding in 1996 and the Affi merged to 
form an organisation called GROW Employment Council which delivers the Commonwealth's 
Regional Assistance {RAP) and Business Incubator and employment programmes in GWS. 
Indeed, GROW covers an area previously served by five Commonwealth Affi that stretches 
way beyond the GWS region; north-south from Berowra to Bowral, and east-west from Bondi 
(metropolitan S}tfne:0 to BJackheath in the Blue 1vfountains (GROW 2002). 
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At the time of writing GROWs focus was on supponing projects that generated a high 
number of up-front jobs; a key criteria for its funding from the Commonwealth. This is not to 
deny that GROW has supported several Councils across GWS in their strategic regional 
development planning activities. The point here is that GROWs employment emphasis may 
change now that Affi come under the portfolio responsibility of the Minister for Transport 
and Regional Services, where longer-term regional development planning will be given more 
importance. Nonetheless, GROW operates through a series of devolved Grow Teams roughly 
equivalent to one in each LGA across GWS. These Grow Teams work predominantly with 
local govennnent and individual state government agencies such as Housing, state and 
Regional Development, Eduction and Training, and Premiers, to partner the funding of local 
projects to stimu1ate job growth and increasingly community development (human capacit}?. 
At the time of writing, GROW had no formal relationship, or had not undertaken any joint 
projects with the OWS. 
Interestingly, GROWs chainnan, Jim Bosnjak, is also chainnan of the state government 
funded GWSEDB and both organisations share other common Board members. This perhaps 
explains the strong synergies between GROW and individual state government agencies which 
are absent in the relationships discussed in the :Mid Murray case study between the local AOC 
and state government (chapter seven). :Moreover, GROWs devolved structure, working 
through a series of teams across GWS, reflects a concern expressed bymanythat, as a focus 
for regional development, the GWS covers too big an area. 
Sizemttte1s 
Many interviewed, from local government and industry in particular, were concerned that with 
the establishment of the OWS the institutional arrangements will focus on grand strategies and 
visions and less on the regional development needs of disadvantaged places 'Within the region. 
According to several people, the geographical coverage of GWS needs to be reconsidered to 
better reflect the extent of its socio-economic and industrial diversity (as discussed earlier). For 
example, the OWS has taken over the running of the Western Sydney Industry Awards that 
were first nm by MACROC to promote industry development (and attention) in the Macarthur 
region of Western Sydney (Campbelltown, Camden, and Wollondill>-1. As one interviewee 
discussed, ' it was a much smaller event then and put the emphasis on industry promotion 
(agricuhure, manufacturing and services etc) in this region'. :More important, 'it focused 
government attention in this pan of Western Sydney. Now all this has been lost because under 
the OWS it is the highly innovative hi-tech finns, based outside :Macarthur, that get all the 
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attention and revive the accolades'. :Moreover, parts of GWS remain outside the S)dney 
telephone zone that imposes added costs on local business in areas such as Penrith, 
Hawkesbury, Blue MOuntains, Campbelltown, Camden and Wollondilly. This limits their 
opportunities in tenns of attracting IT industries (National Economics 2001:28) and means the 
focus of the GWS indusny awards is not on them. 
Before we look at a summary of the key nature of the characteristics underl}1ng the GWS 
economy, some concerns over the size of the geographical area covered by GWS need to be 
explored. 
Work by National Economics and others (GWSEDB 2000; Latham 2002) suggests that the 
region could be better understood as either three or six sub-regions depending on the 
panicu1ar policy focus, i.e. employment or production nodes of activity. For example, in terms 
of three production nodes, you have the production conidor of Liverpoo~ Fairlield, Holroyd 
and parts of Parramatta, and Blacktown. This sub. region is highly industrialised and has a large 
migrant workforce with low formal education standards. Secondly, Baulkam Hills and Penrith 
and Camden remain linked to global Sydney in terms of their industriaV conunercial parks and 
high skill, high-income workforce. Thirdly, there are those areas such as Hawkesbury and 
Penrith that offer life-style environments {GWSEDB 2000:19; see also Latham 2002). Similarly, 
the six employment nodes would sub-divide the region according to levels of skills and 
employment across all LGA with GWS. Or, as another inteiViewee put it, 'GWS could be 
characterised by the geographical sub-regions of the north-west, west and south west'. 
It is not the intention here to debate the merit or otherwise of the suggestions of National 
Economics and others. It is simply to note that the geographical coverage of the GWS, as 
embodied in organisations such as OWS and GWSEDB, according to several inteiViewees 
remains somewhat prob1ematic. Certainly, the practice of GROW (discussed above) suggests a 
focus that better reflects sub-regional differences is required in terms of its current 
employment activities. 
Interim summary of the key chancteristics of the GWS region 
As outlined in the introductory chapter, international experience suggests that some regions 
respond to the forces of change better than others according to the presence, absence and level 
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of maturity of certain spatial and institutional characteristics. From the infonnation gathered 
for this case study, we can now gauge the GWS potential against these charncteristics. 
t hiiiJ 'inmrmir.e' firm (~ ani/ or fonigy uith stm-g anmtimatri armitm!nt to th kral 
~ 
Innovation and resean::h are high in some industries, the tertiuy sector and government 
agencies, i.e. water and waste utilities, for example. The region has a good representation 
of technology/ commercial parks and a strong promotional mechanism for its innovative 
high-tech finns through the OWS regional industry awards. However, as discussed earlier, 
potential industry clusters in non-IT, low-tech, transpon, manufacturing and food 
processing across the region have been identified but receive fewer resources and/ or 
attention from the OWS (or the GWSEDB). The existing critical mass in these sectors, as 
well as in health services and medical resean::h, would appear to lend them more readily to 
the same institutional/business netwOrk and industry cluster str.ttegies than IT firms. 
2. «arJriRs ifsrale arrl atms to rrurkets ( damticlint£rmtimal); 
GWS is well connected into international and domestic mukets across a range of industry 
sectors. GWS is home to more than 90 of Austr.tlia's top 500 exporting companies (OWS 
1999). 
3. ¥ leu!1 if a:nmmity skills, tdrottimatri t:rainiTf; 
As discussed, there is a spatial aspect (with large variances) in skill and teniaryeducation 
across the GWS region. Many finns have highly trained employees and the University of 
Western Sydney (Commonwealth funded) and (state and Commonwealth funded) TAFE 
Institutes play a major educational role in the region. However, according to a report by 
National Economics (2001:30), increased investment is required in knowledge 
infrnstructure as the region has a significant deficit in this area. The point they make is that 
local education institutions cannot keep up with demand in this field. Regional Business 
<llambers have more recently become active in business related training activities. The 
Cllildren's and Westmead Hospital, and associated bio-medical resean::h facilities, at 
Westmead are leading, internationally recognised, medical teaching and resean::h facilities. 
4. tn.niJa/iJity if 11?11/Hre azpital (frr R&D ani to emura1§? start-~ arrl spin-iff irm}; 
Funding for industrial expansion (business/ commercial parks) and public investment 
(NSW Government 2001) appears to be strong in the GWS region. However, there 
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appears to be no coordinated or strategic attempt to nurture the growth of endogenous 
S:MEs with the exception of emerging high-tech and/ or IT firms. 1here would appear to 
be enonnous potential for business incubatoiS and sttategic panneiShips with industry 
(tertiary sector and medical industryforexample) to nurture a diverse range of Slvffis. 
5. 'lllil d?uJqxd fmnd arri irfrnnd instituticml arratfPWTIS ( arri interactim Jmo:m inlustry arri ¥er 
~instiiutims); 
Given the plethora of regional organisations and regional strategies in operation in GWS 
one would assume that formal and infonnal institutional arrangements are well developed 
1he activities of OWS, the GWSEDB and Ta:unW&, for example, are suggestive of an 
institutional fnunewotk that promotes dialogue and interaction. Interaction between 
industry and tertiary sector seems to be more in its fonnative stages, however, particularly 
with the recent restructuring of the University of Western Sydney. Initiatives like the IT 
Ouster, if managed well, have the potential to strengthen these re1ationships. Similarly, the 
larger well-fWlded public utilities operating in GWS in water and waste have the potential 
to build 1asting collaborative relationships with industry. However, as discussed earlier, 
most regional studies of the institutional frameworks across GWS conclude that there 
remains a weakness in the area of industry, government and tertiary col1aborative 
arrangements. 
6. st:rrng (hijl ptrfile) camuniry arri husims la:uhts ( errtreprerl!UrS arxJ/ rT ch:urpitns); 
GWS is well served by a range of high profile finns and individuals located in the region. 
7. puliir/priwte suppat if rl!tUak~ inmwtim arri ailtdxratim; 
Collaboration between the tiers of government and industry in the GWS appears to be 
only in its formative stages. Although there are a lot of regional sttategies in operation 
suggesting collaboration, individual govenunent agencies tend to wotk within their own 
hierarchies and vertical regional institutions coming together when these happen to 
coincide with other agencies. In other words much of the wotk of the OWS and 
GWSEDB seems to be constrained by the priorities and hierarchical structures of the state 
government agencies involved Oearly the activities of T wnW6t are attempts to change 
these institutional arrangements to focus more on horizontal regional structures to shape 
economic development in GWS. But it lacks the resources to drive this agenda. From the 
interviews conducted in the region, it has been individual Councils such as Penrith and 
Fallfield that have developed projects to strengthen business networks and encourage 
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local businesses to collaborate. None of the existing peak regional bodies seem to have the 
resources to take the lead or to sustain long-term strategic regionaVindusnycollaboration. 
8. spa:ia/is«i 'TJDYld.dass itftastniC/Jire (sift am harrg. 
The interviewees participating in this case study focused their attention overwhehningly on 
the region's hard infrastructure needs, i.e. transport and telecommunications. So there are 
no constructive conunents made here on the adequacy of the region's soft infrastructure. 
According to National Economics {2001), important developments have taken place over 
the past decade in tenns of strengthening the regional transport infrastructure. The 
construCtion or conunitment to construct .M2, M5 and M4 roads improving east-west and 
north-south links has been long overdue and most welcomed, as is the Parrarnatta-
Liverpool transitway, a dedicated bus link between major employment zones in the region. 
Yet, as discussed above, traffic congestion and accessibility to efficient cross-regional 
transport remains a problem for many workers travelling across the region. Moreover, in 
tenns of telecommunications, key areas of Western Sydney remain outside Sydney's SID 
zone, which is a hindrance to the development, diffusion and take-up of IT. 
Conclusion 
The question this chapter has explored is whether there is the potential for a post-Fordist 
approach to economic development in the GWS, given the region's economies of scale, 
economic and environmental interdependencies, indusny mix and high level of knowledge-
based assets {human capital). The above discussion indicates that the region has many of the 
underlying characteristics that support a strategic collaborative planning approach; yet 
important st:IUCtUral barriers remain. Part of the explanation for the failure of regional 
organisations to gain support for their initiatives is the sheer size of the region they are 
attempting to cover. Oearly, GWS would be better understood as three distinct regions for 
economic development purposes. 
The emergence of organisations like the GWSEDB, TeunW& and the OWS reflect attempts at 
facilitating greater collaboration yet none has been able to establish their agenda in a 
comprehensive v.rayacross GWS. Each lacks either/ or private sector, Commonwealth, state 
and/ or local government commitment to their processes. For example, as discussed, TB:tmWt3t, 
supported by local government, emerged to give a vision of the region that v.ras less 
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constrained by state government processes. Yet the GWSEDB claims TmmWe-fs agenda was 
not adequately supported by the private sector and that it remained GWS' s peak regional 
development organisation. :Meanwhile, many of the activities of the OWS and the GWSEDB 
remain constrnined by state government priorities and processes and are underfunded. Their 
activities are focused on promoting the region to potential investors. These organisations have 
produced a number of strategy statements but offer no additional funds to support their 
recommended implementation. Pemaps more alarmingly, despite the importance of the region 
to the national economy, the .Howard government has had no policy framewmk to consider 
GWS regional and urban development problems. 
A key problem for GWS is the lack of a dedicated resource to sustain the necessaxy 
collaborative relationships that underpin long-term strategic regional development planning. 
There is a critical need to support capacity building and collaborative firm netwooo to attempt 
to capture more value-added activity in the local production system. Another problem here is 
that the OWS remains narrowly focused on promoting endogenous growth in hi-tech IT firms 
while other industry sectors with a far greater potential to benefit from a cluster development 
strategy are ignored 1vforeover, the types of business paiks that operate in GWS are driven by a 
property development profit rationale and not by a desire to deepen greater inter-firm 
collaboration or embed ongoing innovation (as discussed in Cllapters four and five). In 
particular, there is no overarching governance structure similar to a cluster orRIS approach to 
facilitate managerial and technical services, netwooo, incubators or venture capital nor is there 
an emphasis to grow S:MEs and/ or increase R&D. 
Pemaps the lessons drawn from the Third Italy (discussed in Cllapter four) and in particular 
the use of intennediary organisations such as business cooperative and/ or trade associations 
would prove useful in the case of GWS. A vibrant c<roperative movement emerged in Italy's 
north region that initiated activities including financing, technical assistance, training, and 
muketing to assist endogenous firm development and greater inter-firm collaboration. The 
purpose of these arrangements was to harness the activities of individual firms to a 
collaborative process that stimulates ongoing innovation and economic development in the 
local production system. 
The establishment by the NSW State government of the OWS, while consistent with 
intentional trends toward greater devolution/ decentralization, falls well short of delivety of 
greater autonomy for local regional development. Its main function in the region is to promote 
andre-badge existing government programmes and to promote the IT sector (reflecting its 
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ponfolio funding). This is a poor substitute for a genuine collaborative and coordinated 
approach and leaves little room for re-shaping horizontal state government structures that 
continue to operate across GWS (which is a key function of the regional office models in the 
U.K. and Gmada, discussed in Olapter six). 
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Chapter 9 
CONCLUSION 
This thesis has descnbed the nature of regional problerm in Austr.tlia in the late 1990s and 
explored the potential role of recent developments in international spatial regionaV indusuy 
policy in responding to them. The thesis explored whether there are peculiarities to Australia's 
particular model of competitive Federalism that might inhibit the adoption of more spatially 
oriented collaborative industry/ regional policies. 
The data presented in Chapter two demonstrates that, despite continued growth and lower 
tmemployment, Australia's spatial inequalities are widening (the major theme explored in this 
thesis). Against this backgrotmd the Howard government's 'regional agenda' since 1996 has 
been driven by a political imperative to shore up votes and appease the disenchantment of 
traditional National Party voters in Australia's non-metropolitan regions. This has led to ad 
hoc, 'band aid,' and a politically detennined set of regional initiatives that have selectively 
supported some workers, conununities and regions affected by change and not others. 
Moreover, what government support there has been for regional programmes has remained 
subordinate to a philosophical belief in the ability of market forces to address Australia's major 
structural adjustment issues, and therefore, its regional problems. And, consistent with a long 
Liberal government tradition in Australia, wban and regional development has been seen 
~ely as state government responsibilities and therefore an easy target for G>mmonwealth 
Budget cuts. At the time of writing, the Howard government had no coherent or 
comprehensive national frameworlt to deal with Austr.tlia's growing wban and regional 
development problems. 
This thesis has also aigued that Australia's rising spatial inequalities are part of a global trend 
associated with the rise of neo-liberal policies in general and the tmeven spatial impacts of 
globalisation in particular. Cllapters two, four and five explored the ongoing tension between 
international spatial policy ideas (post-Fordist inspired) and practice and the elevation of neo-
hberal policies (the second major theme developed). 
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Inti:rnatimal trerri tmmrd regjt:nalism 
The discussion indicated that globalisation, rapid changes in technology and neo-liberalism 
have combined to impact on the way production is organised and where it is located This 
results in uneven development and the emergence of new winners and losers both in tenns of 
people (type of skills) and places (types of industries). As a consequence, inequality in income, 
employment, skills, and access to services and infrastructure are widening in many economies 
including Australia and New Zealand This is because jobs in the globalising economy often do 
not emerge in the same location where other jobs are lost. Moreover, growth jobs require 
different technologies, skills and occupations, which favour certain economic nodes, i.e. Silicon 
Valley in the US and/ or Australia's global cities particu1arlySydneyand Melbourne. These 
places benefit in pan because of the positive externalities that come from agglomeration and 
critical mass. Because of their scale, typically these places are better able to absorb the forces of 
structural change. 
Between 1996 and 2001 the Howard government relied on traditional macroeconomic tools to 
achieve national growth. The problem remains that in a globalising economy traditional 
macroeconomic policy such as exchange rate adjustments and changes in the money supply are 
less effective and somewhat constrained by international agreements (OECD, 2001). Most 
importantly, traditional macroeconomic policies tend to affect the economy as a whole and do 
not address the specific structural adjustment and development needs of individual regions - a 
clear area of policy neg.lect since 1996 in the Australian case. More generally, the Howard 
government has chosen to give emphasis to achieving market efficiencies (by policies such as 
national competition policy and deregulation) over issues of spatial development and equity 
concerns. 
In contrast, as shown in chapter six, other countries have developed national frameworks, 
incorporating aspects of devolution, decentralisation and the use of semi-autonomous 
development agencies, to better manage the spatial impacts of change and promote 
endogenous SME growth as a means to facilitate regional development. Many of these 
international approaches to regional policy are associated with developments in post· Fordist 
thought. All streams of post-Fordist thought have in common a notion of devolution where 
the object of policy is to develop institutional changes where government partners regions to 
enhance outcomes and governance within the local production system (or region). Governance 
in this sense refers to strengthening institutional arrangements to assist the way communities 
collectively solve their problems and meet their current and future needs. The argument is that 
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these institutional anangements provide a mechanism for better vertical and horizontal c<r 
ordination of local economic developmem (and microeconomic reforms). 1hrough this 
process government, communities and business are invited to participate in collaborative 
decisionMmaking and encouraged to undertake agreed actions (priorities) for economic and 
social renewal 
As Olapters four and six demonstrated, in contrast to the Australian experience, govenunents 
of various political persuasions have found aspects of devolution and 'regionalism' consistent 
with their broader framework of economic reform in a period of increased globalisation. As 
discussed, the characteristics of the region are seen by many as one of the defining 
determinants to the success of internationally competitive finns. Government policies that can 
influence the quality of the local environment become more important in this context. In other 
words, internationally policy<-makers are broadening microeconomic reforms to tailor policies 
that stimulate favourable region-specific outcomes in the finance, physical, social and human 
capital systems. As the discussion on post-Fordism indicated, this is particularly important as 
world production becomes more knowledge-intensive and firms become increasingly reliant on 
the learning capabilities of their people and their regions. 
The implication is that the same collaborative processes can wotk across a range of other areas 
such as education, health, infrastructure, the environment and social welfare, for example. So 
another important insight of post-Fordist thought is that the prosperity of a region is not 
exclusively dependent of the processes occurring within the region. Therefore regions cannot 
and should not rely on self-help strategies alone to address their regional problems. That is, the 
state still has a valuable role in areas of national expenditure such as welfare, health, defence, 
housing, education and tr.Uning, infrastructure and business support (.Macleod 1999). In this 
way post-Fordism provides a framework for stronger links between industty, regional policy 
and other policy areas that have been traditionally absent in the Australian experience (the third 
theme explored in this thesis). 
However, as Olapters two, seven and eight have highlighted, Australia's particular type of 
competitive Federalism, with each tier of govenunent for the most part working in isolation, 
has traditionally worked against the development of strong national/local collaborative 
processes. Traditionally, the tiers of govenunent have relied more on direct subsidies to 
industry to attract industry development rather than an agreed coherent regional development 
framewo.r:k that would promote better collaboration and coordination and reduce duplication 
between jurisdictions. 
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In contrast, post-Fordist thought is driven by an wuierstanding that productivity of regions 
depends increasingly on external economies, such as local networks and associations between 
firms, institutions and government (the fourth theme explored in this thesis). It is the 
recognition of the importance of networks and trust (social capital) that distinguishes the post-
Fordist approach from the neo-liberal approaches to economic development. The types of 
policies and strategies being pursued in this context include industty clusters, regional 
innovation systems (RIS), and institutional networks. The purpose of these policy tools is to 
focus on endogenous industry development stressing nationaVlocal parmerships and local 
institutional arrangements that strengthen local resources as well as social and economic 
capabilities. lhrough these policies agglomerntion economies can help to reduce trnnsaction 
costs, increase positive externalities, increase innovation and the growth of SMEs and 
entrepreneurship (OECD 2001). 
In shon, post-Fordism is concerned with maximising resoun::es to enhance social and human 
capital, utilising 'organising processes' and 'p1anning strategies' that encourage greater regional-
level governance of the local production system (region). & discussed in the examples of the 
UK, Ireland, and the US in Otaprer six, the objective of spatial policies is to lift the level of 
value-added activity and increase the industtyinterdependencies. 
It has been Porter's wmk on industry clusters, more than any other, that has made many of the 
concepts associated with post-Fordism and 'regionalism' more mainstream (for both business 
and policy-makers alike). This is because much of the post-Fordist debate moves the emphasis 
away from supporting individual firms to support the 'place' in which firms are based. 
Accoroing to Porter (1998), in a globalising economy increasingly it is regions and their finm 
that compete, not nations. Adopting an industry'-cluster approach means that benefits accrue to 
individual finns through working collabor.uively with other firms and local stakeholders to 
enhance the long-term productive base of the region. & Porter has observed, in this context 
government policy, business and community processes (institutional arrangements) are as 
important determinants of industty success as is 'price' (1990:19). 
Post-Fordist approaches to regionaV industty development prove popular to policy-makers 
across the political spectrum because they can also be justified as correcting specific matket 
failures (OEDC 2001). For example, they improve infonnation flows, through networking and 
collaborntion and correct the under-provision of public goods by investing in specialised 
infrastructure and education and training. Moreover, they release positive externalities by 
supporting research and development activities by better linking the tertiary and private sector. 
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In tenns of small, peripheral, industrialised economies, such as Australia, Porter's insights 
remain most salient, particularly his insight that regions do not have to rely on high-tech finns 
to be internationally competitive (Porter 1998b). Porter uses Italian shoes and tourism as 
examples of 'mundane products, that can create value added through strong brands (and 
image) muketing, design, and quality of products (and experience). He makes the point that to 
support high '\V'ages nations need to apply better levels of technology to develop unique 
products and production processes that competitors can not easily produce or can only 
produce after delay (Porter 1998b:3). It should be remembered that Australia remains a net 
importer of hi-tech manufactured goods. 
However, the discussion in Cbapter five also pointed out that important tensions remain in 
Porter's analysis between what should be left to market forces (productivity driven) and the 
role of government intervention. As the New Zealand example highlighted, in small periphernl 
economies the decision-making of finns, including the subsidiary activities of MNEs, and what 
government choses to do and not do to support regional development, act as st:ructurnl 
constraints on the Porter model's 'universal attributes'. This includes the level of competition, 
collaboration, critical mass (size of finns), supply chains (level of value-added activit}?, exports, 
infrastructure, training, investment, the sourcing of inputs, education and training, marketing 
and R&D. Moreover, as discussed in the case studies presented, in economies like Australia 
and New Zealand linkages between endogenous and foreign finns remain weak in tenns of 
inter firm interdependencies, skill transfers, and developing collaborative R&D and innovation 
relationships. 
This apparent paradox reflects the fact that as capital expands some finns maintain hierarchical 
controls and concentrate value-added activities in their home market and some other key 
centres. In contrast, others finns may adopt a less-hierarchical mode of operation, combining 
local and global fonns of industrial networking, entrenching themselves in the local production 
process (see Amin and Malmberg 1992:245). As discused earlier, finn-state relationships (and 
policy approaches) differ depending on the whether interaction is between a firm in its horne 
muket or a host country government dealing with foreign capital (see Dicken 1994). There will 
be a mix of corporate governance structures of finns operating in a given location and this will 
determine the parameters of government! market interdependencies at the regional level as well 
as the type of cluster approach to be emphasised (Cllaiton et al2001). 
As the discussion on Australia's industrial composition in Cbapter four pointed out, many of 
the above constraints apply in the Australian case, as they do in Ire1and and Canada (discussed 
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in Cllapter six). In reruming to New Zealand Porter acknowledged this, by advocating that 
government shouki intervene to promote the right envirorunent for duster development. 1his 
included re-examining government pun:hasing decisions (demand factors) and promoting 
(subsidising) R&D, innovation, ttaining, infrastructure and private investment, for example. 
Much of Porter's suggestions ran contr.uyto the dominant neo-hberal regulatory regime at the 
tune. 
The Australian case studies (Olapters seven and eight) drew three main conclusions in relation 
to the presence of the key spatial and instirutional characteristics identified in post-Fordist 
liternture. Firstly, collaborntion at the regional level between the tiers of government remains 
poor in both regions in terms of agreed strategies and actions to address what is a complex 
range of pressing regional development problerm. Each tier of government seems to be 
developing its own regional development agenda, often to the exclusion, and in competition 
with, the other tiers. This, in prnctice, means that attempts at regional collabor.u:ion and 
coordination are often under resourced and remain ad hoc and incomplete. Secondly, panlyfor 
this reason, institutional structures remain fractured between the tiers of government; and 
networks, particularly between business and government, remain weak and disconnected 
Thirdly, the regions concerned focus vety little attention on capturing value-added activity, 
nunuring emerging SMEs, and increasing the firm interdependencies (supply chain linkages) 
within their local economy. Strategy documents aniculate the need to do these things in both 
regions but interviews with various stakeholders indicated that little progress has been made in 
practice. 
Rethirie~ the msis for n;gjmal pdicy in Australia 
Since Federntion there has been no national consensus on spatial planning or addressing 
Australia's regional disparities in tenns of a coherent national approach to urban and regional 
policy. The experience of other countries addressing these issues provides no simple •model' to 
import since structures vary between states depending on their particular socio-political history. 
However, in re-thinking the basis for regional policy in Australia there are common principles 
to consider. The common principles include linking regional and industry policy, utilising 
fonns of devolution, heightening national government presence in regions, and the use of 
semi-autonomous developmem agencies. The use of semi-autonomous development 
organisations provides the mechanism for vertical and horizontal coordination of local 
economic development (OECD 2001). As the discussion in Olapter six demonstrated, it is 
through this framework that local commitment, input and ownership in decision-making (and 
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local governance) is enhanced Also making support contingent on perlonnance targets 
(and/ or agreed plans or outcomes) ensures accountability and efficiency in policyrnaking 
and/ or output re1ated funding. Whatever national regional structure is adopted or identified in 
the Austr.ilian context, as is the case with the E U, Canada and the US, it needs to be 
adequately funded and maintained 
In particular, international trends and insights into post-Fordist approaches to economic 
development would suggest that governance arrangements in Australia need to move away 
from the current 'competitive Feder.ilism' model to a more 'collaborative Feder.ilism' modeL 
Col1aborative Federalism would be premised on a national policy framework where the tiers of 
government better coordinate programmes and service delivery on a regional (spatial) basis to 
address structural change. These new institutional arrangements would incorporate 
mechanisms for monitoring and assessing the spatial impacts of change and enhance 
collaboration between regional stakeholders, business and government, in responding to them. 
The pwpose would be to build the local institutional thickness that supports ongoing region-
specific 'capacity building' outcomes, i.e. mechanisms that look to enhance social, human, 
physical and economic capital. This is the central role for government to play, according to 
post-Fordist and particularly regulationist theory. 
Perhaps a model along the example of the UK's Government Office of Regions (GOR) would 
be appropriate in the Australian case. The focus of a network of Commonwealth Development 
Offices (CDO) could be to wm:k -with a region to develop a strategic direction with agreed 
targets across a number of key areas/ issues (particularly linking regional and industry 
development). Based on the earlier discussion these could include: investment and promotion, 
business support (emphasis on SME development), research and education, employment and 
employment services, training and skills fonnation, transport and specialised infrastructure, 
health and community services and urban and environmental planning. The CDO would also 
be a one-stop shop and infonnation point for other Commonwealth programs. 
The role of the head of the Q)O (appointed at the CDmrnonwealth Senior Executive Leve~ 
would be to engage local industry associations, community organisations, regional bodies, 
training providers, local and state govenunent representatives and business and conununity 
leaders in collaborative planning processes. In other won:ls the CDO would seek to tailor 
policies that stimulate favourable region specific outcomes in education, infrastructure, 
technology, hwnan and financial capital systems (OECD 2001). The rationale here is that 
agglomeration economies help to reduce transaction costs, increase positive externalities such 
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as knowledge spillovers, and increase innovation and entrepreneurship. In many instances they 
are correcting specific market failures, i.e. poor infonnation flows and barriers to capital 
fonnation. 
More particularly, the CDO could focus Commonwealth pun:hasing at the regional level (to 
stimulate endogenous industtygrowth, as Porter reconunended in the New Zealand case).It 
could also work to facilitate a process to stimulate import replacement in the local production 
system and increase finn interdependencies. This would incorporate strategies to capture value-
added activity of the supply chains of keyfinns in regions. Oearly, utilising development tools 
such as industry clusters, regional innovation system and business and institutional networks 
would be appropriate here. 
The CDO could also gather local industry and social data to advise the Commonwealth on the 
spatial impacts major policy initiatives such as competition policy, and the impact of imports 
on particular industries and communities. This would be a similar role to that EDDs play in the 
US where the US government provides grants for infrastructure development, local capacity 
building, and business development to assist communities and their trade-injured finns 
(Otapter six). 
Importantly, in most instances, the CDO would play an enabling role in building and 
supporting institutional network fonnation- and not necessarily leading them. As Jessop 
(1994:273) reminds us, effective political decentralisation on a regional basis requires an 
adequate allocation of responsibility between the community, regional and national 
governments as well as proper coordination of their actions. Thus it is essential to establish 
new institutional arrangements and allocate specific roles and complementary competences 
across different spatial scales and/ or types of factors, and thereby ensure effective actions. 
Unlike the NSW government's Office of Western S}dney modeL the mo would need to be 
well resoun:ed and have a high level of autonomy from central agencies (similar to the 
Canadian Agency modeQ. In other words, the devolved agency needs not only the autonomy, 
which assists in building local collaboration (trust networks), but the power (in this case 
funding) to support local action and initiatives. For this reason funding, like in the UK modeL 
could be devolved with an allocation of between $AUD250,000 and $AUD500,000 (depending 
on the region) to the <DO for any one project (with amounts above this to be approved by the 
responsible Minister}. This initiative alone would dramatically improve the level of 
locaV national engagement in the region and overcome the concern of many of the regions to 
have decision-making increased at the regional level 
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There are four main reasons for supporting greater autonomy (devolution). Firstly, devolved 
autonomy to approve expenditure and enter public/ private partnerships (through agreed 
regional plans) would assist the CDO to build local trust networks - particularly with industry 
and the other tiers of government. As internal market research by Do TaRS as discussed in 
Olapter three continues to show that regions "W'cUlt a greater say in Conunonwealth decision-
making and want decision makers to be from the region. Secondly, this spatial framework 
would create a mechanism for local issues and concerns to be better incorporated in national 
macroeconomic planning (a two-vraypolicyfonnation process). Thirdly, institutionalising this 
devolved spatial framework would reduce the ease by which future national govenunents can 
withchaw Commonwealth support to regionallindusuydevelopment programs. Finally, in 
terms of natural resources management, this devolved structure would better support the 
government's regional delivery of its major environmental programs. 
In short, a devolved structure would position the Commonweahh to better partner regions to 
achieve greater balance between issues of efficiency, equity and environmental sustainability. 
This structure would also better position the Commonwealth to understand the spatial impacts 
of change and the capacity of regional communities to respond. This would provide the 
Conunonweahh with a long-term basis to better coordinate and evaluate the spatial impacts of 
its policy and programs and their effects on Austr.ilia's spatial development patterns. Moreover, 
it would be in the political interests of the major parties to better understand the varying 
perlonnance of their regional economies. That is, there would be incentives to both lift 
competitiveness and influence employment and living standards in an effort to gain continued 
electoral support. 
Firwri:d support for the CDO 
The discussion in Clapter three indicated that enonoous resources flow from the 
Commonwealth to state and Territory governments through funding instruments such as 
FAGS, Special Purpose Payments and GST revenues. As indicated in that discussion, most of 
these funds flow through state government structures and are untied in the sense that the 
Cornmonweahh does not require recipients to report on their expenditure in terms of their 
differing spatial impacts and distribution. Nor does the Commonwealth fonnally evaluate the 
impact transfers against agreed 'outcomes'. Given Australia's widening spatial inequalities 
(outlined in 01apter two) it would appear much of the expenditure is failing to specifically 
target regional disparities. 
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Bringing more Conunonwealth resoun:es to support a network of CDOs doesn't necessarily 
imply additional total expenditure but the better targeting of the existing transfers between the 
Conunonwealth and other tiers of govenunent. One approach, panicu1arly given the size of 
funds associated with the GST, would be for the Commonwealth to re-visit a regional 
distnbution of transfers similar to that attempted by the Whitlam govenunent in the 1970s 
(discussed in Cltapterthree). Two other more radical options forflmding of the ffiO 
network, that would also be cost neutral to the overall Conunonwealth Budget, could be 
considered 
Firstly, legislation could be changed to redirect a proportion (a certain per cent) of FAGS, 
Special Purpose Payments and or GST revenues to a newly established Special Account to 
support the CDO to achieve specific regional outcomes across health, education, transport, 
industry; environment, and IT, etc. Special Accounts are subject to the Financial Management 
and Accountability Art 1977 and have been used for initiatives such as distributing the 'social 
bonus' from the partial sale of Telstra and the Prime Minister's Federation Fund. Or, secondly 
as part of the annual Federal Budget process a proponion (a certain per cent) of funds from a 
number of identified programmes, could be earmarked to flow to the Special Account. These 
programmes could be drawn from those identified in the Re;icml Statermrt that accompanies 
the Budget each year. These funds could be disbursed across the ffiO network according to a 
new formula devised by the Commonwealth Grants Commission. Alternatively, the 
Government could adapt the same direct funding model used in the Rauls to &:mery flrrwam 
based on the number of local governments that make up a particular CDO' s geographical 
catchment. 
Oearly, the legislative option would be the more complex to achieve because it would require 
the support of both Houses of the Federal Parliament and the support of the majority of state 
governments in the case of the GST legislation. The second option, which is in effect a tax on 
identified programmes (on their administered flmding), would also meet resistance from 
Department Secretaries and resJX>nsible Ministers. 
H:>wever, both options offer a cost neutral mechanism for an ongoing pool of funds to 
specifically address Australia's urban and regional development problems and more particularly 
the issue of rising spatial inequality. The flmds would support national office flmctions as well 
as the establislunent, running (departmental expenses), programme and project activities of the 
CDO network Perhaps, as in the US example, funds allocated to the Special Account would 
remain there for the purpose of supporting the CDO network and its activities and not be 
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returned to consolidated revenue in the case of an underspend in any particular CDO. This 
would go a long "Way to overcoming the 'on again, off again', effect of national government 
involvement in wban and regional development policy in Australia. This approach could also 
adopt the Gmadian example of appointing a Minister for Regional Development (to nm the 
CDO netwOik) to ensure proper tr.msparency and accountability procedures. 
A less ambitious approach would be for the O:>mmonwealth to pilot the establishment of two 
or three CDOs. Much of what is suggested requires little in new resources from the 
O:>mmonwealth but rather a reallocation of existing national and state-based staff. 
Finally, as discussed earlier, in the second half of 2001 the government incorporated a national 
netwolk of Area O:>nsuhative Committees (Affi) into the Transport portfolio. This change 
now re-establishes a national netwolk of semi-autonomous regional development organisations 
that were lost in the Howard government's Budget cuts of 1996. However, Affi on their own 
currently lack the institutional and financial strength to overcome many of the structural 
barriers that wolk against better collaboration and coordination in Australia's regions (as 
discussed in Clupter four and the two case studies). 1he Affi role could be enhanced by 
working in partnership with CDOs to specifically focus on business and indusuy development 
outcomes within a particular CDO's geographical catchment (similar to the role played by 
semi-autonomous agencies in the US, UK, Ireland and Canada). 
However, larger institutional change is required to influence the enduring rules (formal and 
infonnal), traditions, customs and routines that guide local actions. As discussed in Olapter 
one, the ultimate test for successful regionaJ/industty policy is whether policy actually alters the 
decision-making processes QocaVnationaVintemational) that contribute to current problerns. 
Because of Australia's 'vertical fiscal imbalance', only the Commonwealth has the financial 
means to support the type of sustained, devolved collaboration arrangements needed to 
address Australia's widening spatial inequalities. 
If a larger institutional change such as a netwolk of CDOs does not occur then much of 
Australia's growth will continue to be at the expense of many of its regions' human, social, 
economic and physical capital This is because Australia's current model of competitive 
Federalism creates institutional barriers for the effective pursuit of regional development 
outcomes more conducive to post-Fordist development theory. 
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Endnotes 
i For the purpose of this tbes~ a region in the Australian conteXt ref~ to an economic and social interrelated space that is 
less than the size of a State and larger than a .local government area, unless otherwise stated 
ii In a very imigbtful ~~.Meadows' (2000) discusses the evolution of the concept 'sustainable development' and 
highlights the various criticism of the use of the term since it w.as popularised bythe Report of the Wodd Gnnmission on 
Environment and Development (WCED) in 1987. He makes the point that environmental polic}making in industtialised 
countries remains predominant.ly'regulatoryl in nature. That is, environmental governance is based around fixing standards, 
issuing permits and legal enforcement and more generally re-packaging traditional pollution and nature conserv:ttion 
activities of the State. There has, nonetheless, also been more geoenl refonn to the st:n«%Jm5 ani prt:m/u1e of environmeotal 
governance in many industrialised countries. Particularly in relation to extension of State activities linked to international 
environmental conventions and the move towards protiXJting local sustainabilqactions and initiatives. 
iii All dollar amounts in this thesis will be in US dollars unless otherwise Stated as in the above example, which refers to 
Austtalian dollars (SAID) 
iv The Howard government introduced changes to the reporting requirements of Cbmmonweahh Special Purpose Payments 
(SPP) to state governments in late 2002. These changes now reqWre recipients to report on outcomes in a more systematic 
w.ay. It is too early to see if these new administrative changes will lead to better understanding of spatial impacts of 
Cbmmo~expenditure. 
v Akbough the tmcive for the Howard government's re-engagement of rural and regional Australia remaim problemacic, 
some bweaucratic-led initiatives to the programs and functions within Do TaRS, and elemems of the response to the rural 
and regional SUlll~Jli:, provide a real opportunity to address regional problems in a more coherent and collaborative way. 
.,; The term SRD ref~ to the notion of maintaining and enhancing environmental quality and ecological integrity while not 
dilni!mhing opportuoities for future generations through the tbougbt.less degradation and/ or depletion of the natural capital 
endowments (Dore & Woodhill1999:6; Meadowaoft 2000). 'Ibis understanding remains anchored in a history of earlier 
works on environmentll sustainabili:ytbat includes Carson (1962), Silen Spritg Schumacher (197 4), Sm:Jl is &amifol:, the Cub 
of Rome's report, Linils to Grouth (Meadow et al. 1972); and the Brundtland Report, Olr Cnmrn FUIUie (WCE.D 1987). 
:Moreover, it supports the environmemal :ugumeut by Bakkes and Woerden (1997) for the general dematerialisation of all 
economic activity. This incorporates an understanding tbat environmental sustainability is dependent on a continued 
reduction in energy(derived from fossil fuels) and material use across all economic activity(Yenchen2000:10). For example 
the Factor 10 <lub, advocates a 90 per cent reduction in material use and 75 per cent reduction in energy use in developed 
countries and these wgets have been adop:ed. bycoum:ries such as Denmark, Sweden and Austria (Yenchen 2000:10). This 
understanding of SRD supports the expansion and assN:mce to environmeotal industries such as pollution comro~ waste 
management and t:reatmem, contaminated land redemption, energy management, fresh water and marine pollution comrol 
and environmental edllCation and training. In 1994 these industries~ estimated by the European Union (E~ to employ 
one million people directly and supply approximately $AL5140 billion of goods and services and~ growing at a faster rate 
than the EU economy as a whole (Yenchen 2000:11). 
vii For a fuller understanding of the concept of Australia's multi-level system of governance see Capling et al 1988; Stilwell 
and Troy2000. 
Yiii The author draws on his own recollection of these events. Icr.erviews with several Cbmmo~ahh offJCers during the 
course of this research confliDl the details of this chapter (many offJC~ still ~rk for the Cbmmonvvealth and wish to 
remain aoooymous). 
mIn May 2002, the Minister for Local Govemmem and Tezritories put forward a proposal for the House of Representatives 
Economic Committee to undertake an inquiry into the provision of services by State and local government. The pwpose of 
the inquiry is to explore an increase in responsibilq of local govemmem in areas such as policing and health care and to look 
at CU171U Feder.aVState fiscal arrangements. 
" A full understanding of the Cbmmo~alth's historical approach to regional development can be found in the publication 
A16t171iian&;n:JDeu!Jcpnns: ~ in.RlficnJExp!rietm, Pam arrJPnpm (1989), Offtce of Regional Development, 
Departmett: of Indumy. Tech.oology and Regional Development, Gnberra, AGPS. 
,.; It was not until 1m that regional development and wban policy came together under the one Minister in the Housing and 
Regional Development portfolio. 
,.;; At the 2000 meeting of Ministers it -was agreed to establish a Standing Cbmmittee on Regional Development (at officer 
leve.Q and a formal Regional Developmem Cbuncil (of State and Cbmmo~ Ministers). These groups did not meet until 
May 2002 and July 2003 respectively. 
,.;;; Some of these include RlficmJ &tnt.irr, SerWs: Marry TooFtZT A~ the House of Representatives Standing Cb.mmittee on 
Economics, Finance and Public .Administr.uion, Man:h, 1999;]ch pOir &gitn, Senate Employment, Workplace relations, 
Small Business and Education Referax:e Cbmmittee, September, 1999; lrrpxt ifCarpetitimJ¥rmrnRxrr.d ani&yjtml. 
A~<Stn&., Productivity Commission Inquiry Report No. 8, September 1999; and later, T1171!~04: S~RRimJ 
A HStmlia~ FUIJI1e, House of Represent2tives Standmg COmmittee on Primary Industries and Regional SeJVices, February. 2000 
(begun in Feb 1999). 
xiv For a fuller ~cussion on industty duster and ex:uq>les of clusters in pnctice see Anderson 1994; Saxenian 1994 & 1999; 
Rosenfeld 1995, 1996, 2001 a &b; Stevens 1995; Williams 1995 & 1996; Henton et al1997; OECD 1997 & 1999; Roberts 
2000; Green 2000. The Joint Venture: Silioon Valley ~Ik also provides an example of a mature, collabor.u:ive, cluster-
driven regional development str.ttegy. Formed in 1992 the Joint V enrure covers a geographical area larger than 18 U.S. States 
and a population of over 2 million. Funds for the Joint Venture are provided by business (large and small), local, State and 
Federal government, professional associations, labour organisations, foundations and individuals. www.svi.org/jointventure 
xv. During this time the author travelled throughout New Zealand's regions on the nonh and south islands conducting 
interviews with bureaucralli (national and local), representatives from regional organisations and regional development 
pnctirioners. Tune ~ also spent in the major cities of Wellington, Auckland and <llmtchurch. During these interviews 
there~ overwbelming agreement that the major centres of Auckland (m ~ and Wellington bad grown at the 
expense of the non-metro regions (including Christchw-ch) during the reform ~ars. As well as this, there~ an 
overwhelming sense that New Zealanders living owide these .tnetro-cem:res bad largely been abandoned by the reforms 
undert:akJ:n by the national government between 1984-99. lJXerviewees agreed that the election of the Oarlse-led 
Labor/ Alliance government in November 1999 reflected an elector.tte tired of hearing of the alleged benefits of lllal'ket-led 
reforms. It also refl«ted that the Labor/ Alliance coalition bad both committed themselves to a strong regional development 
platform during the election. In Febnwy 2000, a new Ministry of Economic Development (repJacing the Department of 
COmmerce) came into being, and in June 2000 the NZ Budget allocated new funding of $NZ330 million over four years to 
indusayand regional development (see www.mcd.govt.nz/irdev/ Vev/ regi.om.,.__or.html) . 
..; For a discussion on economic development organisations (public/ private and private) across the US see Henton (1997), 
Sabel (1989; 1993), Rosenfeld (1995; 1996; 2001a &2001b), Saxenian (1994). 
xvii Following the research ~it to the MMR.inMarch 2001 Ardmona and SPCsubsequenrlymerged to form SPGArdmona 
Ltd on 4 Janwuy2002. The merger formed an Austr.Uian owned fruit company with annualised sales of $AU450 million. 
xviii Some definitions of GWS only cover 12local government areas and omit Auburn and Bankstown from its coverage. 
Nonetheless this thesis follows the OWS and GWSRDB's defmition of the region. 
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